Diana Franklin v. State

FIFTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, C. J.,
MCMILLIAN, P. J. and GOSS, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
July 1, 2019
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A19A0608. FRANKLIN v. THE STATE.
MCFADDEN, Chief Judge.
After a jury trial, Diana Franklin was convicted of nineteen counts of cruelty
to children in the first degree, eight counts of false imprisonment, and one count of
aggravated assault for acts against her teenaged daughter, A. F. On appeal, she argues
that the trial court erred in failing to merge several of the convictions for sentencing;
we disagree, except as to her eight false-imprisonment convictions, which the state
has conceded should merge into her child-cruelty convictions. She argues that the
trial court erred in failing, sua sponte, to order a mistrial after making an improper
comment on the evidence, but the record does not show that she objected to the
comment at trial and Franklin has not shown that the comment was plain error. And
she argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, asserting that her trial
counsel was deficient in numerous ways, but she has not shown that she was
prejudiced by any deficient performance of her trial counsel. So we affirm the
judgment, vacate the sentence, and remand the case for resentencing.
1. Facts and procedural history.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdicts, the trial evidence
showed that Franklin and her husband adopted A. F. in 2007, when the girl was 10
years old. Five years later, on May 25, 2012, the Department of Family and Children
Services (DFCS) removed A. F. from Franklin’s home after receiving an anonymous
tip from one of Franklin’s former neighbors that a child was being held in a
padlocked, cinder-block building on the property. When DFCS found A. F., the girl
was thin and frail. The state ultimately charged Franklin with numerous offenses
based on the following conduct.
(a) Confinement in a cinder-block building.
The trial evidence showed that on several occasions in 2011 and 2012, Franklin
confined A. F. for periods of up to seven days in a detached cinder-block building on
Franklin’s property. The instances of confinement occurred in both hot and cold
weather, and A. F. often had inadequate clothing for the weather. Sometimes Franklin
2
would provide A. F. with some food during the confinement, such as bread and water,
oatmeal, grits, or cold canned goods. But often Franklin provided no food to A. F.
Franklin used a padlock to lock A. F. into the building. The building had no
heat or air conditioning and could reach inside temperatures of over 90 degrees
Fahrenheit; it also had no bathroom or running water, forcing A. F. to use a chamber
pot that at times she would be unable to empty for days. The building had a partial
dirt floor, one small window, and was used to store items such as tools, propane
containers, paint, and other chemicals. By the spring of 2012, Franklin had placed a
cot in the building and was requiring A. F. to live there, padlocked into the building,
most of the time.
On the afternoon of May 25, 2012, the day DFCS employees removed A. F.
from Franklin’s house, Franklin had just released the girl from the cinder-block
building, in which A. F. had been padlocked for a day and a half with no food in
temperatures exceeding 90 degrees.
A. F. testified that when she was confined (either in this building or in the other
structures described below), she would cry all of the time. She stated: “I wanted to
kill myself or beg God to kill me.”
(b) Confinement in a chicken coop.
3
The trial evidence showed that on several occasions in 2010, 2011, and 2012,
Franklin confined A. F. for periods of up to seven days in the storage area of an
uninsulated chicken coop on Franklin’s property. The instances of confinement
occurred in both hot and cold weather, and A. F. often had inadequate clothing for the
weather. Sometimes Franklin would confine A. F. to the chicken coop with no
clothing, food, or water. Chickens lived in the coop in an area separated from A. F.
by a wire partition. On at least one occasion, Franklin forced A. F. to walk naked to
the chicken coop, in view of a public road, before confining her there. And at one
point, when she was confined in the coop, A. F. tried eating dog food that was stored
there.
(c) Confinement in an outhouse.
The trial evidence showed that on several occasions in 2011 and 2012, Franklin
confined A. F. for up to seven days in an uninsulated outhouse in a remote area on her
property, about a half-mile away from the house. The instances of confinement
occurred in both hot and cold weather, and A. F. often had inadequate clothing for the
weather or no clothing at all. Often Franklin would not provide any food to A. F.
during the confinements.
4
The outhouse was made of wood with a tin roof and it had a toilet seat inside
on a ledge. It had a board on the door that prevented A. F. from opening the door. It
had cracks in the walls that A. F. would stuff with toilet paper during cold weather.
