Bell v. Hargrove

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: December 14, 2021
S21G0459. BELL v. HARGROVE.
COLVIN, Justice.
Georgia law generally requires a person to apply for and
receive a valid weapons carry license from a probate judge before
carrying a handgun or other weapon in public. 1 The General
Assembly has identified specific categories of people to whom “[n]o
weapons carry license shall be issued,” including people with certain
1 “No person shall carry a weapon without a valid weapons carry license
unless he or she meets one of the exceptions to having such license as provided
in subsections (a) through (g) of this Code section.” OCGA § 16-11-126 (h) (1).
See also id. § 16-11-125.1 (5) (defining “weapon” as including handguns).
Under the enumerated exceptions, if certain conditions are met, a person need
not have a valid weapons carry license to, among other things, carry a handgun
on his or her property or in his or her home, motor vehicle, or place of business,
openly carry a loaded long gun, carry an unloaded handgun in an enclosed case,
or carry a handgun or long gun while hunting, fishing, or engaging in shooting
sports. See id. § 16-11-126 (a)-(c), (f). We note that the statutes governing
weapons carry licenses have been amended several times since February 2018,
when the weapons carry license application at issue in this case was submitted.
Unless otherwise indicated, however, the provisions of the statutes cited in this
opinion are the same today as they were in February 2018.
criminal convictions. OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2). To assist probate
judges in determining whether an applicant has a disqualifying
conviction, the General Assembly has provided a mechanism for a
probate judge to obtain a criminal history report for an applicant.
See id. § 16-11-129 (d). Once a probate judge has a sworn application
and a criminal history report in hand, the probate judge’s discretion
to deny a weapons carry license is limited. Under OCGA § 16-11-
129 (d) (4), a probate judge “shall issue” a license “unless” (1) “facts
establishing ineligibility have been reported,” or (2) “the judge
determines such applicant has not met all the qualifications, is not
of good moral character, or has failed to comply with any of the
[statutory] requirements.” We granted certiorari to determine
whether a probate judge may deny an application for a weapons
carry license under OCGA § 16-11-129 based on a determination
that the applicant’s criminal history records report fails to show the
outcome of an arrest that could have resulted in a disqualifying
conviction. Applying the plain language of the statute, we conclude
that a probate judge has no such authority. We therefore reverse
2
the Court of Appeals’ decision to the contrary. See Bell v. Hargrove,
357 Ga. App. 802 (849 SE2d 554) (2020).
1. On February 13, 2018, Clinton Bell filed an application for a
Georgia weapons carry license with the DeKalb County Probate
Court. After running a criminal history records check on Bell, law
enforcement returned a criminal history report to Probate Judge
Bedelia Hargrove. The report stated that Bell had been arrested on
May 27, 1986, for the “Misdemeanor” offense of “Pointing or Aiming
Gun or Pistol at Another.” 2 But the report did not include any
information about whether the State had prosecuted Bell for the
offense or the results, if any, of such a prosecution.
Based on Bell’s 1986 arrest, the probate judge denied his
application for a weapons carry license, concluding that, if Bell’s
1986 arrest had resulted in a conviction and the conviction had
involved domestic violence, Bell would be ineligible for a weapons
carry license. The judge reasoned that OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (E)
2 “A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he intentionally and without
legal justification points or aims a gun or pistol at another, whether the gun or
pistol is loaded or unloaded.” OCGA § 16-11-102.
