DocketNumber: 29991.
Citation Numbers: 26 S.E.2d 206, 69 Ga. App. 567
Judges: STEPHENS, P. J.
Filed Date: 5/7/1943
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
1. Although an employee may, under the provisions of the workmen's compensation act, be entitled to an award against the employer of a sum to compensate for medical services to the employee for injuries received by him which are compensable under the act, the employer may make a special contract with another to furnish medical or hospital services to the injured employee in a sum in excess of that which might be awarded to the injured employee against the employer under the provisions of the workmen's compensation act.
2. The petition as amended set out a cause of action in behalf of the plaintiff for hospital and medical services rendered to an injured employee of the defendant, on the promises and representation of the defendant, through the latter's authorized agent, that the defendant would pay therefor.
3. The allegations in the petition as respects the authority of an alleged agent who negotiated the contract to bind the defendant were not subject to the special demurrer interposed.
The defendant filed a general demurrer to the petition, and a special demurrer to the allegations that Truitt, "acting within the scope of his authority," stated to the plaintiff's representatives at the hospital "on behalf of the defendant" that the defendant assumed responsibility for and would pay all charges incurred at the hospital for services rendered to the injured man, on the ground that there were not sufficient facts alleged in this paragraph or elsewhere in the petition to show that Truitt was authorized to "pledge the credit of this defendant corporation for services rendered to the said Todd." The court sustained both the general and the special demurrers. Other special demurrers were met by amendment, and were overruled.
The above allegations to which a special demurrer was filed and sustained are to the effect that Truitt was an employee and agent of the defendant, and in bringing the injured man to the hospital and stating to the plaintiff's representatives at the hospital that the defendant would pay all charges incurred at the hospital for services rendered to the injured man in connection with his injuries did so for and in behalf of the defendant, and in so doing acted within the scope of his authority as agent of the defendant to bind the defendant to pay for such services. Therefore these allegations are not subject to the special demurrer on the sole ground that it does not appear that Truitt was authorized to pledge the credit of the defendant for the services rendered the injured man. "An averment that the agent was `duly authorized' to act for his principal is not objectionable as being a conclusion." Kiser Co. v. Padrick,
The ruling here made is not in conflict with SouthernGrocery *Page 569 Stores Inc. v. Childs,
While it is not alleged specifically in the petition as amended that the plaintiff owned or operated the Central of Georgia Hospital, or that the services which were rendered were rendered by the plaintiff, it is alleged that the alleged contract by the defendant through its alleged agent, Truitt, was made with petitioner's representative at the hospital, and that the representative of the plaintiff at the hospital, with whom the alleged contract was made, was employed by the plaintiff at the hospital, and it was among his duties to arrange with patients who were about to be admitted to the hospital, or with those who bring them there, as to who will be responsible for the charges incurred. These allegations, when taken in connection with the general allegations that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff for hospital services and medicines furnished the injured person by the hospital, set out *Page 570 a cause of action in behalf of the plaintiff against the defendant for the recovery of $666.25 for the medical and hospital services actually rendered, as alleged, by the hospital to the injured person, unless by virtue of the provisions of the workmen's compensation act the plaintiff would be limited to a recovery only of the amount which, under the terms of the workmen's compensation act, would be chargeable against the defendant for medical or hospital services, which would be a sum much less than that sued for.
Assuming that the defendant and the injured man, who was injured while in the employment of the corporation, were at the time subject to the provisions of the workmen's compensation act, the provisions of that act which authorize an award against the employer of a sum for medical and hospital services rendered the employee on account of an injury which is compensable under the act, does not preclude the making by the employer of a special contract with hospital authorities to pay for the medical or hospital services which may be rendered to the injured person notwithstanding the cost of such services may be in excess of any amount for medical or hospital treatment which may be awarded against the employer under the provisions of the workmen's compensation act.
The petition set out a cause of action as against the demurrers.
Judgment reversed. Sutton and Felton, JJ., concur.