It had no electricity or lighting, leaving A. F. in total darkness at night, which
frightened her and caused her to cry and scream for help.
(d) Confinement in a closet.
The trial evidence showed that on several occasions in 2011 and 2012, Franklin
confined A. F. for up to seven days in an unlit closet in Franklin’s bedroom. Franklin
blocked the door to the closet but would allow A. F. out of the closet once a day to
use the bathroom. Some days, but not every day, Franklin would provide A. F. with
a piece of bread and half a glass of water while she was in the closet.
(e) Other acts against A. F.
The trial evidence showed that on one occasion Franklin tied A. F. to a tree for
approximately 12 hours. Once it got dark, A. F. became scared and depressed, and she
began crying and screaming for help.
The trial evidence showed that Franklin made A. F. wear shock collars,
typically used for a dog, and she would shock her, causing the girl physical and
emotional pain.
5
The trial evidence showed that on one occasion, after A. F. threatened to kill
herself, Franklin put a handgun to A. F.’s head and said, “I’ll do it for you.” A. F. was
scared and believed that Franklin intended to kill her. Although she cried and begged
Franklin not to shoot her and several times tried to push the gun away, Franklin
continued to hold the gun against A. F.’s head. She put the gun away only after being
admonished by one of her sons, who had entered the room.
Finally, the trial evidence showed that sometimes Franklin would force A. F.
to lay naked on a bed and would then beat her with the strap and buckle of a belt. The
beatings were painful to A. F. and left marks on her back.
2. Merger.
Franklin argues that the trial court erred in failing to merge for sentencing
purposes most of the crimes of which she was convicted. This claim of error concerns
her convictions for various crimes arising from her confinement of A. F. in the cinder-
block building, the chicken coop, the outhouse, and the closet. Our analysis of this
argument requires a more detailed discussion of these specific crimes.
As to the cinder-block building, Franklin was convicted of crimes committed
in three separate periods: between May 21, 2012, and May 25, 2012; between January
1, 2012, and April 30, 2012; and between June 1, 2009, and December 31, 2011. She
6
was convicted of three separate offenses occurring in each of these periods: first-
degree cruelty to children in violation of OCGA § 16-5-70 (a) (wilfully depriving a
child of necessary sustenance), for giving A. F. little to no food during her
confinement; first-degree cruelty to children in violation of OCGA § 16-5-70 (b)
(maliciously causing a child cruel or excessive physical or mental pain), for confining
her during hot or cold weather with little or no clothing; and false imprisonment in
violation of OCGA § 16-5-41 (a).
As to the chicken coop and outhouse, Franklin was convicted of crimes
committed in two separate periods: between January 1, 2012, and May 21, 2012, and
between June 1, 2009, and December 31, 2011. Again, as to each of those locations,
she was convicted of three separate offenses occurring in each of these periods: first-
degree cruelty to children in violation of OCGA § 16-5-70 (a) (wilfully depriving a
child of necessary sustenance), for giving A. F. little to no food during her
confinement; first-degree cruelty to children in violation of OCGA § 16-5-70 (b)
(maliciously causing a child cruel or excessive physical or mental pain), for confining
her during hot or cold weather with little or no clothing; and false imprisonment in
violation of OCGA § 16-5-41 (a).
7
As to the closet, Franklin was convicted of two separate offenses committed
between June 1, 2009, and December 31, 2011: first-degree cruelty to children in
violation of OCGA § 16-5-70 (a) (wilfully depriving a child of necessary sustenance),
for giving A. F. little to no food during her confinement; and first-degree cruelty to
children in violation of OCGA § 16-5-70 (b) (maliciously causing a child cruel or
excessive physical or mental pain). She also was convicted of false imprisonment in
violation of OCGA § 16-5-41 (a) for acts committed between June 8, 2009 and
December 31, 2011.
Franklin argues that these convictions should merge such that she receive only
one sentence for crimes committed in each of the four locations. At oral argument, the
state agreed with part of Franklin’s claim, conceding that her false-imprisonment
convictions merge with her child-cruelty convictions. So we do not address her
merger argument as it relates to the false-imprisonment convictions but vacate the
sentence and remand for the trial court to treat the false-imprisonment convictions as
merged and to resentence Franklin accordingly.
