Melanie Granger v. Mst Transportation, LLC

SECOND DIVISION
ANDREWS, P. J.,
MCFADDEN and RAY, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/
October 15, 2014
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A14A0792. GRANGER et al. v. MST TRANSPORTATION, LLC
et al.
ANDREWS, Presiding Judge.
Melanie Granger and Roderick Cody, individually and on behalf of their son,
filed an action against MST Transportation, LLC (“MST”) and Eric A. Skrine,
asserting claims of negligence and negligence per se arising out of injuries they and
their son suffered in a collision between a vehicle Granger was driving and a tractor
Skrine left on the roadway when it ran out of fuel.1 The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of MST and Skrine, concluding that Granger and Cody could not
establish the proximate causation element of their claims. Granger and Cody now
appeal, arguing that the trial court misapplied the intervening act doctrine and failed
1
The complaint also named Gramercy Insurance Company as a defendant and
alleged that Gramercy provided insurance coverage for MST.
to consider that there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. We
conclude that proximate cause is an issue for the jury in this case and therefore
reverse.
On appeal from a grant of a motion for summary judgment, we
review the evidence de novo to determine whether a genuine issue of
fact remains and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. As it determines whether a genuine issue of material fact
remains, a court is bound to view the evidence, and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. Crawford, 317 Ga. App. 75, 76 (730
SE2d 26) (2012). So viewed, the evidence shows that Skrine was an interstate truck
driver for MST. On February 23, 2010, Skrine returned from a trip to Florida and
dropped his trailer at the MST depot in McDonough, Georgia and then drove his
Century Class ST tractor toward the truck stop in Atlanta where he stored it. Skrine
was driving down Moreland Avenue in DeKalb County when his tractor ran out of
fuel at approximately 5:30 p.m. Skrine testified that he had probably last refueled in
Florida. He stated that he knew he was low on fuel but that he thought he had enough
to make it home. The tractor stopped in the right-hand lane along a portion of
Moreland Avenue with three lanes of traffic moving in the direction in which Skrine
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had been traveling. The tractor blocked the lane to within approximately two feet of
the line between the right lane and middle lane. Skrine testified that when his vehicle
stopped, he put on his flashers and put out three reflective warning triangles.
After running out of gas, Skrine called MST and informed the daughter of
MST’s owner about the situation. Skrine decided to walk to a small truck stop he had
passed about 200 yards before he ran out of fuel, where he filled up a five gallon fuel
cannister. When he returned to his vehicle, he poured the fuel into the fuel tank, but
the tractor would not start. Skrine returned to the truck stop, refilled the cannister, and
added five more gallons of fuel to the tractor’s fuel tank, but he was still unable to
start the tractor. Skrine then returned to the truck stop for a third time.
Granger’s mother had been babysitting Granger and Cody’s 10-month-old son
that day, and Granger and Cody went to pick him up in the afternoon. According to
Granger, they left Granger’s mother’s house that evening at approximately 7:20 p.m.
Granger was driving, Cody was in the front passenger seat, and their son was in a
child seat in the back. Granger was driving on Moreland Avenue in the left lane in the
same direction Skrine had been traveling. After she crossed over Interstate 285,
Granger changed lanes from the left lane to the middle lane. As soon as Granger
moved into the middle lane, another car struck her vehicle from behind, hitting the
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back driver’s side of her car. The impact pushed Granger’s vehicle from the middle
lane into the right lane, where she collided “head on” with the rear of Skrine’s tractor.
Granger stated that she was about 30 or 40 feet from Skrine’s tractor when her vehicle
was pushed over and that by the time she saw the tractor, “it was too late.” She
applied the brakes but could not stop in time to avoid the collision. She stated that she
did not notice any triangles or flashers. By the time of the collision, it was dark
outside. Granger, Cody, and their son were injured in the collision.
1. “Before any negligence, even if proven, can be actionable, that negligence
must be the proximate cause of the injuries sued upon.” (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) Grinold v. Farist, 284 Ga. App. 120, 121 (1) (643 SE2d 253) (2007).2 “In
the tort context, proximate causation includes all of the natural and probable
consequences of the tortfeasor’s negligence, unless there is a sufficient and
independent intervening cause.” Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 627-628 (2) (b)
(697 SE2d 779) (2010). In this regard,
2
Apart from the question of whether Skrine violated OCGA § 40-6-202, see
Division 2 infra, the issue of whether Grady and Cody can establish that MST or
Skrine was negligent is not before us. While Granger and Cody moved for summary
judgment in their favor on the issue of negligence, the trial court did not address that
motion. MST and Skrine did not move for summary judgment in their favor on the
basis that Granger and Cody could not prove negligence.
