DocketNumber： 68931, 68932
Citation Numbers： 173 Ga. App. 218, 325 S.E.2d 863
Judges： Beasley, Carley, Deen, Sognier
Filed Date： 12/5/1984
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 1/12/2023
The sole issue before this court is the Department of Transportation’s appeal from an order of the Superior Court consolidating two condemnation proceedings instituted by DOT against one tract of land owned by appellees.
It is uncontroverted that the property is one tract, with continuous borders and a connecting roadway. The apparent rationale behind the DOT’s institution of two separate condemnation proceedings lies in the irregular shape of the tract which results in the property connecting with the DOT’s construction site at two different points.
We affirm the trial court’s order consolidating the two condemnation proceedings. Whether it is appropriate to consolidate two cases
The trial court has the authority to order consolidation under OCGA § 32-3-17.1 which provides that the judge “may . . . make such orders and give such directions as are necessary to speed the cause, and as may be consistent with justice and due process of law . . . .” (Emphasis supplied). The trial court exercised this authority in its order granting the motion for consolidation, stating that “the interests of justice and of judicial economy will be served by having a single trial for the determination of the value of the property taken in both cases and for the determination of the total consequential damages to the entire property of the condemnees remaining after the takings in both cases by reason of such takings.” (Emphasis supplied.)
DOT contends that the Civil Practice Act’s consolidation rules govern here and that the trial court erred by ordering the two condemnation proceedings to be consolidated without the consent of all parties involved. We do not agree with DOT’s argument because we do not find Section 42 of the Civil Practice Act (OCGA § 9-11-42) to be the controlling law here. The Civil Practice Act specifically provides that where its requirements conflict with those of a special statutory proceeding, the latter controls: “This chapter shall apply to all special statutory proceedings except to the extent that specific rules of practice and procedure in conflict herewith are expressly prescribed by law; but, in any event, the provisions of this chapter governing the sufficiency of pleadings, defenses, amendments, counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party practice, joinder of parties and causes, making parties, discovery and depositions, interpleader, intervention, evidence, motions, summary judgment, relief from judgments, and the effect of judgments shall apply to all such proceedings.” OCGA § 9-11-81.
Our Supreme Court and this court have recognized that the requirements of the condemnation act override all provisions of the Civil Practice Act in conflict with the condemnation act’s special purposes. In discussing the sufficiency of a pleading, a declaration of taking in a condemnation action, the Supreme Court stated: “Due to the special nature of condemnation cases in general, it has been held that the CPA did not apply to . . . specific proceedings under Chapter 95A-6 [present OCGA § 32-3-1 et seq.] (Cit.), although provisions of
There is sufficient indication in the record that the trial court properly exercised its power under OCGA § 32-3-17.1 when it consolidated the two actions involving one tract in order to promote justice and due process and avoid the miscarriage of justice. In the absence of a showing of any abuse of discretion by the trial court, we affirm.
Judgment affirmed.