Tommy Hunter, Commissioner v. David Will

SECOND DIVISION
MILLER, P. J.,
RICKMAN and REESE, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
September 9, 2019
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A19A1481. HUNTER v. WILL et al.
MILLER, Presiding Judge.
Tommy Hunter appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his appeal to the
Supreme Court of Georgia and the trial court’s subsequent order denying his motion
to be relieved from the final judgment. Hunter argues that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal, that the dismissal was based on extrinsic evidence,
that ex parte communications tainted the proceedings, and that he was entitled to a
hearing on his motion to be relieved from the final judgment. Our thorough review
of the record discloses no reversible error in the trial court’s dismissal of Hunter’s
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.
“A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss an appeal under
OCGA § 5-6-48 (c) is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” (Citation
omitted.) Park Regency Partners, L.P. v. Gruber, 271 Ga. App. 66, 70 (1) (608 SE2d
667) (2004).
The procedural history of this case is not only complex and convoluted, but it
is also the first of its kind before this Court. An ethics complaint was filed against
Commissioner Tommy Hunter as a result of certain comments he made on social
media, and the Gwinnett County Board of Ethics (“the Ethics Board”) issued findings
and a recommendation that he be publicly reprimanded. Hunter filed in the trial court
a writ of quo warranto, prohibition, mandamus and verified complaint for declaratory
judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against (1) the Ethics
Board; (2) David Will, in his individual and official capacity as the chair of the Ethics
Board; (3) Charles Rousseau, in his individual and official capacity as a member of
the Ethics Board; and (4) the Gwinnett County Board of Commissioners (“the Board
of Commissioners”).1 Among other requests, Hunter sought to invalidate certain
Ethics Board ordinances and he sought the removal of some members of the Ethics
Board.
1
The Board of Commissioners maintains that it is not the real party of interest
in this case and that it is entitled to sovereign immunity. “[T]he trial court did not
decide these questions, and we decline to address them for the first time here.”
Fairfield Plantation Action Committee, Inc. v. Plantation Equity Group, Inc., 215 Ga.
App. 746 (3) (452 SE2d 147) (1994).
2
In June 2017, the trial court denied Hunter’s claims, determining that the Ethics
Board and the ordinance creating it are not constitutionally infirm. Hunter filed a
timely notice of appeal on July 17, 2017, designating the Supreme Court of Georgia
as having jurisdiction over the appeal. In the notice, Hunter stated, “the clerk shall
include the transcript for the June 1, 2017 Emergency Hearing for Temporary
Restraining Order. . . .”2 After approximately seven months, however, that transcript
had not been filed. On February 16, 2018, the Board of Commissioners filed in the
trial court a motion to dismiss Hunter’s appeal, arguing, inter alia, that Hunter was
responsible for filing, or causing to be filed, the transcript which he had demanded
be included in the record. The Board of Commissioners added that Hunter had failed
to ensure that a complete hearing record was timely transmitted to the Supreme Court.
The remaining appellees joined in the motion.
Hunter responded that “through oversight and inadvertence,” his counsel did
not contact the clerk. Concurrently, on February 19, 2018, he also filed an amended
notice of appeal — again designating the Supreme Court as having jurisdiction —
excluding his request for the transcript. The trial court clerk then transmitted the
2
The notice of appeal indicated that the hearing at issue occurred on June 1,
but there appears to be no dispute that the hearing date was actually June 5.
3
record to the Supreme Court. In the interim, however, the parties filed multiple
pleadings concerning the motion to dismiss, and the trial court had not yet ruled on
the motion.
On March 12, 2018, an associate attorney with the law firm representing the
Board of Commissioners telephoned the trial court’s law clerk, claiming that the
transmittal of the record to the Supreme Court was “erroneous” due to the pending
motion to dismiss Hunter’s appeal. That same day, lead counsel for the Board of
Commissioners learned of this conversation, informed Hunter’s counsel, and then
wrote a letter to the trial court. In the letter, which was copied to Hunter’s counsel,
the Board of Commissioners apologized for the ex parte communication but
nevertheless argued that the record had been erroneously transmitted to the Supreme
Court due to the pending motion to dismiss Hunter’s appeal and requested the trial
court to direct that the record be retrieved from the Supreme Court.
