State v. Iona.

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
22-MAY-2019
09:22 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---
________________________________________________________________
STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KEKOA IONA,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CR. NO. 14-1-0648)
May 22, 2019
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY WILSON, J.
This case arises from a pat-down following an
investigative stop in April 2014, in Honolulu. The pat-down
occurred after a lieutenant with the Honolulu Police Department
(“HPD”) noticed Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Kekoa Iona
(“Iona”) and two other individuals riding bicycles lacking tax
decals, which are required by law on all bicycles with wheels
twenty inches or more in diameter.
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The police may, in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, detain individuals for brief, temporary
investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion of a crime
without violating the prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures in the United States and Hawaiʻi Constitutions.
However, the police may not prolong these temporary detentions,
known as Terry stops,1 any longer than needed to handle the
matter for which the stop was made.
We hold that Iona was seized longer than was necessary
for the police to conduct an investigation that confirmed the
lieutenant’s reasonable suspicion that the required tax decal
was missing and to issue a citation to Iona for riding a bicycle
without a tax decal.
After the time necessary for the police to conduct an
investigation confirming the absence of the required tax decal
and to issue a citation for the missing decal had expired, a
warrant check came back from dispatch indicating that Iona had
an outstanding warrant. Iona was arrested at the scene based on
the outstanding warrant, and a search incident to arrest
revealed a small amount of drugs and drug paraphernalia.
Because the warrant check came back after the span of time
1
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (recognizing “that a
police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior
even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest”).
2
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necessary for the police to obtain Iona’s identifying
information from him and to write and issue the citation, Iona’s
arrest was illegal. Since the arrest was illegal, the evidence
obtained as a result of the arrest was fruit of the poisonous
tree. Iona’s pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence from the
search incident to arrest should have been granted, and the
evidence seized as a result of that search should have been
excluded from his trial. Accordingly, we vacate the
Intermediate Court of Appeals’ (“ICA”) judgment on appeal and
the Circuit Court of the First Circuit’s (“circuit court”)
judgment of conviction and sentence, and we remand the case to
the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
At 10:40 a.m. on April 17, 2014, Lieutenant Brent
Kagawa, an officer with the HPD, observed Iona and two other
individuals on bicycles ride past him on Keeaumoku Street in
Honolulu. All three bicycles lacked tax decals, which all
standard-sized bikes are required to display by state and local
law. Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (“HRS”) §§ 249-14, 249-15 (2001);2
Revised Ordinances of Honolulu (“ROH”) § 15-18.1 (Supp. 1995).3
2
HRS § 249-14(a) requires the owner of a bicycle with wheels
twenty inches or more in diameter to register the bicycle and pay a
registration fee. Upon payment of the fee and registration, the owner is
furnished with “a metallic tag or decal[,]” which must be affixed to the
bicycle on “the upright post attached to the sprocket facing in the forward
(continued . . .)
3
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Having observed what appeared to be the absence of the
required decals, Lieutenant Kagawa identified himself, stopped
all three men, and, in the words of the circuit court’s findings
of fact, “initiated an untaxed bicycle inquiry. He informed the
three males that he had stopped them for untaxed bicycles.” The
officer queried the men individually about the status of the
bikes. Initially, each man stated he owned the bike he was
riding. As Lieutenant Kagawa took down this information,
however, Iona changed his statement to say that he borrowed the
bike from someone named “Nalu” at the park. Lieutenant Kagawa
took some additional information, including their names, and
then commenced a warrant check on all three individuals.
Lieutenant Kagawa estimated this initial exchange took about
three or four minutes.
In the meantime, two additional officers, Officers
Alison Lynch and Raymond Chandler, arrived at the scene to
(. . . continued)
direction.” HRS § 249-14(b). HRS § 249-15 authorizes police officers to
seize a bicycle to which no tag or decal is affixed.
