Pannell, Judge.
Barbara V. Garner had an automobile insurance policy with Government Employees Insurance Company with comprehensive coverage, the effective dates of the policy being *236August 20, 1970 to August 20, 1971. On August 30, 1971, her automobile was stolen and recovered in a damaged condition, and upon refusal of the insurer to pay, she brought an action under the policy based upon the provisions of § 56-2430.1 (C) of the Georgia Insurance Code, which, as last amended by Section 3 of the Act approved April 10, 1971 (Ga. L. 1971, pp. 658, 660) provides in part: "(C) (l)No insurer shall fail to renew a policy to which this section applies unless a written notice of nonrenewal is mailed or delivered to the named insured, at the address shown on the policy, at least 20 days prior to the expiration date of the policy, . ..”, and "(2) This subsection shall not apply . . . (c) if the insurer has manifested its willingness to renew by delivery a renewal policy, renewal certificate or other evidence of renewal to the named insured or his representative or by offering to issue a renewal policy, certificate or other evidence of renewal, or has manifested such intention by any other means.” The jury returned a verdict in favor of Barbara V. Garner in the total amount of $4,274.23, which included $1,786.85 the principal sum, $46.71 bad faith penalty and $2,180.97 attorney fees, less a set-off of $140.30 due as premium under the policy. Barbara V. Garner appealed to this court from an order of the trial judge reducing the amount of the verdict and judgment by the amount of attorney fees and the penalty, and the Government Employees Insurance Company appeals from that portion of the judgment granting recovery against it and denying its motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. Held:
1. Is a policy automatically renewed in the event of failure on the part of the insurer to mail the required notice of intention not to renew, or to comply with the subsequent provisions preventing application of the first sentence of the section? Unless it has such effect, the section would be meaningless; so we agree with the parties who have taken the same position on the appeals.
2. There was no notice of intention not to renew and no contention that one was given. The insurer does contend, however, that the policy expires by its own terms because (1) the evidence demands a finding it mailed a notice of willingness to renew to the plaintiff approximately 45 to 50 days before the expiration of the policy, and another some 20 days prior to the expiration of the policy, and (2) if the evidence does not so demand, the acts of the insurer in using its computer in attempting to mail such notices demands a finding that it "has manifested such intention by other means.” While mailing alone as to a notice of intent not to renew is *237expressly provided by the statute to be a sufficient giving of that notice (Code § 56-2430.1 (D)); yet no such express provision is made for the giving of the notice of willingness or intent to renew, so as to prevent the automatic renewal of the policy because of failure to give the notice which could have been made by mailing alone. Under either of the well-known rules as to construction of legislative enactments expressio unius est, exclusio alterius, or expressum facit cessare taciturn, we cannot, by implication hold that the mere mailing, without receipt by the addressee, constitutes notice of intent or willingness to renew. See Crawford v. Glasgow, 86 Ga. 358 (12 SE 747); Parham v. Justices of the Inferior Court, 9 Ga. 341, 346; City of Macon v. Walker, 204 Ga. 810 (2) (51 SE2d 633). Therefore, even should we assume that the evidence demands a finding the notices referred to above were mailed to the plaintiff, although it does not, mailing alone would not demand a finding plaintiff received the notice or renewal certificate. She denied receiving either of them. That these notices contained an offer to renew, if unreceived, did not constitute an offer to the plaintiff to renew. That one puts in writing an offer, the writing, unless communicated to the offeree, constitutes no offer under this section. In our opinion, the same rationale applies to the language "or has manifested such intention by any other means.” The manifestation here required must be to the insured, not to the employees and officers of the insurer, therefore, even the mailing of an unreceived notice of such intentional willingness to renew is not such a manifestation under this portion of the statute. However, assuming arguendo that an attempt to mail, or an actual mailing, is a sufficient manifestation under the section, the evidence does not demand a finding such action occurred. The evidence merely showed that a computer was set up to send notices required and that in the usual course of office procedures, these notices were sent to a mailing room to be properly addressed and stamped and mailed to the insured. Other than this, there was no evidence of the proper addressing, affixing or proper postage, and the mailing of the two notices directed to the insured here. We, accordingly, must hold that the recovery under the policy, as having been automatically renewed, was authorized.
3. Under these circumstances it is not necessary to decide whether or not the insurer is estopped to claim the policy was not in force because of the actions of and promises of the adjuster. See in this connection Assurance Co. of America v. Bell, 108 Ga. App. 766 *238(134 SE2d 540); First of Ga. Ins. Co. v. Josey, 129 Ga. App. 14.
Argued January 9, 1973
Decided May 18, 1973
Rehearing denied June 19, 1973
Paul C. Myers, for appellant.
Dunaway, Shelfer, Haas & Newberry, L. Robert Lake, for appellee.
4. Because the present case involves the first construction of this statute by this court as to the particulars herein involved, we are of the opinion that refusal to pay under the circumstances was not a frivolous and unfounded denial of liability, and hold that the trial judge did not err in striking the attorney fees and bad faith penalty from the judgment. See U. S. Fidelity &c. Co. v. Woodward, 118 Ga. App. 591, 594 (164 SE2d 878).
Judgments affirmed.
Stolz, J., concurs. Eberhardt, P. J., concurs specially.