But the trial court properly declined to merge Franklin’s various child-cruelty
convictions. “When the same conduct of an accused may establish the commission
of more than one crime, the accused may be prosecuted for each crime. He may not,
8
however, be convicted of more than one crime if . . . [o]ne crime is included in the
other[.]” OCGA § 16-1-7 (a) (1). “To determine whether one crime is included in
another, and therefore merges as a matter of fact, the court must assess whether
conviction for one of the offenses is established by proof of the same or less than all
the facts required to establish the other crime.” Sullivan v. State, 301 Ga. 37, 43 (3)
(799 SE2d 163) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). Moreover, “where one
crime is completed before another crime, the ‘same conduct’ does not establish the
commission of both offenses, and the rule prohibiting more than one conviction if one
crime is included in the other does not apply.” Cordero v. State, 296 Ga. 703, 711 (3)
(770 SE2d 577) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). We review the merger
issue de novo. Womac v. State, 302 Ga. 681, 684 (3) (808 SE2d 709) (2017).
Franklin’s convictions for child cruelty fell under two distinct subdivisions of
OCGA § 16-5-70 — convictions based on Franklin depriving A. F. of necessary
sustenance under OCGA § 16-5-70 (a), and convictions based on Franklin causing
A. F. cruel or excessive physical or mental pain under OCGA § 16-5-70 (b). These
categories of convictions do not merge, because each subsection of the Code section
“requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Womac, 302 Ga. at 684 (3)
(citation and punctuation omitted). Likewise, the child-cruelty convictions based on
9
A. F.’s confinement in different locations do not merge, because the trial evidence
authorized the jury to find that each of these crimes “was completed before the
commission of a subsequent crime[.]” Id. at 685 (3). Similarly, the child-cruelty
convictions set in different time periods were also based on crimes that were
“completed before the commission of a subsequent crime[.]” Id.For these reasons, we find that the trial court properly held that Franklin’s
child-cruelty convictions do not merge, and based on the state’s concession we vacate
the sentence and remand the case for the trial court to merge Franklin’s false-
imprisonment convictions into her child-cruelty convictions and to then resentence
her.
3. Comment on the evidence.
Franklin argues that the trial court made an improper comment in violation of
OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1), which provides that “[i]t is error for any judge, during any
phase of any criminal case, to express or intimate to the jury the judge’s opinion as
to whether a fact at issue has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.”
Because Franklin did not timely object to the comment on the record,1 we review this
1
Trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that he raised
this issue with the trial court in chambers.
10
claim only for plain error affecting the substantive rights of the parties. OCGA § 17-
8-57 (b). To show plain error, Franklin “must point to a legal error that was not
affirmatively waived, the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable
dispute, the error must have affected [her] substantial rights, and the error must have
seriously affected the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Tyner v. State, 305 Ga. 326, 331 (4) (825 SE2d 129) (2019) (citation
omitted). She has not made this showing.
The comment that Franklin challenges occurred when the state’s cross-
examination of one of Franklin’s neighbors became heated. The witness accused the
prosecutor of “holler[ing]” at her, followed by an exchange in which the prosecutor
told the witness she could “point at [him] all [she’d] like” and the witness replied,
“Well, don’t holler at me.” The prosecutor then asked the judge to admonish the
witness and the judge replied, “I’m afraid to.” After a brief continuation of the cross-
examination, the trial court called for a break, and after that break the trial court made
the following statement:
Let me say, before the break, any comments that I make should not be
inferred — it’s one of our light moments that — where I make a
comment. It should not be inferred as me making an opinion about the
credibility of any witness or choosing sides. Really to — I guess a good
11
place to break and keep the momentum going in the case. But I
apologize if anybody interpreted what I said to be a slant against the
witness. It was not the intent. You should not infer anything negative
toward the defendant or the witness in this case for any comment I may
make.
As the trial court indicated in his curative instruction, it appears from the
transcript that the comment at issue was a “light” or joking comment, not an improper
expression of opinion in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1). See Abernathy v. State,
278 Ga. App. 574, 591-592 (6) (630 SE2d 421) (2006) (trial court’s joking comment
did not violate earlier version of OCGA § 17-8-57). But even if the comment could
be construed as improper, OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (2) permitted the trial court to give
a curative instruction, and the instruction given by the trial court was sufficient. We
discern no plain error.
