Tony Louis Miller, Jr v. State

FIFTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, C. J.,
RICKMAN, P. J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE PHIPPS
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
DEADLINES ARE NO LONGER TOLLED IN THIS
COURT. ALL FILINGS MUST BE SUBMITTED WITHIN
THE TIMES SET BY OUR COURT RULES.
April 27, 2021
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A21A0643. MILLER v. THE STATE.
PHIPPS, Senior Appellate Judge.
A Harris County jury found Tony Louis Miller, Jr., guilty of rape, kidnapping,
five counts of child molestation, four counts of sexual battery against a child under
16 years of age, three counts of enticing a child for indecent purposes, three counts
of false imprisonment, and three counts of simple battery. Miller appeals following
the denial of his motion and amended motion for new trial. He asserts that the
evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, his trial counsel was ineffective
by failing to move for a mistrial following a spontaneous outburst by the victim’s
father during trial, and the trial court erred in allowing individuals to remain in the
courtroom after the rule of sequestration had been invoked. For the following reasons,
we affirm Miller’s convictions.
1. We turn first to Miller’s assertion that the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions.1 In so doing, we recognize well settled principles regarding
the sufficiency of the evidence standard:
When a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the appellant no longer
enjoys a presumption of innocence. And, of course, in evaluating the
sufficiency of the evidence, we do not weigh the evidence or determine
witness credibility, but only determine whether a rational trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond
a reasonable doubt. We will, then, uphold a jury’s verdict so long as
there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support
each fact necessary to make out the State’s case.
Garner v. State, 346 Ga. App. 351, 353-354 (1) (816 SE2d 368) (2018) (citations and
punctuation omitted).
So viewed, the record shows that at the 2019 trial, the victim testified that she
was 15 years old, and she knew Miller because he lived at both “Granny’s house”2
and his father’s house in her neighborhood. The victim identified Miller in court. One
of Miller’s friends testified at trial that Miller was 26 or 27 years old. The charges
here involved five separate incidents against the same victim.
1
“For convenience of discussion, we have taken the enumerated errors out of
the order in which [Miller] has listed them. . . .” Pugh v. State, 347 Ga. App. 710, 711
(1), n. 5 (820 SE2d 766) (2018) (citation omitted).
2
“Granny’s house” was a house where all the neighborhood kids hung out.
2
Counts 1-5 (simple battery, enticing a child for indecent purposes, sexual
battery against a child under the age of 16, child molestation, and false imprisonment)
occurred at a lake where the victim swam. The victim testified that in the summer of
2017, when she was between seventh and eighth grade, she went to the lake with
some friends. While she was in the lake, Miller swam behind her, grabbed her butt,
pushed her bathing suit bottom section to the side, and placed his penis on her vagina.
The victim tried to get away from Miller, but he would not let her leave. When people
started looking over at them, Miller stopped, and the victim was able to swim away.
Counts 6-9 (false imprisonment, sexual battery against a child under the age
of 16, child molestation, and simple battery) occurred in August 2017 at “Granny’s
house” in the bathroom. According to the victim, the kids were playing hide and seek,
and she went to hide in the bathroom. Miller followed her to the bathroom, told her
to turn around, and pushed her over a pile of clothes. He then pulled down her shorts
and her underwear, and he put his penis on her vagina. The victim was crying and
kept trying to turn around, but Miller kept pushing her down. Miller stopped when
the individual who was the “seeker” came into the bathroom.
Counts 10-15 (enticing a child for indecent purposes, simple battery, sexual
battery against a child under the age of 16, two counts of child molestation, and rape)
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occurred at “Granny’s house” in the living room and kitchen. The victim testified that
when she was in the eighth grade she spent the night on the living room floor at
Granny’s house. When she got up to go to the bathroom, Miller followed her from the
bathroom. Miller put her on a table in the kitchen, got between her legs, and began
kissing her. Miller then pulled the victim’s shorts and underwear to the side, and he
put his penis on her vagina. The victim told Miller “no” and tried to get off the table,
but Miller would not let her off. Eventually, he let her off the table and the victim
went back to the living room.
