Worlds v. the State

THIRD DIVISION
BARNES, P. J.,
BOGGS and BRANCH, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/
August 14, 2014
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A14A1112. WORLDS v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Judge.
We granted Teresa Worlds’ interlocutory application in this case to determine
whether a trailer hitch ball installed on the bumper of a vehicle in front of the rear
license plate “obstructs or hinders the clear display and legibility of a license plate”
within the meaning of OCGA § 40-2-41. Worlds appeals from the trial court’s denial
of her motion to suppress, urging that the trial court erred in concluding that her
license plate was obstructed, thus justifying a traffic stop. We disagree and affirm.
“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply the
‘any evidence’ standard, which means that we sustain all of the trial court’s findings
of fact that are supported by any evidence. We construe all evidence presented in
favor of the trial court’s findings and judgment.” (Citation, punctuation, and footnote
omitted.) Davis v. State, 302 Ga. App. 144, 144-145 (690 SE2d 464) (2010). Because
Worlds “intensely cross-examined the officer and challenged his credibility” in the
hearing on the motion to suppress, we “do not apply a de novo standard of review,
which applies only where the facts are undisputed.” (Citation and footnote omitted.)
Id. at 145.
So construed, the evidence showed that in November 2012, a police officer
stopped Worlds’ vehicle after he observed “that the fourth digit [of her license plate]
was obstructed by the attached ball hitch.”1 During the stop, the officer discovered
drugs in plain view in the vehicle. At the hearing on her motion to suppress, Worlds
introduced photographs of her vehicle purporting to show that the license plate was
not obscured by the hitch. The officer, however, testified that the photographs did not
show the plate as it appeared to him when he made the traffic stop, because they were
taken at a different angle and distance and not while the two vehicles were moving.
At least one of Worlds’ photographs, moreover, shows the fourth digit on the license
plate partially obstructed by the bumper hitch, as testified to by the officer. The video
1
While the officer testified that he initially followed Worlds’ vehicle because
he observed it leaving “a high drug area,” “the stop of a vehicle is authorized, and not
pretextual, if the officer observed a traffic offense.” (Citations, punctuation, and
footnote omitted.) Nelson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 455 (1) (544 SE2d 189) (2001).
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recording of the stop is of poor quality, but the video shows the bumper hitch
concealing at least one of the license plate numbers, and the officer’s recorded
comment to dispatch states that he cannot read the entire tag. The trial court
concluded, “based upon the officer’s testimony, the video recording and the
photographs put into evidence by the defense, that the clear display and legibility of
the plate was obstructed by the ball hitch in this case, giving the officer a valid basis
to stop the vehicle driven by the Defendant.”
1. Worlds contends that a single, partially obscured digit on a license plate does
not violate the law. The applicable Code section provides:
OCGA § 40-2-41. Display of license plates
Unless otherwise permitted under this chapter, every vehicle required to
be registered under this chapter, which is in use upon the highways,
shall at all times display the license plate issued to the owner for such
vehicle, and the plate shall be fastened to the rear of the vehicle in a
position so as not to swing and shall be at all times plainly visible. No
person shall display on the rear of a motor vehicle any temporary or
permanent plate or tag not issued by the State of Georgia which is
intended to resemble a license plate which is issued by the State of
Georgia. The commissioner is authorized to adopt rules and regulations
so as to permit the display of a license plate on the front of certain
vehicles. It shall be the duty of the operator of any vehicle to keep the
license plate legible at all times. No license plate shall be covered with
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any material unless the material is colorless and transparent. No
apparatus that obstructs or hinders the clear display and legibility of a
license plate shall be attached to the rear of any motor vehicle required
to be registered in the state. Any person who violates any provision of
this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
(Emphasis supplied.) The fact that the plate was only partially obstructed does not
change the fact that the hitch “hindered” the “clear display” of the plate and that part
of it was not “legible.” See, e.g., State v. Davis, 283 Ga. App. 200, 201 (1) (641 SE2d
205) (2007) (plate cover that partially obscured name of state violated Code section,
even though officer recognized state of origin); Nelson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 455,
456 (1) (544 SE2d 189) (2001) (black plate border obscured name of state but not
numbers; “the statute does not specify that only certain portions of the tag must not
be obscured.”) And
we must defer to the trial court’s determination on the credibility of
witnesses, and the trial court’s ruling on disputed facts must be accepted
unless it is clearly erroneous. Under these circumstances, the trial court
was authorized to reject [Worlds’ witness’] testimony and to believe [the
officer’s] testimony. . . . And when an officer observes a traffic law
violation, the resulting stop is not pretextual.