3
provides that “[n]o weapons carry license shall be issued to . . . [a]ny
person who is prohibited from possessing or shipping a firearm in
interstate commerce pursuant to subsections (g) and (n) of 18 [USC
§] 922,” and 18 USC § 922 (g) (9), in turn, prohibits the
possession or shipment of a firearm in interstate commerce by
someone “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence.” Although Bell had sworn under penalty
of perjury in his application that he had never been convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence 3 and nothing whatsoever in
the criminal history report indicated that the 1986 arrest involved
domestic violence, the judge concluded that the “incomplete”
information on the report about the “disposition” of his 1986 arrest
3 Bell checked the box for “No” in response to the following question:
Have you ever been convicted of, or pled guilty to, any
misdemeanor crime involving the use or attempted use of physical
force or threatened use of a deadly weapon towards (a) anyone as
to whom at the time of the offense you were a current or former
spouse, parent or guardian or similarly situated to a spouse,
parent or guardian, (b) a person with whom you had a child in
common, or (c) a person you lived with or had lived with as a
spouse, parent or guardian or similarly situated to a spouse,
parent or guardian, including but not limited to a girlfriend,
boyfriend, step-child, foster child or ward?
4
did not allow her to rule out a “possible” conviction for a
misdemeanor domestic violence offense. Concluding that she could
not determine whether Bell had met all the qualifications for a
weapons carry license, the judge denied Bell’s application.
Bell filed suit against the probate judge in superior court,
alleging that her denial of his application violated OCGA § 16-11-
129 (d) (4) and that he was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering
her to issue him a weapons carry license. The parties filed cross
motions for summary judgment, and, after a hearing, the trial court
ruled in favor of the probate judge. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s order, see Bell, 357 Ga. App. at 814 (1), and we
granted certiorari.
2. When a probate judge denies an application for a Georgia
weapons carry license, the applicant has a statutory right to “bring
an action in mandamus or other legal proceeding in order to obtain
such license.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (j). “To obtain the right to the
extraordinary remedy of mandamus, the petitioner must show
either a clear legal right to the relief sought or a gross abuse of
5
discretion.” Hertz v. Bennett, 294 Ga. 62, 62 (1) (751 SE2d 90) (2013).
Although the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that Bell
failed to carry his burden to obtain mandamus relief, the plain
language of OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) leads us to conclude otherwise.
When construing a statute, “we must presume that the General
Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v.
Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013)
(punctuation omitted). Accordingly, we “afford the statutory text
its plain and ordinary meaning,” “view[ing] the statutory text in the
context in which it appears,” and “read[ing] the statutory text in its
most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the
English language would.” Id. at 172-173 (1) (a) (punctuation
omitted). When, as here, statutory text is “clear and unambiguous,”
our interpretive task begins and ends with the text itself. Id. at 173(punctuation omitted).
In OCGA § 16-11-129, the General Assembly set out a
streamlined procedure for processing applications for weapons carry
licenses. An applicant initiates the process by submitting an
6
application under oath to a probate judge, having his or her
photograph and fingerprints taken, and paying the required fees.
See OCGA § 16-11-129 (a), (c), (f) (2). After receiving the application,
a probate judge must direct the “appropriate law enforcement
agency in the county,” OCGA § 16-11-129 (c), to
(d) (1) (a) . . . request a fingerprint based criminal history
records check from the Georgia Crime Information Center
and Federal Bureau of Investigation for purposes of
determining the suitability of the applicant and return an
appropriate report to the judge of the probate court. . . . [;]
(2) . . . conduct a background check using the Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s National Instant Criminal
Background Check System and return an appropriate
report to the probate judge[; and]
(3) [w]hen a person who is not a United States citizen
applies for a weapons carry license[,] . . . conduct a search
of the records maintained by United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement and return an appropriate
report to the probate judge.
Id. § 16-11-129 (d) (1) (A), (2), (3). Based on the records check
results, the county law enforcement agency must then report to the
probate judge “any findings relating to the applicant which may bear
on his or her eligibility for a weapons carry license.” Id. § 16-11-129
7
(d) (4). Finally, subsection (d) (4) provides that, “after the judge of
the probate court receives the report from the law enforcement
agency,” the probate judge
shall issue such applicant a license or renewal license to
carry any weapon unless facts establishing ineligibility
have been reported or unless the judge determines such
applicant has not met all the qualifications, is not of good
moral character, or has failed to comply with any of the
requirements contained in this Code section.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
By its plain terms, subsection (d) (4) sets out a mandatory
requirement that a probate judge “shall” issue a license “unless” a
listed exception applies.4 OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4); see Mead v.
