Williams v. State

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 12, 2016
S16A0965. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
HUNSTEIN, Justice.
We granted this interlocutory appeal to address whether OCGA § 16-12-1,
as it applies to felony contributing to the deprivation or delinquency of a minor,
qualifies as a predicate offense for felony murder. We hold that it does not and
we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Appellant Allan Ray Williams was indicted in Bulloch County in
connection with the death of infant Collen Durden for, among other offenses,
felony murder predicated on the felony offense of contributing to the
deprivation of a minor. Specifically, Williams was charged with felony murder
“while in the commission of a felony, Contributing to the Deprivation of a
Minor, by willfully failing to care for said child so that [he] died from
asphyxiation in violation of OCGA § 16-12-1 (b) (3).” Appellant filed a general
demurrer with respect to this charge, contending that the offense of contributing
to the deprivation of a minor could not serve as the predicate for a felony murder
charge because OCGA § 16-12-1 provides the exclusive scheme of punishment
for child deprivation crimes resulting in death. The trial court summarily denied
Appellant’s general demurrer.
“As in all appeals involving the construction of statutes, our review is
conducted under a de novo standard.” Hankla v. Postell, 293 Ga. 692, 693 (749
SE2d 726) (2013). Pursuant to the rules of statutory construction, we
presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said
what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text its
plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the
context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in
its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the
English language would.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173
(1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013). “Applying these principles, if the statutory text
is ‘clear and unambiguous,’ we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our
search for statutory meaning is at an end.” Id. at 173.
Georgia’s felony murder statute states that “A person commits the offense
of murder when, in the commission of a felony, he or she causes the death of
another human being irrespective of malice.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (c). Upon
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conviction of this offense, a person “shall be punished by death, by
imprisonment for life without parole, or by imprisonment for life.” Id. at (e) (1).
A person commits the offense of contributing to the delinquency or
dependency of a minor when such person “[w]illfully commits an act or acts or
willfully fails to act when such act or omission would cause a minor to be
adjudicated to be a dependent child as such term is defined in Code Section 15-
11-2.” OCGA § 16-12-1 (b) (3). Such an act is deemed a felony when a person
is “convict[ed] of an offense which resulted in the serious injury or death of a
child, without regard to whether such offense was a first, second, third, or
subsequent offense.” (Emphasis added.) OCGA § 16-12-1 (d.1) (1). The
sentencing range for this felony offense is found in OCGA § 16-12-1 (e)1. This
statute was enacted after the felony murder statute.
Because “[t]he legislature is presumed to know the condition of the law
and to enact statutes with reference to it,” State v. Tiraboschi, 269 Ga. 812, 813
(504 SE2d 689) (1998), we will construe the language of OCGA § 16-12-1
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“(1) Upon conviction of the first offense, the defendant shall be imprisoned
for not less than one nor more than ten years; and (2) Upon conviction of the second
or subsequent offense, the defendant shall be imprisoned for not less than three years
nor more than 20 years.”
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considering the pre-existing felony murder statute because “the provisions of the
statute enacted latest in time carry greater weight,” Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga.
844, 846 (1) (426 SE2d 870) (1993). Moreover, “a specific statute will prevail
over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.”
(Citation omitted.) State v. Nankervis, 295 Ga. 406, 409 (2) (761 SE2d 1)
(2014). See also Woods v. State, 279 Ga. 28, 31 (3) (608 SE2d 631) (2005)
(“Where a crime is penalized by a special law, the general provisions of the
penal code are not applicable.”).