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(Citation and footnote omitted.) Bailey v. State, 283 Ga. App. 365, 367 (1) (641 SE2d
548) (2006) (appellant stopped for failure to wear seat belt and obscured decal). State
v. Aguirre, 229 Ga. App. 736 (494 SE2d 576) (1997), cited by Worlds, is not
dispositive because of our standard of review. There, we deferred to the trial court’s
conclusion that the writing on a temporary tag was legible and that the officer’s stop
was pretextual, observing that “in the absence of evidence of record demanding a
finding contrary to the judge’s determination, the appellate court will not reverse the
ruling sustaining a motion to suppress. [Cits.]” Id. at 737.2 Here, the trial court’s
conclusion was supported by the evidence, including the officer’s testimony that he
was unable to read the entire license plate and the video showing that he gave several
alternative numbers to dispatch based upon those numbers that he could read, and the
evidence did not demand a contrary finding.
2. Worlds also argues that OCGA § 40-2-41 applies only to items such as a
plate cover that are attached to the license plate itself, not to other items attached to
the motor vehicle, such as a trailer hitch attached directly to the bumper. OCGA § 40-
2
We have observed that Aguirre is also factually distinguishable because it
“affirmed the grant of a motion to suppress because the temporary Ohio license tag
was covered only by a clear plastic cover which the evidence showed had no effect
on the legibility of the tag.” (Citation and footnote omitted; emphasis in original.)
Nelson, supra, 247 Ga. App. at 456.
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2-41 provides in pertinent part that the license plate “shall be at all times plainly
visible,” that “[i]t shall be the duty of the operator of any vehicle to keep the license
plate legible at all times,” and that “[n]o apparatus that obstructs or hinders the clear
display and legibility of a license plate shall be attached to the rear of any motor
vehicle required to be registered in the state.” Georgia decisions have interpreted this
Code section to forbid license plate frames and covers that obscure portions of the
plate. See Davis, supra, 283 Ga. App. at 201 (1), Bailey, Nelson, and Aguirre, supra;
see also Wilson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 286-287 (1) (702 SE2d 2) (2010) (registration
decal). But the question of whether the statute forbids items other than those attached
to the license plate itself has not been addressed in Georgia.
Other states, however, have determined that a bumper hitch that obscures part
of a license plate violates a statute requiring that a plate be “plainly visible” or
“legible.” In People v. White, 93 Cal. App. 4th 1022 (113 CalRptr2d 584) (2001), a
deputy testified that he stopped White because the bumper hitch on his pickup truck
blocked the lower half of the middle numeral on the license plate. Id. at 1024. The
trial court granted White’s motion to suppress because it believed the statute dealt
only with “dirt or grit or grime or material on the license plate.” Id. The California
Court of Appeal considered the applicable Vehicle Code section 5201, which
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provided: “License plates shall at all times be . . . mounted in a position to be clearly
visible, and shall be maintained in a condition so as to be clearly legible.” The court
concluded that partial obstruction by a trailer hitch ball violated this Code section
because “a license plate must not be obstructed in any manner and must be entirely
readable.” Id. at 1026. It therefore reversed the trial court’s grant of the motion to
suppress. Id.
In Parks v. State, 2011 WY 19 (247 P3d 857) (2011), as here, a “trailer hitch
ball was mounted in a predrilled hole in the truck’s factory bumper so that the license
plate was partially obstructed.” 247 P3d at 858. The applicable law, Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§31-2-205, provided that a license plate shall be “plainly visible” and “[m]aintained
free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible.” Id. at 858-859.
