In re Contested Case Hearing re Conservation District Use Application

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCOT-XX-XXXXXXX
30-NOV-2018
10:45 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---
IN THE MATTER OF CONTESTED CASE HEARING RE
CONSERVATION DISTRICT USE APPLICATION (CDUA) HA-3568
FOR THE THIRTY METER TELESCOPE AT THE MAUNA KEA SCIENCE RESERVE,
KAʻOHE MAUKA, HĀMĀKUA, HAWAIʻI, TMK (3) 404015:009
SCOT-XX-XXXXXXX, SCOT-XX-XXXXXXX, and SCOT-XX-XXXXXXX
APPEAL FROM THE BOARD OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES
(BLNR-CC-16-002 (Agency Appeal))
NOVEMBER 30, 2018
AMENDED DISSENTING OPINION BY WILSON, J.1
I. Introduction
The degradation principle. The Board of Land and
Natural Resources (BLNR) grounds its analysis on the proposition
that cultural and natural resources protected by the
Constitution of the State of Hawaiʻi and its enabling laws lose
1
This amended dissenting opinion makes technical corrections
and minor substantive changes.
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legal protection where degradation of the resource is of
sufficient severity as to constitute a substantial adverse
impact. Because the area affected by the Thirty Meter Telescope
Project (TMT or TMT project) was previously subjected to a
substantial adverse impact, the BLNR finds that the proposed TMT
project could not have a substantial adverse impact on the
existing natural resources. Under this analysis, the cumulative
negative impacts from development of prior telescopes caused a
substantial adverse impact; therefore, TMT could not be the
cause of a substantial adverse impact. As stated by the BLNR,
TMT could not ”create a tipping point where impacts became
significant.” Thus, addition of another telescope—TMT—could not
be the cause of a substantial adverse impact on the existing
resources because the tipping point of a substantial adverse
impact had previously been reached.
Appellants object to the principle advanced by the
BLNR that “without the TMT Project, the cumulative effect of
astronomical development and other uses in the summit area of
Mauna Kea have previously resulted in impacts that are
substantial, significant and adverse” and, therefore, “[t]he
level of impacts on natural resources within the Astronomy
Precinct of the [Mauna Kea Science Reserve (MKSR)] would be
substantially the same even in the absence of the TMT
Project[.]” In other words, BLNR concludes that the degradation
2
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to the summit area has been so substantially adverse that the
addition of TMT would have no substantial adverse effect. Thus,
while conceding that Mauna Kea receives constitutional and
statutory protection commensurate with its unchallenged position
as the citadel of the Hawaiian cultural pantheon, the BLNR
applies what can be described as a degradation principle to cast
off cultural or environmental protection by establishing that
prior degradation of the resource—to a level of damage causing a
substantial adverse impact—extinguishes the legal protection
afforded to natural resources in the conservation district. The
degradation principle ignores the unequivocal mandate contained
in Hawaiʻi Administrative Rules (HAR) § 13-5-30(c)(4) prohibiting
a Conservation District Use Permit (CDUP) for a land use that
would cause a substantial adverse impact to existing natural
resources. The BLNR substitutes a new standard for evaluating
the impacts of proposed land uses, a standard that removes the
protection to conservation land afforded by HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4).
Using the fact that the resource has already suffered a
substantial adverse impact, the BLNR concludes that further land
uses could not be the cause of substantial adverse impact.
Under this new principle of natural resource law, one of the
most sacred resources of the Hawaiian culture loses its
protection because it has previously undergone substantial
adverse impact from prior development of telescopes. The
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degradation principle portends environmental and cultural damage
to cherished natural and cultural resources. It dilutes or
reverses the foundational dual objectives of environmental law—
namely, to conserve what exists (or is left) and to repair
environmental damage; it perpetuates the concept that the
passage of time and the degradation of natural resources can
justify unacceptable environmental and cultural damage.2
2
The duty to preserve and rehabilitate in perpetuity a
resource such as Kahoʻolawe that has, over time, been severely degraded
by government action is a duty potentially undermined or extinguished
under the new degradation principle. See Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes
(HRS) § 6K-3(a)(3) (1993) (requiring Kahoʻolawe to be preserved and
rehabilitated). The principle is directly contrary to the purpose of
the federal National Environmental Policy Act, which notes the
obligation of government to protect and restore the environment:
[I]t is the continuing responsibility of the Federal
Government to use all practicable means, consistent with
other essential considerations of national policy, to
improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs,
and resources to the end that the Nation may—
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation
as trustee of the environment for succeeding
generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful,
productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing
surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the
environment without degradation, risk to health or
safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and
natural aspects of our national heritage, and
maintain, wherever possible, an environment which
supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource
use which will permit high standards of living and a
wide sharing of life’s amenities; and
(continued . . .)
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It is noteworthy that the party responsible for the
substantial adverse impact to this protected resource is the
State of Hawaiʻi (State). It is uncontested that the State
authorized previous construction within the Astronomy Precinct
of the MKSR that created a substantial adverse impact. Thus,
the party that caused the substantial adverse impact is
empowered by the degradation principle to increase the damage.
Now the most extensive construction project yet proposed for the
Astronomy Precinct—a 180-foot building 600 feet below the summit
ridge of Mauna Kea—is deemed to have no substantial adverse
impact due to extensive degradation from prior development of
telescopes in the summit area. The degradation principle
renders inconsequential the failure of the State to meet its
constitutional duty to protect natural and cultural resources
for future generations. It renders illusory the public trust
duty enshrined in the Constitution of the State of Hawaiʻi and
heretofore in the decisions of this court to protect such
resources. And its policy of condoning continued destruction of
natural resources once the resource value has been substantially
(. . . continued)
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and
approach the maximum attainable recycling of
depletable resources.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2012).
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adversely impacted is contrary to accepted norms of the
environmental rule of law.
