DocketNumber: 16008.
Citation Numbers: 45 S.E.2d 405, 203 Ga. 99, 1947 Ga. LEXIS 562
Judges: Jenkins, Wyatt
Filed Date: 11/14/1947
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
1. "No election shall be defeated for noncompliance with the requirements of the law, if held at the proper time and place by persons qualified to hold it, unless it is shown that, by such noncompliance, the result is different from what it would have been had there been proper compliance." Code, § 34-3101. Accordingly, since it is not contended in the instant case that the result of the election would have been different, it is unnecessary to determine whether an unspecified number of persons, whose names did not appear on the voters' list for the last general election, were properly or improperly denied the right to vote in an election held for the purpose of authorizing a bond issue within a county school district. See Cloud v. Maxey,
2. A consolidated county school district is a separate political division of this State such as is authorized to incur a bonded indebtedness up to 7 percent of the assessed valuation of its taxable property, independently of and in addition to any outstanding bonded indebtedness incurred by any of its component former local school districts prior to their merger into a county-wide school district.
(a) Under the above ruling, the fact that a former local school district may already have a bonded indebtedness which, when added to its proportionate share of a proposed bonded indebtedness by a county-wide school district of which it is a component part, will exceed 7 percent of the assessed valuation of the taxable property of such former local school district, does not make such proposed bond issue by the county school district invalid as being violative of the provisions of art. VII, sec. VII, par. I, of the Constitution of Georgia.
3. Under the stipulated facts, the proposed bond issue in the amount of $550,000, by Walker County School District, independent of outstanding bonded indebtedness of its former local school districts, does not exceed 7 percent of the assessed valuation of its combined taxable properties under the tax digest either of 1946 or of 1947, and it follows, therefore, that the trial court did not err in entering an order validating said bonds.
The plaintiffs in error contend that the following questions are presented for determination: "(1) The election being called to be held on the 30th day of May, 1947, and the proposed bonds to be dated July 1, 1947, the question arises as to whether, in determining the amount of the taxable values of the property located in the school districts, . . the digests for the year 1946 would apply, or whether the digests for the year 1947 would apply? (2) That after the act of 1946, whereby all of the local school districts in Walker County, with the exception of the independent school districts, were consolidated into one district, as to whether or not the outstanding bonds of the respective local school districts should be added together and this added to the proposed $550,000 of bonds in determining as to whether or not that would exceed 7 per centum of the assessed tax values of the property located in the school district. (3) That the old LaFayette School District had outstanding $90,000 of school bonds at the time of the election and of the validation, and that the value of the property located in the LaFayette School District is approximately one-fifth of the entire value of the taxable property located in the Walker County School District, and this together with the $90,000 of bonds and its proportionate part of the proposed $550,000 of bonds, would be in excess of $200,000 of *Page 102
bonds, and would be far in excess of 7 per centum of the taxable value of the property located in the LaFayette School District; and the question for determination is as to whether or not this would be a violation of the constitutional provision. (4) Whether or not persons registered and living in the Walker County School District subsequently to the date of the general election of 1946 were entitled to vote in the bond election."
It is provided by art. VII, sec. VII, par. I of the Constitution of Georgia (Code, Ann. Supp., § 2-6001) in part as follows: "The debt hereafter incurred by any county, municipal corporation, or political division of this State except as in this Constitution provided for, shall never exceed seven per centum of the assessed value of all the taxable property therein." While the Constitution does not specifically say so, yet the frequently applied construction of this provision is that each separate political division of the State which has authority to issue bonds is authorized to incur an indebtedness up to 7 percent of the assessed valuation of its taxable property independently of any existing indebtedness of another district and separate municipality or other political body whose territory might be coextensive in whole or in part with that of its own. Under this construction of the Constitution, there are previous decisions of this court recognizing the validity of city bonds, being issued by a separate political division of the State, although located within the limits of a county having issued bonds of its own, where the aggregate would exceed the limit of 7 percent of the assessed property of the municipality thus bonded. There are also decisions recognizing former local school districts as separate political divisions of the State, such as were entitled to incur a bonded indebtedness independently of county bonded obligations.Jennings v. New Bronwood School Dist.,
The real and controlling question therefore is whether or not there is any language in the 7 percent debt-limitation provision of the Constitution which would require a separate and distinct political division of the State, created by the merger of other political divisions, to take into account any outstanding indebtedness of such former political divisions in computing the amount of indebtedness which it is authorized under the Constitution to incur. The Constitution merely provides that "The debt hereafter incurred by any county, municipal corporation or political division of this State . . shall never exceed seven per centum of the assessed value of all the taxable property therein." The language seems unambiguous. There is nothing to indicate that any political division, which is authorized to issue bonds, is prohibited from incurring for itself a bonded indebtedness so long as it does not exceed 7 percent of the assessed value of the property within the political division issuing the bonds. Nor does there seem to be anything which would prevent the previous decisions of this court, recognizing the right of cities and local school districts, as separate political divisions, to incur independent bonded indebtedness, from being given effect here. And since it is not contended that Walker County School District incurred the bonded indebtedness of its former local school districts, and certainly in the absence of specific legal statutory or a constitutional provision which would require the new county-wide school district to assume the payment of any outstanding bonded *Page 105 indebtedness of its former local school districts, it follows that Walker County School District is not required to take into account any indebtedness of its former local school districts in computing the amount of indebtedness which it is authorized to incur; and as an independent political entity, it may incur indebtedness independently of and in addition to that outstanding in its former local school districts. Since, under the stipulated facts of this case, it is agreed that the proposed bond issue by Walker County School District in the amount of $550,000, independently of the outstanding bonded indebtedness of its former local school districts, does not exceed 7 percent of the assessed value of its taxable property, such bonded indebtedness is not prohibited by the Constitution, and the trial court did not err in entering an order validating said bonds.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Wyatt, J.,who took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Brumby v. City of Marietta , 1909 Ga. LEXIS 120 ( 1909 )
Jennings v. New Bronwood School District , 156 Ga. 15 ( 1923 )
Hines v. Etheridge , 173 Ga. 870 ( 1931 )
Ty Ty Consolidated School District v. Colquitt Lumber Co. , 153 Ga. 426 ( 1922 )
Nelms v. Stephens County School District , 201 Ga. 274 ( 1946 )
Cloud v. Maxey , 195 Ga. 90 ( 1942 )
Alexander v. Ryan , 202 Ga. 578 ( 1947 )
Chamlee v. Davis , 115 Ga. 266 ( 1902 )