Jeffrey v. State

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 16, 2015
S14A1418. JEFFREY v. THE STATE.
HUNSTEIN, Justice.
Appellant Wisdom Jeffrey was convicted of murder and related crimes in
connection with the August 2010 shooting death of his wife. Jeffrey appeals,
arguing in his sole enumeration of error that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Though we find no error in the
verdicts, we do find error with respect to the trial court’s merger of some
offenses, and we therefore must vacate and remand to the trial court for proper
merger and resentencing.1
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Jeffrey was indicted by a Clayton County grand jury in June 2012 for malice
murder, four counts of felony murder, four counts of aggravated assault, and two
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At the
conclusion of a jury trial held in December 2012, Jeffrey was found guilty on all
counts. Jeffrey was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole on the malice murder count and a consecutive five-year term for one of the
two firearm possession counts; the trial court purported to “merge” the verdicts on all
the remaining counts. Through trial counsel, Jeffrey filed a motion for new trial on
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the evidence
adduced at trial established as follows. Jeffrey’s wife, Corrissa Friends Jeffrey,
was shot and killed in the early morning hours of August 11, 2010 in her
Clayton County apartment. Jeffrey and the victim had begun dating in 2007,
moved in together in 2008, and married in 2009, shortly after the victim gave
birth to a daughter. The couple’s relationship was tumultuous, with both
Jeffrey and the victim accusing each other of infidelity.
Ashley Layfield, the victim’s best friend, testified to witnessing arguments
between the couple and, on one occasion, to observing the victim with a swollen
eye, which the victim admitted Jeffrey had caused. Layfield further testified that
in April 2010, she received a call from the victim and overheard in the
background an altercation between the couple during which Layfield heard the
victim tell Jeffrey to “get off of me” and “stop it . . . this hurts.” The next
morning, the victim told Layfield that Jeffrey was “boxing her like a man” and
“bashing her head into the couch,” and that afterward he refused her pleas to go
December 26, 2012, which was amended through new appellate counsel on August
19, 2013. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the new trial motion on
December 16, 2013, and Jeffrey filed a notice of appeal on December 23, 2013. The
case was docketed to the September 2014 term of this Court and orally argued on
September 22, 2014.
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to the hospital. The victim confided to Layfield that she feared for her life.
The victim’s uncle testified that on one occasion in 2010 he had observed
the victim with a black eye and scratches on her neck and shoulder and that the
victim reluctantly admitted that Jeffrey had hit her. The uncle also testified that
Jeffrey owned a shotgun, which the uncle saw at the couple’s apartment.
A neighbor of the couple testified that, in June 2010, he witnessed Jeffrey
dragging the victim through the apartment complex parking lot by her hair and
punching her in the face. The neighbor intervened, the victim ran away, Jeffrey
threatened the neighbor while appearing to reach for something in his pants, and
the neighbor called the police. Police arrived and arrested Jeffrey for family
violence battery; Jeffrey was later released on bond, a condition of which was
that he have no contact with the victim.
On August 10, 2010, Jeffrey contacted the victim’s grandmother and told
her, in an agitated state, that he believed the victim was being unfaithful and
their daughter had been conceived by another man. Also on that day, Jeffrey
contacted his friend Keisha McZick and expressed concern that he had not seen
the victim in a few days.
Around 11:00 p.m. on August 10, shortly after the victim had left her
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place of employment, a male co-worker saw a man knock on the front door of
the office building and walk away when no one opened the door. Shortly after
midnight, police responded to a 911 call from the victim at her apartment and
found Jeffrey there. Jeffrey acknowledged he was bound by a no-contact order,
and the officer escorted Jeffrey away but did not arrest him. Approximately an
hour later, police were again dispatched to the apartment and arrived to discover
the victim shot dead in the bedroom. No one else was present in the apartment
when police arrived.
At approximately 3:00 a.m., Jeffrey appeared at McZick’s home seeking
shelter and food. McZick, who by this time knew that there had been “an
incident,” did not allow Jeffrey into her home, but she did give him food and a
cell phone.
