In the Matter of Leonard T. Mathis

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: October 5, 2021
S21Y1269. IN THE MATTER OF LEONARD T. MATHIS.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before this Court on the petition for
voluntary discipline filed by Leonard T. Mathis (State Bar No.
976925) prior to the issuance of a formal complaint pursuant to Bar
Rule 4-227 (b). In his petition, Mathis, who has been a member of
the Bar since 2014, admits that, by his conduct in failing to ensure
that his trust account was properly maintained, he has violated
Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II) (b) of the Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct, found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d), and he requests that, as a
sanction for his admitted violations of the Rules, he receive either a
State Disciplinary Review Board reprimand or a public reprimand.
See Bar Rule 4-102 (b) (3, 4). The State Bar has filed a response, in
which it suggests that this Court should accept Mathis’s petition and
impose a public reprimand.
In his petition, Mathis recounts that, in April 2020, he settled,
with his client’s authorization, a personal injury matter for $125,000
and shortly thereafter received a check for the settlement funds and
deposited those funds into his trust account. Approximately one
month later, Mathis issued a check to the client for approximately
$47,000, which was the client’s share of the settlement proceeds.
Unbeknownst to Mathis, the client did not promptly negotiate the
check, instead waiting approximately four months to do so.
However, on the date on which the client did seek to negotiate the
check, Mathis’s trust account contained only $18,000, which
resulted in the automatic generation by the bank of a notice of
insufficient funds, which was directed to the State Bar.1 Mathis
became aware of the shortfall that evening, contacted the client the
1 Mathis acknowledges that, in the period between when the check was
issued and when the client attempted to negotiate the check, the ending daily
balance in his trust account was “on several occasions” insufficient to pay the
issued check and was as low as $12,825.90.
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next morning to alert him to the situation, and made deposits from
both his operating account and personal checking account to restore
the balance of the trust account to $65,956. Mathis then presented
the client with a new check, which, in addition to the settlement
funds owed to the client, included an additional $100 to defray any
costs incurred by the client. Mathis notes that the client was then
able to negotiate the check without incident and that the client did
not initiate the grievance in this matter. Mathis further notes that,
when contacted by the Bar regarding the insufficient funds matter,
he was forthright and cooperative, explaining the facts as he
understood them and providing copies of relevant documents.
Mathis further recounts that, during the times in question, he
had retained a CPA, whose duties included bookkeeping, monthly
reconciliation of the trust account, and preparation of quarterly
income statements for estimated tax filings. Mathis asserts that he
believed in good faith that the CPA would keep him apprised of the
status of the trust account, because the CPA’s responsibilities
included maintaining a ledger of each client’s account and alerting
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Mathis to any discrepancies, such as outstanding checks drawn on
the trust account. Mathis asserts that, “[d]ue in part to misplaced
reliance on his CPA,” on numerous occasions during the period at
issue, he withdrew earned fees from his trust account without
referencing a ledger detailing the amount of earned fees attributed
to each client. Mathis also states that, on several occasions during
that period, he transferred funds from his operating and personal
accounts, and that many of these transfers were in response to his
realization that the trust account did not contain funds sufficient to
pay checks that were then outstanding.2 Mathis acknowledges that
the facts here reflect his own misunderstanding of proper trust
account management, and he asserts that his references to his
misplaced reliance on his now-former CPA are not intended to
deflect responsibility for these failures onto the CPA, but are rather
intended merely to demonstrate that these failures resulted from his
2 The remaining transfers were apparently made to correct erroneous
transfers made to his operating and personal accounts, the circumstances of
which Mathis does not explain.
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being misinformed, rather than from any knowing and willful
actions on his part.
Mathis acknowledges, as noted above, that his actions violated
Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II) (b). Mathis notes that, although his
actions posed a potential threat of harm to the client, and although
the client was unable to negotiate the initially tendered check for
four days, the client did not file a grievance as to this matter and
has not alleged that any actual injury occurred. As to the
appropriate level of discipline, Mathis cites no factors in aggravation
and cites in mitigation that he has no prior disciplinary record; that
his actions do not demonstrate a selfish or dishonest motive; that he
accepts responsibility for his reliance on his CPA and for managing
his trust account without a proper understanding of bookkeeping
and account procedures; that he quickly moved to remedy any
potential harm caused by his conduct, by making corrective deposits
to his trust account and by tendering a new check to the client, which
included an additional $100 to cover any costs incurred by the client
as a result of the insufficient funds issue; that he has implemented
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additional controls to ensure compliance with the standards
applicable to the maintenance of a trust account, including by
retaining a third-party reconciliation company, which is providing
monthly three-way reconciliation of the trust account and
monitoring his bookkeeping and accounting practices, by completing
a 9.5-hour course on bookkeeping and trust compliance, and by
overhauling his bookkeeping and accounting practices; that he has
cooperated fully with the State Bar throughout these disciplinary
proceedings and demonstrated good faith and a willingness to accept
discipline by the filing of this petition; that he is inexperienced in
the practice of law, having only been practicing for seven years,
including only three years as a solo practitioner, which, together
with the good fortune of a growing practice, resulted in the burden
of bookkeeping and accounting growing before he could implement
appropriate measures to monitor those issues; that his character
and reputation in the community are “stellar,” as attested to by the
several letters of recommendation attached to the petition; and that
he is deeply remorseful and embarrassed about this incident and is
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eager to demonstrate that he accepts responsibility. Mathis suggests
that the appropriate discipline in this matter would be either a State
Disciplinary Review Board reprimand or a public reprimand.
