Taylor v. State

Townsend, J.

1. Whether an. extraordinary motion for new trial should be granted or refused rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and a judgment refusing the same will not be reversed in the absence of abuse of discretion. See Rogers v. State, 129 Ga. 589 (4) (59 S. E. 288); Brown v. State, 141 Ga. 783 (1) (82 S. E. 238); Towler v. State, 24 Ga. App. 362 (100 S. E. 787).

Motions for new trial on extraordinary grounds are not favored. See Hays v. Westbrook, 96 Ga. 219 (22 S. E. 893); Reese v. State, 18 Ga. App. 289 (89 S. E. 303); Minyard v. State, 18 Ga. App. 312 (89 S. E. 379); Davis v. State, 41 Ga. App. 366 (1) (153 S. E. 203); Colwell v. State, 46 Ga. App. 55 (166 S. E. 445).

Decided July 16, 1948. Rehearing denied July 26, 1948.

3. A more strict rule is applied to extraordinary motions on newly discovered evidence than to ordinary motions on the same ground. See Norman v. Goode, 121 Ga. 449 (49 S. E. 268); Teasley v. Pittman, 40 Ga. App. 22 (148 S. E. 600).

4. Refusal of an extraordinary motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is not error where the same is merely cumulative of evidence on the same issues produced on the trial, as in the instant' case. See Puryear v. State, 66 Ga. 753; Moss v. State, 44 Ga. App. 244 (161 S. E. 293); Jackson v. State, 50 Ga. App. 243 (177 S. E. 819).

Judgment affirmed.

MacIntyre, P. J., and Parker, J., concur. Gardner, J., disqualified. Andrew A. Smith, R. Wayne Amos, for plaintiff in error. Roy Leathers, Solicitor-General, contra.