Cordery v. Ige

Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCEC-XX-XXXXXXX
22-FEB-2023
09:33 AM
Dkt. 25 ORD
SCEC-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
________________________________________________________________
GARY ARTHUR CORDERY, Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID YUTAKA IGE; JOSHUA BOOTH GREEN;
SYLVIA JUNG LUKE; and MARK E. RECKTENWALD,
individually and in their official capacities, Defendants.
________________________________________________________________
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
ORDER
(By: Nakayama, Acting C.J., McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ., and
Circuit Judge DeWeese, in place of Recktenwald, C.J., recused)
Upon consideration of Plaintiff Gary Arthur Cordery’s
“Request for Declaratory Judgement” filed on December 15, 2022
(complaint), the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants (Dkt.
15), and the record, the court grants the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss and the complaint is dismissed as to all claims and
parties.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 15, 2022, Cordery, pro se, submitted by
electronic filing a document entitled “request for declaratory
judgement without relief pursuant to HRCP Rule 57 . . .”
(complaint) which was docketed as an “election contest” in the
Hawaiʻi Supreme Court. 1 Dkt. 1; see also Dkt. 2 (notice of
electronic filing). The complaint’s caption and allegations
identify the plaintiffs as “Gary Arthur Cordery pro se, along
with more than Thirty Voters pro se”. Dkt. 1:1. The complaint
asserts this court has jurisdiction under Hawaiʻi Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 11-172 (Supp. 2021), which is the election
contest statute, and HRS § 602-5 (2016). Dkt. 1:2.
The complaint’s allegations take issue with the timing of
the inaugurations, 2 and do not challenge any election results.
See Dkt. 1. The prayer for relief requests a declaratory
judgment related to the timing of the inaugurations. See Dkt.
1:14-18.
1 The complaint refers to the parties as petitioner/respondent, but this
is incorrect. In an election contest the parties are referred to as
plaintiff/defendant. See Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule
81(b)(10) (establishing that the HRCP apply to election contests); see also
HRCP Rule 17 (“Parties plaintiffs and defendant”).
2 C.f., Haw. Const. art. V, § 1 (providing that “[t]he term of office of
the governor shall begin at noon on the first Monday in December next
following the governor’s election and end at noon on the first Monday
in December, four years thereafter.”).
2
The complaint was only signed by Cordery and included
Cordery’s address and phone number. Dkt. 1:1, 16. The
complaint does not include the signature, address or phone
number for any of the other thirty plaintiffs. See Dkt. 1; see
also HRCP Rule 11(a) (requiring a pro se party to sign a
pleading and to include the pro se party’s “address and
telephone number, if any”).
On December 16, 2022 - the day after the complaint was
filed - Cordery submitted an electronic filing of a document
titled “Exhibit 3 Request for Declaratory Judgement” that
appears to identify the purported signatures of thirty voters.
Dkt. 7; see Dkt. 8 (notice of electronic filing).
On December 16, 2022, Cordery filed a motion to correct the
record to identify a defendant (Motion #1). Dkt. 9. Motion #1
is only signed by Cordery. Dkt. 9:2. There is no signature of
the other thirty plaintiffs. Id.
On December 22, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint. Dkt. 15. Defendants’ arguments for dismissal
are addressed below.
On December 26, 2022, Cordery filed a memorandum in
opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. 17. The
memorandum in opposition is only signed by Cordery. Dkt. 17:8.
There is no signature of any of the other thirty plaintiffs.
3
Id. The arguments asserted by Cordery in opposition to the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss are addressed below. Dkt. 17.
On January 6, 2023, Cordery filed a motion for
interrogatories. Dkt. 19. The document states, “I, Gary Arthur
Cordery pro se, lead Petitioner, hereby bring this Motion for
Interrogatories” (Motion #2). Dkt. 19:1. Motion #2 is only
signed by Cordery. Id.
On January 12, 2023, Defendants filed a memorandum in
opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion #2. Dkt. 21.