Miller, however, followed the victim to the living room and told the victim that
when she was 18 he was “going to have [her,]” that someone would get hurt if she
told anyone, and that he always got what he wanted. Miller then left, but he later
came back, got on top of the victim, pulled her shorts and underwear to the side, and
put his penis in her vagina. When he was finished, Miller pulled his shorts back up
and the victim noticed that white “sperm was coming through his shorts[.]” Miller
then left to go change at his father’s house. The victim went to the bathroom and
cleaned herself off because she didn’t want Miller’s sperm to make her pregnant.
Then she cried herself to sleep.
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A few days later, the victim told Miller that she was worried about getting
pregnant and she was going to tell her father what Miller had done, but Miller
convinced her to pee in a cup and let him take it to be tested. Miller then sent the
victim a picture of a negative pregnancy test. The victim told one of her friends who
lived at Granny’s house that Miller was touching her, but asked her not to tell anyone
else.
Count 16 (false imprisonment) occurred at Miller’s father’s house. The victim
testified that she went with Miller to his father’s house to get a cat feeder. Miller told
her his father was home, so the victim did not think anything would happen.
However, when they arrived at the house, Miller’s father was not home. At some
point, Miller asked the victim for a hug and then asked her what color underwear she
was wearing. The victim told Miller she wanted to leave and tried to leave the house,
but Miller turned her around and pulled down her leggings so he could see the color
of her underwear. The two then left the house.
Counts 17-20 (kidnapping, enticing a child for indecent purposes, sexual
battery against a child under the age of 16, and child molestation) occurred in the
woods. The victim testified that while a group of kids was gathering firewood, Miller
told them he was taking the victim back to the house, but instead he pulled her into
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the woods and told her to get on the ground. The victim was scared that Miller would
hurt her, so she got on the ground. She was on her back, and Miller got on top of her,
pulled her shorts and underwear to the side, and placed his penis on her vagina. Miller
also put his hand under the victim’s shirt and grabbed her boob. Miller stopped when
he heard the other kids coming toward them. He ran a different direction, caught up
with the other kids, and then, when they reached the victim, he asked her what she
was doing in the woods. This happened when the victim was in the eighth grade.
A number of witnesses testified that they did not observe anything suspicious
between Miller and the victim. In fact, one witness testified that he never saw Miller
and the victim alone when swimming. However, one of the victim’s friends testified
that the victim told her that “whenever she would be laying down, that [Miller] would
touch on her, and she would tell him to stop but he wouldn’t.” Another friend testified
that the victim told her that Miller “did stuff to [her].” Specifically, the victim told her
that Miller raped her on more than one occasion. In addition, the father of one of the
victim’s friends testified that he heard rumors of something going on between the
victim and Miller, and he asked the victim if someone did “something creepy” to her.
The victim responded, “yes, sir.” At that point, the friend’s father contacted the
victim’s father and the sheriff’s department. The victim’s father testified that the
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victim told him that Miller had “touched her and – . . . done a lot more things to
her[.]”
The sheriff’s corporal who responded to “a possible sexual battery or a child
molestation” call testified that he only asked the victim two questions: whether an
incident took place between her and Miller and whether it was sexual in nature. When
the victim responded yes to both questions, he stopped questioning the victim because
he did not want to taint her interview with individuals who specialized in child victim
interviews.
The victim was taken to a child advocacy center and interviewed by an expert
in child forensic interviewing. The expert testified that she had conducted 428
forensic interviews of children. According to the expert, delayed disclosure by a
sexually abused victim is not unusual, nor is it unusual for a child to return to a
location where an alleged perpetrator is located. The victim’s recorded interview was
played for the jury.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Miller guilty of all counts, and this
appeal followed.
Miller asserts that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of the
charged offenses because it was “largely circumstantial.” According to Miller, “while
7
there was direct testimony from the alleged victim, it was, at best, contradictory.”
Miller also argues that not a single witness observed anything inappropriate between
Miller and the victim. Essentially, he challenges the victim’s credibility as a witness
and the lack of evidence to corroborate her testimony. We find that the evidence was
sufficient to support Miller’s convictions.
