in the Matter of William Norman Robbins

295 Ga. 64
FINAL COPY
S12Z0998. IN RE WILLIAM NORMAN ROBBINS.
PER CURIAM.
This is a petition for readmission as a member of the bar of this state.
William Norman Robbins was admitted to the Bar in 1978. He was disbarred
by this Court in 2003 for admittedly paying a “runner” to refer clients to his
office, in violation of Standard 13 of Bar Rule 4-102 (d). In re Robbins, 276 Ga.
124 (575 SE2d 501) (2003). As aggravating circumstances, this Court took into
account prior disciplinary offenses resulting in four previous reprimands.1 Id.
at 125. We also noted that Robbins made false statements during the
disciplinary process and refused to acknowledge his conduct was wrongful. Id.
1
In a 1988 public reprimand, Robbins was disciplined for placing a misleading ad that
listed his firm’s telephone number as an attorney referral service, in violation of Standard 5, Rule
4-102; in a 1996 public reprimand, Robbins was disciplined for publishing a newsletter referring
to the firm and an attorney practicing with the firm as specializing in certain areas of the law
when no one at his firm had completed the necessary training or obtained certification as a legal
specialist, in violation of Standard 18; in a 1997 Investigative Panel reprimand, Robbins was
disciplined for publishing a firm brochure stating that the firm’s fee was contingent upon the
outcome of the case without language regarding the expense of the action, in violation of
Standard 5 (b), Rule 4-102; in a 1998 Review Panel reprimand, Robbins was disciplined for
failing to deliver file materials to a former client’s new lawyer when, during the pendency of the
grievance, the missing materials were located after a more thorough search of the firm’s files. In
addition, in 1985 the State Bar issued Robbins two informal letters of admonition for allowing
his investigators to present themselves as attorneys to his clients.
More than five years after the date of disbarment, Robbins filed his
application for certification of fitness for readmission. On December 10, 2009,
the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants conducted an informal
conference for the purpose of considering Robbins’s application. At that
conference, with respect to recognition of wrongdoing, Robbins was equivocal
as to whether he knew, at the time he paid the runner a fee, that such payment
was improper. He did, however, acknowledge that this conduct was the result
of bad judgment for which he took responsibility and was sorry for it. With
respect to rehabilitation, Robbins presented evidence that since his disbarment
he had become more active in his temple, he had become involved in community
service by joining the Kiwanis Club, and had become a patient volunteer with
the Guillain-Barre Foundation after contracting the disease himself. He declared
he was now a different person, and if readmitted he planned to become involved
with volunteer lawyering and in community activities with other lawyers. He
also testified that he had offered to assist the State Bar in educating the public
and the bar about illegal lawyer fee-splitting.
After he was notified that his petition had been tentatively denied,
Robbins requested a formal hearing. The Board provided Robbins with a list of
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specifications setting forth the grounds on which the Board had tentatively
denied his application and notifying him that unless he satisfactorily refuted
these specifications at the hearing, the Board would deny his application. The
list of specific allegations of misconduct concluded with the statement that the
enumerated actions “constitute a pattern of conduct that demonstrates a lack of
judgment, candor, integrity, character, professionalism, rehabilitation from prior
unethical acts and the requisite moral fitness required of a prospective member
of the State Bar of Georgia.” The case was heard by hearing officer Hezekiah
Sistrunk, Jr., on November 17, 2010. After more than a year had passed without
a recommendation from the hearing officer, Robbins filed a motion to appoint
a replacement officer, and this Court denied the motion but entered an order
requiring the officer to enter his report within ten days or suffer sanctions to be
entered by the Court. Three days later, on December 15, 2011, the hearing
officer filed a 14-page report recommending against certification of fitness. By
letter dated January 26, 2012, Robbins was notified that the Board had entered
a final order denying the application, after consideration of the hearing officer’s
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations. Robbins filed this
appeal.
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1. In his first enumeration of error, Robbins asserts the deference
normally accorded to the Board’s decision is not required in this case for three
reasons. First, Robbins asserts that the hearing officer’s delay in issuing
recommendations and the fact they were issued only after this Court’s order
directing him to do so creates the appearance of personal motive on the part of
the hearing officer to recommend against certification, for to have reached any
other recommendation after the delay would have been personally embarrassing
to the officer. Robbins presents no evidence of bias or even argument to support
such a conclusion other than speculation about human nature. The
recommendation submitted by the hearing officer contained comprehensive
findings of fact and conclusions of law supported by references to the hearing
transcript and other evidence. It was well-reasoned and the recommendation
was supported by the evidence.