On January 16, 2023, Cordery filed a motion for additional
interrogatories (Motion #3). Dkt. 23. Motion #3 is only signed
by Cordery. Dkt. 23:5.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to HRCP
Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction. Dkt. 15:6. “Our review
of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
is based on the contents of the complaint, the allegations of
which we accept as true and construe in the light most
favorable” to the plaintiff. Yamane v. Pohlson, 111 Hawaiʻi 74,
81, 137 P.3d 980, 987 (2006) (cleaned up). Dismissal of the
complaint is appropriate if “it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Reyes-
4
Toledo, 143 Hawaiʻi 249, 258, 428 P.3d 761, 770 (2018) (citation
omitted); see Yamane, 111 Hawaiʻi at 81, 428 P.3d at 987 (same).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Non-attorney Cordery is the only Plaintiff
While Defendants’ motion to dismiss did not raise any issue
with Cordery, who is not an attorney, appearing to represent
other natural persons in this case, the Court will sua sponte
address the issue.
Under HRS § 605–2 (2016) and HRS § 605–14 (2016), persons
who are not licensed to practice law in Hawaiʻi “are not
permitted to act as ‘attorneys’ and represent other natural
persons” in a lawsuit. Oahu Plumbing and Sheet Metal, Ltd. v.
Kona Construction, Inc., 60 Haw. 372, 377, 590 P.2d 570, 573
(1979) (citing HRS § 605-14 (“Unauthorized practice of law
prohibited”)); see also HRS § 605-2 (providing, in pertinent
part, that “no person shall be allowed to practice in any court
of the State unless that person has been duly licensed . . . by
the supreme court[.]”).
This court’s decision in Alexander & Baldwin, LLC v.
Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi 37, 48-54, 508 P.3d 832, 843-849 (2022), is
instructive. In Armitage the circuit court had allowed non-
attorneys to represent an unincorporated association known as
the “Reinstated Hawaiian Nation” in court to defend on an
ejectment claim. Id., 151 Hawaiʻi at 42, 48, 508 P.3d at 837,
5
843. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff Alexander & Baldwin, LLC and against the defendant
Reinstated Hawaiian Nation. Id. at 45, 508 P.3d at 840. On
appeal, this court held:
Because Noa and Armitage, as non-lawyers, were not
authorized to represent the Reinstated Hawaiian Nation in
court, the circuit court should have exercised its inherent
power to prevent their unauthorized practice of law. “Our
courts have inherent and statutory powers to deal with the
unauthorized practice of law. . . . Under those powers,
our courts, sua sponte, may prevent an unauthorized person
from practicing law in a case pending before [them].” . . .
Courts have an active role in enforcing HRS §§ 605-2 and
605-14. Thus, they not only may but should act sua
sponte to prevent non-attorneys from practicing law before
them.
Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 49, 508 P.3d at 844 (first citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
In so holding this court rejected a blanket “nullity rule”
whereby actions of a non-attorney would “automatically result in
a nullity.” Id. at 50, 508 P.3d at 845; see id., at 51, 508
P.3d at 846 (“[W]e do not view the nullity rule as necessary in
every case to promote the policies behind the ban on the
unauthorized practice of law.”). Instead, the court explained:
[B]ecause the consequences of applying the nullity rule to
a case can be harsh, it should be invoked only where it
fulfills the purposes of protecting both the public and the
integrity of the court system from the actions of the
unlicensed, and where no other alternative remedy is
possible.
Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52, 508 P.3d at 847 (citation omitted).
This court then went on to establish that “courts should address
the effects of non-attorney representation on a case-by-case
6
basis” and that the remedy imposed by the court should vindicate
the “policy aims of HRS §§ 605-2 and 605-14, namely protecting
the courts and the public, including the litigants, from the
conduct of non-attorneys.” Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52-53, 508
P.3d at 847-48. The court held that in conducting this analysis
the courts should consider the following factors:
1. Whether the non-attorney’s conduct is done without
knowledge that the action was improper;
2. Whether the party acted diligently in correcting the
mistake by obtaining counsel;
3. Whether the non-attorney’s participation is minimal;
4. Whether the participation results in prejudice to the
opposing party; and
5. Any other relevant circumstances.
See Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–53, 508 P.3d at 847–48. The
court in Armitage then went on to apply these factors and
vacated the summary judgment that had been entered by the
circuit court. Id. at 51-54, 508 P.3d at 846-49.
Turning to the case before the court, the complaint asserts
that the plaintiffs include “more than thirty voters pro se”
(Dkt. 1:1) and that the signatures of these voters are attached
at Exhibit 3. Dkt. 1:16. Yet there is no Exhibit 3 attached to
the complaint, and the complaint itself does not include the
names, signature, and phone numbers for any plaintiffs except
for Cordery. See Dkt. 1. Even the caption of the complaint is
silent as to the names of these other thirty voters. Id.