First and foremost, it is well settled that “[t]he testimony of a single witness is
generally sufficient to establish a fact.” OCGA § 24-14-8. Here, the victim testified
in detail about all of the occurrences alleged in the indictment. Her testimony, alone,
was sufficient to support Miller’s convictions. See Stodghill v. State, 351 Ga. App.
744, 745 (1) (832 SE2d 891) (2019) (victims’ testimony alone was sufficient to
support convictions for offenses including enticing a child for indecent purposes);
Reinhard v. State, 331 Ga. App. 235, 238 (1) (c) (770 SE2d 314) (2015) (victims’
testimony alone was sufficient to support convictions for rape, aggravated sexual
battery, child molestation, and enticing a child for indecent purposes); Knight v. State,
311 Ga. App. 367, 368 (1) (715 SE2d 771) (2011) (victim’s testimony alone was
sufficient to establish the elements of child molestation); Clark v. State, 282 Ga. App.
248, 250-251 (1) (b, c) (638 SE2d 397) (2006) (victim’s testimony was sufficient to
8
support convictions for kidnapping, child molestation, and enticing a child for
indecent purposes).
Moreover, contrary to Miller’s assertions and although not required, the
victim’s testimony was corroborated in this case. Although none of the witnesses
testified that they observed any inappropriate conduct between the victim and Miller,
a number of the witnesses corroborated the victim’s testimony as to the time and
location of the incidents. In addition, two of the victim’s friends testified at trial about
the victim’s disclosures to them, and one of them testified that the victim told her
Miller had raped the victim. These prior outcry statements corroborated the victim’s
testimony. See Daniel v. State, 296 Ga. App. 513, 519 (4) (675 SE2d 472) (2009)
(“[C]orroboration is not required but if the jurors had concerns they could look to the
victim’s outcry statements for corroboration.”); Sewell v. State, 244 Ga. App. 449,
451-452 (1) (c) (536 SE2d 173) (2000) (victim’s testimony was corroborated by her
outcry to her mother and another witness). Additionally, the jury viewed a videotaped
forensic interview of the victim, in which she reiterated her allegations of sexual
abuse, also corroborating the victim’s testimony. See Bufford v. State, 320 Ga. App.
123, 123 (1) (739 SE2d 421) (2013) (forensic interviews corroborated children’s trial
9
testimony); Pendleton v. State, 317 Ga. App. 396, 399-400 (2) (731 SE2d 75) (2012)
(victim’s testimony was corroborated by forensic interview).
While Miller summarily argues in his appellate brief that the victim’s testimony
was “contradictory” and “at odds with her prior statements in a number of important
respects[,]” he does not identify any specifics to support his argument. “[I]t is not the
function of this Court to cull the record on behalf of a party in search of instances of
error.” Serdula v. State, 356 Ga. App. 94, 110 (3) (a) (845 SE2d 362) (2020) (citation
and punctuation omitted). In any event, to the extent that there were any
contradictions or inconsistencies between the victim’s testimony and her prior
statements, this Court repeatedly has stated that assessing witness credibility,
resolving conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony, weighing the evidence, and
drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence are the province of the factfinder,
not this Court. See Garner, 346 Ga. App. at 355 (1); Knight v. State, 311 Ga. App.
at 368 (1). “In so doing, a jury is authorized to believe or disbelieve all or any part of
the testimony of witnesses.” Knight, 311 Ga. App. at 368 (1) (citations and
punctuation omitted). And, any alleged lack of corroboration “goes to the weight of
the evidence and the credibility of the testifying witness, which is solely within the
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purview of the jury.” Reinhard v. State, 331 Ga. App. at 238 (1) (c) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
In this case, the jury clearly resolved any conflicts or discrepancies in the
victim’s testimony against Miller, which it was permitted to do. Stodghill v. State, 351
Ga. App. at 745 (1). The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find
Miller guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt under Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See OCGA
§ 16-6-1 (a) (rape); OCGA § 16-5-40 (a) (kidnapping); OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (child
molestation); OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (b, d) (sexual battery against a child under 16 years
of age); OCGA § 16-6-5 (a) (enticing a child for indecent purposes); OCGA §
16-5-41 (a) (false imprisonment); and OCGA § 16-5-23 (a) (simple battery).