3
ROH § 15-18.1 provides:
No person who resides within the City and County of
Honolulu shall ride or propel a bicycle on any street,
highway, alley, roadway or sidewalk or upon any public path
set aside for the exclusive use of bicycles unless such
bicycle has been licensed and a license plate two by three
inches in size, or a license decal, is attached thereto as
provided in this article.
The penalty for violating the decal requirement is a fine of between $15.00
and $100.00 for a first offense. ROH § 15-26.9(b) (Supp. 2004).
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assist Lieutenant Kagawa. Officer Lynch called nearby officers
to assist. When they arrived, Lieutenant Kagawa informed the
two additional officers of the facts of the untaxed bicycle
investigation and asked them to take over the investigation.
Lieutenant Kagawa testified that he was waiting until he had all
the information at the end of the investigation before
determining whether he would issue a citation for the lack of
tax decals.
Officers Lynch and Chandler sought to obtain the
bicycles’ serial numbers and run them through the system to
determine whether they were registered and, if registered,
whether they were reported stolen. The officers were only able
to read the serial number on the bike Iona had been riding.
Once that serial number had been obtained, Officers Lynch and
Chandler called dispatch to check the bike registration records
in order to determine whether the bike was taxed or untaxed or
had been reported stolen.
After a few minutes, dispatch confirmed that the bike
was not registered to Iona or to someone named Nalu. Instead,
the bike was registered to a Waiʻanae resident. The bike had not
been reported stolen. Officer Chandler attempted to contact the
registered owner but was unsuccessful. He then contacted the
police station in Waiʻanae and requested that an officer from
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that station drive to the registered owner’s Waiʻanae address in
order to determine whether the bike was stolen.
The warrant check came back at 10:54 a.m., showing
that Iona had an outstanding $100.00 bench warrant for contempt.
A total of fourteen minutes elapsed between the initial stop and
the return of the outstanding warrant information. At no time
within the fourteen-minute period was a citation for failure to
display a tax decal written or started to be written. Iona was
arrested at the scene on the outstanding warrant. Incident to
his arrest, he was patted down. The pat-down revealed a glass
pipe in a plastic sleeve as well as a small, ziplock plastic bag
containing a white, crystalline substance.
Prior to trial, Iona moved to suppress the glass pipe
and the ziplock bag containing a white, crystalline substance,
arguing that they were “fruit of the poisonous tree.” He argued
that he had been illegally seized, that the seizure continued
well after its initial justification, that his arrest was
therefore illegal, and that the evidence seized in the search
incident to his arrest was “fruit of the poisonous tree” and
should thus be excluded. He also argued that (1) a violation of
HRS § 249-14 is not an arrestable offense, (2) the only penalty
authorized for a violation of HRS § 249-14 is the seizure of a
bicycle that does not display the required registration decal,
(3) Lieutenant Kagawa did not have reasonable suspicion to
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further detain Iona in order to determine if he had an
outstanding bench warrant, (4) Lieutenant Kagawa had no basis to
request a warrant check on Iona at the point in time that he did
because Lieutenant Kagawa did not suspect Iona of committing an
arrestable crime or violation at that time, and (5) Lieutenant
Kagawa was not authorized to conduct a warrant check under HRS §
803-6 (2014).
Iona was tried on October 12, 2015.4 After a bench
trial on stipulated facts, Iona was convicted of one count of
promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree and one count of
unlawful use of drug paraphernalia. See HRS § 712-1243 (2014);
HRS § 329-43.5(a) (2010). He was sentenced to two open five-
year terms of imprisonment, to run concurrently, and fined
$1,000. He appealed to the ICA.
The ICA issued its summary disposition order on June
29, 2017. State v. Iona, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2017 WL 2812940
(App. June 29, 2017) (SDO). The ICA concluded that the evidence
discovered in the search incident to Iona’s arrest on the
outstanding warrant was not fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. at
*3. It held that the length of the stop was reasonable “[b]ased
on the police testimony regarding the steps regularly taken in
conjunction with an untaxed bicycle investigation” and “Iona’s
4
The Honorable Edward H. Kubo, Jr. presided.
