Graves v. Builders Steel Supply

McMurray, Presiding Judge.

In this workers’ compensation case, we are called upon to decide whether claimant’s injury arose out of his employment. In making our decision, we apply the holding enunciated in Pike v. Md. Cas. Co., 107 Ga. App. 49 (129 SE2d 78): “If an employee is injured while doing something in the interest of his employer, which is reasonably necessary or incident to his regular work, the injury arises out of his employment. This is true even though the employee has no special permission from the employer to do the particular act and it is beyond the scope of his regular duties.” Id. at 51.

Claimant was employed as a grinder by the employer. In that capacity, claimant used a grinding machine to smooth steel fence parts. One afternoon, after finishing his work, claimant noticed that a belt on a drill press was loose. The drill press had been used by a company employee who was not on the premises at the time. Claimant was not authorized to use the drill press. He was acquainted with it, however, because he used a similar machine in high school.

Claimant tried to replace the belt on the drill press. In the process, it started up and claimant’s finger was injured. Subsequently, a portion of claimant’s finger was amputated.

Claimant sought a hearing when the employer controverted his claim for benefits. After a consideration of the evidence, the administrative law judge entered an award in favor of the employer. The board (with one member dissenting) reversed. It found that “claimant was injured while performing a task which was in the interest of the employer.” Citing Pike v. Md. Cas. Co., 107 Ga. App. 49, supra, it concluded that claimant’s injury arose out of his employment. The superior court reversed the award of compensation, concluding that the act of replacing the belt was not reasonably necessary or incident to claimant’s regular work.

We granted claimant’s application for discretionary review and this appeal followed. Held:

Our Workers’ Compensation Act is “a humanitarian measure” which should be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes. Samuel v. Baitcher, 247 Ga. 71, 73 (274 SE2d 327). Liberally construing the Act, we are led to conclude that claimant sustained a compensable injury.

Claimant operated a grinding machine; he was injured when he attempted to replace a belt on a drill press which had been used by a co-employee. In our view, the gap between claimant’s regular work and the repair of the drill press is narrow enough to conclude that the attempted repair was an incident of claimant’s regular work. See Pike v. Md. Cas. Co., 107 Ga. App. 49, 51, supra; Employers Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 382 (133 SE2d 39). See also Houser v. Young, 25 S2d 421 (Ala. 1946). To hold otherwise is simply unreasonable. “[I]t would be contrary not only to human nature but to the employer’s best interests to forbid employees to help each other on pain of losing compensation benefits for any injuries thereby sustained.” 1A Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 27.12.

The evidence was sufficient to support the board’s conclusion that claimant’s injury arose out of his employment. Claimant was injured while performing an act which benefitted the employer; the act was an incident of claimant’s regular work. See Pike v. Md. Cas. Co., 107 Ga. App. 49, 51, supra. It follows that the superior court erred in reversing the award of the board. Banks v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 160 Ga. App. 18 (286 SE2d 309). See also Clark v. Ga. Kraft Co., 178 Ga. App. 884, 886 (345 SE2d 61).

Judgment reversed.

Deen, P. J., Carley, Sognier, Pope and Ben-ham, JJ., concur. Deen, P. J., also concurs specially. Birdsong, C. J., Banke, P. J., and Beasley, J., dissent.