Brock v. State

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official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: April 18, 2023
S23A0124. BROCK v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Chief Justice.
Appellant Bernard Brock challenges his 2018 convictions for
malice murder and other crimes arising out of the beating death of
Marlene Murray. On appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting, pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)
(“Rule 404 (b)”), evidence that in June 2014 he had beaten Ansley
Minkema, his girlfriend and co-defendant. Appellant also claims
that when Minkema’s testimony did not match the State’s pretrial
proffer, the trial court erred in not reversing its earlier ruling and
striking her testimony and, relatedly, that his trial counsel
performed deficiently in failing to move to strike her testimony.1
The crimes occurred on May 6, 2015. On December 19, 2016, an
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Atkinson County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder (Count 1),
felony murder (Count 2), home invasion (Count 3), eight counts of aggravated
assault (Counts 4-11), possession of a knife during the commission of a felony
(Count 12), false imprisonment (Count 13), theft by taking (Count 14), and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 15). Before trial, the trial
court nolle prossed counts 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13. The trial court also bifurcated
the firearm charge. Appellant was tried from December 10 to 12, 2018, and the
jury found him not guilty of one count of aggravated assault (Count 8) and of
the knife possession charge and guilty of the remaining charges. After hearing
evidence in support of the firearm charge, the jury found him guilty on that
count as well. On December 17, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to
life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder; a term of ten
years in prison for theft by taking to run consecutively to Count 1; and a term
of five years for the firearm charge, to run consecutively to “Count 8.” The trial
court merged the aggravated assault convictions into the malice murder
conviction. The felony murder conviction was vacated by operation of law.
The State contends that the trial court erred in running the sentence on
the count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon consecutively to Count
8, a count on which the jury found Appellant not guilty. It appears that the
reference to “Count 8” is a mere clerical error that arose from the use of a
redacted indictment that was sent out with the jury and that the trial court’s
intent, as expressed at the sentencing hearing, was that the five-year sentence
for possession of a firearm would run consecutively to the ten-year sentence for
theft by taking, which was Count 14. In this regard, we note that upon return
of the remittitur, the trial court would be authorized to correct the sentence.
See OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) (“[W]ithin 120 days after receipt by the sentencing
court of the remittitur upon affirmance of the judgment after direct appeal, . .
. the court imposing the sentence has the jurisdiction, power, and authority to
correct . . . the sentence.”); Marshall v. State, 309 Ga. 698, 701 (2) (848 SE2d
389) (2020) (trial court authorized to correct merger error in sentencing upon
return of remittitur).
On December 18, 2018, Appellant’s trial counsel filed a timely motion for
new trial. On February 13, 2019, attorney Mickey Johnson entered his
appearance as motion-for-new-trial counsel. On May 13, 2019, Appellant filed
a handwritten, pro se amended motion for new trial. On November 19, 2021,
Johnson filed an amended motion for new trial that was essentially a word-for-
word, typewritten copy of Appellant’s pro se motion for new trial. After an
evidentiary hearing on November 30, 2021, the trial court entered an order on
February 11, 2022, denying the motion for new trial. Appellant, still
represented by Johnson, filed a timely notice of appeal that was directed to the
2
As explained below, we conclude that even if the trial court
erred in admitting or failing to strike Minkema’s testimony
regarding the June 2014 assault, the error was harmless.
Appellant’s claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
in failing to move to strike Minkema’s testimony about the assault
is waived. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s convictions.
1. The evidence presented at Appellant’s trial showed the
following. On April 26, 2015, Murray reported to police that her car
was stolen by a man she knew as “Brock.” Deputy Robert Taft of the
Atkinson County Sheriff’s Office investigated Murray’s report. He
testified that Murray told him that Brock had borrowed her car but
failed to return it. According to Deputy Taft, Appellant returned the
Court of Appeals, which transferred the appeal to this Court. The case was
docketed in this Court as Case No. S22A0811. The argument section of
Appellant’s brief in Case No. S22A0811 was virtually the same as Appellant’s
pro se amended motion for new trial, contained many grammatical errors, and
failed to comply with this Court’s rules. Accordingly, on September 7, 2022,
this Court struck the appeal from the docket, directed our Clerk of Court to
redocket the appeal with a new case number, and directed Johnson to file a
new brief within 20 days. This appeal was docketed on September 7, 2022, for
the term beginning in December 2022 and submitted for decision on the briefs.
Johnson filed an appellate brief that complied with our Rules on September
20, 2022.
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car later that day, and no charges were brought against him.
