Sitterli v. Csachi.

FIFTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
BRANCH and BETHEL, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
February 23, 2018
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A17A1509. SITTERLI v. CSACHI.
MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.
This appeal challenges a final judgment, entered after a bench trial, in favor of
the defendant as to the plaintiff’s quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims.
Because the trial court’s findings of fact were supported by some evidence and there
has been no showing of legal error, we affirm.
“In reviewing a bench trial, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the trial court’s rulings, defer to the trial court’s credibility judgments, and will not
set aside the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Gibson
v. Gibson, 301 Ga. 622, 624 (801 SE2d 40) (2017) (citations omitted).
So viewed, the evidence shows that Ecaterina Csachi rented a room in her
house to Adrian Sitterli. Thereafter, Sitterli married Csachi’s daughter, who also
moved into the house. While Csachi was on a trip out of the country, Sitterli began
making renovations to Csachi’s house. Csachi told Sitterli that she could not pay for
renovations, but indicated that after her death the house would belong to her daughter
and Sitterli. Sitterli did further work on the house, but he and Csachi’s daughter later
divorced. The daughter moved out of the house, while Sitterli continued living there
for several months.
Csachi subsequently filed a dispossessory action against Sitterli in magistrate
court, and Sitterli counterclaimed for the value of the alleged improvements made to
the property. The dispossessory action was resolved when Sitterli moved out of the
house and the magistrate court issued a writ of possession, and his counterclaim was
then transferred to superior court. After a bench trial, the superior court entered final
judgment in favor of Csachi on the quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims of
Sitterli. The trial court denied Sitterli’s motion for new trial, and this appeal followed.
1. Quantum meruit.
Sitterli argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had not satisfied an
essential element for his quantum meruit claim. We disagree.
The essential elements of a claim of quantum meruit are that the
provider performed services valuable to the recipient that were requested
by or knowingly accepted by the recipient, that the recipient’s receipt of
2
the services without compensating the provider would be unjust, and
that the provider expected compensation at the time the services were
performed.
One Bluff Drive, LLC v. K. A. P., Inc., 330 Ga. App. 45, 47 (1) (766 SE2d 508) (2014)
(citations omitted; emphasis supplied). Here, the trial court found that Sitterli had
made improvements to Csachi’s house for his own benefit and had failed to show that
he expected compensation at the time those renovations were made. There was
evidence to support these findings, including testimony that Csachi had told Sitterli
that she did not have money to pay for the renovations, that Sitterli had no agreement
with Csachi to make improvements to the house, and that Sitterli made the
improvements to benefit himself and his former wife.
In arguing otherwise, Sitterli cites Terrell v. Pippart, 314 Ga. App. 483 (724
SE2d 802) (2012), for the proposition that an expectation of receiving an ownership
interest in realty satisfies the expectation of compensation element of a quantum
meruit claim. In Terrell, this court found that there was some evidence to support a
jury’s award on a quantum meruit claim where there was testimony that the plaintiff
expected compensation in the form of joint ownership of a house he was building. Id.
at 484 (1). That finding in Terrell does not control the instant case, which sits in the
exact opposite procedural posture. That is, rather than looking for any evidence to
3
support a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff as in Terrell, in this case we are
reviewing a bench trial judgment in favor of the defendant. Thus, while there was
some evidence to support the plaintiff’s verdict in Terrell, that case does not mandate
that the trial court in the instant case, sitting as the finder of fact, was obligated to
find that Sitterli had satisfied the expectation of compensation element for his
particular claim. “At a bench trial, the trial court can determine when essential facts
have not been proved. The trial court’s determination as a trier of fact will be reversed
only where the evidence demands a contrary finding.” Smith v. Ga. Kaolin Co., 269
Ga. 475, 476 (1) (498 SE2d 266) (1998) (citations and punctuation omitted). Even if
the evidence was in conflict, because there was some evidence supporting the trial
court’s finding that Sitterli had not shown an expectation of compensation at the time
of the services rendered, the evidence does not demand a contrary finding and we
must affirm the trial court’s judgment. See DeNapoli v. Owen, 341 Ga. App. 517, 518
(801 SE2d 314) (2017) (on appeal from entry of judgment following a bench trial, we
defer to any factual findings made by that court if there is any evidence to sustain
them).