2. Miller asserts his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to move for a mistrial after the victim’s father made a spontaneous outburst
while the victim was testifying. The trial court concluded that trial counsel’s
performance was not unreasonable or deficient. We agree with the trial court.
[I]n order to establish ineffectiveness of trial counsel, appellant
must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. There is a strong
presumption that the performance of trial counsel falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. The reasonableness of the
11
conduct is viewed at the time of trial and under the circumstances of the
case. In reviewing a lower court’s determination of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, we give deference to the trial court’s factual
findings, which are upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous; however,
we review the lower court’s legal conclusions de novo.
Thompson v. State, 327 Ga. App. 893, 896 (2) (761 SE2d 413) (2014) (citation
omitted). “In order to succeed on this ineffectiveness claim, [Miller] must show that
if his counsel had moved for a mistrial, it would have been an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to deny it.” Paige v. State, 277 Ga. App. 687, 691 (4) (a) (627 SE2d
370) (2006).
Here, after the victim described the events that occurred at the lake, including
Miller grabbing the victim, placing his penis on her vagina, and not letting her leave,
the victim’s father spontaneously shouted, “I’m going to get this mother f***er. I
can’t do it, please.” The trial judge immediately asked that the jury be removed from
the courtroom for a moment, but before the jury left, the victim’s father stated again,
“I’m going to get you. I’m going to get you. I’m going to get you, mother f***er.”
The trial court had the father removed from the courtroom for the remainder of the
trial, and, when the jury was brought back in, the trial judge apologized for the delay
and instructed the jury:
12
I would ask – this is a difficult trial – that you put that aside, what has
just happened, and remember your oath as jurors to simply make your
decision based on the testimony that comes from the witness stand and
the testimony that -- or the exhibits that are admitted during the trial.
The trial then continued. Defense counsel made no objection or motion regarding the
trial court’s instruction to the jury when they were brought back into the courtroom
or the continuation of the trial.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court reiterated in its final instructions to the
jury the jurors’ obligation to base their decision on the evidence and not sympathy to
any party:
Your verdict should be a true verdict based upon your opinion of the
evidence according to the laws given you in this charge. You are not to
show favor or sympathy to one party or the other. It is your duty to
consider the facts objectively without favor, affection, or sympathy to
either party.
It is well settled that “[m]any, if not most, trials by jury involve some degree
of emotion by at least one party or the other. It would be unreasonable to expect that
all emotions be completely frozen during a trial by jury when such effective bridle on
emotions cannot be sustained elsewhere.” Thompson v. State, 327 Ga. App. at 899 (2)
(b) (citation and punctuation omitted). Such “[d]emonstrations and outbursts which
13
occur during the course of a trial are matters within the trial court’s discretion unless
a new trial is necessary to ensure a fair trial.” Id. at 898 (2) (b) (citation and
punctuation omitted). “Where the trial court fails to act to stop the disturbance, or
fails to instruct the jury to disregard it, and the demonstration could prevent the
defendant from receiving a fair trial, this court must grant a new trial.” Sheppard v.
State, 235 Ga. 89, 91 (2) (218 SE2d 830) (1975).
Here, the trial judge immediately removed the victim’s father from the
courtroom and took prompt, thorough, and curative action to handle the outburst,
reminding the jury to evaluate the case based only upon the evidence and testimony.
“Contrary to appellant’s argument, this curative instruction was sufficient to alleviate
the potential for prejudice and to ensure a fair trial.” Christian v. State, 277 Ga. 775,
777 (2) (596 SE2d 6) (2004). See also Butler v. State, 284 Ga. 620, 623 (3) (669 SE2d
118) (2008) (outburst did not deny the defendant a fair and impartial trial in light of
trial court’s prompt, thorough, and curative action); Sheppard, 235 Ga. at 91 (2) (no
error when trial court overruled defense counsel’s motion for mistrial and instead
instructed jury to disregard outburst by victim’s mother).