4. Ineffective assistance of counsel.
Franklin argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel based on
numerous alleged instances of deficient performance by her trial counsel. To prevail
on this claim, she
must show both that [her] counsel’s performance was deficient and that
the deficient performance so prejudiced [her] that, but for the deficiency,
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
12
been different. As for deficient performance, the question is whether the
errors are unreasonable ones no competent attorney would have made
under similar circumstances. As for prejudice, the question is whether
there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder
would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Failure to make the
required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice
defeats the ineffectiveness claim.
Cobb v. State, 348 Ga. App. 210, 212-213 (2) (820 SE2d 241) (2018) (citations and
punctuation omitted). On appellate review, we review the trial court’s legal
conclusions de novo, but we defer to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations unless clearly erroneous. Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 130 (5) (757
SE2D 831) (2014).
(a) Overview of the overwhelming nature of the evidence against Franklin.
In this particular case, we will first describe in more detail the overwhelming
nature of the evidence against Franklin to provide context for our analysis of
Franklin’s numerous, specific allegations of deficient performance. See generally
Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 583, 585 (2) (814 SE2d 302) (2018) (where evidence of
defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, defendant did not show prejudice and his claim
of ineffective assistance was without merit). At trial, A. F. testified to all of the acts
13
establishing the offenses for which Franklin was convicted. As detailed below, other
evidence corroborated her testimony.
Several people testified to witnessing some of the acts of abuse described by
A. F. in her testimony. On an occasion in 2011, a neighbor saw Franklin take a plate
of food to A. F., who was locked in the cinder-block building at the time. In the
summer of 2011, a neighbor saw A. F. doing schoolwork in the chicken coop. On a
hot day in the spring of 2012, a workman saw A. F. in the padlocked cinder-block
building when Franklin opened the building to retrieve a tool; he testified that the girl
was standing by a bed looking hungry and scared. When the DFCS employees arrived
at Franklin’s property on May 25, 2012, they saw A. F. behind the cinder-block
building emptying a chamber pot.
There was also evidence that Franklin talked to others about confining A. F.
Neighbors and acquaintances testified that Franklin described to them instances when
she had confined A. F. in various structures on her property. The instances described
by Franklin to others included making A. F. stay in the chicken coop as punishment
in 2011 and 2012, sometimes without clothing; locking A. F. into the cinder-block
building at night in the spring of 2012; locking A. F. into the outhouse in the spring
of 2012; and confining A. F. in the closet either without food or with only bread and
14
water. In addition, Franklin told a neighbor about making A. F. lie down on a bed,
naked, while Franklin spanked her with a belt.
When the DFCS employees went to Franklin’s property on the afternoon May
25, 2012, Franklin admitted to them that she had locked A. F. in the cinder-block
building the previous morning (a day and a half earlier) and had given the girl no food
during that time. The temperature that day exceeded 90 degrees.
Moreover, Franklin documented these acts in detail in handwritten journals.
Over Franklin’s objection, the trial court admitted the journals into evidence in their
entirety, and at trial an agent from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, who found
the journals during a search of Franklin’s house pursuant to a warrant, read extensive
excerpts from the journals to the jury. In one such excerpt, Franklin described her
reaction to A. F. taking food from the family’s pantry:
[S]he stole again. It was suppertime and I was about to surprise her by
ending the punishment when I noticed she was wearing her jacket
strangely. I had asked her to get eggs. When I went up to her, she tried
to hurry out the door. When I stopped her, I touched her jacket where
she had a package of crackers. She then confessed to stealing two packs
earlier that morning while I was on the phone. Wow, she’s fast, but God
is faster and faithful to me. To think I was just about to end her
punishment completely, to say I was angry is an understatement. So,
now she is back in the garage [cinder-block building]. This time no cot
15
to sleep on. [No2] shower in the morning. No coming in the house at all.
She gets three crackers a day since she stole crackers because she is
hungry, which is not true.
In an excerpt from June 2011, Franklin described A. F.’s confinement in the chicken
coop:
Today [A. F.] was let out of her solitary confinement. Now she sleeps on
a cot with the chickens. If she’s good for seven days, I’ll give her a fan.
Then another seven days and she will earn the privilege of eating meals
with us instead of sandwiches. If at anytime she lies, rebels, or steals,
she goes back to the outhouse and starts over. I need to make a chart to
help me keep track. I pray this works.