Second, Robbins asserts that as a result of the delay, the record is no
longer reflective of his current moral and ethical fitness for admission, which is
what the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants is charged with
determining. Robbins has failed to demonstrate any prejudice as a result of the
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delay.2
Finally, we reject Robbins’s assertion that the Board’s decision did not
comply with Part A, Section 8 (d), of the above-noted Rules, stating that the
applicant must be notified of the Board’s determination not to certify in writing,
“giving its reasons for its decision.” This requirement was fulfilled by the
notification letter sent to Robbins which expressly referenced the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of the hearing officer and
stated that the decision was made after reviewing the record and transcript of the
hearing. Contrary to Robbins’s argument, the form of the Board’s written
decision does not leave this Court without a record to review in making its
decision to accept or reject the Board’s decision. In arriving at its decision, this
Court has reviewed the transcript of the informal conference, the transcript of
the formal hearing, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation of the hearing officer, the Board’s notification of decision
letter, the Board’s sealed investigative file, and all other records relating to the
application for character and fitness certification that Robbins filed to support
2
In any event, pursuant to the Rules of the Office of Bar Admissions Part A, Section 9,
an applicant who has been denied certification of fitness to practice law may reapply after three
years from the date a final decision is affirmed by this Court.
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his appeal. The form of the decision letter in this case has not prejudiced
Robbins’s right to appellate review.
2. In cases in which past conduct requires a showing of rehabilitation in
order to prove character and fitness for admission to the Bar, the applicant is
required by the Board to produce evidence of, among other things, the taking of
responsibility for past conduct, insight and appreciation for why the conduct
raises fitness concerns, candor with the Board, good reputation and assurances
of a desire and intention to conduct one’s self in an exemplary fashion in the
future, and positive action demonstrating rehabilitation by things such as
occupation, religion, or community or civic service.3 In such cases, the
applicant’s burden is to prove rehabilitation and fitness to be readmitted to the
practice of law by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Spence, 275 Ga.
202 (563 SE2d 129) (2002). Robbins’s remaining enumerations of error
challenge the substance of the hearing officer’s findings and conclusions and the
Board’s decision regarding Robbins’s failure to meet the burden of clear and
convincing evidence of his rehabilitation.
3
See Policy Statement of the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants Regarding
Character and Fitness Reviews at p. 6.
6
At the formal hearing, with respect to recognition of wrongdoing, Robbins
gave evasive responses to questions about his conduct that had resulted in the
disciplinary actions filed against him prior to the disbarment proceedings, which
are set forth in footnote 1, supra. At first, he indicated he did not remember
receiving the 1985 letters of admonition and that he did not review them prior
to the hearing, even though they were cited in the specifications he received
prior to the hearing. When pressed, he dismissed the letters by stating they did
not constitute disciplinary actions against him but also stated he would have
taken the letters very seriously and would have corrected the behavior noted in
them. Regarding the 1998 Review Panel reprimand for a misleading ad, he
refused to admit it was misleading and stated he did not think any potential
client actually called the number advertised but he surmised the Bar must have
called the number. Robbins attributed the newsletter that formed the basis for
the 1996 public reprimand to an error by his office manager who published the
newsletter before he reviewed it. He gave the same explanation for the firm
brochure that formed the basis for the 1997 Investigative Panel reprimand.
Robbins did, however, later testify that he took responsibility for these office
mistakes. With respect to the 1998 Review Panel reprimand, Robbins admitted
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he ultimately found the missing client materials that formed the basis for the
grievance only after a more thorough search, once the Special Master to the
disciplinary proceeding suggested he should look again. When asked about his
vigorous defense of the disbarment proceedings, Robbins acknowledged that
there appeared to be no defense to the case and excused the written denials
initially filed by his counsel as “standard lawyering.” When asked about
whether he lied and thus perjured himself during the proceedings, Robbins
appeared to prevaricate, answering that he “did not give the full statement,” and
calling his testimony at the proceeding that he paid the runner for his
investigative services a “misrepresentation,” and noting that he was never
charged with perjury.
Robbins’s testimony at the formal hearing, just as it was at the informal
hearing, was equivocal with respect to demonstrating a recognition of the
wrongdoing that resulted in disbarment. An applicant’s lack of candor to the
Board is evidence to support the conclusion that he fails to possess the requisite
integrity and character to be a member of the Bar. See In re Baska, 281 Ga. 676,
677 (1) (641 SE2d 533) (2007); In re Beasley, 243 Ga. 134, 136 (2) (252 SE2d
615) (1979). Further, since the burden of proof with respect to the requisite
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character and fitness to practice law is upon the applicant, “[d]oubt of
consequence, of necessity, must be decided in favor of the public’s protection.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) In re Lubonovic, 248 Ga. 243, 244 (1) (282
SE2d 298) (1981).
