DocketNumber: A14A0517
Citation Numbers: 327 Ga. App. 572, 760 S.E.2d 188
Judges: Barnes
Filed Date: 6/12/2014
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/8/2022
Following the grant of her discretionary application, the mother of then 23-month-old M. M. M. T. appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights.*
On appeal from a termination order, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent’s rights to custody have been lost. We do not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses but defer to the trial court’s factfinding and affirm unless the evidence fails to satisfy the appellate standard of review.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) In the Interest of H. F. G., 281 Ga. App. 22, 23 (635 SE2d 338) (2006).
So viewed, the evidence demonstrates that after M. M. M. T. was born on August 11, 2011 with Xanax in her system, the Bartow
In the 72-hour hearing order filed on February 23, 2012, the trial court found probable cause that M. M. M. T. was deprived because of the mother’s inability to independently care for the child, and issues related to her substance abuse were reserved for later adjudication. Following a hearing on DFACS’ deprivation hearing,
On February 18,2013, the trial court entered an order extending the previous deprivation order. Prior to entering the order, the trial
DFACS filed a motion for termination of the mother’s parental rights on March 19, 2013, and the hearing was held on June 6 and 11, 2013. At the hearing, evidence showed, among other things, that, based on her psychological evaluation, the mother would be unable to permanently care for M. M. M. T. without a strong support system, and needed to be monitored for substance abuse and obtain psychological treatment. The mother was also unemployed, did not have safe and stable housing for herself or M. M. M. T., had not successfully completed substance abuse treatment, and had not obtained any treatment for her fainting disorder. Further, the mother did not consent to enter family drug treatment court, and had not paid child support as ordered.
While the evidence showed that the mother had successfully maintained her visitation with M. M. M. T. and had bonded with her, it also demonstrated that the mother continued to show little progress toward being independent despite encouragement from service providers to get public housing and a job to show that she could care for M. M. M. T. The DFACS caseworker testified that the child was having tantrums and pulling her own hair, behavioral issues which could be indicators of the emotional and behavioral problems associated with the lack of permanency in her life.
Based on these findings, as well as others demonstrating the mother’s failure to comply with her case plan, and upon concluding that M. M. M. T. was deprived, that the lack of proper parental care and control by the mother is the cause of her deprivation, that the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue, and that the continued deprivation will cause or is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights.
While the record does show the mother’s slight efforts to comply with some aspects of the case plan, what weight to give that evidence was a question for the trier of fact. Likewise, judging the credibility of her good intentions was a task for the juvenile court. Moreover, the juvenile court was authorized to consider the mother’s past conduct in determining whether the causes of deprivation were likely to continue. And the decision as to [a] child[’s] future must rest on more than positive promises which are contrary to negative past fact. Given this record, we conclude that the juvenile court was authorized to terminate the mother’s parental rights. In accordance with Court of Appeals rules, we granted the mother’s application for discretionary review without the benefit of the full appellate record, including the transcript of the termination hearing; however, because the record supports the order of the court below, we conclude that the application for discretionary appeal was improvidently granted. Accordingly, the order granting the mother’s application is vacated, and her appeal is hereby dismissed.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) In the Interest of A. M. B., 324 Ga. App. 394, 395-396 (750 SE2d 709) (2013).
Appeal dismissed.
The father, whose parental rights were also terminated, is not a party to this appeal.
The termination hearing transcript is the only transcript included with the record.
As we have explained:
Georgia law provides for a two-step process that must he followed in determining whether to terminate parental rights. OCGA § 15-11-94 (a) requires*575 that the trial court first determine whether there is present clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability. Parental misconduct or inability is determined under the four criteria set forth in OCGA § 15-11-94 (b) (4) (A) (i)-(iv). Those four factors are: (1) the child is deprived; (2) the lack of proper parental care and control by the parent whose rights are being terminated is the cause of the deprivation; (3) the cause of the deprivation is likely to continue; and (4) continued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child. If these four factors are shown to exist by clear and convincing evidence, then the court must also determine whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, after considering the physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and needs of the child, including the need for a secure and stable home.
(Punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of K. D. E., 288 Ga. App. 520, 523 (654 SE2d 651) (2007). In 2013, the General Assembly adopted a new Juvenile Code to replace Chapter 11 of Title 15 of the Georgia Code. Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1. The new Juvenile Code became effective on January 1, 2014, and does not apply to this case but to all juvenile proceedings commenced on and after January 1, 2014. Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 5-1.