Williams v. State

Beasley, Chief Judge.

A vehicle used by Rodney Bernard Gude to transport crack cocaine was seized by law enforcement officers pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-49 (g). Thereafter, Gude’s girl friend, Pamela Williams, filed a claim to the vehicle alleging to be the owner. In response, the State filed an in rem complaint for forfeiture under OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) alleging that Gude was the true owner of the vehicle; that the vehicle was titled in Williams’ name for the purpose of disguising Gude’s ownership of the vehicle; that Gude had been observed to have had exclusive use of the vehicle in the past; and that Williams was a mere nominee or strawperson.

Williams answered but the trial court granted the State’s motion for judgment of forfeiture and disposition of property on the ground that Williams’ answer failed to satisfy the pleading requirements of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3). Williams appeals.

“It is well established that the legislature may impose pleading requirements in special statutory proceedings in addition to those found in the Civil Practice Act and in such cases, the sufficiency of a pleading must be judged in light of the specific statutory requirements.” State of Ga. v. Alford, 264 Ga. 243, 245 (2) (a) (444 SE2d 76) (1994).

OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3) (D), (E), and (F) provide that an answer asserting a claim to property subject to forfeiture must set forth, inter alia, the “circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition of the interest in the property!,] • • • [t]he specific provision of this Code section relied on in asserting that the property is not subject to forfeiture . . . [and] [a]ll essential facts supporting each assertion.”

Claimant Williams’ verified answer, which incorporates copies of her certificate of title to the subject car and the tag registration, “set[s] forth” the items required by OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3) concerning her relationship to the car and to Rodney Gude’s alleged crime. Considering her answer in its entirety, she asserts that she purchased the used 1984 four-door Deville Cadillac on January 29, 1994, from Dixie Auto Sales in Decatur, Georgia, that seller had a first lien or security interest, that she was solely responsible for payment of the purchase loan, that the lien or security interest of seller Dixie Auto Sales had been released on March 2, 1995, that there were currently no other interest holders besides herself, that Gude had driven her vehicle in the past, and that the vehicle is used by her for personal transportation.

Although the State contends Williams did not specifically aver that she purchased the car, the registration shows her as the owner, Dixie Auto Sales as both the lienholder and “the party from whom purchased” on January 29, 1994, Pamela Williams as “the purchaser whose name appears above,” and what is apparently her signature attesting that this information is correct on penalty of fine or imprisonment. To deny her a hearing because she incorporated documents showing this but did not repeat elsewhere in her answer that she purchased the car from Dixie Auto Sales on that date would elevate form over substance to an intolerable degree.

Williams’ eight-page answer is a far cry from the two-paragraph response which was held to be insufficient in Alford, supra. That answer, which Alford conceded at oral argument was insufficient under OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3), merely denied all allegations of the State’s complaint except the description of the property (cocaine, cash, handgun, mobile home, and its land) and, by amendment, included citations to the “innocent owner” provisions of OCGA § 16-13-49 (e). Williams’ answer, on the other hand, provided all the information required by subsection (o) (3) to be in the pleading.

The State faults Williams for providing no details in her answer as to the circumstances of her acquisition of the car. But the statute does not require that, and the statute must be strictly construed, not judicially amplified. Lang v. State of Ga., 168 Ga. App. 693, 695 (4) (310 SE2d 276) (1983). Besides, Williams gave the date of her purchase, the name of the dealership from which she bought the car, and the information that the car was financed by the seller. If such details are contemplated by subsection (o) (3) (F), she provided them. The statute does not suggest that she must state and swear that she earned the money to pay for the car by way of labor or investment or got the funds from a relative or some other benefactor. Nor does it require that documentary proof of purchase be included with or in the answer. That may be aired at the hearing, but this is merely the pleading stage.

Part of the intent of the legislature in enacting the very detailed and precise scheme in OCGA § 16-13-49 is “to protect the interests of innocent property owners.” Alford, supra at 245. The pleading requirement must be construed to implement that intent. Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681 (279 SE2d 430) (1981). True, there is another judicially discerned legislative intent, i.e., to provide for the prompt disposition of contraband property. See Alford, supra at 245, and cases cited thereat. But the desire for speed is not a higher value than that of protecting the rights of innocent property owners. See State of Ga. v. Jackson, 197 Ga. App. 619, 620-621 (1) (399 SE2d 88) (1990). That includes a hearing soon after a sufficient answer is filed by the party who wishes return of the property from the custody of the State. OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5).

The State also argues that Williams failed to point to any provision of the statute which she relies on in asserting that the car was not subject to forfeiture (subsection (o) (3) (E)). But she expressly and under oath claims each of the negative facts required to establish herself as an innocent owner under subsection (e). In other words, she is not asserting that any other procedural or substantive impediment forecloses forfeiture, such as that, for example, the complaint is deficient (subsection (o) (1)), or the action was brought in the wrong county (subsection (c)), or the property was seized without probable cause (subsection (g) (2)). Of course, she must, as the statute states, “establish” these facts by proof at the hearing, but the case is merely at the pleading stage.

Unlike the unsigned and uninformative conclusory claim in State of Ga. v. Cannon, 214 Ga. App. 897, 898 (449 SE2d 519) (1994), or the partially false and deficient answer in Mitchell v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. App. 282 (457 SE2d 237) (1995), or the conclusory claim in Jackson v. State of Ga., 218 Ga. App. 437, 439 (461 SE2d 594) (1995), Williams’ answer sufficiently met the mandate of the statute “so as to assure some degree of legitimacy to the claim and to [provide] supportive factual information so as to expedite the proceeding.” Cannon, supra at 898.

The judgment of forfeiture is reversed and the case remanded for a hearing within 60 days after receipt of the remittitur. See OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5).

Judgment reversed.

Pope, P. J., Andrews, Johnson and Ruffin, JJ, concur. McMurray, P. J, Birdsong, P. J., Blackburn and Smith, JJ., dissent.