In yet another excerpt from June 2011, Franklin described confining A. F. to the
outhouse after she soiled some clothing:
Now she’s in the outhouse with no panties or shorts on, plus she goes
without water tomorrow because she decided to pour her water out and
dehydrate so that Sam [Franklin’s husband] and I will be in trouble. Like
a spoiled brat that holds his breath until you give him what he wants.
Ah. So, I told her we would help her stick to the plan, but for one day,
but she don’t – but she don’t know that. Hehehe.
2
Franklin wrote the word “now” in her handwritten journal, which was a trial
exhibit. When the GBI agent read this portion of the journal to the jury, she spelled
out the word “N-O-W.” From the context, it appears that Franklin meant the word to
be “no.”
16
Another excerpt, written on a Thursday, describes a confinement in the closet:
[A. F.] is still in the closet. She has been there since Tuesday afternoon.
Why is she being so stubborn? I put her in there because she wanted to
be left alone. No rules, no lectures, no spankings or yelling. Just left
alone. Then and only then will she, according to her, learn to trust and
love. So, I said okay, and in the clothes closet she went. I told her she
can come out when she is right with God and ready to do the work.
Nothing has come out of her mouth. Well, a fake I am sorry for being
rebellious. That is not what I want. I want true repentance and heart
change. So she stays in the closet and life is quiet and peaceful. I’m not
yelling or spanking or lecturing. Maybe I’ll give her a flashlight and a
Bible. Done. Thank you, Holy Spirit, for giving me that idea. So how
long? As long as it takes. This morning I gave her some bread and water.
That’s all she needs for now.
In other excerpts, Franklin describes A. F. receiving “stripes on her back” and states,
“[A. F.] threw another temper tantrum and received a lashing.”
As with these excerpts, other portions of the journals read to the jury
corroborated details from A. F.’s accounts of the abuse Franklin inflicted on her.
Franklin does not contest the authenticity of the journals. She admitted at trial that she
wrote those words but argued that they were not an accurate depiction of actual
events.
17
Keeping this evidence in mind, we turn to Franklin’s specific claims of
ineffective assistance and find that she has not made the necessary showing. As
detailed below, she has not shown deficient performance as to many of the instances
she alleges, and even if we assume without deciding that there was deficient
performance as to the other instances, she has not shown prejudice either individually
or cumulatively due to the overwhelming evidence against her.3
(b) Claims of deficient performance concerning evidence of Franklin’s
statements or writings that corroborate A. F.’s testimony.
The main reason the evidence described above is overwhelming is that it
concerns Franklin’s own statements or writings admitting to the acts that form the
basis of the bulk of her convictions — the repeated confinement of A. F. in various
3
In reviewing the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we note that both
sides have cited decisions of this court or divisions within those decisions that are
physical precedent only: Darst v. State, 323 Ga. App. 614 (746 SE2d 865) (2013),
cited by Franklin, and Chamberlain v. State, 347 Ga. App. 775, 781 (3) (a) (819 SE2d
303) (2018), cited by the state. We take this opportunity to remind counsel that
physical precedent only decisions are not binding precedent. See Court of Appeals
Rule 33.2 (a) (1) (“An opinion is physical precedent only (citable as persuasive, but
not binding, authority), however, with respect to any portion of the published opinion
in which any of the panel judges concur in the judgment only, concur specially
without a statement of agreement with all that is said in the majority opinion, or
dissent.”). Neither side provided us with argument for why we should base our
opinion in this case on non-binding authority.
18
locations without sufficient food, water, or clothing, which A. F. described in her trial
testimony. This evidence was extremely damaging to Franklin’s defense, and she
argues that her trial counsel was ineffective in certain respects affecting its admission.
So we begin our analysis with Franklin’s claimed deficiencies relating to that
evidence. As detailed below, Franklin has not shown deficient performance.
(i) Failure to redact portions of the journals.
