In the Interest of K. G., a Child

FIFTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
BRANCH and BETHEL, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
February 23, 2018
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A17A1519. IN THE INTEREST OF K. G., A CHILD.
MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.
In In the Interest of K. G., 343 Ga. App. 345 (807 SE2d 70) (2017), the mother
of K. G. appealed the juvenile court order granting a petition for permanent
guardianship of the child. We affirmed the order. Id. Now, the child’s attorney-
guardian ad litem appeals on behalf of the child. She argues that the juvenile court
erred by granting the petition because the court failed to adequately accommodate the
mother’s disability, a hearing impairment, but the record does not support her
argument. She argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that the appointment of
a permanent guardian is in K. G.’s best interests, but clear and convincing evidence
supports that finding. So we affirm.
1. Failure to accommodate the mother’s hearing impairment.
The child’s attorney-guardian ad litem argues that the juvenile court erred in
granting the permanent guardianship because the court failed to adequately
accommodate the mother’s disability when it denied a motion for continuance and
when it modified the mother’s case plan. Neither example demonstrates that the
juvenile court failed to accommodate the mother’s disability.
At each hearing that occurred after the guardianship petition was filed, two
American Sign Language interpreters were present for the mother’s benefit. See
OCGA § 24-6-654 (a). At a July 22, 2016, hearing (at which two interpreters were
present) the mother’s counsel moved for a continuance on the ground that she and the
mother had only had an hour to discuss the case with an interpreter present. The
attorney had been appointed almost two months before as substitute counsel for the
mother’s previous attorney.
The attorney for the permanent guardian opposed the motion for a continuance
on the ground that the case had been pending for more than two years and the child
still lacked permanency. The juvenile court denied the motion for a continuance,
noting that the court would hear one and one-half hours of testimony that day and that
the case would resume four days later. The court told the mother’s attorney that the
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court “will afford you whatever opportunity you need between now and then for the
interpreter services. All you have to do is ask.”
“We will not disturb a juvenile court’s denial of a motion for continuance
absent abuse of discretion.” In the Interest of K.A.P., 277 Ga. App. 794, 798 (2) (627
SE2d 857) (2006) (citation omitted). Under the circumstances here, K. G.’s attorney-
guardian ad litem has not shown that the trial court abused her discretion in refusing
to continue the hearing. Nor has she shown how the court’s exercise of discretion
failed to accommodate the mother’s disability.
To the extent K. G.’s attorney-guardian ad litem argues that the mother’s rights
were violated by a modification of the case plan, the argument fails. As we noted in
our prior opinion, nothing in the record demonstrates that the mother — or anyone
else — objected to the modification of the case plan. In the Interest of K. G., 343 Ga.
App. at 350 (2) (b). See also In the Interest of D. E., 269 Ga. App. 753, 756 (2) (605
SE2d 394) (2004) (objection to reunification plan not raised in the juvenile court was
waived).
2. K. G.’s best interests.
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K. G.’s attorney-guardian ad litem argues that the juvenile court erred by
finding that the appointment of a permanent guardian was in K. G.’s best interests.
In relevant part, OCGA § 15-11-240 (a) provides:
the juvenile court shall be vested with jurisdiction to appoint a
permanent guardian for a child adjudicated as a dependent child in
accordance with this article. Prior to the entry of such an order, the court
shall: (1) Find that reasonable efforts to reunify such child with his or
her parents would be detrimental to such child or find that the living
parents of such child have consented to the permanent guardianship; (2)
Find that termination of parental rights and adoption is not in the best
interests of such child; (3) Find that the proposed permanent guardian
can provide a safe and permanent home for such child; [and] (4) Find
that the appointment of a permanent guardian for such child is in the
best interests of such child and that the individual chosen as such child’s
permanent guardian is the individual most appropriate to be such child’s
permanent guardian taking into consideration the best interests of the
child. . . .
K. G.’s attorney-guardian ad litem argues that the trial court erred in finding that the
appointment of a permanent guardian was in K. G.’s best interest because there is a
bond between her and her mother; the mother is capable of meeting her needs; the
mother completed her case plan goals; the mother was having regular unsupervised
overnight visits with K. G.; and the mother was attending medical appointments.
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But evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding. As we observed in In the
Interest of K. G., 343 Ga. App. at 349-350 (2) (b), the evidence showed that the
mother had not completed her case plan and it supported the juvenile court’s
conclusion “that K. G. had experienced chronic neglect [and] that the mother lacks
the necessary skills to be able to meet the child’s severe needs and the ability to
ensure that K. G. receives the essential services to which she is entitled.” Id. at 350
(2) (b). Further, the child’s guardian ad litem (as opposed to the appellant here, the
child’s attorney-guardian ad litem) testified that permanent guardianship is in the
child’s best interest. Id. at 349 (2) (b).
“In the appellate review of a bench trial, a trial court’s factual findings must not
be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Rather, due deference must be given
to the trial court, acknowledging that it has the opportunity to judge the credibility of
the witnesses.” Strickland v. Strickland, 298 Ga. 630, 633-634 (1) (783 SE2d 606)
(2016) (citations omitted). After giving the juvenile court’s findings of fact the
required deference, we find that the court was authorized to conclude that the
permanent guardian had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the
appointment of a permanent guardian would be in K. G.’s best interest. See generally
id. at 635 (2).
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Judgment affirmed. Branch and Bethel, JJ., concur.
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