Cox v. Department of Human Resources

Weltner, Justice,

dissenting.

1. (a) One of the purposes of the Child Support Recovery Act, OCGA § 19-11-1 et seq., is plainly stated at § 19-11-2 (a) (3), as follows: “The underlying purposes of this article are ... To provide for the enforcement of an able parent’s obligation to furnish support.”

Decided October 1, 1985. Gregory Valpey-Toussignant, Mary R. Carden, Nancy Lind-bloom, Phyllis J. Holmen, John L. Cromartie, Jr., for appellant. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Mary Foil Russell, Staff Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. M. Kathryn Hoover, William C. Thompson, Richard K. Green-stein, David A. Webster, Mary Margaret Oliver, amici curiae.

(b) The same code section provides, at subparagraph (b): “This article shall be liberally construed to promote its underlying purposes.”

(c) OCGA § 19-11-3 (5) of the Act provides: “As used in this article, the term . . . ‘Parent’ means the natural or adoptive parents of a child and includes the father of a child born out of wedlock. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)

(d) The statutory basis for the claim of recovery against the mother in this case is OCGA § 19-11-5, which provides in part: “The payment of public assistance to or on behalf of a child creates a debt due and owing the state by the parent or parents responsible for the support of the child.” (Emphasis supplied.)

2. The following facts are undisputed:

(a) Cox is the natural mother of the child, and

(b) the child was born out of wedlock.

3. Applying these plain and unambiguous code sections to the plain and unambiguous facts of this case, only one question remains: Is Cox “responsible for the support of the child” within the meaning of OCGA § 19-11-5?

4. The answer to that question is provided plainly and unambiguously by OCGA § 19-7-24, as .follows: “It is the joint and several duty of each parent of an illegitimate child to provide for the maintenance, protection, and education of the child until he reaches the age of majority, except to the extent that the duty of one parent is otherwise or further defined by court order.” (Emphasis supplied.)

I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Marshall joins in this dissent.