Sheffield, 278 Ga. 268, 269 (601 SE2d 99) (2004) (“‘Shall’ is generally
construed as a word of command.”)5; see also Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 1370 (11th ed. 2006) (defining “unless” as
4 The phrase “shall issue . . . a license . . . unless” first appeared in the
2008 version of the statute. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (2008).
5 “Although the word ‘shall’ is ‘generally construed as a mandatory
directive,’ this Court has explained that it ‘need not always be construed in
that fashion,’ if the context in which it is used indicates a permissive
instruction.” Carr v. State, 303 Ga. 853, 865 n.15 (5) (815 SE2d 903) (2018).
Here, we discern no contextual basis for concluding that the word “shall,” as
used in OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), does not function as a mandatory directive.
8
“except on the condition that”). The statute enumerates only two
exceptions to this command, both of which require that the probate
judge make an affirmative factual determination that the applicant
does not qualify for a weapons carry license. First, a probate judge
may deny a license if “facts establishing ineligibility have been
reported.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied). Second,
a probate judge may deny a license if “the judge determines such
applicant has not met all the qualifications, is not of good moral
character, or has failed to comply with any of the [statutory]
requirements.” Id. (emphasis supplied). The statute recognizes no
other exceptions to a probate judge’s duty to grant an application for
a weapons carry license. Accordingly, “unless” one of the two
exceptions applies, the probate judge must issue a weapons carry
license. See id.
3. With this understanding of OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) in
mind, we turn to the heart of the question presented on certiorari:
Does a probate judge have discretion to deny an application for a
weapons carry license based solely on a determination that an
9
applicant’s criminal history report raises a question about whether
the applicant has a disqualifying conviction? Applying the plain
language of the statute, the clear answer to this question is “no.”
Information that merely indicates or leaves open the possibility that
an applicant might be ineligible for a weapons carry license neither
“establish[es]” the applicant’s “ineligibility” nor provides evidentiary
support for a “determin[ation]” that the “applicant has not met all
the qualifications, is not of good moral character, or has failed to
comply with any of the [statutory] requirements.” OCGA § 16-11-
129 (d) (4).6 In other words, mere speculation or uncertainty about
an applicant’s qualifications for a weapons carry license cannot
support a determination that an applicant is ineligible or
disqualified from obtaining a license. Cf. Selph v. Williams, 284 Ga.
349, 352 (667 SE2d 40) (2008) (holding that “mere speculation” could
not support a factual finding in a special master’s report); see also
6 The probate judge does not argue that Bell’s 1986 arrest showed that
he “[wa]s not of good moral character” or that he “failed to comply with any of
the [statutory] requirements,” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), so we will not address
the substance of those grounds in this opinion.
10
Davis v. Davis, 262 Ga. 420, 421 (3) (419 SE2d 913) (1992) (noting
that “speculative” findings “not supported by the evidence” are
clearly erroneous).
4. Here, Bell had a clear legal right to receive a weapons carry
license under OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4). In his sworn application,
Bell stated that he had never been convicted of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence, which would have rendered him ineligible for
a weapons carry license under OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (E), and no
evidence indicated that his statement was false. Nevertheless,
because Bell’s criminal history report did not allow the probate judge
to rule out the possibility that his 1986 arrest for pointing a pistol
at another might have resulted in a disqualifying conviction, she
concluded that she could not determine whether Bell qualified for a
weapons carry license and denied his application on that basis.
Given the record here, the probate judge had no valid statutory basis
for denying Bell’s application on that ground.
The rationale the probate judge gave for denying Bell’s
application finds no support in the statute. A finding that the
11
probate judge cannot determine whether an applicant is ineligible or
unqualified cannot itself justify the denial of an application.