The Bar has responded to Mathis’s petition, recommending
that it be accepted by this Court and that this Court impose as a
sanction a public reprimand. In its response, the Bar reiterates the
facts laid out by Mathis, adding that its review of this matter
revealed that Mathis made numerous “round number” transfers
from his trust account to his operating account that did not directly
correspond to his fees and expenses in personal injury matters. As
to the admitted Rules violations, the Bar states that Mathis violated
Rule 1.15 (I) (a)3 by failing to segregate client funds from his own,
by withdrawing fees from the trust account without referencing
applicable records, by failing to keep the client’s funds in his trust
account, and by failing to hold the client’s funds in the manner
3Rule 1.15 (I) (a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall hold
funds or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer’s
possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own
funds or other property.”
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required of a fiduciary. As to Rule 1.15 (II) (b),4 the Bar notes that
Mathis violated it by making deposits from his operating and
personal accounts to cover the shortfall in his trust account, by his
record-keeping failures, and by the improper withdrawal of funds
from the trust account without reference to properly kept records.
The Bar states that it does not appear that Mathis had any
intention of withholding the client’s funds, as this incident appears
to have arisen from his mismanagement of his trust account.
Although the Bar acknowledges Mathis’s assertions regarding the
role played by his then-CPA in leading to the incident here, it notes
that Mathis’s own admissions demonstrate that he was conscious of
4 Rule 1.15 (II) (b) provides:
No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer’s trust
account, except that unearned attorney’s fees may be so held until
the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may
be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as
service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts
shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact
balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be
withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the
lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer’s fees
debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as
such.
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the existence of ongoing shortfalls in the trust account, which he
remedied by depositing his own personal and business funds to
make up for the deficiencies. Nevertheless, the Bar acknowledges
that Mathis’s failings here may have been due to inexperience and
ignorance, rather than an intention to improperly convert client
funds. As to the question of client injury, the Bar notes that Mathis
acknowledged at least some minimal injury to the client in the
client’s not having been able to negotiate the settlement check at the
time of his choosing, and that his mismanagement of his trust
account posed a general risk of potential injury to his clients. The
Bar asserts that it is “somewhat material” that no client has claimed
an actual injury, but it states that such is neither a mitigating nor
aggravating factor, citing Standard 9.4 (f) of the American Bar
Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
Moving to aggravating and mitigating factors, the Bar
identifies no aggravating factors.5 As to mitigation, the Bar does not
5However, the Bar does note that, although its investigation “potentially
revealed multiple offenses and a pattern of misconduct—the admittedly
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contest Mathis’s assertions regarding the applicable mitigating
factors. In arguing for the proposed sanction here, the Bar points to
Mathis’s cooperation and contrition, noting that he immediately
sought to remediate the matter with the client, admitted his
misconduct, and filed this petition. The Bar further argues that
Mathis’s lack of experience and his lack of a dishonest or selfish
motive should mitigate in his favor. The Bar points to Mathis’s
misplaced reliance on his CPA as the source of much of his trouble,
although it also acknowledges that Mathis was the one making
transfers between his various accounts, with apparently little
diligence exercised as to the propriety of those transfers. The Bar
asserts that Mathis “did not appear to have been aware that he was
repeatedly violating the trust accounting rules until he was ‘caught’”
doing so, and maintains that his practice of transferring money back
and forth between his trust and operating accounts appears to have
improper transfers back and forth between IOLTA and operating accounts over
all of the seven months under review—pursuant to negotiations with
[Mathis]’s counsel[,] the State Bar refrains from arguing these as factors in
aggravation in response to his Petition.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in
original.)
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been intended simply to remedy his bookkeeping failures and does
not evince an intent to engage in misconduct.
Having reviewed the record, we agree that the imposition of a
public reprimand is the appropriate sanction in this matter. See In
the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206 (859 SE2d 495) (2021) (imposing
public reprimand for acknowledged violations of trust account rules
where attorney did not act dishonestly, intentionally, or maliciously;
where attorney lacked a prior disciplinary history; and where no
client was harmed). See also In the Matter of Howard, 292 Ga. 413(738 SE2d 89) (2013) (imposing public reprimand where attorney
admitted violations of trust account rules). Accordingly, we accept
this petition for voluntary discipline and direct that Leonard T.
Mathis receive a public reprimand in accordance with Bar Rules 4-
102 (b) (3) and 4-220 (c).
Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Public reprimand.
All the Justices concur.
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