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shifting statements regarding the bicycle’s ownership, which
were inconsistent with the bicycle’s registration[.]” Id. at
*2. As to Iona’s pretext argument, the ICA held that there was
“no evidence that follow up inquiries regarding the bicycle’s
ownership were pretextual or that the officers delayed the
attempts to reach the registered owner of the bicycle in order
to prolong the warrant check.” Id. Accordingly, the ICA
affirmed the circuit court’s judgment of conviction and
sentence. Id. at *3. Iona applied for a writ of certiorari,
and his application was accepted.
II. Standards of Review
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to suppress de novo to determine whether, as a matter of
law, the ruling was right or wrong. State v. Eleneki, 106
Hawaiʻi 177, 180, 102 P.3d 1075, 1078 (2004). A court’s findings
of fact “are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, and
will not be set aside on appeal unless they are determined to be
clearly erroneous.” State v. Kaleohano, 99 Hawaiʻi 370, 375, 56
P.3d 138, 143 (2002) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
III. Discussion
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution
“safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
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arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” State v. Navas,
81 Hawaiʻi 113, 122, 913 P.2d 39, 48 (1996) (quoting Camara v.
Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)); see State v. Tauʻa, 98
Hawaiʻi 426, 446 n.5, 49 P.3d 1227, 1247 n.5 (2002) (Acoba, J.,
dissenting) (“The fourth amendment was intended both to protect
the rights of individuals and to prevent the government from
functioning as in a police state.” (quoting Donald L. Doernberg,
The Right of the People: Reconciling Collective and Individual
Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 259, 260
(1983))). Both prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by
government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV (prohibiting
“unreasonable searches and seizures” and requiring a warrant
based on probable cause as a condition of any search or
seizure); Haw. Const. art. I, § 7 (prohibiting “unreasonable
searches, seizures and invasions of privacy” and requiring a
warrant based on probable cause as a condition of any search or
seizure).
Given these constitutional protections, warrantless
searches or seizures are presumed “invalid unless and until the
prosecution proves that the search or seizure falls within a
well-recognized and narrowly defined exception to the warrant
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requirement.”5 State v. Prendergast, 103 Hawaiʻi 451, 454, 83
P.3d 714, 717 (2004). “If the prosecution fails to meet this
burden, the evidence obtained from the illegal search will be
suppressed as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” Id. (quoting
State v. Fukusaku, 85 Hawaiʻi 462, 475, 946 P.2d 32, 45 (1997)).
A. Constitutional Principles Governing Terry Stops
The temporary investigative detention of an individual
by the police without a warrant is constitutionally permissible
only within strict and narrow limits. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19
(“The scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and
justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible.” (quoting Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring))); Kaleohano, 99
Hawaiʻi at 378–79, 56 P.3d at 146–47 (“Because temporary
investigative stops involve an exception to the general rule
requiring that searches and seizures be supported by probable
cause, the scope of such detentions must be narrow.”).
These strict limitations on the constitutionally
permissible scope of a Terry stop govern both its initiation and
5
We have held repeatedly that exceptions to the warrant
requirement are well-recognized and narrowly defined, and generally “provide
for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as
danger to law officers or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence,
outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate.” State v.
Wallace, 80 Hawaiʻi 382, 393, 910 P.2d 695, 706 (1996) (quoting State v.
Clark, 65 Haw. 488, 493, 654 P.2d 355, 360 (1982)).