On May 9, 2015, a police officer with the City of Douglas Police
Department responded to a call reporting that a car had been found
abandoned behind a residence. The officer testified that it was
Murray’s car, a white Chevrolet Malibu, and that the doors of the
car were open, the floor mats were “laid out on the driver’s side,” and
“[d]irt was thrown in the vehicle.” The officer knew Murray’s son
and called him to advise him of what he had found. After the call,
Murray’s son, daughter-in-law, and daughter went to Murray’s
house to check on her. When they arrived at the home, they found
the door unlocked and a foul odor coming from inside the home.
Murray’s daughter-in-law entered the house and found Murray’s
body lying face down on the floor in the living room area, with blood
underneath her head and significant signs of decomposition.
The following day, Minkema’s father arranged for Minkema to
meet law enforcement officers at a local store. Minkema thereafter
provided law enforcement officers an account of Murray’s death,
including Appellant’s involvement. At trial, Minkema testified that,
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about 10:00 p.m. on May 6, 2015, an acquaintance of Appellant’s,
Stephen Ogles, drove Appellant and Minkema to Murray’s home in
Atkinson County. 2 Ogles also testified that he drove Appellant and
Minkema to Murray’s home about 10:00 p.m. on May 6. Minkema
further testified that Appellant was Murray’s drug dealer, that he
had borrowed Murray’s car on several occasions, and that he wanted
to borrow the car again that evening. According to Minkema, once
Appellant and Minkema arrived at Murray’s home, Minkema went
into the bathroom while Appellant asked Murray about borrowing
her car. Minkema testified that she heard Murray scream “No!” and
that she emerged from the bathroom to find Murray lying on the
ground. Appellant told Minkema to hold Murray’s feet and ankles
down, and Minkema did so. Appellant then beat Murray with a
baseball bat and a metal antique iron, stabbed her with a knife, and
smothered her with a pillow. Minkema helped Appellant clean up
the scene, and they removed the bat, the knife, the pillow, Murray’s
2 Before Appellant’s trial, Minkema pleaded guilty to voluntary
manslaughter and other crimes and testified against Appellant.
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purse, and Murray’s pill bottles from the home. Minkema looked for
the iron but was unable to find it.
Minkema testified that she and Appellant then took Murray’s
car and drove to the home of Appellant’s cousin, Keyon Moffett.
Moffett testified that Appellant and Minkema were driving a white
Chevrolet or Ford and that Appellant asked to use Moffett’s phone.
Because Moffett’s phone was not working, he took Appellant and
Minkema to the home of a neighbor. Moffett added that he thought
that Appellant and Minkema were “acting strange” and that
“something wasn’t right.” Moffett also noticed Minkema “looking at
a pocketbook.” A “burn barrel” was located behind Moffett’s
neighbor’s house, and, according to Minkema, she and Appellant left
the purse, bat, and other evidence in the “burn barrel.” Minkema
testified that she and Brock then drove off in Murray’s car and later
left it behind an abandoned house. Law enforcement officers
recovered a charred purse from the burn barrel and recovered the
iron from under a sofa located near Murray’s body. The knife and
bat were never recovered. The iron was tested and found to have
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Murray’s blood on it. The medical examiner testified that Murray
died of multiple blunt force injuries to the head, with sharp force
injuries to her neck as a contributing factor. She added that the
blunt force injuries were consistent with Murray being hit with a
bat or a metal iron and that the sharp force injures were consistent
with knife wounds. Finally, according to the medical examiner,
Murray’s ankles were bruised in a manner that was consistent with
someone having held her down.
On May 12, 2015, Appellant was located and taken into
custody. He declined to be interviewed that day, stating that “he
needed to get it right and he had not had enough sleep.” He was
interviewed the next day by a GBI agent and denied being at
Murray’s house. Appellant first stated that he was with his niece on
the night of the murder and that he remembered that because he
stayed with his niece on the night that a “9-1-1 call was made in
reference to an argument that he and Minkema had.” The GBI agent
discovered that the 911 call occurred on May 7, not May 6, and she
asked Appellant about the discrepancy. Appellant then stated that
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he had stayed with his niece on the night of May 6. When asked
about the recovered iron, he “initially denied any knowledge” of it.
He then stated, however, that his fingerprints might be on it
because, about a year earlier, he had taken a woman to Murray’s
house to steal things, and the iron was one of the items stolen; he
claimed to have returned it later. Appellant also said that Minkema
could identify who had hit Murray, even though the agent had not
yet divulged the manner of Murray’s death to Appellant.