The cases cited by Miller do not require a different result because in those
cases the trial court failed to take steps to mitigate the impact on the jury of any
14
outburst. See Glenn v. State, 205 Ga. 32, 34-35 (52 SE2d 319) (1949) (trial court did
not take prompt action to give curative instruction when widow audibly and visibly
wept in front of jury); Patton v. State, 117 Ga. 230, 238-239 (43 SE 533) (1903) (trial
court did not take prompt action to give curative instruction or otherwise lessen
impact when the jury was influenced by a mother who was in tears and sobbing with
grief). We note that in both of those cases, the Supreme Court of Georgia indicated
that prompt action by the trial court, such as removing the sympathetic individual
from the courtroom, generally will obviate the necessity of declaring a mistrial.
Glenn, 205 Ga. at 35; Patton, 117 Ga. at 238-239.
Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court would have
abused its discretion by denying a requested motion for mistrial. Because Miller “has
failed to show that he would have been entitled to a mistrial under the circumstances
presented, . . . trial counsel’s failure to pursue a meritless motion does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Gipson v. State, 332 Ga. App. 309, 323 (8) (f) (772
SE2d 402) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Moreover, when questioned at the motion for new trial hearing, Miller’s trial
counsel testified that he did not move for a mistrial following the victim’s father’s
outburst because (1) he felt it was unnecessary given that the trial court took
15
immediate, curative action, and (2) he strategically chose not to move for a mistrial
in front of the jury because he felt it would be more prejudicial to Miller after the
steps taken by the trial court. “[A] tactical decision will not form the basis for an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim unless it was so patently unreasonable that no
competent attorney would have chosen it[,]” State v. Goff, 308 Ga. 330, 334 (1) (840
SE2d 359) (2020), and, here, “we cannot say that trial counsel’s assessment was
objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 335 (2).
Miller has not met his burden to establish ineffective assistance of counsel on
this ground. See Thompson, 327 Ga. App. at 899 (2) (b).
3. Following opening statements and after the first witness was called to the
stand, Miller invoked the rule of sequestration. The State requested that the victim,
the victim’s father, and the lead investigator from the sheriff’s office be allowed to
remain in the courtroom. Miller did not object to the victim and her father remaining
in the courtroom; however, he did object to the lead investigator remaining in the
courtroom. After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court permitted all three
individuals to remain in the courtroom.
16
On appeal, Miller contends that the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s
father and the lead investigator to remain in the courtroom after the rule of
sequestration had been invoked. We find no error.
Known as the rule of sequestration, OCGA § 24-6-615 provides that, at the
request of any party to a trial, “the court shall order witnesses excluded so that each
witness cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses[.]” “[T]he purpose of the
sequestration rule is to prevent the shaping of testimony by one witness to match that
of another, and to discourage fabrication and collusion.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180,
185 (2) (a) (2) (787 SE2d 221) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[I]ts
violation generally does not affect the admissibility of the testimony, but may impact
the offending witness’ credibility.” Rakestrau v. State, 278 Ga. 872, 876 (4) (608
SE2d 216) (2005).
There are, however, exceptions to the sequestration rule. As relevant here,
OCGA § 24-6-615 (3) precludes trial courts from excluding a witness “whose
presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party’s cause.”
In addition, OCGA § 24-6-616 precludes the trial court from excluding the victim of
a criminal offense. And, a “victim” is defined to include “[a] parent, guardian, or
custodian of a crime victim who is a minor or a legally incapacitated person except
17
if such parent, guardian, or custodian is in custody for an offense or is the defendant.”
OCGA § 17-17-3 (11) (C). The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether
a witness comes within an exception. Davis, 299 Ga. at 186 (2) (a) (2).
(a) The father. We first turn to Miller’s argument that allowing the father to
remain in the courtroom violated the rule of sequestration. We find no merit to this
argument.