With respect to the element of positive action, evidence of rehabilitation
included testimony that Robbins is active in his temple, but that activity
consisted primarily of Torah studies in which he participated, in some degree,
before the disbarment proceedings. In fact, evidence was presented that
Robbins increased his participation in these studies in 1997, at the time the
complaint for which Robbins was disbarred was filed, and yet he testified
untruthfully at that hearing. Based on the testimony presented, it appears that
certain trips he took with his temple were primarily for his own enjoyment and
involved minimal service to others. He testified he had volunteered to give one
or more interfaith tours of his temple to Presbyterian youth, that he has been
involved in fundraising efforts that supported community projects for the
Kiwanis Club, and that he had served others through his involvement with
counseling patients with Gillian-Barre Syndrome. While these activities are
commendable, they are not enough to establish rehabilitation in this case since
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this evidence is offset by the applicant’s failure to meet the burden of proof with
respect to other elements of rehabilitation, such as candor and credibility, as well
as appreciation and insight into why his previous conduct raises fitness
concerns. Further, “[m]erely showing that an individual is now living as and
doing those things he or she should have done throughout life” does not
demonstrate rehabilitation. See In re Cason, 249 Ga. 806, 808-809 (294 SE2d
520) (1982).
Although several character witnesses testified in support of Robbins’s
application, few were familiar with the details of the conduct that led to
disbarment, demonstrating that Robbins had not discussed his prior conduct
with these witnesses or confided in them about his understanding of his
wrongdoing. Few even knew about the issue of his testifying untruthfully at the
disbarment hearing until they were informed by Robbins’s counsel at the time
they were requested to appear at the hearing on his application for readmission.
Thus, while demonstrating good reputation, these witnesses did not support a
finding of insight and appreciation into why his past acts raise concerns about
his current fitness. Laurie Robbins, the applicant’s wife, testified that Robbins
expressed remorse to her and their children and acknowledged his wrongful
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conduct to them prior to the disbarment hearing. Yet, we note that at the
disbarment hearing, Robbins denied wrongdoing and testified untruthfully about
his conduct. Thus, her testimony, and those of others, that Robbins understands
what he did in the past was wrongful and that they believe he would not repeat
these mistakes is unconvincing.4
Finally, Robbins asserts the decision of the Board in this case is
inconsistent with its recommendations in prior readmission cases that are,
according to Robbins, essentially identical to his. In none of these previous
cases, however, is there any discussion of evidence of prior false statements to
the Board during the disbarment proceedings or any mention of the applicant’s
lack of candor with the Board. See In re Friedberg, 286 Ga. 472 (689 SE2d
312) (2010) (noting, among other things, more than 1,400 hours of community
4
In recognition of his stated disability as a result of suffering from the effects of
Guillain-Barre Syndrome, Robbins was offered the opportunity to discontinue and reconvene the
hearing on a second day but he declined and elected to proceed to conclusion. After the hearing,
however, Robbins submitted a Motion to Open Evidence on the ground that his physical
impairment from Guillain-Barre Syndrome adversely impacted his ability to testify effectively
during the hearing due to fatigue. He attached an affidavit in which he attempted to restate his
remorse, understanding, and assumption of responsibility for the unethical professional conduct
involved in each of the disciplinary actions brought against him prior to the disbarment
proceeding, as well as the conduct that resulted in disbarment. We agree with the hearing officer
that the affidavit not only explained significant portions of his testimony during the hearing but
also changed and supplemented it. We have considered the affidavit in our appellate review of
the case.
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service and assumption of leadership roles in various non-profit and religious
organizations); In re Calhoun, 286 Ga. 471 (689 SE2d 311) (2010); In re
Siegelman, 285 Ga. 817 (683 SE2d 595) (2009) (noting, in addition to extensive
religious studies, volunteer work assisting Jewish inmates and other community
service through his synagogue).
“Generally, if there is any evidence to support the Board’s decision
regarding the fitness of a Bar applicant, it will be upheld. Nonetheless, the
ultimate decision regarding a Bar candidate’s fitness to practice law is made by
this Court.” (Citations omitted.) In re Spence, supra, 275 Ga. at 204. The
hearing officer found Robbins’s responses at the hearing “are inconsistent with
the fundamental constructs of rehabilitation.” The Board adopted these
findings. Our independent review of the record confirms the conclusion that
Robbins did not meet his burden of proving the requisite integrity, character,
and moral fitness required for readmission to the Georgia Bar. Therefore, we
affirm the Board’s decision to deny Robbins’s application.
Certificate of Fitness for Readmission denied. All the Justices concur,
except Nahmias, J., not participating.
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Decided March 28, 2014 – Reconsideration denied April 17, 2014.
Certification of fitness to practice law.
Wilson, Morton & Downs, James E. Spence, Jr., for appellant.
Sarah E. Lockwood, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Stefan E. Ritter,
Rebecca S. Mick, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for Office of Bar
Admissions.
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