Trial counsel strenuously attempted to convince the trial court to exclude
Franklin’s journals from admission in their entirety, but the trial court ruled the
journals admissible and Franklin does not challenge that ruling on appeal. Instead,
she argues that her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to redact portions of the
journals, noting that her trial counsel’s testimony at the hearing on her motion for new
trial suggests he “did not seem to be aware that redaction was an option” because he
misunderstood the law regarding the rule of completeness. See OCGA § 24-1-106
(“When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an
adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other
writing or recorded statement which, in fairness, should be considered
contemporaneously with the writing or recorded statement.”). The only specific
portions of the journals that she argues should have been redacted are those portions
19
describing concerns that her husband was having sexual contact with A. F. She argues
that allowing the jury to hear those portions of the journals prejudiced her by
suggesting a motive for her confinement of A. F. to structures outside the house. But
the trial court specifically addressed the admissibility of these portions of the journals
and ruled, over the objection of Franklin’s trial counsel, that they were admissible
because Franklin had opened the door to the evidence in her own testimony on direct
examination. Just as Franklin does not enumerate as error the trial court’s decision to
admit the journals in their entirety, she also does not challenge on appeal the trial
court’s ruling that she had opened the door to the admission of those particular
portions of the journals, and thus she has not shown that any attempt by her trial
counsel to redact those portions would or could have been successful. Consequently,
she has not shown deficient performance. See Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 356 (3)
(a) (689 SE2d 280) (2010) (trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to
make meritless objection).
(ii) Failure to object to journals going out with jury during deliberations.
Franklin argues that her trial counsel should have made a “continuing witness”
objection to her journals going back with the jury during their deliberations. Under
the continuing witness rule, where the jury has heard written testimony read from the
20
witness stand “it is unfair and places undue emphasis on written testimony for the
writing to go out with the jury to be read again during deliberations, while oral
testimony is received but once.” Williams v. State, 337 Ga. App. 381, 386-387 (3) (b)
(787 SE2d 333) (2016) (citations omitted; emphasis supplied). Documents subject to
this rule are those that “generally contain their makers’ assertions of purported truths,
[and] are ascribed evidentiary value only to the extent that their makers are credible.”
Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 348 (8) (676 SE2d 215) (2009) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Franklin’s journals were not such documents. Franklin, the maker of the
journals, did not assert that they contained the truth; to the contrary, Franklin argued
that they often reflected her prayers and expression of emotion, rather than real
events. Because the journals “were not written testimony and did not derive their
evidentiary value solely from the credibility of [Franklin,] . . . they were original
documentary evidence and were properly allowed to go out with the jury.” Id. See
Porter v. State, 270 Ga. App. 860, 861-862 (2) (608 SE2d 315) (2004) (letter written
by defendant regarding his alleged molestation of victim, which was properly
admitted as documentary evidence, “was not testimony and therefore was not subject
to a continuing witness objection”). Trial counsel’s failure to make a meritless
continuing witness objection was not deficient. See Wesley, 286 Ga. at 356 (3) (a).
21
(iii) Failure to object to evidence of Franklin’s statements to DFCS employees.
Franklin argues that her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek the
suppression of her inculpatory statements to the DFCS employees when they came
to her property on May 25, 2012. Although Franklin made the statements during a
non-custodial interview, she argues that they could have been suppressed as
involuntary because they were induced by threats that the DFCS employees would
contact a special assistant attorney general or a juvenile court judge if Franklin did
not let them speak with A. F. alone.
As with the other alleged deficient acts discussed above, Franklin has not
shown this to be deficient performance because she has not shown that an objection
on this ground would have had merit. See Wesley, 286 Ga. at 356 (3) (a). It is true
that, “[t]o make a confession admissible, it shall have been made voluntarily, without
being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”
OCGA § 24-8-824. But the “threats” identified by Franklin, and the context in which
they were made, do not constitute a “remotest fear of injury” as that phrase has been
construed by our courts. See Price v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (2) (825 SE2d 178) (2019)
(“[I]t is physical or mental torture that prevents a confession from being admissible.”)
(citation and punctuation omitted).
22
(c) Other claims for which Franklin has not shown deficient performance.
Franklin alleges several other instances of ineffectiveness for which she has not
shown deficient performance by her trial counsel.
(i) Failure to object on the record to alleged improper comment by trial court.
Franklin argues that her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object on the
record to the trial court’s comment discussed above in Division 3. But as we
explained in that Division, even though her trial counsel did not object on the record,
the trial court ultimately gave a curative instruction that was sufficient under OCGA
§ 17-8-57 (a) (2). Franklin has not shown that any further objection or motion by her
trial counsel would have been meritorious, so she has not shown deficient
performance. See Wesley, 286 Ga. at 356 (3) (a).
(ii) Failure to seek to redact aliases from indictment.