II. The BLNR and the Majority Fail to Comply with the
Requirement of HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) that the Impact of the Thirty
Meter Telescope upon the Existing Adversely Impacted Cultural
Resource Be Considered
HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) prohibits a proposed land use in
the conservation district that will cause a substantial adverse
impact to existing natural resources: “In evaluating the merits
of a proposed land use, . . . [t]he proposed land use will not
cause substantial adverse impact to existing natural resources
within the surrounding area, community, or region.” Because
“natural resources” includes cultural resources,3 land use cannot
occur in the conservation district if it causes a substantial
adverse impact to existing cultural resources. HAR § 13-5-
30(c)(4) sets the standard to evaluate whether the proposed land
use project should be permitted. Under this standard, the
impact of the proposed land use must be considered with an
understanding of the condition of the existing natural
resources. If the land use will cause a substantial adverse
impact to the existing natural resources, it is prohibited. The
3
“Natural resource” as defined by the version of HAR § 13-5-
2 in effect when Appellees submitted their Conservation District Use
Application included “resources such as plants, aquatic life and
wildlife, cultural, historic, and archaeological sites, and minerals.”
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degradation principle violates HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) by removing
the requirement to consider the effect of a proposed land use on
the existing natural resource. The degradation principle
reverses the requirement that the impact of the new land use be
considered; instead, the degradation principle requires that the
impact not be considered once the existing resource has suffered
a substantial adverse impact. Consideration of the impacts of a
proposed land use becomes irrelevant because the existing
resource is already substantially degraded.4
It is undisputed that the relevant area of the TMT
project has suffered a substantial adverse impact to cultural
resources due to the construction of twelve5 telescopes: “[T]he
cumulative effects of astronomical development and other uses in
the summit area of Mauna Kea have previously resulted in impacts
4
The Majority states that the “BLNR does not have license to
endlessly approve permits for construction in conservation districts,
based purely on the rationale that every additional facility is purely
incremental. It cannot be the case that the presence of one facility
necessarily renders all additional facilities as an ‘incremental’
addition.” Majority Opinion at 55 (quoting Kilakila ʻO Haleakalā v.
Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 138 Hawaiʻi 383, 404, 382 P.3d 195, 216
(2016)). However, the increment with the greatest impact of all
telescopes, TMT, is deemed to not cause a substantial adverse impact
because prior increments of telescope construction cumulatively caused
a substantial adverse impact.
5
The Astronomy Precinct of the MKSR “currently has eight
optical / infrared observatories, three submillimeter observatories
and a radio telescope.” Eight of these facilities became operational
between 1970 and 1992; four became operational between 1996 and 2002.
HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4), the rule protecting natural resources from
substantial adverse impacts, was adopted in 1994.
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that are substantial, significant and adverse.” Understandably,
the proscription against imposition of a substantial adverse
impact upon conservation district land contained in HAR § 13-5-
30(c)(4) must be applied in light of the purpose of the chapter
of which it is a part. See Kilakila, 138 Hawaiʻi at 405, 382
P.3d at 217. The purpose of HAR Title 13, Chapter 5 is to
conserve, protect and preserve the important natural and
cultural resources of the State of Hawaiʻi in the conservation
district: “The purpose of this chapter is to regulate land-use
in the conservation district for the purpose of conserving,
protecting, and preserving the important natural and cultural
resources of the State through appropriate management and use to
promote their long-term sustainability and the public health,
safety, and welfare.” HAR § 13-5-1. To effectuate the
protection of cultural resources in the conservation district
mandated in HAR Chapter 13-5, HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) was adopted to
prohibit land use that will cause a substantial adverse impact
on cultural resources. The legislative history, the record of
legislative intent preceding HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4), is an
unequivocal expression of intent to protect conservation land
from the consequences of the degradation principle. Rather than
promote further degradation of conservation land that, in its
“existing” condition, has been substantially adversely impacted,
i.e., degraded, the Hawaiʻi State Legislature (legislature)
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created a management framework that protects against further
degradation. The companion statute that authorized the
implementation of HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) is HRS Chapter 183C. Its
purpose is to conserve, protect, and preserve natural and
cultural resources in the conservation district—not to establish
a process permitting the degradation of such a resource once the
resource has been substantially adversely impacted:
The legislature finds that lands within the state
land use conservation district contain important natural
resources essential to the preservation of the State’s
fragile natural ecosystems and the sustainability of the
State’s water supply. It is therefore, the intent of the
legislature to conserve, protect, and preserve the
important natural resources of the State through
appropriate management and use to promote their long-term
sustainability and the public health, safety and welfare.
HRS § 183C-1 (2011). The adoption of HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) in
1994 was intended to implement the purpose of HRS Chapter 183C,
namely “clarify[ing] the department’s jurisdictional and
management responsibilities within the State conservation
district.” H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 491, in 1994 House Journal,
at 1057. To clarify the responsibility of the State to
conserve, protect, and preserve natural resources, mandatory
language prohibiting land use that causes substantial adverse
impact on natural resources, including cultural resources, was
codified.6 The legislative history of HRS § 183C-1 and HAR § 13-
6
HAR § 13-5-30(b) provides that, “[u]nless provided in this
chapter, land uses shall not be undertaken in the conservation
(continued . . .)
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5-30(c)(4) contains no discussion of or allusion to the
degradation principle; instead, its import is to provide more
clear protection for Hawaii’s natural resources by preventing
further damage to conservation land already subjected to
substantial adverse impacts.7
(. . . continued)
district.” (Emphasis added). HAR § 13-5-30(c) provides that, “[i]n
evaluating the merits of a proposed land use, the department or board
shall apply the following criteria.” (Emphasis added). We have
interpreted this language to mean that a proposed land use is
“prohibit[ed]” if it violates HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4), the fourth of these
criteria. Majority Opinion at 54. As noted, consistent with the
clarification of the State’s duty to protect cultural resources, the
1994 passage of HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) specifically defined natural
resources to include cultural resources.