As stated above, OCGA § 24-6-616 carves out an exception to the general rule
of sequestration, specifically providing that “the victim of a criminal offense shall be
entitled to be present in any court exercising jurisdiction over such offense[,]” and
OCGA § 17-17-3 (11) (C) specifically defines “victim” to include “[a] parent,
guardian, or custodian of a crime victim who is a minor[.]” OCGA § 24-6-616’s
exception to the rule of sequestration, however, is subject to OCGA § 17-17-9, which
provides in pertinent part:
A victim or member of the immediate family of a victim shall not be
excluded from . . . trial . . . based solely on the fact that such person is
subpoenaed to testify unless [(1)] it is established that such victim or
family member is a material and necessary witness . . . and [(2)] the
court finds that there is a substantial probability that such person’s
presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial. . . . A motion to
exclude a victim or family members from the courtroom for any reason
other than misconduct shall be made and determined prior to jeopardy
attaching.
18
Pretermitting whether Miller is precluded from raising this argument because
jeopardy had already attached when he invoked the rule3 or because he waived the
argument by failing to raise it below, it is clear that the victim’s father in this case is
considered both a “victim” of a criminal offense and a “member of the immediate
family of the victim” for purposes of the statutory exemption excluding these
individuals from the rule of sequestration. See Nicely v. State, 291 Ga. 788, 791 (2)
(733 SE2d 715) (2012) (discussing the exclusion of the victim’s mother from
sequestration). “Since its enactment, Georgia courts have applied OCGA § 17-17-9
to allow the trial court to except both testifying victims and members of the victim’s
immediate family from the rule of sequestration.” Thompson v. State, 308 Ga. 854,
861 (3) (843 SE2d 794) (2020).
Miller does not contest that the father of the victim fell within the statutory
exemption for the rule of sequestration; he simply argues that if the father had been
excluded from the courtroom, Miller would not have been prejudiced by the father’s
outburst, as discussed in Division 2, during the victim’s testimony. However, Miller
did not argue at trial that the father should be sequestered because his presence would
3
Jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when a “jury is impaneled and sworn.”
Alexander v. State, 279 Ga. 683, 685 (2) (b) (620 SE2d 792) (2005).
19
impair the conduct of a fair trial. In fact, neither the parties nor the trial court could
have expected the father’s outburst. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
decision to allow the father to remain in the courtroom after the rule of sequestration
had been invoked.
(b) The investigator. Miller asserts that the trial court erred by not applying the
rule of sequestration to the lead investigator. We disagree because
[s]ettled law authorizes such an exception to sequestration. The trial
court may allow an investigative officer to remain in the courtroom to
assist the prosecutor in the orderly presentation of evidence. A trial court
is vested with the discretion to make an exception to the sequestration
rule for the chief investigating officer and the discretion will not be
reversed on appeal unless abused.
Hudson v. State, 325 Ga. App. 657, 660 (3) (754 SE2d 626) (2014) (citation omitted).
Here, the record shows that the State requested that the lead investigator remain
in the courtroom to assist “with regard to matters that might come up during the
course of the trial with regard to things that occurred during the investigation[.]”
After listening to argument, the trial court exercised its discretion to permit the lead
investigator to remain in the courtroom.
On appeal, Miller generally argues that two assistant district attorneys and at
least one investigator from the district attorney’s office were present at the trial to
20
assist with the presentation of evidence, and it “seems excessive to ask for an
additional investigator to remain in the courtroom to assist with the presentation of
the witnesses or evidence.” However, Miller acknowledges that the Georgia Supreme
Court has held that “[i]t is within a trial court’s discretion to exempt the government’s
chief investigative agent from sequestration, and it is well settled that such an
exemption is proper[.]” Anderson v. State, 307 Ga. 79, 88 (5) (834 SE2d 830) (2019);
accord Upshaw v. State, 300 Ga. 442, 445 (4) (796 SE2d 287) (2017). Moreover, the
lead investigator “was never called to testify, and contributed neither evidence nor
testimony to the jury[,]” so the purpose behind the rule – to insulate witnesses from
the testimony of others – was not violated or called into question. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion by allowing the lead investigator to remain in the courtroom
after the rule of sequestration had been invoked.
Judgment affirmed. McFadden, C. J., and Rickman, P. J., concur.
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