A neighbor in the apartments testified that he heard several “pops” in the
early morning hours of August 11. He also testified that Jeffrey’s vehicle had
been parked in the parking lot during the day of August 10 and that the vehicle
was not in the lot the following morning.
A search of the crime scene uncovered shotgun pellets and casings. A
crime scene expert concluded that the shots had been fired while the shooter was
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advancing on the victim. A pump-action shotgun was also found in the
apartment and was later determined to have fired the pellets removed from the
victim during the autopsy. Blood on the gun matched that of the victim. The
medical examiner testified that the victim had sustained gunshot wounds to the
shoulder and abdomen, which would not have been immediately fatal, and a
gunshot wound to the head, which would have instantly killed her.
Approximately 18 months after the murder, after a nationwide manhunt,
Jeffrey was located in Ohio, having changed his appearance by growing out his
hair and facial hair. He had been utilizing pre-paid cellular phones for
communication, which do not require proof of identification to obtain.
1. Though Jeffrey has not enumerated the general grounds, we have
concluded that the evidence as summarized above was sufficient to enable a
rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jeffrey was
guilty of all the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.
S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Jeffrey contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to request a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser
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included offense of murder.
To prevail on this claim, he must show that the failure to make the
request was a deficiency in his attorney’s performance and that, but
for the lack of the instruction, there is a reasonable probability that
the jury would have found him guilty of the lesser offense.
Sparks v. State, 277 Ga. 72, 74 (3) (586 SE2d 645) (2003) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). In order
to have been entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, Jeffrey would
have had to show at least “slight evidence . . . that the victim seriously provoked
[him], causing [him] to kill the victim solely as the result of a sudden, violent,
and irresistible passion.” (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Jones v. State,
No. S14A1702, slip op. at 6 (decided March 2, 2015); see also OCGA § 16-5-2
(a). Thus, absent “slight evidence” that the killing was “solely” the result of a
“sudden, violent, and irresistible passion,” a voluntary manslaughter instruction
would not have been warranted, and trial counsel’s failure to request an
inapposite instruction cannot form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim. See
McNeal v. State, 289 Ga. 711 (715 SE2d 95) (2011) (counsel not ineffective for
failing to request voluntary manslaughter instruction where there was no
evidence to support such a charge); Ros v. State, 279 Ga. 604 (6) (619 SE2d
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644) (2005) (same).
Here, there were no eyewitnesses to the killing, and thus the sequence of
events immediately preceding the shooting is unknown. The evidence reflects
that Jeffrey was upset during the day because he did not know his wife’s
whereabouts and suspected she was being unfaithful. However, the patrol
officer who responded to the victim’s 911 call that night testified that, at the
time he arrived at the apartment, Jeffrey was asleep, and that, once awakened,
Jeffrey’s demeanor was calm and he was generally compliant. There was no
evidence of any “sudden passion” provoked by the victim subsequent to this
encounter such as would support a voluntary manslaughter conviction. To the
contrary, the evidence reflects that Jeffrey made a conscious decision to defy the
no-contact order almost immediately after being escorted away, returning to the
victim’s apartment, shooting her dead, and fleeing. As there was no evidence
to support an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, trial counsel was not
ineffective in opting not to request such a charge. See McNeal, 289 Ga. at 715;
Ros, 279 Ga. at 608.
3. Though we find no error with respect to the jury’s verdicts, we have
noted an error with regard to the merger of certain counts for judgment and
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sentencing. See Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49 (2) (766 SE2d 1) (2014) (merger
error, even if it is not raised by the parties, may be addressed by appellate court
sua sponte). As noted in footnote 1, supra, the trial court imposed a life without
parole sentence for malice murder, plus five years consecutive for firearm
possession during the commission of the murder. The court then purported to
“merge” all four felony murder verdicts and all four aggravated assault verdicts
into the malice murder verdict.