2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its pre-trial
ruling allowing the State to introduce Rule 404 (b) evidence, through
Minkema, that approximately one year before the crimes at issue,
Appellant had beaten Minkema. Appellant also contends that, even
if the trial court did not err in its pre-trial ruling, it erred in not
excluding the evidence at trial on the ground that Minkema’s
testimony did not match the State’s proffer at the pre-trial hearing.
Finally, Appellant contends that trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective in failing to move to strike this portion of Minkema’s
testimony.
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Before trial, the State filed a motion to present Rule 404 (b)
evidence of an aggravated assault that Appellant committed against
Minkema on June 26, 2014. The State asserted that the evidence
was admissible to show motive and the absence of mistake or
accident. See Rule 404 (b). At a pre-trial hearing on that motion, the
State proffered that the evidence would show that Appellant
assaulted Minkema because she refused to give him all the proceeds
from her panhandling. The State argued that the Rule 404 (b)
evidence was admissible in Appellant’s murder trial in that
Appellant killed Murray because she would not give him her car.
The trial court admitted the evidence, ruling that its “probative
value outweighs any prejudice to the Defendant.”
At trial, Minkema testified about the June 26, 2014, incident.
She said that she “jumped” on another woman who was
“disrespecting [her]”; that Appellant broke up that altercation; and
that, after he did so, he “knocked the crap out of [Minkema]” and
“choked [her]” until she did not “remember anything else.” She
added that she “remember[ed] waking up in the hospital.” Minkema
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did not testify that her failure to give Appellant all of her
panhandling money was the cause of the assault. Appellant did not
object to or move to strike Minkema’s testimony on the ground that
it differed from the pre-trial proffer by the State.
We conclude that any error in admitting or failing to strike
Minkema’s trial testimony was harmless. 3
The test for determining whether a nonconstitutional
evidentiary error was harmless is whether it is highly
probable that the error did not contribute to the verdicts.
In conducting harmless-error analysis, we review the
record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect
reasonable jurors to have done.
Saxton v. State, 313 Ga. 48, 51 (867 SE2d 130) (2021) (cleaned up).
Here, the evidence that Appellant killed Murray was strong.
Minkema testified that she saw Appellant beat Murray with a bat
and a metal iron and stab her with a knife and that the two of them
stole Murray’s car, drove it to Moffett’s house, where Appellant and
3 For purposes of appeal, we assume without deciding that Appellant
preserved for ordinary appellate review the issue that the trial court erred in
failing to strike Minkema’s trial testimony on the ground that it differed from
the State’s proffer at the pre-trial hearing.
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Minkema disposed of evidence in a nearby burn barrel, and then
later left the car behind an abandoned house. Other evidence
corroborated Minkema’s testimony. This included evidence that
Murray’s car was found behind an abandoned house; evidence that
the iron found near Murray’s body had her blood on it; testimony
from Moffett that Appellant and Minkema were driving a car that
was similar to the one they took from Murray; and testimony that a
charred pocketbook was located in the burn barrel. In addition, the
medical examiner’s testimony supported Minkema’s description of
the attack on Murray. She testified that Murray died from blunt and
sharp force injuries consistent with being hit with a bat and metal
iron and being stabbed with a knife and that bruising on her ankles
was consistent with her being held down. In addition to Minkema’s
testimony and the corroborating evidence, there was Appellant’s
statement to police, which, in addition to being inconsistent and
contradictory, displayed knowledge about the murder that police
had not revealed to Appellant.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that it is highly
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probable that any error in admitting or failing to strike Minkema’s
testimony regarding the June 2014 incident did not contribute to the
verdicts finding Appellant guilty of murder and other crimes. See
Fletcher v. State, 303 Ga. 43, 47 (810 SE2d 101) (2018) (holding that
any error in admitting other crimes evidence was harmless given the
strength of the evidence against the defendant); Davis v. State, 301
Ga. 397, 400 (801 SE2d 897) (2017) (same). 4
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
4 Appellant also argues that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective
in failing to move to strike Minkema’s testimony regarding the June 2014
incident once it became apparent that her trial testimony did not match the
State’s proffer at the pre-trial hearing. However, Appellant had new counsel,
Johnson, at the motion for new trial proceedings and did not raise this claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Appellant thus did not raise this claim
at the “earliest practicable moment” and failed to preserve the claim for
appellate review. See Elkins v. State, 306 Ga. 351, 361 (830 SE2d 217) (2019)
(holding that when a defendant is represented by new counsel at the motion
for new trial stage, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that are not
raised at that stage are not preserved for appellate review).
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