7
HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) protects natural resources in the
conservation district from any land use that causes a substantial
adverse impact. HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) does not allow this protection to
be balanced against any competing interest, such as economic value
from the proposed land use. If the proposed land use will cause a
substantial adverse impact to the existing cultural resource, no
amount of compensation or economic benefit is legally capable of
justifying the impact. This is in contrast to other Hawaiʻi resource
management regimes, such as the Coastal Zone Management statute, which
explicitly requires a balancing test:
No development shall be approved unless the authority
[designated by the county] has first found . . . [t]hat the
development will not have any substantial adverse
environmental or ecological effect, except as such adverse
effect is minimized to the extent practicable and clearly
outweighed by public health, safety, or compelling public
interests.
HRS § 205A-26(2)(A) (2017). Unlike the Coastal Zone Management
regulatory regime, under HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4), economic benefit is not
available as a justification for a project that will cause a
substantial adverse impact on natural resources in the conservation
district. A change of the land use classification to a designation
other than conservation land would be necessary.
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As noted, the BLNR’s decision reverses the standard of
protection in HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) requiring evaluation of the
impacts of TMT on existing natural resources. The new
“reversed” standard ignores the fact that the existing resource
has been substantially adversely impacted. The degradation
principle eliminates the analytical requirement of HAR § 13-5-
30(c)(4) that a determination be made as to whether the proposed
land use will have a substantial adverse impact on the resource
as it exists. Instead, the degradation principle provides that,
once the resource has been substantially adversely impacted, the
impact of the proposed land use cannot cause a substantial
adverse impact. In this way, the BLNR omits the requirement of
HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) that, regardless of whether the existing
resource has previously sustained substantial adverse impact,
the impacts of the construction of TMT on existing resources
must be considered to determine whether TMT will cause a
substantial adverse impact. The BLNR’s decision directly
contradicts this court’s holding in Kilakila that required the
proposed land use to be considered in the context of “existing
natural resources within the surrounding area, community, or
region.” HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4); see 138 Hawaiʻi at 403, 382 P.3d
at 215 (considering the impacts of a telescope in the context of
the cultural resources of the site on which it was proposed to
be located).
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Thus, the BLNR and the Majority acknowledge past
telescope projects have had a substantial adverse impact on
cultural resources,8 specifically that the cumulative effect of
8
The BLNR described these impacts as being substantial,
significant, and adverse:
At the summit ridge, the existing observatories obscure
portions of the 360-degree panoramic view from the summit
area. Overall, the existing level of the cumulative visual
impact from past observatory construction projects at the
summit ridge area has been considered to be substantial,
significant, and adverse.
Development of the existing observatories also
significantly modified the preexisting terrain. The tops
of certain puʻu, or cinder cones, were flattened to
accommodate the foundations for observatory facilities.
Some materials removed from the puʻu were pushed over the
sides of the cinder cones, creating steeper slopes that are
more susceptible to disturbance. Consequently, the
existing level of cumulative impact from preexisting
observatories on geology, soils, and slope stability is
considered to be substantial, significant, and adverse.
The United Kingdom Infrared Telescope, specifically, was constructed
on the summit ridge, which the BLNR described as “a more sensitive
cultural area.” It found that the United Kingdom Infrared Telescope
and the James Clark Maxwell Telescope obstruct views to the west, and
the 2.2-meter telescope and NASA Infrared Telescope Facility obstruct
views to the north.
The Majority’s conclusion that TMT will not have a
substantial adverse impact on existing natural resources comes with
little explanation, other than to make clear that it is relying upon
the reasoning of the BLNR in its Decision and Order. Majority Opinion
at 59 (accepting the BLNR’s finding that “the TMT project will not
cause substantial adverse impact to the existing natural resources
within the surrounding area, community, or region under HAR § 13-5-
30(c)(4)”).
Though the Majority accepts the BLNR’s conclusion of no
substantial adverse impact, it provides no explanation as to how the
BLNR reached its conclusion. It does not discuss the BLNR’s
proposition that the substantial adverse impacts already imposed on
the cultural resources mean that TMT could not be the cause of a
substantial adverse impact. Instead, the Majority begs the question.
It states as a premise that TMT does not cause a substantial impact
(continued . . .)
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astronomical development on Mauna Kea and other uses of the
summit area “have already resulted in substantial, significant
and adverse impacts[.]” Majority Opinion at 55. Yet, based on
the fact that the condition of the existing resource has already
reached the point of substantial adverse impact, the proposed
land use escapes scrutiny as to whether it will cause a
substantial adverse impact; the “tipping point” beyond which
impacts become substantial has already been reached due to the
cumulative impacts of prior telescope development. The TMT
project cannot, therefore, be the tipping point to cause a
substantial adverse impact. The signature purpose of HAR § 13-5-
(. . . continued)
and restates the premise as its conclusion. Thus, the Majority avoids
an analysis of whether TMT causes a substantial adverse impact to the
existing natural resources. The Majority lists resources that the
BLNR concluded will not be affected, including cultural resources, and
states that because they are not substantially adversely impacted, the
BLNR was correct in concluding there is no substantial adverse impact:
Because (1) the TMT will not cause substantial adverse
impact to existing plants, aquatic life and wildlife,
cultural, historic, and archaeological sites, minerals,
recreational sites, geologic sites, scenic areas,
ecologically significant areas, and watersheds, (2)
mitigation measures of restoring the abandoned Poliʻahu Road
and decommissioning five telescopes will be adopted, and
(3) other measures to lessen the impacts of the TMT will be
adopted, the BLNR did not clearly err in concluding that
the TMT will not have a substantial adverse impact to
existing natural resources within the surrounding area,
community, or region, as prohibited by HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4).
Majority Opinion at 59-60. Most of the Majority’s opinion regarding
HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) is spent discussing the mitigation measures. The
focus on mitigation by the BLNR and the Majority supports the
conclusion that the project will cause a substantial adverse impact.