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its duration. The initiation of a temporary investigative
detention by police is valid only “if they have a reasonable
suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal
activity is afoot.” State v. Spillner, 116 Hawaiʻi 351, 357, 173
P.3d 498, 504 (2007) (quoting State v. Kearns, 75 Haw. 558, 569,
867 P.2d 903, 908 (1994)); State v. Heapy, 113 Hawaiʻi 283, 285,
151 P.3d 764, 766 (2007) (“It is axiomatic that reasonable
suspicion to justify a stop must relate to criminal activity.”);
State v. Barnes, 58 Haw. 333, 337, 568 P.2d 1207, 1211 (1977)
(explaining that “such an intrusion upon personal liberty must
be reasonable and be based on something more substantial than
inarticulate hunches” (quoting State v. Goudy, 52 Haw. 497, 501,
479 P.2d 800, 803 (1971))). In addition, under the Hawaiʻi
Constitution, a Terry stop may last no longer than is absolutely
necessary under the circumstances to handle the matter for which
the stop was made. State v. Estabillio, 121 Hawaiʻi 261, 271,
218 P.3d 749, 759 (2009) (“In order to pass constitutional
muster, the length of time the officer could permissibly detain
the defendant must have been ‘no greater in intensity than
absolutely necessary under the circumstances.’” (emphasis added)
(brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Barros, 98 Hawaiʻi 337, 342-
43, 48 P.3d 584, 589-90 (2002))).
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B. The Perez Test and Vehicle Stops
In Hawaiʻi, the constitutional principles governing
unreasonable searches and seizures in the context of traffic
stops have been synthesized into a two-part test. See State v.
Perez, 111 Hawai‘i 392, 397, 141 P.3d 1039, 1044 (2006). Unless
the police action during a vehicle stop satisfies both parts of
the Perez test, the police action is unlawful, and “the evidence
originating from that unlawful action must be suppressed.”
State v. Alvarez, 138 Hawaiʻi 173, 182, 378 P.3d 889, 898 (2016).
The first part of the Perez test requires that the
investigative stop must be justified at its inception. Perez,
111 Hawaiʻi at 397, 141 P.3d at 1044. “To justify an
investigative stop, . . . the police officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion.” Alvarez, 138 Hawaiʻi at 182, 378 P.3d at 898
(ellipses in original) (quoting Barnes, 58 Haw. at 338, 568 P.2d
at 1211); see also Estabillio, 121 Hawai‘i at 273, 218 P.3d at
761 (holding that under the first part of the Perez test, a
seizure was clearly justified at its inception when the officer
had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was “driving a
vehicle with a fraudulent registration sticker”).
The second part of the Perez test requires that a
search or seizure must be “reasonably related in scope to the
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circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.” Alvarez, 138 Hawai‘i at 182, 378 P.3d at 898 (quoting
Perez, 111 Hawaiʻi at 397, 141 P.3d at 1044). The
constitutionally permissible scope of a vehicle stop has two
components. First, “it must ‘last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the detention.’” Id. (quoting
Estabillio, 121 Hawaiʻi at 270, 218 P.3d at 758); see also
Estabillio, 121 Hawaiʻi at 271, 218 P.3d at 759 (“In order to
pass constitutional muster, the length of time the officer could
permissibly detain the defendant must have been ‘no greater in
intensity than absolutely necessary under the circumstances.’”6
(brackets omitted) (quoting Barros, 98 Hawaiʻi at 342-43, 48 P.3d
at 589-90)). “Second, the subject matter and intensity of the
investigative detention must be limited to that which is
justified by the initial stop.” Alvarez, 138 Hawaiʻi at 182, 378
P.3d at 898.
6
The “absolutely necessary under the circumstances” standard
derives from our view that
the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures under
article, I, section [7] of the Hawaii Constitution is enforceable
by a rule of reason which requires that governmental intrusions
into the personal privacy of citizens of this State be no greater
in intensity than absolutely necessary under the circumstances.
State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 369, 520 P.2d 51, 58–59 (1974) (internal
quotation marks and footnote omitted).
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C. Under the circumstances presented here, the officers’
seizure of Iona exceeded the scope of a constitutionally
permissible vehicle stop.