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the general rule is that if, subsequently to an original wrongful act, a
new cause has intervened, of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the
misfortune, the former must be considered as too remote, still if the
character of the intervening act . . . was such that its probable or natural
consequences could reasonably have been . . . foreseen by the original
wrong-doer, the causal connection is not broken.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ontario Sewing Machine Co., Ltd. v. Smith, 275
Ga. 683, 686 (2) (572 SE2d 533) (2002). This principle applies even with respect to
a third party’s intervening illegal act or act of negligence. Williams v. Grier, 196 Ga.
327, 338 (2) (26 SE2d 698) (1943); Stern v. Wyatt, 140 Ga. App. 704, 705 (1) (231
SE2d 519) (1976). It is also well-settled under Georgia law that “the proximate cause
of an injury may be two separate and distinct acts of negligence acting concurrently”
and that “[t]he mere fact that the plaintiff’s injuries would not have been sustained
had only one of the acts of negligence occurred will not of itself operate to limit the
other act as constituting the proximate cause.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Hayes, supra, 317 Ga. App. at 78.
MST and Skrine argue that they were entitled to summary judgment because
the intervening criminal act of the third party who was driving the vehicle that struck
Granger’s vehicle and forced it into the right lane was unforeseeable. In addressing
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this issue, our decision in Gen. Motors Corp. v. Davis, 141 Ga. App. 495 (233 SE2d
825) (1977), is instructive. Davis involved a wrongful death action arising out of the
death of the plaintiff’s husband in a collision that occurred after a General Motors
truck with a defective alternator stalled on an interstate. The record contained
evidence that the plaintiff’s husband was driving behind a large panel truck as he
approached the stalled truck and was unable to see it until the panel truck swerved
into another lane some two to three hundred feet from the motionless truck, leaving
the plaintiff’s husband with little time to respond. Id. at 496, 498 (4). The plaintiff’s
husband collided with the stalled truck, which caused his death. Id. In affirming the
denial of General Motors’ motion for summary judgment, we rejected its argument
that an intervening agency was responsible for the collision as a matter of law. Id. at
497-498 (3). We held that a “[a] jury could reasonably conclude that the occurrences
subsequent to General Motors’ alleged negligence were natural and foreseeable
results of its negligence that did not so preponderate as to insulate the manufacturer
from liability.” Id. at 498 (3).
The facts in this case share similarities with those in Davis. The record includes
evidence that Skrine’s tractor was standing in an active lane of traffic and that
Granger, because of another driver’s conduct, found herself in a position where she
6
had little or no chance of avoiding a collision with the stopped vehicle. Consistent
with our decision in Davis, we conclude that it was not unforeseeable as a matter of
law that another motorist on the road, for reasons beyond his or her control (including
the negligent or unlawful actions of another driver), might be placed in a position in
which it was all but impossible to avoid striking Skrine’s stationary tractor. Granger
and Cody need not prove that Skrine or MST could foresee the precise manner in
which the collision occurred. “[T]he foreseeability analysis is not that specific: the
relevant inquiry is not whether the exact intervening negligent act was foreseeable,
but whether, as a general matter, the original negligent actor should have anticipated
that this general type of harm might result.” Smith v. Commercial Transp., 220 Ga.
App. 866, 867 (1) (470 SE2d 446) (1996).
We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that summary judgment for MST
and Skrine was warranted under CSX Transp. v. Deen, 269 Ga. App. 641 (605 SE2d
50) (2004). The plaintiff in Deen filed an action against a railroad for negligently
maintaining a crossing after she was injured when a car in which she was sitting at
night at the crossing was struck from behind by a drunk driver and propelled into a
train occupying the crossing. Id. at 641-642. We held that the third-party driver’s
conduct was an intervening cause of the injury and that it was neither “normal” nor
7
foreseeable that a subsequent driver would miss seeing a car stopped in the road with
properly functioning brake lights, headlights, and tail lights and a train sitting in a
known railroad crossing. Id. at 643-644 (1).
Unlike in Deen, the foreseeability issue in this case does not relate to the
visibility of a roadway obstruction to a third-party driver. In addition, this case
involves a car left sitting in an active lane of traffic as opposed to one stopped at a
known railroad crossing, and “both the Supreme Court and this court have held in a
plethora of cases that one who is negligent in blocking or obstructing a roadway,
whether by turning, stopping, braking, backing, overturning, colliding, etc., is not
relieved of the injurious consequences inflicted by the negligence of another motorist
encountering the obstruction.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith, supra, 220
Ga. App. at 867.
