Hendrix v. State

Banke, Presiding Judge.

The appellant was tried for leaving the scene of an accident, driving without insurance, and for violating OCGA § 40-6-40, which requires that vehicles be driven on the right half of the roadway except under certain specified circumstances. The trial court directed a verdict on the driving without insurance charge, and the jury subsequently acquitted the appellant of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident while convicting her of violating OCGA § 40-6-40. She was sentenced to serve 12 months on probation, fined $110, and ordered to pay $400 restitution to a railroad whose signal post she was accused of having knocked down.

The state presented an eyewitness who testified that he had seen the appellant’s car approaching him, that it had veered across the centerline onto his side of the road, and that it had then run off the road on its own side, knocking down a railroad signal post. The witness identified the car by its license number, which he recorded. The appellant admitted having driven the car on the date and at the location in question but denied that the state’s witness had been present or that she had driven across the centerline or hit anything. Held:

1. “It is the function of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and to weigh and resolve any conflicts in the testimony. This court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. [Cit.] Viewing the evidence in that light, we are satisfied that any rational trier of fact could have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Cit.]; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).” Blackman v. State, 178 Ga. App. 88 (1) (342 SE2d 24) (1986).

2. The appellant contends that the order of restitution was not authorized by the evidence. We disagree. It may reasonably be inferred from the testimony of the eyewitness in this case that immediately after crossing over the centerline the appellant overcompensated, causing her vehicle to veer back to the right to such an extent that it left the roadway and struck the signal post. As used in the criminal restitution statute, the term “ ‘[damages’ means all damages which a victim could recover against an offender in a civil action . . . based on the same act or acts for which the offender is sentenced, except punitive damages and damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish, or loss of consortium.” OCGA § 17-14-2 (2). The evidence in this case supports the conclusion that the damage to the sign post was proximately caused by the unlawful act of which the appellant was convicted. It follows that the trial court was authorized to order the appellant to pay restitution for the damage.

3. The appellant enumerates as error the admission, during the sentencing phase of the trial, of a copy of a bill showing the cost of repairing the signal post. It is contended that this document was inadmissible because it was irrelevant, the original was not accounted for, and it constituted hearsay. The first of these contentions is clearly without merit. As for the second and third, the witness who identified the bill testified that he was employed as an investigator for the railroad, that he was the custodian of the record, and that he had received the document from “the accounting department in Jacksonville” in the normal course of business. We hold that this constituted a sufficient showing to authorize the admission of the document as a “photostatic, microphotographic, or photographic reproduction of [an] original writing or record made in the regular course of business to preserve permanently by such reproduction the writing or record. . . .” OCGA § 24-5-26. See also OCGA § 24-3-14.

Judgment affirmed.

Birdsong, C. J., Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Sognier, Pope, and Beasley, JJ., concur. Carley and Benham, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.