Farmer v. State

Birdsong, Judge.

This is an interlocutory appeal of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence and a ruling that a confession was admissible in evidence. Farmer contends the trial court erred (1) by finding that there was probable cause to search appellant or that items seized were admissible; and (2) in finding appellant’s oral statement voluntary.

Based on the evidence adduced, the trial court was warranted in concluding the following factual setting. An assistant high school principal (Damron) went into the boys’ restroom before classes started on November 21,1979. Twelve to fifteen boys were gathered around Farmer by the window. Suspecting that Farmer might have been smoking a cigarette in violation of school rules, the school official told him to empty his jacket pockets. When Farmer refused to show the principal what he had in one pocket, Damron attempted to pull Farmer’s hand from the jacket pocket. During the ensuing struggle, Damron observed Farmer holding a number of crumpled one dollar bills and what Damron believed to be hand-rolled marijuana cigarettes. Farmer was taken to the principal’s office and searched. Neither the cigarettes nor any other marijuana was found on Farmer. Farmer’s mother and the police were called. Detective Dodd came to the school and was informed of these facts. Dodd advised Damron to swear out a warrant against Farmer for simple assault, because Dodd was of the opinion there was insufficient evidence to arrest Farmer for marijuana possession. Thereafter Dodd searched Farmer and found two cigarette packages containing hand-rolled cigarettes hidden in appellant’s underwear. Dodd testified that he placed Farmer under arrest for simple assault prior to searching him.

After Farmer was arrested he was advised of his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694)) at the school and then taken to jail. There Farmer was read “a standardized Miranda rights form,” and asked if he had any questions about the “rights” form, if he understood “and he acknowledged by signing the Miranda rights form.” Thereafter Farmer told Dodd he had been selling marijuana cigarettes in the restroom at the time Damron entered. Held:

1. Farmer, an eighteen-year-old student, has confessed that he had been “caught with the goods” as to possession of marijuana.

As to the search we are bound by State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 495 (216 SE2d 586), wherein that opinion states: “The law recognizes that students through the secondary school grades do not have the maturity of the adult citizen. To the end that they may be formed and educated, they are subject to the control of others in various circumstances. The citizen on the street is subject only to the restraints of the criminal law; but the student in school is subject additionally to all reasonable school rules and regulations. The administrators to whom we accord the right to make such rules and regulations must be allowed to enforce them. See generally, Note, Balancing In Loco Parentis and the Constitution, 26 U. Fla. L. Rev. 271 (1974).”

Presiding Justice Jordan in his special concurrence in that case further stated: “In my opinion the action of the assistant principal was clearly reasonable under the lower standard of reasonableness applicable to a school community situation. A school official stands in loco parentis to the student under his authority. In the performance of his duties he must be allowed reasonable bounds for the preservation of order and discipline.”

The search by the school official in the case sub judice was in support of school rules and regulations. It was a minimal and reasonable extension of loco parentis care and control while the student was at school. The fact that a law enforcement officer assisted the teacher and parents at school would not under Young, supra, make the questioning, investigation, search, arrest, or confession unreasonable. A school official was present. The appellant’s mother was present and stated to Dodd that she had found marijuana on her son before. Dodd was on the school premises with the permission and apparent consent of school officials and the mother acting under the doctrine of loco parentis. In addition to this appellant voluntarily said he wanted to talk to Dodd. The acts of the latter and the acts of the school officer were within the reasonable bounds of preservation of order and discipline necessary while at the public school.

2. As to the police officer’s “strip” search, the assistant principal’s disclosure of facts to Dodd that he observed a crumpled packet of hand-rolled cigarettes, a number of one dollar bills, and a group of students gathered around the appellant would give rise to a reasonable belief that school rules probably were being breached and that illicit traffic in drugs was occurring. State v. Medders, 153 Ga. App. 680, 681 (266 SE2d 331). The police officer was present only because he was invited by school officials, and he continued the investigation only after being told by appellant’s mother that she did not want to handle the situation privately. Thus, the conclusion is irresistible that the officer was acting as an extension of an arm of school discipline at the time of the search. Moreover, in spite of the police officer’s belief that probable cause was lacking as to the possession or sale of marijuana because no marijuana ultimately was found by the assistant principal, the trial court still had the independent duty to determine objectively if probable cause was present. We are satisfied that probable cause to arrest and search existed in spite of the subjective feelings of the officer. United States v. Clark, 559 F2d 420, 425 (4) (5th Cir. 1977). But whether the search is supported by a reasonable belief that Farmer illegally possessed marijuana, or was based upon the arrest for simple assault, the search was lawful. The arresting officer was unequivocal in his testimony that the “strip” search did not occur until after appellant had been arrested. There is no real dispute that an assault occurred. It has repeatedly been held that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a lawful search. United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (94 SC 467, 38 LE2d 427); State v. Handspike, 240 Ga. 176 (240 SE2d 1); Mitchell v. State, 136 Ga. App. 658 (222 SE2d 160).

Moreover, we have no hesitancy in concluding that appellant’s statement that he had been selling marijuana for a dollar a “stick” was properly admitted. The officer testified he gave a full warning to appellant at the school and later, at the station house had the appellant execute a waiver of rights which included a full Miranda warning. The officer testified that appellant gave every indication of having a full comprehension and understanding of those rights. The trial court was presented with an issue of fact based upon appellant’s apparent difficulty with reading. The trial court resolved that issue against the appellant. We find ample evidence to support the conclusions made by the trial court. See Farley v. State, 145 Ga. App. 98 (243 SE2d 322) (holding that mental deficiency alone is not enough to establish involuntariness) and Smith v. State, 146 Ga. App. 444, 445 (1) (246 SE2d 454) (holding that an arrest for probable cause does not necessarily lead to a coerced statement). The trial court did not err in its denial of the motion to suppress or the admission of Farmer’s confession.

Argued June 4, 1980 Decided December 4, 1980 Rehearing denied December 19, 1980 Barry Hazen, for appellant. Steve Williams, District Attorney, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Deen, C. J., Quillian, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Shulman, Banke and Carley, JJ., concur. Smith and Sognier, JJ., dissent.