The trial court issued an order on March 14, 2018, scheduling a hearing on the
motion to dismiss and directing the trial court clerk to transmit the order to the
Supreme Court of Georgia to prevent the appeal from being docketed prior to a ruling
on the motion to dismiss. Hunter filed a “verified motion to vacate [the March 14,
2018 order] and/or motion to recuse,” and the trial court entered an order of voluntary
4
recusal. The case was reassigned to another judge who scheduled a hearing on the
motion to dismiss. After oral argument, in April 2018, the trial court ruled that
because the record had already been transmitted, it no longer had jurisdiction to
consider the motion to dismiss. Simultaneously, the trial court requested that the
Supreme Court remand the record to enable a ruling on the motion to dismiss.
Months later, in August 2018, the trial court issued a final judgment in which
it explained that it had received an email from the Gwinnett County chief deputy clerk
about correspondence that office had with the Supreme Court’s clerk’s office. The
email from the Supreme Court’s clerk’s office explained that the appeal had not yet
been docketed and also stated:
We had already reviewed it in our system, so it does not read rejected.
It is, however, deleted from our system, per the Trial Court[’]s request.
. . . If a case has not received a docket number and we are asked to reject
or delete it, per the trial court, it is the same as never having been
submitted.
The Supreme Court’s clerk’s office further stated that if the appeal were to be
pursued, the record would have to be resubmitted. Having reviewed the email
correspondence, the trial court determined that the transmittal of the record was
deleted from the Supreme Court system and that it could therefore rule on the motion
5
to dismiss. The trial court dismissed Hunter’s appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-48 (c),
reasoning that the delay in filing the June transcript was “unreasonable, inexcusable
and was caused by [Hunter].”
Hunter then filed a motion for relief from judgment and to set aside the court’s
final judgment dismissing his appeal, and he also requested that the trial court vacate
the March 2018 order that sought to prevent the docketing of the appeal. The trial
court denied Hunter’s motion, and this appeal followed.3
1. First, Hunter claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his appeal
because, in the absence of an order from the Supreme Court, the trial court never
regained the authority to rule on the motion to dismiss. Because of the unique
circumstances of this case, however, we are compelled to disagree.
Preliminarily, when the record was transmitted to the Supreme Court of
Georgia, the trial court lost the authority to decide the motion to dismiss Hunter’s
appeal. Supreme Court Rule 74 provides that an
[a]ppellee shall be deemed to have waived any failure of the appellant
to comply with the provisions of the Appellate Practice Act relating to
the filing of the transcript of the evidence and proceedings or transmittal
3
We note that Hunter initially filed this appeal with the Supreme Court of
Georgia, which then transferred it to this Court.
6
of the record to this Court unless objection thereto was made and ruled
upon in the trial court prior to transmittal, and such order is appealed as
provided by law.
This Court has an almost identical rule regarding waiver. See Court of Appeals Rule
20. More recently, in a whole court decision, we reaffirmed the longstanding
precedent that a trial court loses the ability to rule on a motion to dismiss once the
record has been transmitted to the appellate court. Noorani v. Sugarloaf Mills Ltd.
Partnership, 308 Ga. App. 168, 169-170 (706 SE2d 750) (2011). See also Strese v.
Strese, 237 Ga. 334 (1) (227 SE2d 749) (1976) (applying the former version of
Supreme Court Rule 74). And decades ago, we clarified that this principle of waiver
applies whether the record is transmitted “erroneously or not.” Turner v. Taylor, 179
Ga. App. 574, 575 (1) (a) (346 SE2d 920) (1986). There is no dispute that the record
was transmitted. Thus, the trial court initially lacked authority to rule on the
appellees’ motion to dismiss.
Normally, trial courts regain the authority to rule on a motion to dismiss an
appeal through either a remand of an appeal or an explicit order from the appellate
court. See, e.g., Rois-Mendez v. Stamps, 312 Ga. App. 136, 138 n.1 (717 SE2d 718)
(2011) (explaining that we remanded the first appeal to the trial court, allowing the
7
court to exercise its authority to dismiss the appeal); Winzer v. EHCA Dunwoody,
LLC, 277 Ga. App. 710, 711 (627 SE2d 426) (2006) (“[T]his court returned the record
to the trial court, informing the lower court . . . that we could not accept the appeal.
. . .”); Miller v. Ingles Market, Inc., 214 Ga. App. 817, 817-818 (449 SE2d 166)
(1994) (remanding the case for a ruling on the motion to dismiss); Price v. Ortiz, 152
Ga. App. 651, 652 (263 SE2d 527) (1979) (explaining that we previously “returned
the case to the trial court” via an order).
