DocketNumber: Civil Action File No. 1:12-CV-4072-TWT
Citation Numbers: 24 F. Supp. 3d 1249
Judges: Thrash
Filed Date: 6/3/2014
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/25/2022
OPINION AND ORDER
In this civil rights action, the Plaintiff contends that she was subjected to abusive
I. Background
This case stems from allegations that a former Fulton County School District teacher, Defendant Melanie Pickens, was abusive toward the special needs students in her class at Hopewell Middle School, including the Plaintiff Repheka Persadi, who is severely disabled.
Boyd answered Persadi’s complaint and filed a counterclaim against Persadi for damages under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1000.
Both the School District and the Third-Party Defendants seek to dismiss Boyd’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6). They argue that Boyd released any claims against the School District in the August 2007 Settlement Agreement she signed after the district investigated her role in the alleged abuse at issue in this case. They further argue that nothing in Boyd’s employment contract required them to provide her with a defense in this lawsuit. Finally, they argue that Boyd’s request for a writ of mandamus is procedurally and substantively inappropriate.
II. Legal Standard
A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears that the facts alleged fail to state a “plausible” claim for relief.
III. Discussion
A. Boyd’s Claim for Breach of Contract
The School District and the Third-Party Defendants argue that Boyd has not stated a claim for breach of contract. In Georgia, to sufficiently allege a breach of contract, a plaintiff must show a more than minimal breach of the contract and resulting damages against the plaintiff.
The Board also purchases liability insurance, in an amount determined by the Board and subject to such exclusions and other limitations as the Board deems appropriate, insuring employees against claims for damages arising out of the performance of their duties as employees of the Board.
To the extent permitted by Georgia law, the Board in its discretion may pay the amount of any deductible specified in a liability insurance policy and may pay attorneys’ fees and other expenses which are not otherwise covered by insurance and which are incurred by an employee in defending against any civil action brought against the employee alleging acts or omissions arising out of or otherwise connected with the performance of his/her duties, regardless of whether such action has been brought or concluded during the term of his/her employment. Such payments shall not be made to any employee who has interests in the litigation that are adverse to those of the Board; or who has acted in violation of Board policy or procedure; or whose acts or omissions giving rise to such liability involve ... commission of any other civil or criminal offense*1253 against the Board, its members, employees or students.15
This language unambiguously shows that the School District and the Third-Party Defendants were under no obligation to provide Boyd with a legal defense. The passage specifically states that the Board may pay for attorneys’ fees in its discretion. Likewise, the provision of liability insurance itself is contingent upon any limitations the Board deems appropriate. There is no mandatory language in the passage. Boyd contends that the settlement agreement she signed with the School District in 2007 required the School District to provide her with any employee benefits, including the professional liability insurance and indemnity. But the plain language of the policy does not require the School District or the Third-Party Defendants to provide Boyd with a defense or any professional liability benefit; it only states that the Board may provide a defense. Because the settlement agreement only provided that Boyd would continue to receive employee benefits until her retirement, and because a legal defense is not a guaranteed employee benefit, Boyd’s claim for breach of contract should be dismissed.
B. Boyd’s Claim for a Declaratory . Judgment
Boyd seeks a declaratory judgment that she has a right to a legal defense and indemnity from both the School District and the Third-Party Defendants. Because the Court concludes that neither the School District nor the Third-Party Defendants are required to provide Boyd with a legal defense and indemnity, Boyd’s claim for a declaratory judgment should be. dismissed.
C. Boyd’s Claim for a Writ of Mandamus
The Third-Party Defendants and the School District argue that a writ of mandamus is procedurally improper here. In general, federal courts do not have the authority to issue writs of mandamus against state entities and officials.
Boyd’s claim for a writ of mandamus should be dismissed for at least two reasons. First, Boyd cannot attempt to amend her complaints to seek injunctive relief in a response to a motion to dismiss, and she has not sought to amend under Rule 15(a).
D. Boyd’s Claim Against the Third-Party Defendants Under O.C.G.A. § 36-33-4
Boyd claims that the Third-Party Defendants maliciously denied Boyd a legal defense and indemnification in violation of O.C.G.A. § 36-33-4. That statute provides that “[m]embers of the council and other officers of a municipal corporation shall be personally liable to one who sustains special damages as the result'of any official act of such officers if done oppressively, maliciously, corruptly, or without authority of law.”
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Cross-Defendant Fulton County School District’s Motion to Dismiss Cross-Plaintiff Frances Boyd’s Amended Cross-Claims [Doc. 51] is GRANTED. Likewise, Third-Party Defendants Robert Avossa, Cindy Loe, James Wilson, Linda Schultz, Linda Bryant, Katie Reaves, Gail Dean, Linda McCain, Catherine Maddox, and Julia Bernath’s Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Plaintiff Frances Boyd’s Third-Party Complaint [Doc. 52] is GRANTED.
. (Compl. n 20-21).
. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-44).
. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-53).
. (Boyd Amended Answer, [Doc. 45], ¶ 13).
. (Id. at ¶¶ 95-103).
. (Id. at 36, ¶¶ 5-14).
. (Id. at ¶¶ 104-115).
. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
. See Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 (11th Cir.1983); see also Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir.1994) (noting that at the pleading stage, the plaintiff "receives the benefit of imagination").
. See Lombard’s, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed.2d 892 (1986).
. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964).
. TechBios, Inc. v. Champagne, 301 Ga.App. 592, 595, 688 S.E.2d 378 (2009).
.(Boyd 'Amended Answer ¶ 97).
. (Def. Fulton County School District’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1). It is appropriate for the Court to consider the professional liability policy in the instant motions to dismiss because the policy is central to Boyd’s claim for breach of contract and because Boyd does not challenge its authenticity. See Kwok v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-1713, 994 F.Supp.2d 1290, 1293, 2014 WL 106223, at *2 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 10, 2014).
. Church of Scientology of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, Ga., 843 F.Supp.2d 1328, 1380 (N.D.Ga.2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1361).
. See Brannen v. U.S., No. 4:11-cv-0135, 2011 WL 8245026, at *5 (N.D.Ga. Aug. 26, 2011) aff'd sub nom. Jesse E. Brannen III, P.C. v. U.S., 682 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir.2012).
. Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.2003).
.Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).
. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005).
. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-4.