Franklin argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
redact the indictment to remove references to her aliases. The indictment that went
out with the jury stated: “Diana Lynn Franklin, aka Diana L. Glaser, Diana L.
Tijerina, Diana L. Quinn, Diana L. Thomas.” Although the trial court instructed jury
that “[t]here’s nothing to be read into [the aliases] other than the fact that it was prior
23
to getting married or there’s different names,” Franklin argues that these aliases made
her look bad before the jury.
Franklin has not shown deficient performance. “It is permissible under Georgia
law for an indictment to allege that a defendant has been known by an alias. It is also
permissible for a jury to hear or see the allegation pertaining to the alias, and such a
reference or disclosure does not, in and of itself, place the defendant’s character in
issue.” Banks v. State, 269 Ga. App. 653, 654 (2) (605 SE2d 47) (2004) (citation and
punctuation omitted). See Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 804, 806-807 (2) (764 SE2d 376)
(2014); Hawes v. State, 266 Ga. 731, 732 (2) (470 SE2d 664) (1996). Georgia courts
have found no error in the disclosure to the jury of aliases such as “Psycho,” Banks,
supra, “Stomper,” Hawes, supra, and “Iceman,” Scott v. State, 185 Ga. App. 887, 887-
888 (1) (366 SE2d 196) (1988), which are far less innocuous-sounding than
Franklin’s aliases. Franklin does not deny the aliases, and because she has not shown
that a request to redact the aliases would have been meritorious, she has not shown
that her trial counsel was deficient for failing to make that request. See Wesley, 286
Ga. at 356 (3) (a).
Franklin suggests that we should decide this claim of error under an Eleventh
Circuit decision, United States v. Harriston, 329 F3d 779, 792 (III) (11th Cir. 2003),
24
instead of under Georgia law. She cites the rule that we look to federal authority in
certain instances to construe Georgia’s new Evidence Code. See State v. Almanza,
304 Ga. 553, 556 (2) (820 SE2d 1) (2018) (“if a rule in the new Evidence Code is
materially identical to a Federal Rule of Evidence, we look to federal case law”). That
rule does not apply here, because this claim of error does not implicate any provision
of the Evidence Code.
(iii) Failure to object to evidence of acts by Franklin’s husband.
Franklin argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to
evidence of allegations that her husband had sexual contact with A. F. or to the state’s
comment on this evidence during closing argument. But the record shows that her
trial counsel did object to the evidence and the trial court determined that it was
admissible. So Franklin has not shown deficient performance.
(iv) Failure to seek a mistrial after testimony that Franklin did not cooperate
with DFCS employees.
Franklin argues that her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a
mistrial after a DFCS employee testified that Franklin had been “very irate, very
oppositional” when the DFCS employees and deputy sheriff came to her house in
response to the tip that a child was locked in a shed. Without citation to authority, she
25
argues that this testimony constituted an improper comment on her silence or failure
to come forward.
Assuming that this evidence could be construed as a comment on Franklin’s
silence, “[i]mproper reference to a defendant’s silence does not automatically require
reversal or mandate a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hines v. State, 277
Ga. App. 404, 408 (2) (626 SE2d 601) (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Under Georgia’s new Evidence Code there is no longer a “categorical rule excluding
all comment upon a defendant’s pre-arrest silence or failure to come forward[.]”
Rowland v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (3) (__ SE2d __) (Case No. S19A0289, decided June
3, 2019). The exclusion of such a comment depends on case-specific considerations,
see id., and Franklin has made no argument for why the comments in this case
required exclusion. So she has not met her burden of showing that her trial counsel’s
performance in this regard was deficient. See Pearce v. State, 300 Ga. App. 777, 786-
787 (7) (a) (686 SE2d 392) (2009) (where defendant did not show “that a motion for
mistrial would have been meritorious under the circumstances of th[e] case or that the
remedial actions taken were insufficient, his claim [of ineffective assistance] fails”).
(v) Failure to object to testimony that law enforcement based a request for a
search warrant on information from A. F. or to request a clarifying jury charge.
26
Franklin argues that her trial counsel was ineffective in failing either to object
to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent’s testimony that she obtained a search
warrant for Franklin’s property based on information obtained from A. F. or to
request a jury charge explaining the lower standard of proof required to obtain a
search warrant. She asserts that, as a result, “the jury was left to assume that because
there was enough evidence to obtain a search warrant, there must be enough evidence
already to say that [she] is guilty.”
