DocketNumber: 28999.
Citation Numbers: 17 S.E.2d 902, 66 Ga. App. 464, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 532
Judges: Felton, Stephens, Sutton
Filed Date: 12/5/1941
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/8/2024
This case is in this court on exception by the plaintiff to a nonsuit. The plaintiff did not claim that at the time he received the injuries which he alleges caused the damages he was on the premises of the defendant as a customer or patron, or for any matter connected with the defendant's business or for the defendant's benefit. The plaintiff claimed however, and introduced evidence in support thereof, that he went upon the premises of the defendant for the purpose of contacting his son, who worked there for the defendant, and to obtain the indorsement of his son on a note which he was executing for the purpose of obtaining a loan for himself, and that he was given *Page 470 express permission by the defendant's agent in charge of these premises to enter thereon for this purpose. The plaintiff therefore, at the time he was injured, was not a trespasser on the premises but was a licensee with express permission to enter the defendant's theatre building. The evidence supports this.
The liability of the owner or proprietor of premises, for injuries received by persons while present upon such premises, may be divided into four classes or distinctions: (1) Where the injured person is upon the premises by invitation, express or implied of the owner or proprietor. Code, § 105-401. (2) Where he is upon the premises as a licensee. Code § 105-402. (3) Where he is there under some other special relation. (4) Where the person injured is upon the premises as a trespasser. See MandevilleMills v. Dale,
If it is the duty of the owner or proprietor of premises to use ordinary care to prevent injuring the licensee after his presence is known, certainly then by parity of reasoning it is the duty of such owner or proprietor to use ordinary care to avoid injuring the licensee when the owner or proprietor of land gives to another express permission to go upon the premises, not for the common interest or mutual advantage of both parties but for the mere benefit of the one to whom the privilege is extended. As was stated in Rollestone v. Cassirer, supra where it was held that "After the presence of the licensee is known, exactly the same acts of caution may be required of the proprietor, to satisfy the legal duty, as would be necessary if the licensee were invited, . . ``duties arise out of circumstances.'" Therefore, while it is stated that the duty of the owner or proprietor of premises owing to a licensee is merely the duty not to injure him wantonly or wilfully, the courts proceed on the theory that such licensee is wantonly or wilfully injured where the owner or proprietor of the premises, after the presence of the licensee on the premises is known or reasonably should be anticipated, fails to exercise ordinary care and diligence to prevent injuring the licensee. Therefore, where one is not upon premises as a trespasser, but is there in his own interest, with the express permission of the owner or proprietor, and his presence on the premises is known to the owner or proprietor, it is the duty of the owner or proprietor to use the same acts of caution to prevent injury to the licensee as are sufficient to satisfy the legal duty which would be necessary if the licensee were invited. If this be true, where the owner or occupier of premises gives to the licensee express permission to enter the premises the condition of such premises must be such as to satisfy the requirements of ordinary care and diligence in so far as such licensee is concerned. Therefore, as to a licensee who is upon premises with the express permission and consent of the owner it is the duty of the owner to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe. See Mandeville Mills v. Dale,
and Petree v. Davison-Paxon-Stokes Co., supra; AtlanticSteel Co. v. Cleaton,
Also it is the rule that as "to the licensee, as to the trespasser, no duty arises of keeping the usual condition of the premises up to any given standard of safety, except that they must not contain pitfalls, mantraps and things of that character." Mandeville Mills v. Dale, supra. A jury may infer wantonness from evidence of negligence. Humphries v. SouthernRy. Co.,