Given the distinctive factual context of this case, however, we conclude that
despite the absence of a formal order from the Supreme Court, the trial court was
authorized to rule on the motion to dismiss Hunter’s appeal at the time of its ruling
in August 2018. As Hunter recognizes, the record shows that the trial court appears
to have been awaiting an order from the Supreme Court. In fact, when the trial court
made the record remand request in April 2018, it also stayed the supplementation of
the record “pending the direction of the Georgia Supreme Court regarding the
requested remand of the record.”
Thereafter, the Supreme Court’s docket clerk explained by email that the case
had been deleted from the Supreme Court’s system, per the trial court’s request. She
added: “If a case has not received a docket number and we are asked to reject or
8
delete it, per the trial court, it is the same as never having been submitted.” This
correspondence came after the Gwinnett County clerk’s office specifically asked the
Supreme Court’s clerk’s office to send a “rejection.” It would strain credulity for us
— an inferior appellate court — to hold that under these circumstances the Supreme
Court was required to do something more before the trial court could rule on the
motion to dismiss. This is not a case in which the trial court proceeded independently
while the Supreme Court remained silent, and there is no indicia in the record that an
order from the Supreme Court was forthcoming.
We are also particularly disinclined to hold that an order from the Supreme
Court was warranted here because there is neither a statute nor a court rule
enunciating the minimum procedural requirement for a trial court to regain authority
to rule on the motion to dismiss following the transmittal of the record. See, e.g., In
Interest of I.L.M., 304 Ga. 114, 118 n.12 (816 SE2d 620) (2018) (all courts generally
have had a “longstanding and inherent” judicial power “to control the disposition of
the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and
for litigants,” though this power can be limited by statute) (citation omitted). Thus,
no statute or rule of court necessitated an order.
9
Hunter adamantly suggests that because the Supreme Court did not issue an
order, its clerk’s office deleted or rejected the record without authority. Nothing in
the record supports this assumed impropriety. “Until the contrary appears, it will be
conclusively presumed that a public officer not only acted within the scope of his
legal authority but acted properly in the performance of such duty and only when
authorized so to act.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. Northside Hosp.,
Inc., 302 Ga. 517, 524-525 (2) (807 SE2d 909) (2017); see also Taylor v. Young, 253
Ga. App. 585, 586 (1) (b) (560 SE2d 40) (2002) (“Clerks and deputy clerks of court
are public officers and are presumed to discharge their duties properly.”) (citation
omitted). Therefore, we are unpersuaded that the trial court erred in adjudicating the
motion to dismiss for lack of an order from the Supreme Court.
2. Hunter claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his appeal based on
extrinsic evidence.4 We disagree because the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in taking judicial notice of the fact that the transmittal of the record had been deleted
from the Supreme Court’s system.
4
Insofar as Hunter asserts that the email constituted hearsay, we do not address
this argument because Hunter did not mention it below when challenging the trial
court’s judgment. Burdette v. McDowell, 321 Ga. App. 507, 508 (1) (739 SE2d 28)
(2013).
10
Whether requested by a party or not, a trial court may take judicial notice of “a
fact which is not subject to reasonable dispute,” in that it is “[c]apable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.” OCGA § 24-2-201 (b) (2), (c). In taking judicial notice of a fact, the trial
court “dispens[es] with the need for any evidence regarding it.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Graham v. State, 275 Ga. 290, 293 (2) (565 SE2d 467) (2002);
Brown v. C & S Nat. Bank, 245 Ga. 515, 518 (265 SE2d 791) (1980) (in taking
judicial notice from the clerk’s calendar, the trial court “did not consider extrinsic
evidence”). “Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding,”5 and a plain
reading of the current version of OCGA § 24-2-201 dictates that the trial court can
take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact without giving the parties advance notice.
See OCGA § 24-2-201 (e) (2013) (“A party shall be entitled, upon timely request, to
an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor
of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, such request may be made
after judicial notice has been taken.”) (emphasis supplied). “[A] court has wide
discretion to take judicial notice of facts,” Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites
Distribution, LLC, 369 F3d 1197, 1204-1205 (IV) (A) (11th Cir. 2004) (applying Fed.
5
OCGA § 24-2-201 (f).
11
R. Evid. 201 (c)), although the process is “highly limited.” (Citation omitted.) Id. We
are mindful that the abuse-of-discretion standard, while not “toothless,” is “a
deferential standard of review.” (Citation omitted.) RES-GA LJY, LLC v. Y.D.I., Inc.,
322 Ga. App. 607, 609 (745 SE2d 820) (2013).
Here, the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that the transmittal of the
record had been deleted from the Supreme Court’s system. In doing so, it identified
its source of information as the email from the Supreme Court clerk, explained that
it had reviewed the email, and attached the email to its order, which bears the
Supreme Court insignia and a Supreme Court email address. See Valdivia v.
