DocketNumber： 76270
Judges： Carley, Sognier, Deen
Filed Date： 5/2/1988
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 11/8/2024
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty of the offense of homicide by vehicle in the first degree. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered on the jury’s verdict.
1. The trial court, over appellant’s chain-of-custody objection, admitted into evidence two vials of blood and the results of the blood-alcohol test conducted thereon. Appellant enumerates this evidentiary ruling as error. He urges that a proper chain of custody was not established in that the vials were stored in an unlocked refrigerator prior to their being taken to the crime laboratory for testing.
“What [appellant] seeks is that the [S]tate, in order to render the evidence admissible, be required to negate all possibilities of tampering or error while the [blood] was in the [refrigerator]. This is not the law. . . . ‘The evidence shows that the blood sample was handled in the normal course of testing and there is nothing in the record that creates a suspicion that the blood tested was other than that taken from the [appellant]. The identity of such blood samples need not be proved beyond all possibility of doubt or that all possibility of tampering with them be excluded. The circumstances need only establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the sample.’ ” Meadows v. State, 135 Ga. App. 758, 758-759 (219 SE2d 174) (1975). “[T]here is no evidence that [the blood] was in any way tampered with [while in the refrigerator]; the evidence shows it had been sealed and not unsealed until tested and [there was] positive testimony that no one had tampered with the sample. . . .” Williams v. State, 145 Ga. App. 81, 83 (3) (243 SE2d 614) (1978). A proper chain of custody was clearly established and the trial court correctly admitted the blood and test results into evidence.
2. The trial court’s failure to sustain an objection to the admission of testimony which appellant characterizes as an inadmissible legal opinion is enumerated as error. The specific contention is that,
A review of the record shows that the police officer did not give an opinion as to the legal concept of implied consent. What he did was to give a description of the police procedures that were followed before the blood-alcohol tests were administered to appellant. Moreover, even if we were to assume that the trial court had committed error in admitting the officer’s testimony, that error was harmless. It was “highly probable that the admission of the testimony . . . did not contribute to the verdict. [Cits.]” Little v. State, 165 Ga. App. 389, 392 (3) (300 SE2d 540) (1983).
3. Appellant made two unsuccessful motions for mistrial during the prosecuting attorney’s closing argument. The denials of those motions are enumerated as error.
With regard to the first motion, the trial court denied a mistrial but did give the jury curative instructions. Appellant thereafter failed to renew his motion for mistrial. “Where the trial judge gives corrective instructions and thereafter counsel fails to request further instruction or renew his motion for mistrial, an enumeration addressed to such ground is without merit. [Cit.]” Chandler v. State, 143 Ga. App. 608, 609 (2) (239 SE2d 158) (1977).
Appellant made his second motion for mistrial when the prosecuting attorney’s argument touched upon the topic of the deceased victim. “ ‘Counsel is permitted, in the sound discretion of the court, to argue all reasonable inferences and deductions which may be drawn from the evidence. . . . [Cits.] The discretion of the trial court in handling these matters will not be disturbed on appeal except in clear cases of abuse and we find none here.’ [Cits.]” Minor v. State, 143 Ga. App. 457, 458 (2) (238 SE2d 582) (1977). See also Brand v. Wofford, 230 Ga. 750, 754 (9) (199 SE2d 231) (1973). The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for mistrial.
Judgment affirmed.