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30(c)(4), to prevent land use that will cause a substantial
adverse impact to natural resources in the conservation
district, is extinguished. Without the protection afforded by
HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) and HRS § 183C-1, the way is open to a
conclusion fraught with illogic: the construction of a
telescope the magnitude of TMT will not cause a substantial
adverse impact to a natural resource of undisputed significant
cultural value—notwithstanding that the resource has already
been substantially adversely impacted by construction of twelve
existing buildings of lesser size. The real severity of the
impact to the resource is made apparent by the effort of the
BLNR and the Majority to mitigate the project’s effects with
conditions that—though ineffective—support that Mauna Kea will
be substantially adversely impacted when TMT is constructed.9
9
Although the Majority concludes that, in its degraded
condition, the existing resource will not be substantially adversely
impacted by the TMT project, it takes a contradictory position
implying acknowledgment that TMT will cause a substantial adverse
impact that must be mitigated. The Majority seeks to mitigate the
damage TMT will cause. It relies upon the University of Hawaiʻi at
Hilo’s (University) agreement to decommission three telescopes, the
Very Long Baseline Array antenna, and one additional observatory. The
Majority presumes that the impact from TMT will become less than
substantial once the mitigation measures are complete. However,
contrary to the assumption of the Majority that TMT can proceed
conditioned on significant, long-term mitigation measures, HAR § 13-5-
30(c)(4) prohibits land use in the conservation district where the
land use will cause a substantial adverse impact. Thus, restoration
of cultural resources to a condition that is not substantially
adversely impacted must occur before a Conservation District Use
Permit is granted.
(continued . . .)
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The degradation principle is antithetical to the
intent expressed in HAR Chapter 13-5 to provide protection to
natural resources in the conservation district. It causes
(. . . continued)
Moreover, the mitigation measures adopted by the BLNR and
the Majority do not constitute reasonable mitigation measures. They
are illusory. Three of the telescopes have no required date of
decommissioning. Instead, removal is relegated to an undefined point
in the future when it is “reasonably possible” to remove them. These
aspirational measures appear in Special Conditions 10 and 11 of the
permit:
The University will decommission three telescopes
permanently, as soon as reasonably possible, and no new
observatories will be constructed on those sites. This
commitment will be legally binding on the University and
shall be included in any lease renewal or extension
proposed by the University for Mauna Kea;
. . . [C]onsistent with the Decommissioning Plan, at
least two additional facilities will be permanently
decommissioned by December 31, 2033, including the Very
Long Baseline Array antenna and at least one additional
observatory.
If the University fails to decommission the five telescopes, the BLNR
would be authorized, but not required, to revoke the permit for TMT.
See HAR § 13-5-44. Given that the BLNR speculates that the time it
would take for TMT to become operational is a reasonable amount of
time in which to decommission three telescopes, it seems highly
unlikely that the BLNR would revoke the TMT permit after this
reasonable amount of time has passed—that is, when TMT becomes
operational. Even if the permit were revoked due to a failure to
decommission the other telescopes, it is not clear that there would be
adequate funding to decommission TMT before 2033. These conditions
are little more than aspirational goals, as their enforcement would
depend on action taken by the very entity presently granting the
permit—the BLNR. And the term “as soon as reasonably possible” is
vague enough as to be effectively unenforceable. These supposed
conditions are ineffective as mitigation measures because their
failure can occur at any time up to the completion of the construction
of TMT, at which time they are highly unlikely to be put into effect.
Rather than mitigating the adverse impact of TMT, they will permit
further degradation of the resource that, in its existing condition,
has already been substantially adversely impacted.
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cultural resources protected from substantial adverse impact to
lose protection once they are substantially impacted in an
adverse manner. The import of this method of rejecting the
protection afforded to conservation land is the authorization of
degradation of resources with utmost cultural and environmental
importance. And so it has happened in the instant case.
III. The Degradation Principle Violates Norms of Environmental
Law
Norms of environmental law support the legislature’s
intent to protect natural resources on conservation land—
notwithstanding that it has been previously subjected to a
substantial adverse impact. The degradation principle, on the
other hand, violates norms of environmental law. It allows
further environmental and cultural damage to occur in a region
of great cultural significance because the cultural resource has
been previously substantially degraded and compromised. This
justification for acceleration of damage to a protected resource
runs contrary to the intent embodied in article XII, section 7
and article XI, section 9 of the Constitution of the State of
Hawaiʻi (Hawaiʻi Constitution) to protect cultural and
environmental rights. The degradation principle also
contravenes widely accepted principles of law that protect the
outstanding value of cultural and natural resources,
notwithstanding degradation to the resource. These norms
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include intergenerational equity, polluter pays, and non-
regression.
A. Cultural and Environmental Rights Embodied in the
Hawaiʻi Constitution
The degradation principle contravenes provisions of
the Hawaiʻi Constitution that protect cultural and environmental
rights. Article XII, section 7 affirms and protects the rights
of Native Hawaiians to engage in traditional and customary
practices. Under article XI, section 9, every person holds a
substantive “right to a clean and healthful environment[.]”
Contrary to article XII, section 7, and article XI, section 9,
the degradation principle teaches that once a natural resource
in the conservation district is degraded to the degree that it
has suffered a substantial adverse impact, it is no longer
worthy of protection; it bears insufficient worth to protect the
resource from additional proposed development.
This court has held that “‘[t]he right to a clean and
healthful environment’ is a substantive right guaranteed to each
person by Article XI, section 9 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution[.]”
In re Application of Maui Elec. Co., 141 Hawaiʻi 249, 261, 408
P.3d 1, 13 (2017) (quoting Haw. Const. art. XI, § 9). Article
XI, section 9 provides:
Each person has the right to a clean and healthful
environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental
quality, including control of pollution and conservation,
protection and enhancement of natural resources. Any
person may enforce this right against any party, public or
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private, through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to
reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law.