Schwarzenegger, 599 F3d 984, 994 (I) (G) (9th Cir. 2010) (“Judicial notice is used
to supplant authentication of ‘adjudicative facts.’”).
The Supreme Court’s clerk’s office “is the repository of . . . official documents
filed with the Court” and “is responsible for maintaining all case files and tracking
the progress of cases through the Supreme Court.”6 Clearly, the clerk’s office is the
official repository of the Court’s records. It is difficult to conceive of a more veritable
source than the actual clerk’s office for purposes of confirming that a record has been
deleted from the Supreme Court’s system and attesting to the status of the appeal once
6
https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/clerks-office/.
12
that deletion has occurred. And, as the Ethics Board aptly highlights, our case law is
replete with instances of trial and appellate courts depending and acting upon
information relayed by the clerk’s offices. See Taylor v. State, 285 Ga. App. 697,
701-702 (4) (647 SE2d 381) (2007) (“[T]he trial judge exercised informed and sound
discretion” by removing an empaneled juror after being informed by the clerk’s office
that the juror’s child had been admitted to the hospital); Farrar v. Georgia Bd. of
Examiners of Psychologists, 280 Ga. App. 455, 456 (634 SE2d 79) (2006) (“[T]he
superior court clerk’s office has informed us that it does not have a copy of these
transcripts.”); Kilgo v. Dept. of Corrections, 202 Ga. App. 50, 50 n.1 (413 SE2d 507)
(1991) (“We are informed by the clerk of the trial court that the . . . order was
subsequently vacated. . . .”); In Interest of J.B., 195 Ga. App. 520 (394 SE2d 143)
(1990) (“[W]e have been informed by the clerk of the juvenile court that the court’s
order was never reduced to a written order.”). See also In re Smith, 211 Ga. App. 493,
495 (1) (439 SE2d 725) (1993) (noting the “complex and on-going”
“interrelationship” between the court and its officers). Therefore, we determine that
the email correspondence from the Supreme Court’s docket clerk is a source whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, and the trial court did not abuse its
13
discretion in taking judicial notice of the fact that the transmittal of the record had
been deleted from the Supreme Court’s system.
Further, the trial court need not have announced its intention to take judicial
notice on the record in a “trial-type procedure,” as Hunter implies. Conceivably, the
better practice in these circumstances may be to hold another hearing. But OCGA §
24-2-201 (e) contemplates the possibility that there may not even be a hearing if no
party timely requests it. Jaycee Atlanta Dev., LLC v. Providence Bank, 330 Ga. App.
322, 324 (1) n.4 (765 SE2d 536) (2014) (“Under Georgia’s new Evidence Code, a
party is entitled to an opportunity to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice
only ‘upon timely request,’ which may be made ‘after judicial notice has been
taken.’”).7 In accordance with OCGA § 24-2-201 (e), Hunter could have requested
7
Before the new Evidence Code took effect, which established a hearing
procedure for judicial notice, the Supreme Court of Georgia determined that “if a trial
court is going to take judicial notice, it must do so on the record. . . .” Graves v. State,
269 Ga. 772 (504 SE2d 679) (1998), disapproved on other grounds by Jones v. State,
272 Ga. 900 (537 SE2d 80) (2000). The Court’s rationales were: (1) an appellate
court is otherwise hindered from reviewing a lower court’s findings; (2) an aggrieved
party must be able to challenge the deductions drawn from judicial notice or dispute
the notoriety or truth of the facts allegedly relied upon; and (3) in the absence of the
trial court’s announcing on the record an intention to take judicial notice, it might
appear that reviewing courts could resort to judicial notice to legitimize an otherwise
flawed decision without evidence that judicial notice actually was taken. Graves,
supra, 269 Ga. at 775 (4) (a). In its order, the trial court clearly identified the email
it had reviewed before enunciating that the record had been deleted. Compare In re
14
a hearing after the entry of the trial court’s final order. He simply failed to do so.
Additionally, we have scoured Hunter’s briefs and his motion for relief from the final
judgment, and we note that he has never contested the accuracy of the Supreme
Court’s clerk’s statement about the record being deleted. See Jaycee Atlanta Dev.,
LLC, supra, 330 Ga. App. at 324, n.4. Thus, the trial court did not commit any
reversible error in taking judicial notice of the status of the appeal.