The day after the complaint was filed, on December 16,
2022, Cordery submitted an electronic filing of the signatures
7
of the thirty voters on a document that is marked “Exhibit 3”.
See Dkt. 7; see also Dkt. 8 (indicating on the notice of
electronic filing that Cordery filed Docket No. 7).
The issue before the court, therefore, is whether the
Exhibit 3 document filed by non-attorney Cordery the day after
the complaint was filed joins these other natural persons to
this action.
Applying the Armitage factors, we hold that the Exhibit 3
filing (Dkt. 7) does not have the legal effect of joining other
natural persons to this action and, therefore, the only
plaintiff to this action is Cordery.
As to the first factor - whether Cordery’s conduct was done
without knowledge that the action was improper - this factor is
neutral as the record is silent as to whether Cordery knows he
is not authorized to represent other natural persons in this
action. See Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–53, 508 P.3d at 847–48.
As to the second factor - whether these thirty voters acted
diligently in correcting the mistake - the record indicates that
none of these voters have filed a document in this case or have
otherwise appeared on their own behalf in this action. Id.
Thus, as to the second factor it weighs in favor of finding the
Exhibit 3 filing (Dkt. 7) has no legal effect.
As to the third factor - whether non-attorney Cordery’s
participation is minimal - this factor weighs in favor of a
8
finding that the Exhibit 3 filing has no legal effect. See
Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–53, 508 P.3d at 847–48.
Cordery has submitted numerous filings on behalf of other
natural persons. Specifically, the complaint (Dkt. 1) and other
documents were filed by Cordery on behalf of other natural
persons. See Dkts. 1, 9, 17, 19, 23. In these filings Cordery
purports to act as the “lead Petitioner” (see Dkts. 17:1, 19:1)
and requests relief on behalf of “Petitioners” or “Plaintiffs.”
See Dkt. 9:2 (stating “Petitioners reserve all rights[.]”); Dkt.
17:5 (arguing jurisdiction and asserting that “Plaintiffs
maintain”). Yet none of these documents were signed by the
other plaintiffs. See Dkts. 1, 9, 17, 19, 23.
As to the fourth factor - whether the participation results
in prejudice to the opposing party - this factor is neutral as
the record is silent as to any prejudice to the Defendants. See
Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–53, 508 P.3d at 847–48.
As to the fifth factor - other relevant circumstances -
this factor also weighs in favor of finding the Exhibit 3 filing
(Dkt. 7) has no legal effect and that Cordery is the only
plaintiff. See Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–53, 508 P.3d at 847–
48. This is because Cordery did not include any contact
information for any of the other “thirty voters” and, thus,
there is no way for the court to contact them without going
directly through Cordery. See HRCP Rule 11(a) (requiring a
9
self-represented natural person to sign every pleading, written
motion, or other paper filed with the court).
In sum, three of the five Armitage factors weigh in favor
of a finding that Cordery is the only plaintiff before the court
and Cordery’s Exhibit 3 filing (see Dkt. 7) did not join the
other purported plaintiffs to this action. As set forth in
Armitage, before the court applies the nullity rule it must also
consider policy considerations and alternative remedies:
[B]ecause the consequences of applying the nullity rule to
a case can be harsh, it should be invoked only where it
fulfills the purposes of protecting both the public and the
integrity of the court system from the actions of the
unlicensed, and where no other alternative remedy is
possible.
Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52, 508 P.3d at 847 (citation omitted).
Here, to apply the nullity rule to Cordery’s Exhibit 3
filing (Dkt. 7) serves to protect the public from the
unauthorized practice of law. See Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–
53, 508 P.3d at 847–48. This is because Cordery, as a non-
attorney, is not authorized to represent the thirty voters and
Cordery’s filing on December 16, 2022 of a document on behalf of
the voters is a document filed in violation of HRS §§ 605-2 and
605-14.
The application of the nullity rule to the Exhibit 3 filing
also protects the “integrity of the court system from the
actions of the unlicensed” because it is consistent with other
10
court rules. See Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–53, 508 P.3d at
847–48.
In this case for other natural persons to join this lawsuit
they were required to sign the complaint. See HRCP Rule 11(a)
(“Every pleading, written motion, and other paper . . . if the
party is unrepresented, shall be signed by the party.”). But
only Cordery signed the complaint. Dkt. 1:16.
After the complaint was filed, in order for other self-
represented natural persons to join this lawsuit, these natural
persons would need to file a motion and obtain leave of court.