In Maui Electric, this court classified this right as “a
property interest protected by due process.” 141 Hawaiʻi at 261,
408 P.3d at 13. The right to a clean and healthy environment is
enumerated in laws relating to the environment including, for
example, those that prohibit a proposed land use in a
conservation district when it will “cause [a] substantial
adverse impact to existing natural resources[.]” HAR § 13-5-
30(c)(4). The degradation principle undermines the right to a
clean and healthy environment because it allows unimpeded
destruction of the environment once a determination is made that
the natural resource protected from substantial adverse impacts
within the conservation district has been subject to
“substantial, significant and adverse” impacts from development.
Majority Opinion at 55. Similarly, the degradation principle
vitiates the right to practice Native Hawaiian traditional and
customary practices embodied in article XII, section 7 of the
Hawaiʻi Constitution10 whenever the cultural practices have been
10
“The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights,
customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and
religious purposes and possessed by ahupuaʻa tenants who are
descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands
prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate such
rights.” Haw. Const. art. XII, § 7; see, e.g., In re Waiʻola O
Molokaʻi Inc., 103 Hawaiʻi 401, 409, 83 P.3d 664, 672 (2004) (holding
that the Commission on Water Resource Management “failed to discharge
(continued . . .)
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subjected to a substantial adverse impact in the conservation
district.
B. Intergenerational Equity
The State holds Hawaii’s natural resources in trust
“[f]or the benefit of present and future generations[.]”11 Haw.
Const. art. XI, § 1. This court has consistently emphasized the
responsibility held by the State to ensure that the rights of
future generations are preserved. E.g., Kauai Springs, Inc. v.
Planning Comm’n of Cty. of Kauaʻi, 133 Hawaiʻi 141, 172, 324 P.3d
951, 982 (2014) (“The public trust is, therefore, the duty and
authority to maintain the purity and flow of our waters for
future generations and to assure that the waters of our land are
put to reasonable and beneficial uses.”); Kelly, 111 Hawaiʻi at
221–23, 140 P.3d at 1001–03 (discussing this court’s adoption of
(. . . continued)
its public trust duty to protect native Hawaiians’ traditional and
customary gathering rights, as guaranteed by . . . [A]rticle XII,
section 7 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution”); Kalipi v. Hawaiian Tr. Co., 66
Haw. 1, 4, 656 P.2d 745, 748 (1982) (recognizing this court’s
obligation to protect and enforce the rights of Native Hawaiians to
exercise traditional and customary practices embodied in article XII,
section 7 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution).
11
See, e.g., In re ʻĪao Ground Water Mgmt. Area High-Level
Source Water Use Permit Applications, 128 Hawaiʻi 228, 276, 287 P.3d
129, 177 (2012); Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 111 Hawaiʻi 205,
222-23, 140 P.3d 985, 1002-03 (2006); In re Waiʻola O Molokaʻi, 103
Hawaiʻi at 429–31, 83 P.3d at 692–94; In re Water Use Permit
Applications (Waiāhole I), 94 Hawaiʻi 97, 113, 129-32, 138-39, 141,
189, 9 P.3d 409, 425, 441-44, 450-51, 453, 501 (2000); Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 674, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (1982).
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the public trust doctrine and the principle of intergenerational
equity embodied therein); Waiāhole I, 94 Hawaiʻi at 141, 9 P.3d
at 453 (“Under the public trust, the state has both the
authority and duty to preserve the rights of present and future
generations in the waters of the state.”); Robinson, 65 Haw. at
674, 658 P.2d at 310 (recognizing the State’s concomitant duty
to protect water for future generations and ensure that water is
“put to reasonable and beneficial uses”).12
The BLNR promotes an analysis that requires it to
ignore the impacts to future land uses arising from the
cumulative effect of twelve telescopes built over the last fifty
years in the MKSR. Future generations do not receive the
benefit of protection of the cultural resource in the future
because past substantial adverse impacts render it unnecessary
12
U.S. courts have recognized that the federal government
owes a public trust duty to present and future generations. In
Juliana v. United States, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon ruled that a group of young environmental activists between the
ages of eight and nineteen (plaintiffs) had standing to assert
substantive due process and public trust claims against the U.S.
government based on its failure to adopt adequate measures to decrease
the country’s reliance on fossil fuels and reduce carbon emissions.
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233, 1267 (D. Or.
2016), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL
2483705 (D. Or. June 8, 2017). The plaintiffs argued that the U.S.
government has “known for over fifty years that carbon dioxide (“CO2”)
produced by burning fossil fuels were destabilizing the climate system
in a way that would ‘significantly endanger plaintiffs, with the
damage persisting for millennia.’” Id. at 1233. The court granted
the plaintiffs standing because they established that the “youth and
future generations” would suffer harm “in a concrete and personal
way.” Id. at 1224, 1267.
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to determine future impacts from TMT. In Unite Here! Local 5 v.
City & Cty. of Honolulu, 123 Hawaiʻi 150, 231 P.3d 423 (2010)
this court rejected a similar decision to ignore impacts of a
proposed land use. In Unite Here!, this court emphasized the
importance of considering future impacts from proposed
development decisions. The case arose from a proposed expansion
of Kuilima Resort at Turtle Bay (Kuilima) on the North Shore of
Oʻahu. Unite Here!, 123 Hawaiʻi at 154, 231 P.3d at 427. In
1985, Kuilima submitted an environmental impact statement (EIS)
to the Department of Land Utilization. Id. The EIS identified
various adverse impacts of the development including “drainage,
traffic, dust generation, water consumption, marsh drainage
input, loss of agricultural uses, construction noise, air
quality, and solid waste disposal.” Id. at 155, 231 P.3d at
428. Over the course of the next twenty years, the project
encountered several delays. Id. at 157, 231 P.3d at 430. In
2005—twenty years after the permit was granted—Kuilima submitted
a Site Development Division Master Application Form and
contended there was no basis for a supplemental EIS (SEIS) to
assess changes to the surrounding area. Id. at 154, 159, 231
P.3d at 427, 432. The Department of Planning and Permitting
agreed; it ruled that no SEIS was required because “[n]o time
frame for development was either implied or imposed by the City
Council as part of its [original] approval.” Id. at 159, 231
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P.3d at 432. Kuilima was allowed to proceed without conducting
a SEIS.
