Citation Numbers: 49 Ga. 335
Judges: Gibson, Trippe
Filed Date: 10/15/1872
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
The complainant, as the surviving grantee in a deed executed in 1849, and absolute on its face, seeks to engraft a parol trust thereon to him and his deceased co-grantee, to-wit: that it was made for the pui’pose of the property therein mentioned being applied to the payment of debts existing in account and contracted in 1848, and due to the grantees, severally, and divers other parties. There is no reference in the deed to any debts, nor indeed was there any satisfactory evidence what debts were intended to be secured. After the lapse of twenty-two years, and after the death of the alleged debtor, complainant asks to be allowed to set up the parol trust, and to enforce the collection of the debts that would be more than three times barred by the statute of limitation, unless they can be saved by the course he seeks to adopt. Prior to the Act of 1856, a verbal promise to pay a debt would take it out of the statute, or give a new point of time from which the statute would commence running. Since the passage of that Act a new promise to have that effect must be in writing. If there was no such written promise in this case these debts must have been barred, taking the most favorable view for complainant, in 3860. This is supposing that
Under this view there could have been no legal liability on Taylor’s estate for these claims in 1871, which could have been enforced, independent of the Act of 1869. But whether that position be correct or not, we do not think that the allegations in the bill and the proof at the hearing entitle the complainant to any greater rights than a mortgagee would have, or than if the debts had been securities under seal. Twenty years will bar the right of action on instruments under seal, and the right of a mortgagee to foreclose. So, if the mortgagee receives possession of the mortgaged property under the mortgage, twenty years will bar the mortgagor’s right to redeem, although the former, in such instances, is usually called a trustee for the latter : Morgan vs. Morgan et al., 10 Georgia, 300; 3 Johns. Ch. R., 129 ; 3 Atk., 313. We do not see from the facts in the record why the creditors in this case should have superior rights to a mortgagee to foreclose, or to a mortgagor to redeem. The mortgagee and this complainant both would sustain the relation of a creditor to the party against whom they may severally pro
The verdict of the jury having been rendered in favor of defendant, the judgment granting a new trial is reversed.