Lieutenant Kagawa stopped Iona while Iona was riding a
bicycle. For present purposes we consider a bicycle stop to be
a traffic stop (also called a vehicle stop). “A stop of a
vehicle for an investigatory purpose constitutes a seizure
within the meaning of the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” Estabillio, 121 Hawaiʻi at
270, 218 P.3d at 758 (quoting State v. Bolosan, 78 Hawaiʻi 86,
92, 890 P.2d 673, 679 (1995)); Spillner, 116 Hawaiʻi at 357, 173
P.3d at 504 (“There is no dispute that a traffic stop is a form
of seizure for constitutional purposes.”). Thus, Iona was
seized when Lieutenant Kagawa ordered him off his bike. As to
its duration, Lieutenant Kagawa acknowledged during the hearing
on Iona’s motion to suppress that the seizure lasted up to the
point at which Iona was arrested.
Having established that Iona was “seized” for
constitutional purposes, we proceed to analyze the facts in
light of the two-part Perez test. We assume without deciding
that the first part of the Perez test, that “the action was
justified at its inception,” was satisfied here. Perez, 111
Hawaiʻi at 397, 141 P.3d at 1044. Lieutenant Kagawa observed
that the bicycles of all three individuals he stopped lacked tax
decals. Assuming that the lieutenant’s observation concerning
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the missing tax decals is analogous to observing a violation of
traffic laws, the action was justified at its inception.
Alvarez, 138 Hawai‘i at 182, 378 P.3d at 898 (“It is well settled
that an investigative stop based on an officer’s observation of
an apparent traffic violation satisfies the first part of the
Perez test.”).
As to the second part of the Perez test, we hold that
the time during which Iona was seized exceeded the duration
necessary to accomplish the purpose for which he was stopped.
See id. Here, the matter or purpose for which the stop was made
was determined by Lieutenant Kagawa’s observation that the bikes
lacked tax decals. That lack of decals is what justified the
initial stop of Iona. The circuit court’s findings of fact
based on testimony at the suppression hearing state that “Lt.
Kagawa initiated an untaxed bicycle investigation” and that he
informed the riders “he had stopped them for untaxed bicycles.”
However, it is undisputed that Iona was never cited during the
Terry stop for riding a bicycle which failed to display a tax
decal.
Instead, Iona was held until a warrant check was
completed. Rather than issue a citation for failure to display
a tax decal, the police called dispatch to determine if the bike
was registered and, if so, to identity the owner and determine
whether the bike was reported stolen. Dispatch confirmed the
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bike was registered and that it was not reported stolen.7 The
pursuit of inquiry relevant to theft was not the purpose of the
stop, although the stop was used as an opportunity to make such
inquiries.8
Because what justified the initial stop was the lack
of a tax decal on the bike Iona was riding, the time span needed
to handle that matter was the sum of the time required under the
circumstances for Lieutenant Kagawa to confirm his reasonable
suspicion that the decals were missing, the time necessary to
obtain the identifying information of Iona required to fill out
the citation for riding without a decal, and the time necessary
to write and issue the citation.9 See State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw.
293, 300, 687 P.2d 544, 549 (1984) (“The obvious violation of
the Traffic Code gave [the officers] reason to seek information
necessary for the issuance of a citation.”). It took only
seconds to confirm the decals were missing. Lieutenant Kagawa
7
The police “may investigate matters unrelated to the original
stop if they have an independent basis for reasonable suspicion to indicate
that criminal activity is afoot[.]” Alvarez, 138 Hawaiʻi at 184, 378 P.3d at
900 (emphasis added). Here, however, there was no such basis. At oral
argument, the State conceded that no theft investigation occurred at any
point.
8
Calls were made by the police to locate the owner without
success; consequently, police at the scene called the Waiʻanae police station
and requested that it send an officer to the registered owner’s residence.
9
HRS § 291C-165(a) (2007) states that “[t]here shall be provided
for use by authorized police officers, a form of summons or citation for use
in citing violators of those traffic laws which do not mandate the physical
arrest of such violators.”
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testified that Iona gave him his correct name and date of birth
within “maybe three, four minutes” after the initial stop. The
warrant check came back fourteen minutes after the initial stop.