Subsection (d) (4) affords a probate judge no discretion to deny an
application for a weapons carry license unless the probate judge
makes an affirmative determination that the applicant is in fact
ineligible or unqualified to receive such a license. See OCGA § 16-
11-129 (d) (4). 7
Moreover, the probate judge did not make a determination, and
could not have determined based on the evidentiary record, that an
7 We note that a prior version of the statute provided that a probate judge
“shall issue . . . a license . . . if the judge determines the applicant has met all
the qualifications.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (2006) (emphasis supplied). By
its plain terms, that version of the statute required a probate judge to make an
affirmative determination that an applicant was qualified before issuing a
license. Cf. Moore v. Cranford, 285 Ga. App. 666, 671-672 (1) (647 SE2d 295)
(2007) (holding that the 2006 version of the statute implicitly extended the
deadline for processing an application for a weapons carry license when the
law enforcement agency did not timely return a criminal history report because
a probate judge could not determine that the applicant had met all the
qualifications without the report). The General Assembly, however, has since
flipped the burden of proof. Since 2008, the statute has provided that a probate
judge must affirmatively determine that an applicant is not qualified before
denying a license. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (2008) (providing that the
probate judge “shall issue . . . a license . . . unless the judge determines such
applicant has not met all the qualifications” (emphasis supplied)). A finding
that the probate judge cannot determine whether the applicant is qualified is
not equivalent to a finding that the applicant is not qualified.
12
exception to her duty to issue a license applied. As the Court of
Appeals correctly found, and as the judge concedes before this Court,
“facts establishing ineligibility” were not reported in Bell’s criminal
history report or application. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4). While
Bell would have been ineligible for a weapons carry license if he had
a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, 8 the
evidence before the probate judge showed that Bell did not have such
a conviction. Bell swore under oath in his application that he was
never convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, and
his criminal history report – which showed only an arrest for an
offense that hypothetically could have involved domestic violence –
did not contradict his sworn statement.
For the same reasons, the evidence before the probate judge
did not support a “determin[ation]” that Bell “ha[d] not met all the
qualifications” for a weapons carry license. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d)
(4). The judge’s argument that this provision calls on a probate
judge to make a “quintessentially discretionary” determination
8 See OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (E) and 18 USC § 922 (g) (9).
13
about an applicant’s qualifications is incorrect. Because the statute
enumerates the categories of persons who are disqualified from
receiving a weapons carry license, see id. § 16-11-129 (b) (2),9 a
probate judge has no discretion to create new grounds for
disqualification. See Mooney v. Webster, 300 Ga. 283, 288 (794 SE2d
31) (2016) (discussing “the long-recognized doctrine of statutory
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which
discourages judicial recognition of exceptions not specifically set
forth in a legislative enactment when other exceptions are expressly
stated”). Further, because no evidence supported a finding that Bell
“ha[d] not met all the qualifications” for a weapons carry license
based on a disqualifying conviction, OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), this
case did not call upon the probate judge to exercise discretion in
9 The statute identifies several categories of persons to whom “[n]o
weapons carry license shall be issued,” including, for example, “[a]ny person
younger than 21 years of age unless [certain conditions apply],” “[a]ny person
who has been convicted of a felony,” “[a]ny person who has been convicted of
an offense arising out of the unlawful manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance or other dangerous drug,” and “any person who has been
hospitalized as an inpatient in any mental hospital or alcohol or drug
treatment center within the five years immediately preceding the application.”
OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (A), (B), (F), (J).
14
weighing conflicting evidence about his qualifications. Cf. Ellis v.
Ellis, 290 Ga. 616, 617 (1) (724 SE2d 384) (2012) (“[T]he trial court
is authorized to resolve conflicts in the evidence.”). Moreover, the
probate judge did not purport to weigh the evidence and conclude
that Bell did not meet the qualifications but rather said she could
not make such a determination.
