BELL v. GILDER TIMBER COMPANY Et Al.

FOURTH DIVISION
ELLINGTON, P. J.,
BRANCH and MERCIER, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
May 4, 2016
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A16A0300. BELL v. GILDER TIMBER COMPANY et al.
MERCIER, Judge.
We granted Kenneth Bell’s application for discretionary appeal to review the
decision of the Superior Court of Laurens County affirming the decision of the appellate
division of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation, which had denied Bell’s claim
for permanent partial disability income benefits. In his sole enumeration of error, Bell
contends that the State Board of Workers’ Compensation erred as a matter of law by
failing to toll, or carve out an exception to, the four-year statute of limitation found in
OCGA § 34-9-104 (b), and thereby denying him benefits because his compensable injury
took place outside the statutory four-year time period. Finding no error, we affirm.
In reviewing a workers’ compensation award, this Court must construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing before the
appellate division. The findings of the State Board of Workers’
Compensation, when supported by any evidence, are conclusive and
binding, and neither the superior court nor this Court may substitute itself
as a factfinding body in lieu of the State Board.
Laurens County Bd. of Educ. v. Dewberry, 296 Ga. App. 204, 205-206 (674 SE2d 73)
(2009) (citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted). However, “[w]hile the findings of
fact of the appellate division are conclusive and binding when supported by any
evidence, reviewing courts, including this court and the superior courts, may review the
appellate division’s legal determinations and reverse an award based on an erroneous
theory of law.” Mechanical Maintenance, Inc. v. Yarborough, 264 Ga. App. 181, 183
(590 SE2d 148) (2003) (footnote omitted).
The facts in this case are undisputed. Bell sustained a compensable injury to his
neck in January 1992 while working for Gilder Timber Company (Gilder). As a result
of the injury, Bell underwent cervical fusion surgery in February 1992. Bell was not
assigned a permanent partial disability (“PPD”) rating at that time. However, Bell was
granted temporary total disability (“TTD”) income benefits for a period of approximately
four months until he returned to work. Bell returned to work in 1992 until he retired in
2009, but between 1992 and 2009 he experienced continued pain in his neck and
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eventually elected to have a second surgery as recommended by his doctors. The
question of whether Gilder would pay for the second surgery was litigated before the
State Board of Workers’ Compensation. Gilder was ordered to pay for the surgery
because it resulted from an injury that arose during the course of Bell’s employment. The
surgery was performed in September 2013. After the surgery was performed, Bell’s
doctor assigned him a 15% PPD rating. Bell then sought payment of PPD income
benefits from Gilder at a hearing of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation in
November 2014. The surgery Bell underwent in 2013 was directly related to the original
injury he suffered in 1992. However, Bell’s 2014 claim for PPD income benefits was
denied because the State Board of Workers’ Compensation found that it was barred by
the statute of limitation set forth in OCGA § 34-9-104 (b). Bell appealed this decision,
and in March 2015, the appellate division of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation
affirmed the denial of PPD income benefits as being barred by the statute of limitation.
Bell then appealed the ruling to the Superior Court of Laurens County, where the
decision of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation was affirmed. This appeal
followed.
Bell contends that although his claim for PPD benefits was not filed within four
years of the last time he received TTD benefits and thus would normally be barred by the
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statute of limitation, we should create an exception to the statute of limitation and permit
his claim to go forward. The statute of limitation at issue in this case can be found in
OCGA § 34-9-104 (b). The statute pertinently provides, “any party may file for benefits
solely under Code Section 34-9-263 [PPD benefits] not more than four years from the
date the last payment of income benefits pursuant to Code Section 34-9-261 [TTD] or
34-9-262 [temporary partial disability, “TPD”] was actually made under this chapter.”
It is undisputed that Bell’s claim for PPD benefits in 2014 was not filed within four years
of the last payment of TTD income benefits in 1992. However, Bell argues that because
the application of the statute of imitation will lead to a harsh result in this case, we should
create a limited exception to the rule.
We recognize that the application of the statute of limitation under these
circumstances leads to a harsh result. Bell’s need for the surgery in 2013 relates back to
his original compensable injury in 1992. It would seem obvious that his permanent
partial disability rating should also relate back to the 1992 injury, regardless of the
passage of time. Bell argues that this application of the statute of limitation leads to an
absurd and inequitable result in that an employee with an otherwise meritorious claim
for PPD benefits would be barred from receiving those benefits because he chose to
return to work, while a similarly situated employee who chose not to return to work, and
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received TTD benefits until a subsequent surgery was performed and PPD rating
assigned, would not be barred by the statute of limitation. We agree with Bell’s argument
that this is a harsh and inequitable result. However, we do not agree that this Court
should create an exception to the statute of limitation.
“When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General
Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the
statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1)
(a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citations and punctuation omitted). “[W]here the language
of a statute is plain and susceptible of only one natural and reasonable construction, an
appellate court must construe the statute accordingly.” In re L.T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 592
(754 SE2d 380) (2014) (punctuation and footnote omitted). In the instant case, the statute
is clear and unambiguous, and its plain and ordinary meaning is that the statute bars
claims for PPD benefits made more than four years from the last payment of either TTD
benefits or TPD benefits. See OCGA § 34-9-104 (b).
“Statutes of limitation are considered as beneficial, and resting on principles of a
sound public policy, and as not to be evaded except by the methods provided therein. .
. . And courts cannot engraft on such statutes exceptions not contained therein, however
inequitable the enforcement of the statute, without such exceptions, may be.” Harrison
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v. Holsenbeck, 208 Ga. 410, 412 (67 SE2d 311) (1951) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Here, Bell presents a compelling policy argument as to why an exception
should be created; however, those arguments are properly addressed to the General
Assembly. See Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County v. Athens Newspapers,
LLC, 284 Ga. 192, 199 (2) (663 SE2d 248) (2008) (policy arguments as to
reasonableness of statutory time limits for Open Records Act request responses, should
be addressed by the legislature). Although the result under these facts may be harsh, we
cannot construe OCGA § 34-9-104 (b) to force an outcome that the legislature did not
expressly authorize. See generally Turner v. Georgia River Network, 297 Ga. 306, 308
(773 SE2d 706) (2015). Therefore, the State Board of Workers’ Compensation did not
err by failing to toll, or carve out an exception to, the four-year statute of limitation found
in OCGA § 34-9-104 (b), nor did the superior court err by affirming the decision of the
State Board of Workers’ Compensation.
Judgment affirmed. Ellington, P. J., and Branch, J., concur.
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