3. Hunter argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for relief from
the final judgment because (1) the trial court did not hold a hearing on the motion,
which Hunter claims was effectively a motion for trial; and (2) ex parte
communications and corresponding violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct Rules
2.9 (A), (C), and (D) and Uniform Superior Court Rule 4.1 have “infected the process
in this case.” Both arguments lack merit.
(a) With regard to Hunter’s contention that he was not afforded a hearing,
USCR 6.3 provides: “Unless otherwise ordered by the court, all motions in civil
actions . . . shall be decided by the court without oral hearing, except motions for new
J.B., 289 Ga. App. 617, 619 (658 SE2d 194) (2008) (“[W]e can find no indication in
the record that the juvenile court took judicial notice of the fact that Hinesville is
located in Liberty County.”). None of the parties are claiming that there is any
ambiguity in this regard.
15
trial and motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” “[O]bjections which go
[to] the judgment only, and do not extend to the verdict i.e., the facts, cannot properly
be made grounds of a motion for new trial. A motion for new trial seeks to set aside
the verdict. No new trial is necessary to correct a judgment or decree.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) O’Neal v. Winn-Dixie of Atlanta, 195 Ga. App. 409, 410 (1)
(393 SE2d 473) (1990).
The grounds for Hunter’s motion for relief from judgment were that the initial
trial judge’s March 2018 order was “invalid” because it was the result of ex parte
contact and he had no opportunity to respond; the final judgment dismissing the
notice of appeal was improperly entered based on unexamined extrinsic evidence; and
the trial court had “lost all jurisdiction” over the case. Hunter “did not contest factual
issues or errors contributing to the verdict, but instead challenged only the trial
court’s legal conclusions and judgment.” Bank South Mtg., Inc. v. Starr, 208 Ga. App.
19 (429 SE2d 700) (1993). Simply put, Hunter’s allegations were that the trial court’s
judgments were erroneous, and “where it is only the judgment thereon which is
alleged to be erroneous or illegal, this alludes to a matter of law only and there is no
need for a new trial.” Sunn v. Mercury Marine, 166 Ga. App. 567, 568 (305 SE2d 6)
16
(1983). Therefore, we will not construe Hunter’s motion for relief from judgment as
a motion for new trial, and no hearing was required.
(b) Lastly, we reject Hunter’s argument that ex parte communications have
“infected the process in this case.”
Specifically, Hunter takes issue with the associate attorney’s conversation with
the initial trial judge’s law clerk after the record was transmitted. Here, however, lead
counsel promptly disclosed that the ex parte communication occurred, the initial trial
court judge almost immediately recused herself and requested that the clerk reassign
the case, and the case was reassigned to a new judge. The trial court then held a
hearing at which all parties appeared, represented by counsel, and offered argument.
In its written order that followed, the trial court indicated that it had considered the
parties’ pleadings, arguments, and post-hearing letter briefs, and requested that the
Supreme Court remand the record to allow a ruling on the motion to dismiss. We
therefore determine that “the intervention ex parte was cured by the subsequent
proceedings.” Ebon Foundation v. Oatman, 269 Ga. 340, 342 (1) (a) (498 SE2d 728)
(1998) (reversal not required because after the ex parte intervention the trial court
conducted hearings where all parties were represented by counsel and given the
opportunity to show why the earlier ruling should be set aside, and the trial court then
17
restated its previous ruling by written order after hearing argument and evidence and
considering the parties’ briefs); In re Estate of Sands-Kadel, 292 Ga. App. 343, 346
(3) (665 SE2d 46) (2008) (appellant failed to show harm resulting from “ex parte
communications” because the trial court judge recused from the case, and it was
reassigned by the court clerk to another judge in the circuit); Mary A. Stearns, P.C.
v. Williams-Murphy, 263 Ga. App. 239, 242 (1) (a) (587 SE2d 247) (2003)
(subsequent hearing “cured” any procedural defects with previous order that resulted
from ex parte hearing).8
In sum, Hunter’s arguments do not warrant reversal, and we affirm the trial
court’s order dismissing his appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Judgment affirmed. Rickman and Reese, JJ., concur.
8
Our conclusion dispenses with Hunter’s argument that the Supreme Court was
“misled” by Gwinnett County into acting on the appeal under the false premise that
the attorneys had all agreed that the record was sent prematurely. As discussed, after
the recusal of the first trial court judge, the trial court ultimately heard from the
parties and issued its own request for the Supreme Court to remand the record.
18