DocketNumber: A12A1078
Judges: Phipps
Filed Date: 9/25/2012
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/18/2024
Jennifer Chamblee appeals her conviction for possession of a drug related object,
“In a ruling on a motion to suppress, a trial court’s findings as to disputed facts will be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard and the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review.”
The officer who obtained the evidence at issue was the sole witness at the combined suppression hearing/bench trial.
In construing the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States has set forth three tiers of police-citizen encounters: “(1) communication between police and citizens involving no coercion or detention and therefore without the compass of the Fourth Amendment, (2) brief seizures that must be supported by reasonable suspicion, and (3) full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable cause.”
Chamblee argues that the officer’s exiting his squad car, saying her name, and approaching her with inquiries amounted to sufficient coercion to give rise to a “tier-two” encounter — a brief seizure that must be accompanied by a reasonable suspicion. These actions by the officer were not supported by a reasonable suspicion, Chamblee asserts, pointing out further that the officer admittedly had observed her engage in no illegal conduct.
However, “the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between police and citizens, but simply to prevent arbitrary and oppressive police interference with the privacy and personal security of individual citizens.”
Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen. Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, [and] ask for identification... — provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means. If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.8
even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request mightbe compelled.9
Here, the evidence authorized the trial court to conclude that the officer’s approach of and initial inquiries to Chamblee amounted to a first-tier encounter that did not have to be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.
It was during their first-tier encounter that Chamblee told the officer that she had a crack pipe on her person, which supplied the
Nothing in Gattison v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
OCGA § 16-13-32.2 (a).
Canty v. State, 286 Ga. 608 (690 SE2d 609) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).
See generally White v. State, 263 Ga. 94, 98 (5) (428 SE2d 789) (1993) (suppression hearing transcript and trial transcript may he considered on review of suppression ruling); Arnold v. State, 304 Ga. App. 90, n. 2 (695 SE2d 402) (2010) (same).
See generally Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 124 (120 SC 673, 145 LE2d 570) (2000) (while officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation, an individual’s mere presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime); In the Interest of J. B., 314 Ga. App. 678, 682 (1) (725 SE2d 810) (2012) (mere presence in area known to the police for criminal activity without more, is insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that one is engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity).
See Jones v. State, 237 Ga. App. 847, 850 (3) (515 SE2d 841) (1999) (possession of a “crack pipe” is possession of a drug related object in contravention of OCGA § 16-13-32.2).
In the Interest of J. B., supra at 680 (1) (punctuation and footnote omitted), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (III) (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968).
Lucas v. State, 284 Ga. App. 450, 452 (644 SE2d 302) (2007) (punctuation and footnote omitted).
United States v. Drayton, 536 U. S. 194, 200-201 (II) (122 SC 2105, 153 LE2d 242) (2002) (citations and emphasis omitted); see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434 (111 SC 2382, 115 LE2d 389) (1991) (a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions; the encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature); Terry, supra at 19, n. 16 (“Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’has occurred.”); Lucas, supra (during first-tier encounter, “an officer
Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 577-578 (4) (300 SE2d 126) (1983) (citation and punctuation omitted); see Santos v. State, 306 Ga. App. 772, 774 (1) (703 SE2d 140) (2010) (concerning “circumstances that might indicate a second-tier detention”).
See State v. Westmoreland, 204 Ga. App. 312 (1) (418 SE2d 822) (1992) (“merely approaching an individual and requesting that he give his consent for a search does not constitute a seizure and need not he supported by an articulable suspicion”) (emphasis in original); see also Foster v. State, 285 Ga. App. 441-443 (646 SE2d 302) (2007) (officer’s testimony authorized the trial court to find that his encounter with defendant was consensual and that defendant’s consent to search was freely given); see also In the Interest of D. H., supra; In the Interest of S. B., supra.
Lucas, supra (punctuation and footnote omitted). See Drayton, supra; Bostick, supra; Terry, supra; In the Interest of D. H., supra; In the Interest of S. B., supra.
See generally In the Interest of D. H., supra at 53 (2) (noting officer’s testimony at suppression hearing that neither she nor her partner did anything to make defendant feel that he was not free to leave); Lucas, supra (noting officer’s testimony at suppression hearing that he did nothing to make defendant feel as though he was not free to leave and noting further the absence of any evidence to the contrary).
See Bowden v. State, 279 Ga. App. 173, 176 (1) (630 SE2d 792) (2006) (reasonable suspicion to detain driver from driving off in vehicle was supplied by driver’s admission to police during first-tier encounter that he had no driver’s license or other identification); United States v. Lewis, 674 F3d 1298, 1304 (III) (A) (11th Cir. 2012) (based on defendant’s admission that he was carrying a handgun in his waistband, the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was violating Florida law that “a person who carries a concealed firearm on or about his person commits a felony of the third degree”).
See In the Interest of D. H., supra at 53-54 (2); Foster, supra; Lucas, supra; Bowden, supra; In the Interest of S. B., supra; Westmoreland, supra.
309 Ga. App. 382 (711 SE2d 25) (2011).
Id. at 383 (punctuation omitted).