Despite the fact that twenty years had passed since
the initial project proposal, the circuit court affirmed the
Department of Planning and Permitting’s decision. Id. at 166-
67, 231 P.3d at 439-40. It ruled “that a SEIS is required only
when there is a substantive project change and . . . that, as a
matter of law, the timing of the project had not substantively
changed.” Id. This meant that absent a substantial change in
the proposal itself, the original “EIS would remain valid in
perpetuity and no SEIS could ever be required[.]” Unite Here!
Local 5 v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 120 Hawaiʻi 457, 472, 209
P.3d 1271, 1286 (App. 2009) (Nakamura, J., dissenting), vacated,
123 Hawaiʻi 150, 231 P.3d 423 (2010).
This court reversed the ICA’s majority decision. The
court found it significant that substantial, cumulative changes
in the area occurred between 1985 and 2005. Unite Here!, 123
Hawaiʻi at 179, 231 P.3d at 452. This included a dramatic
increase in traffic and the introduction of endangered and
threatened species in the area, including the monk seal and
green sea turtle. Id. The court held that the timing of the
project had substantively changed and this change had a
significant effect on the project. Id. at 180, 231 P.3d at 453.
The passage of twenty years created “an ‘essentially different
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action’” than the one proposed, necessitating an SEIS. Id. at
178, 231 P.3d at 451. In Unite Here!, this court contemplated
“changes in the project area and its impact on the surrounding
communities[.]” Id. In doing so, we considered the impacts of
the proposed development on the rights and interests of future
generations. Rather than freeze the analysis of the impacts by
considering only a period twenty years in the past, this court
recognized that the interests of subsequent generations required
that the impacts on the resource be considered at the time the
construction was to occur.
The BLNR would return to the proposition rejected in
Unite Here! that a project need not take into consideration the
impacts of the proposed land use on the resource as it presently
exists. The degradation principle removes the need to consider
the impacts of TMT on the existing resource; once the existing
cultural resource has been substantially adversely impacted, it
is unnecessary to consider whether a future land use would cause
a substantial adverse impact. In this way the BLNR ignores the
rights of future generations to the protections specifically
afforded them by the rule adopted in 1994, which mandates that
“the proposed land use will not cause substantial adverse impact
to existing natural resources within the surrounding area,
community, or region.” HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4). The legislature
did not intend that the rights of future generations to the
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protection of Mauna Kea be ignored by disregarding the impact of
the TMT project on a resource already substantially adversely
impacted by the construction of twelve telescopes.
Application of the degradation principle disregards
the rights of future generations. It creates a threshold
condition of damage—substantial adverse impact—that, once met,
renders the resource available for future degradation. In so
doing, the degradation principle presumes there is no natural
resource value left to protect. The actions of prior and
present generations extinguish the chance for future generations
to protect the environmental and cultural heritage that once
enjoyed legal protection. Future generations are left with the
proposition enshrined in the degradation principle that
incremental degradation to “the highest mountain peak in the
Hawaiian Islands” and one that “is of profound importance in
Hawaiian culture” justifies significant future degradation if
the degradation attains a substantial adverse degree. Mauna Kea
Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res. (Mauna Kea I), 136 Hawaiʻi
376, 399, 363 P.3d 224, 247 (2015).13
13
Intergenerational equity is a tenet of international law.
Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
prescribes the boundaries of intergenerational equity: “The right to
development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental
and environmental needs of present and future generations.” Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 3, June 14, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 874, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26. The International Court of
(continued . . .)
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(. . . continued)
Justice (ICJ) recognized intergenerational equity as early as 1996.
In Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ noted
“the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living
space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings,
including generations unborn.” Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 241, ¶ 29. The Supreme Court of
the Republic of the Philippines recognized the rights of future
generations in Juan Antonio, et al. v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792 (S.C. July 30, 1993) (Phil.). In
the Juan Antonio case, the petitioners asserted claims to prevent mass
deforestation based on the rights of “their generation as well as
generations unborn.” Juan Antonio, 224 S.C.R.A. at 798. The court’s
decision arose from the principle of intergenerational equity:
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety.
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations. Needless to say,
every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of
a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.
Id. at 798-99. See also Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of
India, AIR 1996 SC 1, 11 (India) (recognizing that intergenerational
equity is a cornerstone of the customary international law principle
of sustainable development). Thus, intergenerational equity ensures
accountability between the generations of mankind.
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C. Polluter Pays Principle
The polluter pays principle seeks to deter
environmental degradation by imposing liability on the polluter.
See Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Koppers Co., 40 F.3d 750, 762 (5th Cir.
1994). Polluters must pay for the cost of restoring the value
of the site damaged by their own activities and those impacted
by the damage. Courts in the United States have applied
polluter pays to remedy harm to the environment. E.g., United
States v. Capital Tax Corp., 545 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2008)
(recognizing that the government can recover damages from
responsible parties to clean up hazardous waste because “the
‘polluter pays’” under Title 42, Sections 9606(a) and 9604(a) of
the United States Code); Joslyn Mfg. Co., 40 F.3d at 762
(ordering the polluter to pay the cost of restoring a
contaminated site and denying the polluter’s “scheme under which
it could defray part of its clean-up cost by passing the
contaminated property through a series of innocent landowners
and then, when the contamination is discovered, demanding
contribution from each”); see also Fla. Const. art. II, § 7(b)
(incorporating the polluter pays principle to protect the
Everglades Agricultural Area by holding those who cause
pollution “primarily responsible for paying the costs of the
abatement of that pollution”).
