Judges: Jackson
Filed Date: 11/15/1880
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
This court granted a new trial to the defendant in error in this case when here before, on the ground that the court erred in ruling that the title of the Eagle and Phenix Manufacturing Company, based upon the deeds through which it claimed this property, extended as a fee to the western shore of the Chattahoochee river; this court at the same time holding that the Eagle and Phenix Company possessed a dominant easement of the water power of the river, subject only to the servient fee in the Water Lot Company to the bed of the river, from the line described in the deeds near the Georgia side up to high water mark on the Alabama side of the river. Now the then defendant in error is plaintiff in error here, and complains that the court below committed error against it, the Eagle and Phenix Company, on the trial before the jury this time on three-assignments : — First, in ruling out, a former levy, claim, verdict and judgment offered in connection with and to sustain a plea of res adjudicata ; secondly, in charging the jury that, “ under the pleadings in this case, the only question here is whether these lots levied upon are subject to this ft. fa., and if they are, the question as to what has been or what has not been sold heretofore in reference to these lots, whether water privileges have been sold heretofore, does not arise. That the sheriff would only sell the title of defendant in execution, and the rights of the claimant would not be affected thereby;” and, thirdly, in rendering the judgment set out in the record.
But the entire interest of the Water Lot Company in these parts of lots now levied on, was not adjudicated and could not have been then adjudicated, because that entire interest was not then levied on and claimed and put in issue, but the only thing in these lots then in issue was the water power and the dam essential to its use. In support of a plea in bar of the plaintiff’s right to proceed against the fee in these parts of lots, it is clear that this-former judgment was not good, for the reason that the fee was not then in issue; and, in this light, it is equally clear, therefore, that there was no error.in ruling out the evidence offered as not in point to bar the plaintiff’s right to proceed against the servient fee, however small its money value. Only the dominant easement was then in issue and only that could have been then adjudicated.
The claimant in no plea takes issue that the entire property is not subject, and only a servient fee is, but it claims all itself; and issue was joined on the right and title of defendant in execution to these parts of lots, claimant asserting title to the whole fee. If, therefore, the plaintiff in execution had the right to proceed against the servient fee, as held by this court before, reported in 62 Ga., 455, it did not matter how much that estate was servient to a dominant easement. Whoever bought that fee would buy it as encumbered with the easement. The
Judgment affirmed.