See HRCP Rule 24(c). And to comply with HRCP Rule 11(a), any
motion filed by a natural person would need to be signed by the
party that seeks to join the case. But no such motion was
filed.
Given the failure of Cordery to follow the court rules, the
application of the nullity rule to Exhibit 3 (Dkt. 7) also
protects the “integrity of the court system from the actions of
the unlicensed”. See Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52, 508 P.3d at
847.
The final consideration is whether an “alternative remedy
is possible.” Id. Here, one alternative remedy would be to
construe the complaint liberally to include the next-day filed
Exhibit 3 (Dkt. 7), and thereby allow Cordery to join thirty
additional plaintiffs to this action. The court finds this
11
alternative is inappropriate because it would countenance
Cordery representing the other natural persons in this case in
violation of HRS §§ 605-2 and 605-14.
In addition, this alternative remedy is inconsistent with
the policy considerations behind the fundamental tenant of
Hawaiʻi law that a pleading prepared by a pro se litigant “should
be interpreted liberally.” See Waltrip v. TS Enterprises, Inc.,
140 Hawaiʻi 226, 239, 398 P.3d 815, 828 (2016) (citation
omitted). “The underpinnings of this tenet rest on the
promotion of equal access to justice — a pro se litigant should
not be prevented from proceeding on a pleading or letter to an
agency if a reasonable, liberal construction of the document
would permit [them] to do so.” Id. But here the complaint will
be dismissed as untimely and for lack of jurisdiction regardless
of whether additional parties are joined. Therefore, a liberal
construction of the complaint to include the Exhibit 3 filing
(Dkt. 7) would not serve to promote equal access to justice, and
the court declines to construe the complaint liberally to
include the Exhibit 3 filing.
A second alternative remedy would be to notify the thirty
voters of their failure to sign the complaint. In the usual
situation, the clerk would bring a party’s failure to sign a
document to the attention of the party before the document is
stricken. See HRCP Rule 11(a) (providing that “[a]n unsigned
12
paper shall be stricken by the clerk unless omission of the
signature is corrected promptly after being called to the
attention of the attorney or party.”).
But in this case, there is no way to notify the voters set
forth on Exhibit 3 (Dkt. 7) of their failure to sign the
original complaint without going through their purported
representative, Cordery. This is because the complaint and all
subsequent documents filed by Cordery did not include the
addresses and phone numbers for any of the other pro se voters.
In this circumstance there is no reasonable alternative remedy
available for this court to bring the omission of the failure to
sign the complaint to the attention of the thirty pro se voters.
Accordingly, we find Cordery is the only plaintiff in this
case.
B. The Election Contest is Time Barred
The complaint cites to HRS § 11-172 as the basis for this
court’s jurisdiction. Dkt. 1:2. And Cordery has maintained
throughout his filings that this court has jurisdiction to
consider this action as a contested election under article II,
13
section 10 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution, 3 HRS § 11-171 (2009), 4
and HRS § 11-172. See Dkt. 17:5-7.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the basis that
Cordery failed to meet the statutory deadline to file an
election contest as set forth in HRS § 11-174.5 (Supp. 2021).
Dkt. 15:10.
In response, Cordery argues that HRS § 11-174.5 is
“irrelevant to this action” because Cordery made “no reference
to this statute anywhere in this election complaint.” See Dkt.
17:3. Cordery also cites to Watland v. Lingle, 104 Hawaiʻi 128,
133 n.8, 85 P.3d 1079, 1084 n.8 (2004), for the general
proposition that this court “has jurisdiction to consider the
election challenge[.]” Dkt. 17:7. Essentially Cordery argues
there is no time limitation on an election contest under HRS
§ 11-172 when the party asserting the election contest does not
rely on HRS § 11-174.5. See Dkt. 17:3-7.
Cordery’s reliance on Watland is misplaced. Watland does
not stand for the broad proposition that an election contest
under HRS § 11-172 has no deadline. To the contrary, in Watland
the election contest challenging the ratification of the
3 Article II, section 10 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution provides, “Contested
elections shall be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in such
manner as shall be provided by law.”
4 HRS § 11-171 provides, “This part shall apply whenever a contested
election is subject to determination by a court of competent jurisdiction in
the manner provided by law.”