“Questions of negligence and diligence and of cause and proximate cause and
whose negligence constituted the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries are,
except in plain, palpable and indisputable cases, solely for the jury.” (Citations and
punctuation omitted.) Hayes, supra, 317 Ga. App. at 79. Under the circumstances of
this case, the jury must determine whether the conduct of the third-party driver
8
constitutes a sole or concurring proximate cause of the collision between Granger’s
vehicle and Skrine’s tractor and the ensuing injuries.
2. In addressing MST and Skrine’s motion for summary judgment based on
lack of proximate cause, the trial court concluded that OCGA § 40-6-202, a statute
upon which Granger and Cody’s claim of negligence per se is based, is inapplicable
under the circumstances of this case. We agree.
Granger and Cody argued below that Deen, supra, was distinguishable because,
in that case, the train with which the plaintiff’s car collided “was traveling in the train
tracks where it was supposed to be.” In response to this argument, the trial court
found that, contrary to Granger and Cody’s allegations, Skrine did not violate OCGA
§ 40-6-202. OCGA § 40-6-202 states:
Outside of a business or residential district, no person shall stop, park,
or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the
roadway when it is practicable to stop, park, or so leave such vehicle off
the roadway; but in every event, an unobstructed width of the highway
opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other
vehicles, and a clear view of the stopped vehicle shall be available from
a distance of 200 feet in each direction upon the highway.
The record established the presence of various businesses in the vicinity of the
collision between Granger’s vehicle and Skrine’s tractor, and Granger and Cody do
9
not dispute that the collision occurred in a business district. Rather, relying on White
v. Scott, 284 Ga. App. 87 (643 SE2d 356) (2007), they maintain that OCGA § 40-6-
202 applies only within business and residential districts instead of outside of them.
In White, which is physical precedent, the Court held that the trial court erred in
giving the jury a charge based on OCGA § 40-6-202 because the evidence did not
support a finding that the stretch of highway where the appellant’s truck had stalled
was in a business or residential district. Id. at 92 (3).
The opinion in White does not explain the basis for concluding that the
restrictions in OCGA § 40-6-202 apply within business and residential districts, and
we have reached a contrary conclusion in other cases. See Darwicki v. State, 291 Ga.
App. 239, 240-241 (2) (661 SE2d 859) (2008) (physical precedent); Southern
Intermodal Logistics v. Coleman, 175 Ga. App. 853, 854 (2) (334 SE2d 888) (1985).3
“When we consider the meaning of a statutory provision, we do not read it in
isolation, but rather, we read it in the context of the other statutory provisions of
which it is a part.” Hendry v. Hendry, 292 Ga. 1, 3 (734 SE2d 46) (2012). Reading
3
We acknowledged but did not resolve the conflict in our cases in State v.
Stafford, 288 Ga. App. 309, 313 (1) (653 SE2d 750) (2007). The Georgia Supreme
Court also declined to resolve this issue in its opinion affirming our decision in
Stafford. See Stafford v. State, 284 Ga. 773, 774 (671 SE2d 484) (2008).
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OCGA § 40-6-202 together with the statutory definition of “business district,” we
conclude that the parking restrictions in OCGA § 40-6-202 do not apply within a
business district and that, as the trial court found, the statute is inapplicable here. A
business district is defined as “the territory contiguous to and including a highway
when within any 600 feet along such highway there are buildings in use for business
or industrial purposes, . . .which occupy at least 300 feet of frontage on one side or
300 feet collectively on both sides of the highway.” OCGA § 40-1-1 (8). Because a
business district is comprised of “the territory contiguous to and including a
highway,” the parking restrictions in OCGA § 40-6-202 cannot be read to apply to
roadways within areas meeting the criteria in OCGA § 40-1-1 (8).4 Our conclusion
in this regard, however, is not dispositive of whether Skrine committed an act or acts
of ordinary negligence in allowing his tractor to run out of gas in the roadway and
obstruct traffic. See Sinclair Disposal Service v. Ochoa, 265 Ga. App. 172, 173 (593
SE2d 358) (2004) (“Compliance with the rules [of the road] does not necessarily
demonstrate that a defendant exercised ordinary care.”) (footnote omitted). That issue
is not before us now.
4
The definition of “residence district” includes the same “contiguous to and
including” language. See OCGA § 40-1-1 (51).
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Judgment reversed. McFadden and Ray, JJ., concur.
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