Cochran v. State

Weltner, Presiding Justice.

Sanders Cochran was convicted of the shooting and killing of Darrell James with a handgun. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.¹

1. The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that Cochran and a co-defendant searched for, found, and assaulted the victim; that Cochran beat the victim with his hands and feet while the co-defendant beat him with a handgun; that the gun discharged twice during the assault; and that one projectile struck the victim in the head, killing him. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. The trial court heard evidence on Cochran’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and denied his motion for new trial. Cochran raises this issue on appeal.

(a) As we stated in Jowers v. State, 260 Ga. 459 (396 SE2d 891) (1990):

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), establishes the benchmarks for determining whether trial counsel’s representation of a defendant in a criminal case was so deficient as to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. ... In determining whether the defendant has established that counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, the court should keep in mind that “counsel’s function ... is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case.” Id. at 690. “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations.” Id. at 691. Moreover, the defendant must “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” [Cits.] [Id. at 461-462.]

The record establishes counsel’s failure to prepare adequately for trial.² Counsel admitted these failures to act during testimony at the motion for new trial and attributed them to a lack of time to work on this case. Whatever the reason for counsel’s failure to prepare,³ we conclude that Cochran has made the first showing required under Strickland.

(b) The second component of Strickland requires the defendant to show prejudice. The total failure of trial preparation in this case requires a disposition like that in Ross v. Kemp, 260 Ga. 312 (393 SE2d 244) (1990), where we held that there was

evidence of ineffectiveness “so pervasive that a particularized inquiry into prejudice would be ‘unguided speculation.’ [Cit.]” House v. Balkcom [725 F2d 608, 620 (11th Cir. 1984).] [Id. at 315.]

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who dissents; Sears-Collins, J., not participating.

1 The homicide occurred September 21, 1989. The indictment was returned September 14,1990; a verdict of guilty was found November 7,1990; and the sentence was filed November 26, 1990. A motion for new trial was filed November 30, 1990, by appellate counsel; was amended April 2, 1991, to add a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and was denied June 18, 1991. The notice of appeal to this court was filed July 9, 1991, and the appeal was docketed in this court August 14, 1991, and argued October 16, 1991.

2 1) Counsel was appointed to the case approximately two weeks before Cochran’s trial was scheduled to begin.

2) He filed no written motion for continuance.

3) He spent a total of 45 minutes with Cochran before the trial began.

4) He filed no pre-trial motions.

5) Prior to trial, he interviewed no witnesses listed in the indictment face-to-face.

6) He filed no written requests for jury charges.

3 It appears from the testimony at the motion for new trial hearing that counsel had only a short period of time in which to prepare for this case; that he had duties in other courts; and that his mother’s illness occupied a great deal of his out-of-court time.