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“Polluter pays” is also a principle of international
law. A prominent example of its application occurred in the
Trail Smelter Arbitration spanning the late 1930s and early
1940s. See Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905,
1965 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1938 and 1941). A trail smelter owned by a
Canadian corporation emitted noxious sulphur dioxide fumes that
drifted and harmed crops in the United States. Id. at 1917,
1965. The Permanent Court of Arbitration14 held Canada
financially responsible for the damage and accorded compensation
to the United States:
[U]nder the principles of international law, as well as the
law of the United Sates, no State has the right to use or
permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or
the properties or persons therein, when the case is of
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence . . . . Considering the
circumstances of the case, the Tribunal holds that the
Dominion of Canada is responsible in international law for
the conduct of the Trail Smelter.
Id. Therefore, the polluter was liable for the environmental
and economic harm caused by its pollution. Similarly, in the
seminal case Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India &
Ors., the Supreme Court of India recognized the polluter pays
14
The Permanent Court of Arbitration is an intergovernmental
organization with 121 contracting parties (states) located in the
Hague. Permanent Court of Arbitration, https://pca-cpa.org/en/home/
(https://perma.cc/B2V9-TCC9) (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). It was
formally established through the Convention for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes in 1899, arising out of a need for a forum
to conduct dispute resolution among states. Id.
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principle as a tenet of sustainable development—a principle of
customary international law. AIR 1996 SC 1, 11-13, 22 (India).
A citizens’ group challenged tanneries that were releasing
untreated effluent into surrounding waterways and land. Id. at
1. The court defined polluter pays:
[T]he absolute liability for harm to the environment
extends not only to compensate the victims of pollution but
also the cost of restoring the environmental degradation .
. . . [P]olluter is liable to pay the cost to the
individual sufferers as well as the cost of restoring the
environmental degradation.
Id. at 12. The court ordered the formation of an official
authority to implement the polluter pays principle to determine
the costs of repaying victims and restoring the environment.
Id. at 22.15
15
In the absence of an express statutory or constitutional
mandate, the court integrated international norms into domestic law.
It noted that when customary international law does not directly
contradict domestic law, it is inherently incorporated into domestic
law:
In view of the above mentioned constitutional and
statutory provisions we have no hesitation in holding that
the precautionary principle and the polluter pays
p[r]inciple are part of the environmental law of the
country.
Even otherwise once these principles are accepted as part
of the Customary International Law there would be no
difficultly in accepting them as part of the domestic law.
It is almost accepted proposition of law that the rule of
Customary International Law which are not contrary to the
municipal law shall be deemed to have been incorporated in
the domestic law and shall be followed by the Courts of
Law.
Vellore Citizens, AIR 1996 SC at 13. Therefore, the court
incorporated the polluter pays principle into its analysis.
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The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, reviewing
an appeal from Trinidad and Tobago,16 recently applied the
polluter pays principle to address water pollution regulations:
The Polluter Pays Principle . . . is now firmly established
as a basic principle of international and domestic
environmental laws. It is designed to achieve the
“internalization of environmental costs”, by ensuring that
the costs of pollution control and remediation are borne by
those who cause the pollution, and thus reflected in the
costs of their goods and services, rather than borne by the
community at large.
Fishermen & Friends of the Sea v. the Minister of Planning,
Hous. & Env’t [2017] UKPC 37 ¶ 2 (appeal taken from Trinidad and
Tobago).17 In Fishermen and Friends, a non-profit organization
challenged a regulation promulgated by the Minister of Planning,
Housing and the Environment that prescribed fixed fee amounts
for cases of pollution or environmental degradation. Id. ¶¶ 6-
7. The regulation was promulgated under the National
Environmental Policy of Trinidad and Tobago which codifies the
polluter pays principle. Id. ¶ 5. Section 2.3(b) of the
National Environmental Policy mandates that money collected from
polluters “will be used to correct environmental damage.” Id.
16
Lord Carnwath, assigned from the Supreme Court of England,
authored the opinion of the Council.
17
In 2001, the Minister of Planning, Housing and the
Environment promulgated the Water Pollution Rules and the Water
Pollution (Fees) Regulations. Fishermen & Friends, ¶¶ 15-16. The
Rules and Regulations established a permitting system whereby
permittees that were releasing water pollutants above permissible
levels were required to pay a “prescribed fee.” Id. ¶ 15. “The fee
did not vary according to the type or amount of the pollution
permitted” and therefore did not apply polluter pays. Id. ¶ 16.
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The regulation was challenged as inadequate because it imposed a
flat fee on all polluters as opposed to a fee based on actual
damage:
“As a result of the flat fee model which has been selected,
no fees collected are being used to correct environmental
damage. This also has a consequential effect in respect of
proportionality, as there is no ability to tailor the fee
to meet the degree of damage which might be caused by
different permittees. The costs associated with rectifying
environmental damage will obviously vary according to the
pollution load, pollutant profile, sensitivity of receiving
environment and toxicity.”
Id. ¶ 38. Under this reasoning, the court found that the
regulation did not adequately incorporate the polluter pays
principle and failed to comply with the National Environmental
Policy. Id. ¶¶ 43, 45, 53. The court enforced the polluter
pays principle to ensure that polluters are held accountable for
the actual harm caused by their development.
The Majority recognizes that the University is
responsible for the substantial adverse impacts caused by its
development in the summit area of Mauna Kea.18 It is the
“polluter” that caused cultural harm. Under the Majority’s
opinion, the polluter pays principle is reversed. The polluter
is permitted to benefit from degradation so adverse that the
removal of five telescopes—identified by the BLNR and the
Majority—would be necessary to mitigate the substantial adverse
18
The University began operating observatories on Mauna Kea
in 1968.
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impact upon cultural resources. The protection of conservation
land for future generations afforded by the polluter pays
principle is lost.
