DocketNumber: A13A2336
Citation Numbers: 327 Ga. App. 191, 755 S.E.2d 551
Judges: Phipps
Filed Date: 3/26/2014
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/8/2022
Jauanna Miles appeals from two orders entered in favor of her ex-husband, Lonnie Payne: (1) a final order denying her petition for custody of their minor child; and (2) a judgment awarding Payne attorney fees. On October 2, 2012, a hearing was held on Miles’s custody petition. The order on the petition and the judgment for attorney fees were each marked with stamps reading “Filed with the Court,” followed by a line, under which was printed “J. David Roper, Judge”; a handwritten signature appeared on the line and beside the signature, the handwritten date “11-26-12.” The order and judgment also each contained stamps showing that they were “Filed For Record” with the clerk of the superior court on November 27, 2012. The notice of appeal contained a stamp showing that it was filed with the superior court clerk on December 27, 2012.
Miles contends that her appeal is timely and this court has jurisdiction over her appeal because the clerk’s stamp filed date is the date from which the 30 days to file a notice of appeal began to run, and not the judge’s stamp filed date.
“The filing with the clerk of a judgment, signed by the judge, constitutes the entry of a judgment within the meaning of [Georgia’s appellate practice] article.”
Miles asserts that in Storch,
In Storch, the judgment was marked with a stamp from the trial judge which read “Filed in Open Court.”
Notably, Miles does not argue that she did not receive notice of the final order and judgment, such that she was unable to timely appeal therefrom. In fact, the record shows that on December 14, 2012, Miles filed with the clerk a “Motion for Reconsideration, Stay of Judgment, and Rule Nisi,” wherein she wrote that “[t]he court entered an order on or about November 26,2012, ordering [her] to pay [a sum of money] to the [sic] Lonnie Payne.”
That Miles did not realize that the 30-day period started on the date of the judge’s stamp is no excuse. “It is black letter law that ignorance of the law is no excuse.”
Appeal dismissed.
On Motion for Reconsideration.
Miles moves for reconsideration of our decision. She asserts that this court “misunderstood the issue related to the timeliness of the appeal.” She states that “The issue is whether the trial judge, on his oum motion, had authority to file-stamp his own orders.” (Emphasis in original.) Specifically, Miles posits:
OCGA § 9-11-5 (e)... provides that if a party brings to court any pleading, motion, a response to a pleading or motion, or any other document the party wants filed with the court such as a domestic relations financial affidavit, the judge has authority to permit the document to be filed with the judge. In order for the trial judge to allow documents to be filed with him or her, one of the parties must necessarily make such a request. In the absence of a request by a party, the trial judge has no authority for [sic] permit the filing of documents.
(Emphasis in original.)
However, the language of OCGA § 9-11-5(e) is not as Miles states (as set forth above). And the only authority Miles cites to support her
Motion for reconsideration denied.
See OCGA § 5-6-38 pertinently providing that “[a] notice of appeal shall he filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of.”
OCGA § 5-6-31.
Storch v. Hayes Microcomputer Products, 181 Ga. App. 627 (353 SE2d 350) (1987).
Id.
See generally Opensided MRI of Atlanta v. Chandler, 287 Ga. 406, 407 (696 SE2d 640) (2010) (“When a statute contains clear and unambiguous language, such language will be given its plain meaning and will be applied accordingly.”) (citations omitted).
The trial judge’s stamp in Storch also contained a date, the judge’s signature, and the name of the court.
Storch, supra (citation omitted).
Both the final order and the judgment awarding attorney fees specified the amount of attorney fees Miles was required to pay.
Govt. Employees Ins. Co. v. Dickey, 255 Ga. 661, 662 (340 SE2d 595) (1986); OCGA § 1-3-6 (“After they take effect, the laws of this state are obligatory upon all the inhabitants thereof. Ignorance of the law excuses no one.”).
Storch, supra at 628.
Supra.
See Storch, supra at 627-628 (no indication that either party had requested the order appealed from he filed with the trial judge).