DocketNumber: 9472, 9445
Citation Numbers: 23 Ga. App. 528, 1919 Ga. App. LEXIS 184, 98 S.E. 740
Judges: Bloodworth, Broyles, Stephens
Filed Date: 4/4/1919
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/8/2024
In answer to questions certified by this court, the Supreme Court, on November 16, 1918, rendered the following opinion (the decision was held up, however, by a motion for a rehearing, until February 24, 1919, when the motion was denied by the Supreme Court) :
“A limited payment (20-pay) life-ÍD sur anee policy was issued
“On June 26, 1916, the fourth annual premium having become due on May 25, 1916, the company offered to loan to the insured the full amount available after the policy had been in force four years, to wit, $621, at the same time tendering the insured a loan agreement to be executed by himself and hib wife, the latter being the beneficiary named in the policy. Along with the loan agreement the company furnished to the insured a statement of his indebtedness to it, showing: former loan, $337.11; premium due on May 25, 1916, $316.89, and interest to May 25, T917, $37.26, making a total of $691.26; and required the insured to pay the additional sum of $70.26 to cover the total of his indebtedness to the company. On June 27, 1916, the insured signed the agreement and forwarded it from Macofi, Ga., to -the beneficiary at Atlanta, Ga., with the request that she also execute the agreement and deliver it to the company together with the sum of $70.26. At the time of the receipt of the agreement by the beneficiary she was fill and bed-ridden 'and remained in this condition for several days, at which time she became wholly unconscious and remained in this condition until after the death of the insured; and for said reasons was unable to execute said loan agreement prior to the death of the insured.’ The insured died without knowing that the beneficiary had not complied with the ‘wrongful’ demands of the company. After the death of the insured the beneficiary completed the agreement and tendered it together with $70.26 to the company. One clause of the policy provided: ‘This policy
“1. Under the foregoing facts, the available loan value on the policy, to wit, $58.89 (conceding, without deciding, that interest at six per cent, per annum in advance on the existing loan and on the amount appropriated to the payment of the premium due should not be first deducted), was, under the automatic premium-loan clause quoted above, insufficient to ‘carry the policy in force, in the form as written,’ to the date of the insured’s death, August 35, 1916. *
“ (a) The obligation of the company, under the automatic premium-loan clause quoted above, was to apply such available .loan value toward the payment of the premium due, and to carry the policy in force ‘in the form as written and at the rate of premium as provided for in the face’ of the policy. In a strict technical sense no ‘rate of premium’ is provided in the-face of the policy. The' reference is, however, to the contract as written, and the words quoted above are to be given their usual and ordinary signification. The parties were dealing with this contract of insurance,' to wit, a limited-payment life policy as distinguished from a purely protective policy or other form of contract.
“3. The insurance company was not estopped from declaring a forfeiture of the policy (conceding, without deciding, that its demand that the loan agreement be executed by the • beneficiary was wrongful and unauthorized), it affirmatively appearing that the sum of money necessary to pay the past-due premium, interest in advance upon thé loan, and the existing loan upon the policy was neither paid nor tendered to the company until after the death of the insured.” 148 Ga. 687 (98 S. E. 464).
Under the foregoing decision, neither count of the petition set forth a cause of action; and the court properly sustained the general demurrer to the second count of the petitioü-, but erred in overruling the general demurrer to the first count thereof, and in refusing to dismiss the entire petition.
Judgment on the main hill of exceptions reversed; on the cross-hill affirmed.