D. Non-regression Principle
The principle of non-regression imposes an affirmative
obligation to not regress, or backslide, from existing levels of
legal protection. This principle is generally applied in the
context of cultural and social rights, and environmental law.
The Clean Water Act,19 for example, mandates a “general
prohibition on backsliding[.]”20 Cmtys. for a Better Env’t v.
State Water Res. Control Bd., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 396, 406 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2005), as modified (Sept. 27, 2005). It ensures that
“subsequent permit effluent limits that are comparable to
earlier ones are not allowed to ‘backslide,’ i.e., be less
stringent.” Id.
Nations have included the principle of non-regression
in treaties and domestic legislation. For example, the Regional
19
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(2012).
20
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California has recognized that the Clean Air Act also implements a
non-regression policy. WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, 870 F. Supp. 2d
847, 850 (N.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d sub nom. WildEarth Guardians v.
McCarthy, 772 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In 1977, Congress further
amended the Clean Air Act to add requirements designed to ensure not
only that certain air quality standards were attained, but also that
the air quality in areas which met the standards would not degrade or
backslide.”).
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Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and
Justice in Environmental Matters between Latin America and the
Caribbean, adopted in March 2018, provides that the parties
shall be guided by the principle of non-regression. Regional
Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and
Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the
Caribbean art. 3(c), March 4, 2018,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=XXVII-18&chapter=27&clang=_en (https://perma.cc/AVK7-5YGM).
The European Parliament (Parliament) also applies the non-
regression principle to natural resources. Its significance as
a principle of environmental protection was a central feature of
the Parliament’s commitment to sustainable development. The
Parliament specifically adopted a resolution that “calls for the
recognition of the principle of non-regression in the context of
environmental protection as well as fundamental rights[.]”
Resolution of 29 September 2011 on Developing a Common EU
Position Ahead of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development (Rio+20), PARL. EUR. DOC. P7_TA(2011)0430 (2011). The
principle of non-regression was applied by the United Nations
General Assembly in 2012. G.A. Res 66/288, ¶ 20, annex, The
Future We Want (July 27, 2012). General Assembly Resolution
66/288 recognizes that “it is critical that we do not backtrack
from our commitment to the outcome of the United Nations
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Conference on Environment and Development.” Id. (emphasis
added).
Notwithstanding prevailing international norms
disfavoring backsliding on legal protection of the environment,
the analysis of the BLNR and the Majority does so. The purpose
of HAR § 13-5-1 is “to regulate land-use in the conservation
district for the purpose of conserving, protecting, and
preserving the important natural and cultural resources of the
State through appropriate management and use to promote their
long-term sustainability and the public health, safety, and
welfare.” Therefore, the natural and cultural resources in
conservation districts have a baseline level of protection from
usage that causes a substantial adverse impact.
The degradation principle peels away this protection.
It allows further degradation based on damage cumulatively
caused by prior impacts. The BLNR’s analysis regresses to a
former stage of the law—prior to the passage of HAR § 13-5-
30(c)(4) in 1994—when the conservation district was not
protected by the proscription codified in HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4)
barring land use that causes a “substantial, significant and
adverse” impact on cultural resources. Per the degradation
principle, protection of cultural resources at the summit of
Mauna Kea regresses to a time prior to 1994, when the purpose of
regulating land use in the conservation district had not yet
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been specifically defined by regulation as “conserving,
protecting, and preserving the important natural and cultural
resources of the State[.]” HAR § 13-5-1 (1994).
The BLNR’s decision encourages regression by reversing
protections for critical natural resources in the conservation
district. It employs an analysis that renders TMT invisible:
“Even without the TMT, the cumulative effect of astronomical
development and other uses in the summit area of Mauna Kea have
resulted in impacts that are substantial, significant and
adverse.” Majority Opinion at 55 (emphasis added). The BLNR
and the Majority enhance regression by ignoring the impact of
TMT. But viewed under the correct standard contained in HAR §
13-5-30(c)(4), TMT is not invisible. The principle of non-
regression made explicit in HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) requires that
the effects of a 180-foot high structure, dug 21 feet into the
earth, 600 feet below the summit of Mauna Kea, be considered.
The degradation principle treats any further development on the
cultural resource as inconsequential because the cultural
resource has already been substantially adversely impacted. As
applied to the proposed project, the degradation principle
adopts a regressive approach to managing environmental and
cultural resources in the conservation district that violates
HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4).
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IV. Conclusion
The degradation principle ascribes to the legislature
the intent that conservation land lose its protection under the
Hawaiʻi Constitution and the laws of the State of Hawaiʻi
whenever it has been subjected to a substantial adverse impact.
HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) is a direct refutation of such regressive
treatment of conservation land. Instead, the legislature
intended—consistent with its constitutional duty to future
generations—to conserve, protect, and preserve “the important
natural and cultural resources of the State through appropriate
management and use to promote their long-term sustainability.”
HRS § 183C-1. Appellees’ Conservation District Use Application
proposes a land use that cannot be permitted if it causes a
substantial adverse impact on cultural resources. HAR § 13-5-
30(c)(4). The degradation principle substitutes a contrary
standard that relieves the permittee of the burden to prove no
substantial adverse impact—if the resource is already
substantially adversely impacted. Correctly applied—and
consistent with the clear intent of Hawaii’s legislature and
norms of environmental law—HAR § 13-5-30(c)(4) requires that the
impacts of TMT be assessed with full recognition that the
existing resource has already received cumulative impacts that
amount to a substantial adverse impact. In light of the correct
standard, whether TMT will have a substantial adverse impact
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where there already is a substantial adverse impact becomes
straightforward. The substantial adverse impacts to cultural
resources presently existing in the Astronomy Precinct of Mauna
Kea combined with the impacts from TMT—a proposed land use that
eclipses all other telescopes in magnitude—would constitute an
impact on existing cultural resources that is substantial and
adverse. Accordingly, the Conservation District Use Application
for TMT must be denied.
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
36