Casey Green v. State

THIRD DIVISION
ELLINGTON, P. J.,
ANDREWS and RICKMAN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
September 21, 2017
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A17A1017. GREEN v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Presiding Judge.
Following a bench trial in the Superior Court of Wheeler County, the court
found Casey Green guilty of four counts of theft by taking, OCGA § 16-8-2.1 Green
appeals following the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial. He contends that
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm for the reasons set
forth below.
On appeal of a criminal conviction on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence,
the appellate court’s duty is to determine “whether after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
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Green was indicted with committing five counts of theft by taking. The court
found Green guilty of Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5, and not guilty of Count 3.
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Punctuation and
footnote omitted.) Thompson v. State, 277 Ga. 102, 103 (1) (586 SE2d 231) (2003).2
So viewed, the evidence shows that Green and Henry Clark had a long standing
business relationship. Clark, through his company, T.C. Logging, Inc., was in the
business of purchasing and reselling timber. Green was a “forester” who contracted
with landowners for the purchase of timber and oversaw harvesting operations. In the
course of his business, Green did not sell timber directly to the mills. Rather, Green
would take timber to the mill under Clark’s “ticket,” the mill would pay Clark for the
timber, and Clark would cut checks to pay the loggers and the landowners. Green
would then, according to Clark, “deliver the checks back where they were supposed
to be.” After the expenses were paid, Green and Clark would share the remainder.
During July and August of 2012, Clark made four checks payable to Rick
Compton under the name “RC Timber,” and he gave those checks to Green with
direction that he deliver them to Compton.3 According to Clark, Compton had been
2
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
3
The checks were payable to the order of RC Timber and drawn on TC
Logging’s account at Wheeler County State Bank in the amounts of $7741.04,
$7129.97, $3538.15, and $12,902.59, respectively.
2
acting as a “consultant” for a landowner, and Compton was supposed to pay the
landowner out of the proceeds of the checks.4 Rather than deliver the checks to
Compton, Green endorsed the checks in his own name and deposited them in his
account at Wheeler County State Bank. The Bank’s teller, who was familiar with both
Green and Clark, was initially concerned about processing the deposits, but she did
so after Green, either directly or in response to her inquiry, represented to her that his
initials had been mistakenly transposed.5
Clark realized that there was an issue with the checks when he received word
that the landowner had not been paid. After meeting with Compton, Clark called the
Bank and asked for copies of the backs of the checks so he could see the
endorsements. Clark then made direct payments to the landowner and Compton. An
officer of the Bank met with Green in an effort to determine what had happened, but
Green offered no explanation for the deposits.6 Clark testified that he contacted Green
4
Clark testified that a portion of the proceeds were to be retained by Compton,
and “the rest to the landowner.”
5
The teller testified that Green’s initials are “CR Green[] and I think the checks
were RC. [Green] is CRG Timber[.]”
6
The Bank ultimately reimbursed Clark in the amount of $31,311.75 on
account of “bank error.”
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and invited him to his office to “work this out,” but Green never came, nor did he
explain to Clark where the money had gone.
1. Green testified in his defense that he and Compton were working as
“partners” and that Compton had asked Green to deposit the checks payable to
Compton’s business in Green’s account. As Compton did not testify, Green contends
that there is no evidence to dispute his testimony and that the State therefore failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he unlawfully appropriated the checks.
OCGA § 16-8-2 provides in pertinent part that: “[a] person commits the offense
of theft by taking when he . . . being in lawful possession thereof, unlawfully
appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the
property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated.”
The offense’s gravamen “is the taking of the property of another against the will of
such other, regardless of whether the property is taken or appropriated and the manner
of the taking or the appropriation.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown v.
State, 302 Ga. App. 641, 643 (1) (692 SE2d 9) (2010).
For purposes of our review of the sufficiency of the evidence, “as long as there
is some evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary for the
state’s case, the verdict will be upheld.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wiggins
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v. State, 334 Ga. App. 54, 57 (3) (778 SE2d 60) (2015). And “[i]t is axiomatic that[,]
in a bench trial, the trial court weighs the evidence and determines the credibility of
witnesses.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kelly v. State, 270 Ga. App. 380, 381
(606 SE2d 586) (2004). Here, the trial court found that, upon considering the
witnesses’ credibility, motive, and opportunity, as well as Green’s manner and
disposition, Green’s factual account was not persuasive.
Clark testified that Green was working with him and represented Clark’s
business, T.C. Logging. Green also worked with a number of consultants, such as
Compton, with different consultants representing different landowners. According to
Clark, Green came to his office and picked up the checks, and Green’s “job was to
deliver these checks to [Compton],” consistently with the manner in which Green and
Clark had conducted business for over twelve years. Thus, viewed in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, the evidence showed that Green had been entrusted by
Clark with the act of physically delivering T.C. Logging’s checks to Compton, and
that, contrary to Clark’s direction and without Clark’s consent, Green deposited the
checks in his own account. This was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Green had unlawfully appropriated the checks. See
Frost v. State, 269 Ga. App. 54, 56 (1) (603 SE2d 481) (2004) (Proof that a check
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written to another company was deposited in the account of appellant’s company was
sufficient to support the jury’s determination that appellant had committed theft by
taking.). Compare In the Interest of E. C., 311 Ga. App. 549, 550 (2) (716 SE2d 601)
(2011) (As the only evidence that the appellant took his sister’s car without her
consent was nonprobative hearsay, the evidence was not sufficient to support the
appellant’s adjudication of delinquency based on theft by taking beyond a reasonable
doubt.).
2. Green further argues that the State failed to prove the element of intent
beyond a reasonable doubt. OCGA § 16-8-2 requires that, to constitute the crime of
theft by taking, an unlawful appropriation of another’s property be “with the intention
of depriving him of the property.”
[I]ntent may be found by the [trier of fact] upon consideration of the
words, conduct, demeanor, motive and all other circumstances
connected with the act for which the accused is being prosecuted.
Whether a defendant has the requisite intent to commit a crime is a
question for the [trier of fact].
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bearden v. State, 316 Ga. App. 721, 723 (2) (728
SE2d 874) (2012). Green argues that his testimony and supporting exhibits showed
that he had paid more “legitimate expenses” of his and Compton’s business than the
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proceeds of the checks that he was accused of taking, and that, as he was entitled to
be reimbursed for his expenses, the State failed to show that he intended to deprive
either Compton or Clark of their property. Whatever expenses Green might have
personally incurred, the evidence showed that the checks at issue were not payable
to him but were placed in his possession for their physical delivery to Compton, and
that, by endorsing the checks and misrepresenting that the checks were actually
payable to him, he knowingly took the proceeds of the checks for himself. The
evidence was sufficient to establish Green’s criminal intent. See Frost v. State, 269
Ga. App. at 56 (1); Jordan v. State, 242 Ga. App. 547, 549 (1) (b) (528 SE2d 858)
(2000) (Proof that defendant deposited unauthorized checks into her own account was
sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that defendant committed theft by taking.).
Judgment affirmed. Andrews and Rickman, JJ., concur.
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