The Wyoming Supreme Court concluded:
The requirements that a license plate be “plainly visible” and “clearly
legible” indicate that a license plate must not be obstructed in any
manner. This interpretation is in accord with the purpose of the statute.
License plates need to be easily read in order to facilitate law
enforcement and ordinary citizens in reporting and investigating
hit-and-run accidents, traffic violations, gas-pump drive offs, and other
criminal activity. . . . Law enforcement officers frequently must
determine from tag numbers whether a vehicle is stolen; whether it is
properly registered; or whether its occupant is suspected of a crime, is
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the subject of a warrant, or is thought to be armed. The plain language
and the purpose of the statute indicate that a trailer ball mounted in a
place that causes it to partially obstruct a license plate from view is a
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-205.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 860. Here, once the officer stopped
Worlds’ vehicle and was able to read the complete license plate number, he
discovered that the vehicle’s registration was suspended and there was no valid
insurance on it.
The Florida Court of Appeal in Harris v. State, 11 So3d 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 2009), reached a different result based upon Fla. Stat. § 316.605(1),
requiring that numbers and other marks on license plates “shall be clear and distinct
and free from defacement, mutilation, grease, and other obscuring matter.” Id. at 463
(Emphasis in original). The court applied the statutory construction principle of
“ejusdem generis” to hold that the language “other obscuring matter” applied “only
to matter on the tag itself” and that “[m]atters external to the tag, such as trailer
hitches, bicycle racks, handicap chairs, u-hauls, and the like are not covered by the
statute.” Id. at 463-464.3
3
Similarly, in People v. Gaytan, 2013 Ill. App. 4th 120217 (992 NE2d 17, 25-
26) (2013), the Appellate Court of Illinois construed a statute requiring that “[e]very
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The court acknowledged that its holding was in the minority on this point,
noting White, supra, as well as decisions from New Mexico and Ohio finding that
statutes with the “clearly legible” or “visible” language prohibited license plates
partially obscured by trailer hitches. Id. at 464.4 Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Wyoming in Parks, supra, observes that “a number of jurisdictions have considered
this issue and nearly all have determined that a trailer hitch that partially obstructs a
license plate is a traffic violation,” citing United States district court decisions from
Kansas and a Washington State Court of Appeals decision as well as the decisions
cited by the Florida court. 247 P3d at 861.
Bearing in mind these decisions, the plain wording of OCGA § 40-2-41 does
not limit its prohibition to items attached to the license plate itself, but includes any
registration plate . . . shall be maintained in a condition to be clearly legible, free from
any materials that would obstruct the visibility of the plate, including, but not limited
to, glass covers and plastic covers.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 992 NE2d at 20-21
(II) (B). The court held that this provision applied only to materials attached to the
plate and not to a trailer ball hitch. The court noted the distinction between statutes
using the “clearly/plainly legible” and “visible” language and the Illinois and Florida
statutes which refer to the plate itself. Id. at 22-23 (II) (B).
4
The Florida court also cited to a different Ohio Court of Appeals case holding
that the trial court did not err in granting a motion to suppress when a state trooper
contended that a portion of the defendant’s license plate was obscured by a trailer
hitch, but that decision does not consider the wording of the applicable statute, if any.
State v. Ronau, 2002 Ohio 6687, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6480 (Ohio App. 2002).
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“apparatus” that is “attached to the rear of any motor vehicle” (emphasis supplied),
such as the bumper hitch at issue here. It is not clear whether a distinction can be
made between an attachment that obscures the license plate and is more or less
permanent – such as a trailer ball bolted to the vehicle itself – and a temporary
attachment such as a separate, removable trailer hitch inserted into a receiver welded
to the vehicle frame, a bicycle rack whether loaded or unloaded, or a hitch tray or step
folded in an upright position against the rear of the vehicle or piled high with
luggage. But that is not a question that need be answered here, although the General
Assembly would be the proper body to clarify the point.
Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Branch, J., concur.
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