In the Interest of B. C., a Child

SECOND DIVISION
ANDREWS, P. J.,
MILLER and BRANCH, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
September 3, 2015
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A15A1050. IN THE INTEREST OF B. C., A CHILD.
MILLER, Judge.
The State filed a petition alleging that then 13-year-old B. C. committed the
delinquent acts of aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation and child
molestation. At the adjudicatory hearing, B. C. informed the juvenile court that,
pursuant to plea negotiations with the State, he intended to enter an Alford1 plea to
the child molestation charge in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges.2 The
trial court denied B. C.’s request, finding that OCGA § 15-11-580, which the
1
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 (91 SCt 160, 27 LE2d 162) (1970).
2
We note that aggravated sodomy and aggravated child molestation are
designated felonies when allegedly committed by a juvenile aged 13 to 17 years. See
OCGA § 15-11-560. The superior court has original jurisdiction over those offenses,
unless the State elects to decline prosecution in superior court and the case is
transferred to the juvenile court. Id.
legislature enacted in 2013 as part of the new Juvenile Code, does not authorize the
entry of an Alford plea in juvenile court. This Court granted B. C.’s application for
interlocutory review. On appeal, B. C. contends, and the State agrees, that the juvenile
court erred in finding that OCGA § 15-11-580 prohibits Alford admissions. For the
reasons that follow, we vacate the juvenile court’s order and remand this case.
An Alford plea allows an individual accused of a crime to “voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even
if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the
crime.” Alford, supra, 400 U. S. at 37. Juvenile courts in Georgia have historically
accepted Alford pleas. See, e.g., In the Interest of J. L. B., 280 Ga. App. 556, 561 (634
SE2d 514) (2006); In the Interest of L. T., 325 Ga. App. 590 (754 SE2d 380) (2014)
(juvenile entered Alford plea while former Juvenile Code was in effect). In this case,
however, the juvenile court narrowly interpreted OCGA § 15-11-580 as precluding
the entry of an Alford plea in juvenile court.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which this Court reviews de
novo without deference to the juvenile court’s ruling. See Frix v. State, 298 Ga. App.
538, 539 (1) (680 SE2d 582) (2009).
2
In construing a statute, our goal is to determine its legislative
purpose. In this regard, a court must first focus on the statute’s text. In
order to discern the meaning of the words of a statute, the reader must
look at the context in which the statute was written, remembering at all
times that the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the
separate words, as a melody is more than the notes. If the words of a
statute, however, are plain and capable of having but one meaning, and
do not produce any absurd, impractical, or contradictory results, then
this Court is bound to follow the meaning of those words.
(Citation omitted.) See Frix, supra, 298 Ga. App. at 540 (1). In determining the
legislative purpose, we presume that the statute was enacted by the legislature with
full knowledge of the existing law. See State v. Johnson, 292 Ga. 409, 412 (738 SE2d
86) (2013).
With these statutory rules of interpretation in mind, we turn to the language of
OCGA § 15-11-580. With regard to the admission or denial of allegations in a
delinquency petition, OCGA § 15-11-580 provides that the child may:
(1) Deny the allegations of such petition, in which case the court shall
proceed to hear evidence on such petition; or (2) Admit the allegations
of such petition, in which case the court shall further inquire to
determine whether there is a factual basis for adjudication. If so, the
court may then adjudge such child to have committed a delinquent act.
3
OCGA § 15-11-580 (b). The statute further provides: “[i]f a child stands mute, refuses
to answer, or answers evasively, the court shall enter a denial of the allegations.”
OCGA § 15-11-580 (c).
The plain language of OCGA § 15-11-580 provides that a child may admit the
allegations in a delinquency petition, and nothing in the statute prohibits admissions
made pursuant to an Alford plea, as long as there is a factual basis for the child’s
delinquency adjudication. See OCGA § 15-11-580 (b) (2).3 Accordingly, we presume
that the General Assembly enacted OCGA § 15-11-580 with the knowledge and
understanding that Alford pleas have historically been accepted in Georgia’s juvenile
courts. See, e.g., In the Interest of J. L. B., supra, 280 Ga. App. at 561; In the Interest
of L. T., supra, 325 Ga. App. at 590.
Moreover, the provisions of OCGA § 15-11-580 are similar to the arraignment
provisions set forth in the adult Criminal Code, which provide that the adult shall be
required to answer whether he is guilty or not guilty of the charged offense and if he
pleads not guilty or stands mute then the clerk shall record a plea of not guilty. See
OCGA §§ 17-7-93 and 17-7-94. As with OCGA § 15-11-580, the adult arraignment
3
See also Skinner v. State, 297 Ga. App. 828, 831 (2) (678 SE2d 526) (2009)
(requiring inquiry into factual basis for Alford plea); accord, Alford, supra, 400 U. S.
at 38 n., 10.
4
statutes make no express reference to the well-established practice of accepting
Alford pleas in Georgia’s state and superior courts. See id.Finally, any doubt regarding whether the General Assembly intended to allow
Alford pleas in juvenile court must be resolved in favor of the General Assembly’s
express statement that the Juvenile Code is intended to provide treatment and
rehabilitation for juvenile offenders and “shall be liberally construed to reflect that
the paramount child welfare policy of this state is to determine and ensure the best
interests of its children.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 15-11-1.
Since the General Assembly has not expressly prohibited the entry of Alford
pleas in juvenile court, and the juvenile court was required to construe OCGA § 15-
11-580 liberally to ensure B. C.’s best interests, the juvenile court erred in narrowly
interpreting that statute to preclude the entry of an Alford plea. Moreover, we note
that both the State and B. C. believe that an Alford plea is in B. C.’s best interest.
Accordingly, we vacate the juvenile court’s order and remand this case for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment vacated and case remanded. Andrews, P. J., and Branch, J., concur.
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