Under these circumstances, it was not constitutionally
permissible for the police to forego the issuance of a citation
and hold Iona. See Estabillio, 121 Hawaiʻi at 271, 218 P.3d at
759 (“In order to pass constitutional muster, the length of time
the officer could permissibly detain the defendant must have
been ‘no greater in intensity than absolutely necessary under
the circumstances.’” (emphasis added) (brackets omitted)
(quoting Barros, 98 Hawaiʻi at 342-43, 48 P.3d at 589-90)).
Officers have the discretion to confiscate a bicycle “liable for
the payment of the required fees or which has no tag or decal
affixed as required by section 249-14[.]” HRS § 249-15. At
oral argument, the State took the position that the
constitutionally permissible duration of the Terry stop at issue
here could last as long as it took the officers in their
discretion to decide whether or not to confiscate the bicycle.
Oral Argument, State v. Iona (SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX) at 46:00-49:00,
http://oaoa.hawaii.gov/jud/oa/18/SCOA_011818_SCWC_16_100.mp3.
We disagree.
What justified the initial Terry stop of Iona was a
missing tax decal. As Lieutenant Kagawa testified, he stopped
all three riders for violating a “[r]evised ordinance,”
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specifically, “1481 or something to that –- I’d have to look it
up.” The ordinance that authorizes a police officer to issue a
citation for a missing tax decal, ROH § 15-18.1, applies to any
resident bicycle rider; it is not specific to the registered
owner:
No person who resides within the City and County of
Honolulu shall ride or propel a bicycle on any street,
highway, alley, roadway or sidewalk or upon any public path
set aside for the exclusive use of bicycles unless such
bicycle has been licensed and a license plate two by three
inches in size, or a license decal, is attached thereto as
provided in this article.
See also ROH § 15-26.9 (stating that “it is a violation for any
person to violate any of the provisions of this traffic code”
and providing for a range of fines); HRS § 291C-165(a) (“There
shall be provided for use by authorized police officers, a form
of summons or citation for use in citing violators of those
traffic laws which do not mandate the physical arrest of such
violators.”).
For the police to issue the relevant citation under
the ordinance, it is not necessary for the police to know
whether the rider of the bicycle is also its owner. Therefore,
the subject matter of the investigative detention for which Iona
was seized was limited to a citation for the missing decal. See
Alvarez, 138 Hawai‘i at 182, 378 P.3d at 898 (“[T]he subject
matter and intensity of the investigative detention must be
limited to that which is justified by the initial stop.”). Once
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the investigation relating to that subject matter was complete,
the police should have informed Iona that he was free to leave,
regardless of whether the police decided to confiscate the
bicycle.
In conclusion, the phase of Iona’s investigative
detention relating to a police decision whether or not to
confiscate the bicycle was not “reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.” Id. (quoting Perez, 111 Hawaiʻi at 397, 141 P.3d 1044);
see Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015) (“A
seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation
. . . ‘becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete the mission’ of issuing a ticket
for the violation.” (brackets omitted) (quoting Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005))).
Because the constitutionally permissible duration of
the stop was limited to the time necessary to confirm the
violation, obtain identification necessary to issue a citation,
and write the citation, Iona’s detention could not be prolonged
by Lieutenant Kagawa to conduct a warrant check. By detaining
Iona longer than necessary to write the citation, Lieutenant
Kagawa clearly exceeded the reasonable time necessary to
accomplish the purpose of the stop. Since the arrest was
illegal, the evidence obtained as a result of the arrest was
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“fruit of the poisonous tree.” Prendergast, 103 Hawaiʻi at 454,
83 P.3d at 717 (quoting Fukusaku, 85 Hawaiʻi at 475, 946 P.2d at
45). Iona’s pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence from the
search incident to arrest should have been granted, and the
evidence seized as a result of that search should have been
excluded from his trial.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we vacate the ICA’s July
28, 2017 judgment on appeal and the circuit court’s January 25,
2016 judgment of conviction and sentence, and we remand the case
to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Henry P. Ting /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
(William H. Jameson, Jr.
on the brief /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
and application)
for Petitioner /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
Stephen K. Tsushima /s/ Richard W. Pollack
for Respondent
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
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