5. The Court of Appeals concluded that OCGA § 16-11-129
afforded the probate judge discretion to make a “judgment call” that
Bell’s criminal history report was “incomplete” and therefore not
“appropriate” because, in the court’s view, the structure of § 16-11-
129 required a probate judge “to make a threshold determination as
to whether the report returned by the law enforcement agency
constituted an ‘appropriate’ report.” Bell, 357 Ga. App. at 812, 814
(1). The court reasoned that, because subsections (d) (1) and (d) (2)
contemplate that the county law enforcement agency will return an
“appropriate report,” and receiving “the report” is what triggers a
probate judge’s duty to process an application for a weapons carry
license under subsection (d) (4), a probate judge cannot grant an
15
application unless it has first determined that the report is
“appropriate.” Bell, 357 Ga. App. at 804, 812, 814 (1). Accordingly,
the court concluded, a probate judge may deny an application if it
determines that the report returned by the law enforcement agency
is not “appropriate.” Id. at 814 (1).
The Court of Appeals’ understanding of the statutory scheme
was incorrect. As an initial matter, OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) does
not state that a probate judge may deny an application based on a
threshold determination that an applicant’s criminal history report
is “incomplete” or otherwise not “appropriate.” Instead, as discussed
above, the statute enumerates only two exceptions to a probate
judge’s duty to issue a license: a probate judge may deny an
application only if the judge determines that (1) the facts reported
establish the applicant’s ineligibility, or (2) the applicant is
unqualified, not of good moral character, or has not met all statutory
requirements. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4). Given these enumerated
exceptions, there is a strong presumption that the statute does not
recognize additional exceptions. See Mooney, 300 Ga. at 288.
16
Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ analysis, the interplay
between subsections (d) (1), (2), and (4) does not allow, let alone
require, a probate judge to make a threshold determination that a
criminal history report is “appropriate.” As explained in Division 2
above, subsections (d) (1), (2), and (3) instead require a probate judge
to direct the appropriate law enforcement agency in the county to
request criminal history checks from state and federal law
enforcement agencies and to conduct a background check using the
FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check System “for
purposes of determining the suitability of the applicant” and then to
“return an appropriate report” to the probate judge. OCGA § 16-11-
129 (d) (1) (A), (2), (3). The term “appropriate report” has a clear
meaning in context that does not call upon a probate judge to
exercise judgment about whether the information produced in the
criminal history check process is comprehensive or sufficiently
inclusive. The ordinary meaning of “appropriate” is “especially
17
suitable or compatible” or “fitting.” 10 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 61 (11th ed. 2006) (defining “appropriate”); see also Deal,
294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a) (explaining that we generally interpret
statutory text in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning).
Because the statute directs the law enforcement agency to return a
“suitable” or “fitting” report after conducting a criminal history
records check process meant to aid a probate judge in determining
an applicant’s eligibility for a license, the “appropriate report”
referenced in the statute is simply one that includes any potentially
relevant information derived from the records check process.
This interpretation of “appropriate report” is confirmed by
subsection (d) (4), which provides that “[t]he law enforcement agency
shall report to the [probate] judge . . . by telephone and in writing . .
. any findings relating to the applicant which may bear on his or her
eligibility for a weapons carry license,” and that the probate judge
has a limited time to process an application after the judge “receives
10 The phrase “return an appropriate report” first appeared in the 2006
version of the statute. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (1), (2) (2006).
18
the report from the law enforcement agency concerning the
suitability of the applicant for a license,” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4)
(emphasis supplied). Here, too, the statute indicates that “the
report” is simply a report identifying any potentially relevant
“findings” from the criminal history checks. The fact that the law
enforcement agency must report to the probate judge any relevant
information discovered in the records check process does not suggest
that a probate judge has discretion to deny an application if the
report is not as thorough as the probate judge would like. 11
To the extent that the statute grants discretion to determine
what constitutes an “appropriate report,” it grants that discretion
not to the probate judge but instead to the law enforcement agency.