Looking at both the plain language of the statutes, as well as the sequence
of their adoption, we come to the conclusion that the felony deprivation statute
cannot be used as a predicate offense for felony murder. The clear language of
OCGA § 16-12-1 (d.1) (1) & (e) specifically criminalizes the death of a minor
resulting from an accused’s contribution to the deprivation or delinquency of
that child, whereas felony murder criminalizes general felony conduct resulting
in death of another. Because the felony deprivation statute specifically
criminalizes the actions or inactions of an accused resulting in the death of a
child, the general provisions of the earlier enacted felony murder statute are
inapplicable to OCGA § 16-12-1 (d.1) (1). Further, because the legislature is
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presumed to have known the condition of Georgia’s felony murder law when it
enacted OCGA § 16-12-1 (d.1) (1) & (e), it must be concluded that the General
Assembly created the crime of felony deprivation knowing that a violation of
that statute would be specifically sentenced pursuant to OCGA § 16-12-1 (e)
and therefore not subject to the felony murder sentencing scheme.
Additionally, we have long recognized that the purpose of the felony
murder rule is “to furnish an added deterrent to the perpetration of felonies
which, by their nature or by the attendant circumstances, create a foreseeable
risk of death.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Chapman v. State, 266 Ga.
356, 358 (2) (467 SE2d 497) (1996). Here, however, the General Assembly has
addressed the “foreseeable risk of death” that could result in the deprivation
statute by doing two things. First, the General Assembly added the phrase
“resulting in the serious injury or death of a child” within the felony code
section. This portion of the statute requires the State to prove the accused’s
actions or inactions resulted in the death or serious injury of a child beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to obtain a felony conviction. Second, the General
Assembly created, and later enacted a specific sentencing scheme for individuals
convicted under the felony deprivation statute, including for acts resulting in the
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serious injury or death of a child. Consequently, this offense cannot be used as
a predicate for felony murder, because it has a separate and distinct criminal
disposition for those who cause the death of another. See OCGA § 16-5-1 (c),
(e) (1); compare OCGA § 16-12-1 (e). Indeed, allowing a crime committed
under OCGA § 16-12-1 (d.1) (1) to be a predicate offense where the State
charges an accused of felony murder could render the sentencing provision set
forth in OCGA § 16-12-1 (e) effectively meaningless, thus forcing judges to
impose a life sentence every time a defendant is convicted of a felony under the
deprivation statute for conduct resulting in death, as opposed to having the
discretion to implement a sentence pursuant to OCGA § 16-12-1 (e) as
designated by the General Assembly. The State cannot circumvent the specific
sentencing scheme established by the General Assembly in OCGA § 16-12-1 (e)
by subsuming it into the felony murder statute in order to take advantage of a
harsher sentencing provision. Cf. State v. Slaughter, 289 Ga. 344, 346 (711
SE2d 651) (2011) (affirming the principal “that a felony used to convict a
defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon cannot also be used
to enhance the defendant’s punishment as a repeat offender under OCGA §
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17–10–7(a),” as it would eviscerate the sentencing provision of the criminal
possession statute.) (Citation omitted).
The State relies heavily on this Court’s decision in State v. Tiraboschi, to
argue that OCGA § 16-12-1 (d.1) (1) qualifies as a predicate offense for felony
murder. However, our holding in Tiraboschi is inapplicable here. Tiraboschi
was indicted for, inter alia, vehicular homicide and felony murder, both
predicated on felony fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer. Tiraboschi
filed a pre-trial demurrer on the felony murder charge, arguing that felony
fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer could only be used as a predicate
offense for vehicular homicide and not felony murder; this Court rejected that
argument.
Unlike the felony fleeing statue at issue in Tiraboschi, which does not
require proof of conduct resulting in death, here, both the felony murder and the
felony deprivation statutes require the State prove that an accused’s conduct
resulted in the death of another. Moreover, both statutes in this case have a
specific sentencing scheme for a person convicted of conduct resulting in death,
therefore, accounting for the “foreseeable risk of death” that is not present in the
felony fleeing statute in Tiraboschi.
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The plain language of OCGA § 16-12-1 establishes that the felony
deprivation statute cannot be used as a predicate offense for felony murder.
Accordingly, the trial court should have granted Appellant’s demurrer to count
1 of his indictment.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.
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