Rajappa v. State

Sognier, Chief Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

I agree with appellant that the evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient to establish a violation of OCGA § 16-10-25 beyond a reasonable doubt so as to satisfy the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). The accusation issued in this case charged appellant with violating OCGA § 16-10-25 by giving the officers the name of “Nini Vankat.” I find the State did not establish the essential element of falsely stating the name of “Nini Vankat” because Officer Dodson testified that appellant said her name was “Mini Vankat,” and Officer Biumi testified that appellant could have said either “Nini” or “Mini” Vankat. Accord Preston v. State, 257 Ga. 42, 44 (1) (354 SE2d 135) (1987). Further, given the officers’ admitted difficulty in understanding appellant’s statements; their acknowledged inability to speak or read appellant’s native language; appellant’s unchallenged testimony concerning the difference in customs between “first” and “last” names in the United States and India; and considering the obvious similarity between appellant’s nickname and what she gave as the shortened version of her last name (which she testified had the same meaning in her language as the full name) and the name Officer Dodson testified appellant gave them, I cannot conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential element of intent to deceive beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, supra at 319; see generally Teston v. State, 194 Ga. App. 324 (390 SE2d 437) (1990). I disagree with the majority’s reliance on Douglas v. State, 194 Ga. App. 182 (390 SE2d 98) (1990) on the issue of intent to deceive because in that case the defendant subsequently admitted giving a false name to the arresting officers, whereas here appellant insisted the name she gave was correct and gave a logical explanation to support her claim. Johnson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 273 (253 SE2d 889) (1979) is similarly distinguishable because unlike appellant in the case sub judice, the defendant in Johnson gave police a name that was not remotely similar to the name on his identification, and he made no explanation for the discrepancy.

For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.

I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Presiding Judge Banke, and Presiding Judge Birdsong join in this dissent.

Decided July 9, 1991. Robert H. McDonnell, for appellant. Ralph T. Bowden, Jr., Solicitor, Gary D. Bergman, Cliff Howard, Assistant Solicitors, for appellee.