As to the four felony murder counts, the trial court merely used incorrect
nomenclature, as these verdicts did not “merge” into the malice murder verdict
but rather were vacated by operation of law. See Hulett, 296 Ga. at 53 (when
valid guilty verdict is returned on both malice murder and felony murder of the
same victim, defendant should be sentenced for malice murder, and alternative
felony murder verdicts stand vacated by operation of law). With the felony
murder verdicts vacated, the four aggravated assaults on which the felony
murder counts were predicated must be evaluated to determine whether any of
these verdicts merged as a matter of fact into the malice murder. See id.
The test for determining whether one crime is included in another,
and therefore merges as a matter of fact, is the “required evidence”
test-whether conviction for one of the offenses is established by
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proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the
other crime.
Grissom v. State, No. S14A1431, 2015 WL 240477, at *3 (1) (decided Jan. 20,
2015).
Each of the aggravated assault counts relates to the August 11, 2010
shooting, the first charging assault with a deadly weapon; the second charging
assault by shooting the victim in the shoulder; the third charging assault by
shooting her in the chest; and the fourth charging assault by shooting her in the
head. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (2) (aggravated assault with a deadly weapon).
Significantly, each aggravated assault count also notes that “at the time of said
offense the parties were parents of the same child,” thus drawing the offenses
within the realm of family violence aggravated assault. See OCGA § 16-5-21
(k) (aggravated assault committed between spouses, “persons who are parents
of the same child,” or others in similar familial or cohabiting relationships).
Because there was no evidence that the shooting occurred in a manner
other than in a single transaction, with no “deliberate interval” separating any
of the shots, see Ortiz v. State, 291 Ga. 3 (3) (727 SE2d 103) (2012), only a
single verdict for aggravated assault can stand, and the remainder must be
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merged into that verdict. See Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 295 (3) (687 SE2d
427) (2009) (“[w]hen a victim suffers multiple wounds inflicted in quick
succession, each infliction of injury does not constitute a separate assault”). Cf.
Thomas v. State, 292 Ga. 429 (5) (738 SE2d 571) (2013) (aggravated assault
with intent to rob does not merge into aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,
because each requires proof of an element that the other does not, see OCGA §
16-5-21 (b) (1), (2)); Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 114 (1) (645 SE2d 602)
(2007) (aggravated assault with a knife that occurred downstairs at the victim’s
house did not merge with aggravated assault with a gun that occurred upstairs).
In addition, while ordinarily, in the case of a single victim in a single
transaction, an aggravated assault verdict will merge into a verdict for murder,
see Ortiz, 291 Ga. at 6, this is not so when the aggravated assault involves
family violence as defined in OCGA § 16-5-21 (k).
On this issue, this Court recently held squarely that a family violence
aggravated assault verdict did merge as a matter of law into the malice murder
verdict as to the same victim. Durden v. State, 293 Ga. 89 (1) (c) (744 SE2d 9)
(2013). Our holding was expressly predicated on the finding that the family
violence aspect of the aggravated assault – which elevates the mandatory
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minimum sentence from one year to three years, compare subsections (c) and (k)
of OCGA § 16-5-21 – was merely a sentencing factor and not an element of the
aggravated assault offense. Id. at 92-93. However, a mere two weeks after our
decision in Durden, the United States Supreme Court disagreed with this
rationale, concluding that, under the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause,
any fact that serves to enhance a mandatory minimum sentence is an element of
the crime that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v.
United States, __ U. S. __ (III) (B) (133 SCt 2151, 186 LE2d 314) (2013). In
conformity with Alleyne, our contrary holding in Durden is thus overruled.
Accordingly, because the aggravated assault counts here all allege family
violence as an essential element, these offenses require proof of a fact that the
malice murder count does not, and the guilty verdicts on these counts do not
merge into the malice murder verdict.
Accordingly, we vacate the sentencing order insofar as it purported to
“merge” the four felony murder verdicts into the malice murder verdict; these
verdicts, rather, stand vacated by operation of law. We also vacate the
sentencing order insofar as it merged all four of the family violence aggravated
assault verdicts into the malice murder verdict, and we direct the trial court to
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enter judgment on one of the four verdicts, merge the verdicts on the other three
aggravated assault counts, and impose a lawful sentence on the single count on
which judgment is entered.
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part and case remanded for
resentencing. All the Justices concur.
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