2. Unjust enrichment.
4
Sitterli enumerates that the trial court erred in ruling that his unjust enrichment
claim required a showing that he had an expectation that Csachi would be responsible
for the remodeling costs. The enumeration is without merit.
“Unjust enrichment is an equitable concept and applies when as a matter of fact
there is no legal contract, but when the party sought to be charged has been conferred
a benefit by the party contending an unjust enrichment which the benefitted party
equitably ought to return or compensate for.” Estate of Crook v. Foster, 333 Ga. App.
36, 39 (1) (775 SE2d 286) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).
[A] claim for unjust enrichment exists where a plaintiff asserts that the
defendant induced or encouraged the plaintiff to provide something of
value to the defendant; that the plaintiff provided a benefit to the
defendant with the expectation that the defendant would be responsible
for the cost thereof; and that the defendant knew of the benefit being
bestowed upon it by the plaintiff and either affirmatively chose to accept
the benefit or failed to reject it.
Campbell v. Ailion, 338 Ga. App. 382, 387 (2) (790 SE2d 68) (2016) (citations
omitted; emphasis supplied). Thus, “[f]or unjust enrichment to apply, the party
conferring the labor and things of value must act with the expectation that the other
will be responsible for the cost. Otherwise, that party, like one who volunteers to pay
the debt of another, has no right to an equitable recovery.” Morris v. Britt, 275 Ga.
App. 293, 294 (1) (620 SE2d 422) (2005) (citations and punctuation omitted). Accord
5
Engram v. Engram, 265 Ga. 804, 807 (2) (463 SE2d 12) (1995) (rejecting appellant’s
unjust enrichment claim on ground that the evidence showed “the parties never
intended that appellees be responsible for the cost of the bedroom addition”); Jones
v. White, 311 Ga. App. 822, 828 (1) (b) (717 SE2d 322) (2011) (noting that unjust
enrichment requires party conferring labor to act with expectation that the party
receiving the benefit is responsible for the cost); Hollifield v. Monte Vista Biblical
Gardens, 251 Ga. App. 124, 131 (2) (c) (553 SE2d 662) (2001) (reciting that for
unjust enrichment to apply, the party providing labor and things of value must act
with the expectation that the recipient will be responsible for the cost). Accordingly,
contrary to Sitterli’s contention, the trial court did not err in ruling that the unjust
enrichment claim required a showing that Sitterli acted with an expectation that
Csachi would be responsible for the cost of the renovations.
We note that Sitterli’s reliance on Yoh v. Daniel, 230 Ga. App. 640 (497 SE2d
392) (1998), to support his claim of error is misplaced. As an initial matter, the
decision in Yoh is non-binding, physical precedent only. See Court of Appeals Rule
33.2 (a) (1). Moreover, the dicta in Yoh upon which Sitterli relies is not contrary to
the well-settled law on unjust enrichment set out above and cited by the trial court in
its final judgment. In Yoh, this court stated: “Quantum meruit relies on an implied
6
promise of compensation. This is in essence an implied contract. Unjust enrichment
differs. . . . Because an implied contract is not necessary for unjust enrichment, a
showing of an expectation of compensation is not required.” Id. at 642-643 (3)
(emphasis supplied).
Contrary to Sitterli’s argument, the trial court did not contradict this statement
in Yoh by citing the well-settled law that for unjust enrichment to apply, a party
conferring a benefit “must act with the expectation that the other will be responsible
for the cost.” Morris, supra (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). An
expectation of compensation for one’s services, as referenced in Yoh as an element
of quantum meruit, is different from the expectation of responsibility for costs that
is an element of unjust enrichment. As Sitterli has shown no legal error in the trial
court’s ruling, we affirm.
Judgment affirmed. Branch and Bethel, JJ., concur.
7