Citation Numbers: 52 Ga. 417
Judges: Warner
Filed Date: 7/15/1874
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
It appears from the record in this case that Peacock was appointed- receiver of the Cherokee Railroad Company by an order of the district judge of the United States for the northern district of Georgia, and as such receiver took into his possession a certain locomotive steam engine, called the “ Euharlee.” On the application of the Pittsburg Locomotive and Car Works Company to the judge of said district court, leave was granted to it to commence legal proceedings against said receiver to recover the possession of said engine, either by possessory warrant, action of trover, or other legal proceeding in the state courts. In pursuance of the leave thus granted, the aforesaid company, by its agent, sued out a possessory warrant against the receiver .on the 9th day of December, 1872, to recover the possession of the engine, on the ground that it had been- taken from its possession by fraud, and was then in possession of Peacock, as receiver of the Cherokee Railroad Company. After the possessory warrant was issued the plaintiff and defendant therein, entered into a
The main ground of error insisted on here was, that the court had no legal authority to render the judgment it did against the defendant, because the order appointing him receiver of the Cherokee Railroad Company had been rescinded, and the engine was now rightly in the possession of the company, and he had no right now to have the possession of it in his individual capacity, lie being no longer the receiver of the company. The reply is, that when the possessory warrant was sued out against him, he had possession of the engine as the receiver of the company. The plaintiff had acquired rights as against him as such receiver, and claimed the possession of the engine from him in that capacity. The process of the court was resting upon him in that capacity, and if lie voluntarily surrendered the possession of the engine to the company, he did so at his own risk and peril. The company could not have compelled him to have surrendered the
Let the judgment of the court below be affirmed.