11 Notably, the criminal history information made available to a county
law enforcement agency from the statutorily specified sources is limited to the
information generated by computer databases maintained by the Georgia
Crime Information Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. It is unclear what authority a
probate judge or county law enforcement agency would have to require those
entities to include more or different information in their criminal history
records reports. Further, although the probate judge suggested that Bell could
file a certified copy of his police report from his 1986 arrest and other evidence
showing the disposition of that charge with a motion for reconsideration, such
information would not change the report that the judge received.
19
Because the probate judge does not have access to information
generated in the criminal history record check process until after the
law enforcement agency “report[s] . . . any findings relating to the
applicant which may bear on his or her eligibility for a weapons
carry license,” only the law enforcement agency could determine
what information might be relevant to include in the report. OCGA
§ 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied). 12 The statute further
clarifies that the duty to determine what to include in the report
rests solely with the law enforcement agency by providing that,
“[w]hen no derogatory information is found on the applicant bearing
on his or her eligibility to obtain a license or renewal license, a report
shall not be required.” Id. Only the law enforcement agency would
be privy to whether the criminal history check produced “derogatory
12For example, the record in this case indicates that the county law
enforcement agency did not pick and choose what information to include in its
report regarding the FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check
System but simply relayed to the probate judge a computer-generated printout
from the system, which included all information about Bell’s criminal history
maintained in the system. Although the report was overinclusive, the law
enforcement agency satisfied its duty to report “any findings relating to [Bell]
which may bear on [Bell’s] eligibility for a weapons carry license” by sending
the probate judge a report that included all information produced from the
criminal history record check. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied).
20
information,” so only the law enforcement agency would be in a
position to know whether a report is “required.” Id. Because the
statute gives no indication that a probate judge has discretion to
determine what constitutes an “appropriate report,” the Court of
Appeals erred in concluding that the probate judge could make a
discretionary choice to deny Bell’s application on the ground that
she did not find his criminal history report “appropriate.” 13
13 We note that nothing in the statute prohibits a probate judge who is
dissatisfied with the law enforcement agency’s report from requesting
additional information from the law enforcement agency or performing a
follow-up investigation of his or her own, so long as the judge observes the
statutory time requirements for processing applications. See OCGA § 16-11-
129 (d) (4) (providing that a probate judge must rule on an application “[n]ot
later than ten days after the judge of the probate court receives the report” and
“shall not suspend the processing of the application or extend, delay, or avoid
any time requirements provided for under this paragraph”). The statute also
authorizes a probate judge to investigate potential grounds for ineligibility and
to revoke a license through a notice-and-hearing process after issuing a license
to an applicant, if certain conditions apply:
If, at any time during the period for which the weapons carry
license was issued, the judge of the probate court of the county in
which the license was issued shall learn or have brought to his or
her attention in any manner any reasonable ground to believe the
licensee is not eligible to retain the license, the judge may, after
notice and hearing, revoke the license of the person upon a finding
that such person is not eligible for a weapons carry license
pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section or an adjudication
of falsification of application, mental incompetency, or chronic
alcohol or narcotic usage.
21
As a final matter, we are unpersuaded by the judge’s policy
argument that a probate judge should be afforded greater discretion
to deny weapons carry licenses to protect the public from dangerous
people. Balancing policy considerations is a job for the General
Assembly. It is not for us to second-guess the General Assembly’s
policy determinations as embodied in the statutory language it
enacted.14
6. For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that Bell
established that he had a clear legal right to a weapons carry license.
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the
trial court’s denial of mandamus relief. The Court of Appeals is
directed to remand the case to the trial court with instructions to
issue a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Hargrove to issue Bell a
weapons carry license.
OCGA § 16-11-129 (e) (1).
14 We note that, although Bell sought costs and attorney’s fees under
OCGA § 16-11-129 (j), the trial court granted summary judgment to the
probate judge on that issue, and Bell abandoned any challenge to the trial
court’s ruling by failing to raise the issue before the Court of Appeals. See
Blalock v. Cartwright, 300 Ga. 884, 889 n.4 (III) (799 SE2d 225) (2017).
22
Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the
Justices concur.
23