To show this constituted deficient performance, Franklin must show that no
reasonable attorney would have allowed such testimony to go unchallenged or
without a request for a clarifying jury charge. See Kennedy v. State, 304 Ga. 285, 289
(2) (818 SE2d 581) (2018). She has not met this burden; in fact, she offers no
authority in support of this proposition. We find no error in the trial court’s
determination that Franklin failed to show deficient performance.
(d) Remaining claims, for which Franklin has not shown prejudice either
individually or collectively.
We need not analyze whether trial counsel performed deficiently in the other
respects alleged by Franklin, because even if we assume deficient performance,
Franklin has not shown that she was prejudiced either by the individual alleged
27
deficiencies or by them collectively. Those alleged instances of deficient performance
are: (1) trial counsel’s failure to obtain an in-camera inspection of A. F.’s
psychological, school, and other records for use in cross-examining the state’s expert
witnesses4; (2) trial counsel’s failure to present expert evidence or offer alternative
theories to discredit expert testimony that A. F. suffered from post-traumatic stress
disorder; (3) trial counsel’s failure to present expert evidence to challenge A. F.’s
forensic interview; and (4) trial counsel’s failure to object to comments made by the
prosecutors in closing argument.
The first three of these instances of alleged deficient performance go to the
credibility of A. F.’s accounts of the abuse. Even if trial counsel was deficient for not
challenging A. F.’s credibility in the ways Franklin argues he should have done,
Franklin has not shown that she was prejudiced, because she has not shown that,
“absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”
Cobb, 348 Ga. App. at 213 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). As discussed
above, there was overwhelming evidence that Franklin engaged in many of the acts
described by A. F., including Franklin’s own statements and writings corroborating
4
Contrary to the state’s argument, Franklin raised this claim of ineffective
assistance in her motion for new trial as amended.
28
A. F.’s accounts. So any deficient performance in the manner in which trial counsel
challenged A. F.’s credibility did not prejudice her defense.
Franklin likewise has not shown prejudice in connection with her final instance
of alleged deficient performance, trial counsel’s failure to object to two comments
made at separate points in closing argument by two different prosecutors. The first
of these comments was made in the initial portion of the state’s closing argument:
[Franklin] said that she was withholding Christmas gifts as punishment.
Defendant purports to be a Christian and yet we know that God’s grace
came down as Christ. And one thing that we don’t have to earn is
Christmas. We don’t have to earn it. We don’t have to deserve it, but she
makes [A. F.] deserve it, even though she gets it for free.
The second of these comments was made by a different prosecutor in the rebuttal
portion of the state’s closing argument: “[A. F.] stood tall in this courtroom against
the evil she lived with for five years.”
Considering these comments in the context of the closing argument and the
overall trial, see Adams v. State, 283 Ga. 298, 302 (3) (e) (658 SE2d 627) (2008)
([c]losing arguments are judged in the context in which they are made”), we do not
agree with Franklin’s assertion that these comments suggested to the jury that they
should base their verdict on “God’s law.” But the first comment is concerning. While
29
it could be construed to suggest that Franklin did not sincerely hold her professed
religious beliefs, it could also be construed to suggest that she sincerely held those
beliefs but that the beliefs themselves were wrong. “If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (4) (63 SCt 1178, 87 LE1628) (1943). To the
extent that the state’s closing argument asserted that Franklin’s religious beliefs were
not a correct interpretation of Christianity, it ran afoul of this constitutional principle.
Nevertheless, assuming without deciding that trial counsel performed deficiently by
not objecting to the comments, we cannot see that “absent [an objection to the
comments], the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt,” Cobb,
348 Ga. App. at 213 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted), for the same reason
discussed above — the evidence of Franklin’s guilt was overwhelming.
Finally, “the effect of prejudice resulting from counsel’s deficient performance
is viewed cumulatively.” Jackson v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (9) (__ SE2d __) (Case No.
S19A0343, decided June 3, 2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). Recognizing
this, “we conclude that the cumulative prejudice from any deficiencies assumed in
30
[this subdivision] is insufficient to create a reasonable probability that the results of
the proceedings would have been different in the absence of the deficiencies alleged.”
Id.
Judgment affirmed, sentence vacated, and case remanded for resentencing.
McMillian, P. J. and Goss, J., concur.
31