DocketNumber: 59679, 59680
Citation Numbers: 275 S.E.2d 769, 156 Ga. App. 698
Judges: Banke, Birdsong, Carley, Deen, McMurray, Quillian, Shulman, Smith, Sognier
Filed Date: 12/4/1980
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 8/21/2023
This case arises out of a dispute over the adoption and custody of Mary Angela Evans, age 3. The Daveys are her maternal aunt, uncle and grandparents, all residents of Cartersville, Bartow County,
1. Under both Georgia and Tennessee law, it appears that Mary Angela was a domiciliary of Tennessee at the time of her parents’ death. See Code § 79-404; Hayslip v. Gillis, 123 Ga. 263 (51 SE 325) (1905); Sailors v. Spainhour, 98 Ga. App. 475, 479 (106 SE2d 82) (1958). Appellants, citing Huff v. Moore, 144 Ga. App. 668 (242 SE2d 329) (1978), and Herrin v. Graham, 87 Ga. App. 291 (73 SE2d 572) (1952), contend that, since the child’s domicile is in Tennessee, the Georgia courts are without jurisdiction to grant an adoption. Appellees argue that, under current Georgia law, the domicile of the child is not controlling.
The asserted domicile requirement has its origin in former Code § 74-402, which provided: “The petition for adoption... shall be filed ... in the superior court of the county in which said child shall be domiciled . . .” See Portman v. Mobley, 158 Ga. 269 (123 SE 695) (1924). In 1941, the adoption jurisdiction statute was amended. The new law provided: “All petitions for adoption shall be filed in the county in which the adopting parent or parents reside, except that upon good cause being shown, the court... may allow the petition to be filed in the county of the child’s domicile, or in the county in which is located any licensed child-placing agency having legal custody of the child . . .” Although the adoption jurisdiction statute no longer required that the child be domiciled in a county of this state, this court continued to adhere to the requirement that the child reside or be domiciled in Georgia. In Herrin v. Graham, supra at 292, this court held: “It would seem that, in order for a superior court of Georgia to have jurisdiction of an adoption proceeding, the child to be adopted must be domiciled in, or be a resident of this State.” Several subsequent opinions of this court expressly relied on the holding in Herrin. See Altree v. Head, 90 Ga. App. 601, 604 (83 SE2d 683) (1954); Carpenter v. Forshee, 103 Ga. App. 758 (120 SE2d 786) (1961); Huff v.
We now address this contention and hold that the residence or domicile of the child in this state is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to adoption where the adoption proceeding is brought in the county of the adopting parents’ residence. Rather, jurisdiction for adoption is governed by the express language of Code § 74-401: “The superior courts of the several counties shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of adoption, except such jurisdiction as may be granted to the juvenile courts. All petitions for adoption shall be filed in the county in which the adopting parent(s) resides, except that upon good cause being shown, the court of the county of the child’s domicile or of the county in which is located any licensed child-placing agency having legal custody of the child sought to be adopted may, in its discretion, allow the petition to be filed in that court.” “If the statute is silent as to any requirement of residence of the person who petitions for the adoption, or of the residence of the child within the state, it is generally held that such terms will not be implied, and the mere presence of the parties appears to be sufficient basis for jurisdiction.” 2 AmJur2d 901, Adoption , § 50. Our holding is consistent with the position adopted in other jurisdictions whose statutory provisions are similar to our own (see Pascual v. O’Shea, 421 FSupp 80 (D. Hawaii 1976); Petition of J.E.G. and M.K.G., 357 A2d 855 (Dist. Col. App. 1976); Annot. 33 ALR3d 176), and clearly reflects the intent of the legislature.
It is undisputed that Mary Angela has lived in Georgia since her parents’ death, spending most of this time in Richmond County. She is not in this state by virtue of any wrongful conduct. Appellees are residents of the county in which the adoption petition was filed. We
2. Appellants assert that Mary Angela cannot be adopted until a guardian is duly appointed. We cannot agree. Although the adoption petition must state “whether the child has a guardian of its person” (Code § 74-407(a)), we are aware of no requirement that a guardian must be appointed before an adoption is legally permissible. “In adoption proceedings . . . the best interest of the child is always a prime factor to be considered by the court.” Owens v. Griggs, 151 Ga. App. 730 (261 SE2d 463) (1979). In the absence of any evidence showing that the failure to appoint a guardian is not in the best interest of the child, the failure to appoint a guardian is not cause for reversal.
3. Appellants challenge the adoption on the merits. However, “[t]he trial judge, who has the opportunity to observe the adults and children involved in a proceeding for adoption, and to listen to their testimony, has a wide discretion in determining whether the petition should be granted, and if the judgment is supported by any substantial evidence it should be affirmed by this court. Nix v. Sanders, 136 Ga. App. 859 (223 SE2d 21) (1975).” Weaver v. Deen, 151 Ga. App. 152 (259 SE2d 156) (1979). There being substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination that granting the adoption is in the best interest of the child, we will not interfere.
4. In their cross-appeal, appellees challenge the trial court’s finding that “Mary Angela Evans remains a resident and domiciliary of the State of Tennessee.” In view of our holding in Division 1 of this opinion, appellees’ cross-appeal is moot and is therefore dismissed. See Peacock v. Cox, 243 Ga. 261 (253 SE2d 728) (1979).
Judgment affirmed on main appeal; cross-appeal dismissed.
See also Ga. L. 1977, pp. 202, 213, which deleted the language in Code § 74-407 requiring that the adoption petition set forth the “place of residence of the child.” This statutory modification was not before this court at the time of our decision in Huff v. Moore, supra, since the adoption petition in that case was filed prior to January 1, 1978, the effective date of Ga. L. 1977, p. 202.