14
constitutional amendment by the electorate in the November 5,
2002 general election was filed on November 22, 2002, seventeen
days after the general election. See Watland, 104 Hawaiʻi at
132-33, 85 P.3d at 1083-84. In 2002, HRS § 11-174.5(a) was
identical to the current version of the statute, which provides:
(a) In general, special general, special, or runoff
elections, the complaint shall be filed in the office of
the clerk of the supreme court not later than 4:30 p.m. on
the twentieth day following the general, special general,
special, or runoff election and shall be accompanied by a
deposit for costs of court as established by rules of the
supreme court. The clerk shall issue to the defendants
named in the complaint a summons to appear before the
supreme court not later than 4:30 p.m. on the tenth day
after service thereof.
HRS § 11-174.5 (emphasis added). Cordery is incorrect that
Watland allows for an exception to the statutory deadlines to
file an election contest under HRS § 11-172. To the extent
Watland has any application to the instant case it would be the
exact opposite of the proposition argued by Cordery because the
election contest in Watland was filed within the 20-day deadline
to file an election contest challenging a general election
result as established by HRS § 11-174.5. See Watland, 104
Hawaiʻi at 132-33, 85 P.3d at 1083-84.
Notably, the complaint’s core allegations - viewed in a
light most favorable to Cordery and deemed to be true - are not
a direct challenge to any election result, and rather they
complain about the timing of certain inaugurations. See Dkt. 1.
Yet Cordery maintains throughout his pleading and filings that
15
this court has jurisdiction to consider the complaint as a
contested election under HRS § 11-172. To this end, we agree
with Defendants that any election contest claim made in the
complaint under HRS § 11-172 is time barred.
HRS § 11-172 provides:
With respect to any election, any candidate, or qualified
political party directly interested, or any thirty voters
of any election district, may file a complaint in the
supreme court. The complaint shall set forth any cause or
causes, such as but not limited to, provable fraud,
overages, or underages, that could cause a difference in
the election results. The complaint shall also set forth
any reasons for reversing, correcting, or changing the
decisions of the voter service center officials or the
officials at a counting center in an election using the
electronic voting system. A copy of the complaint shall be
delivered to the chief election officer or the clerk in the
case of county elections.
See HRS § 11-172. Under HRS § 11-174.5(a), the deadline to file
a contest for cause of the general election pursuant to HRS
§ 11-172 is “not later than 4:30 p.m. on the twentieth day”
following the general election. Id.; see also Tataii v. Cronin,
119 Hawaiʻi 337, 339, 198 P.3d 124, 126 (2008) (holding in an
election contest challenging the result of a general election
“pursuant to HRS § 11-172” that the “twenty-day provision of HRS
§ 11–174.5(a) is mandatory”).
While the complaint does not allege the date of the general
election, the Constitution of the State of Hawaiʻi sets forth the
date of the general election:
General elections shall be held on the first Tuesday after
the first Monday in November in all even-numbered
years. Special and primary elections may be held as
provided by law; provided that in no case shall any primary
16
election precede a general election by less than forty-five
days.
Haw. Const. art. II, § 8 (emphasis added). And in 2022 the date
fell on Tuesday, November 8, 2022. See Hawaiʻi Rules of
Evidence, Rule 201(c) (allowing the court to take judicial
notice of a fact not subject to reasonable dispute because it is
“capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”); A.
Bowman, Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence Manual, § 201-5[2] (2020)
(“Calendars can be used to ascertain the day on which a
particular date fell” and collecting cases). 5
Here, the deadline for Cordery to file an election
challenge based on HRS § 11-172 was on November 28, 2022. See
HRS § 11-174.5(a). But the complaint was filed after this
deadline on December 15, 2022. See Dkt. 1.
Accordingly, to the extent Cordery’s complaint asserts an
election contest claim based on HRS § 11-172, we hold the claim
is time barred by HRS § 11-174.5(a).
C. The Declaratory Judgment Claim is Dismissed
Defendants also move to dismiss the complaint on the basis
that this court lacks original jurisdiction to resolve the
complaint’s claim for declaratory judgment. See Dkt. 15:14. In
5 When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to HRCP Rule 12(b)(1) the
trial court is “not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review
any evidence . . . to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of
jurisdiction.” Yamane, 111 Hawaiʻi at 81, 137 P.3d at 987.
17
response, Cordery argues this court has jurisdiction to consider
the claim for declaratory judgment pursuant to HRS § 602-5.
Dkt. 17:6-7.
We agree with Defendants.
Cordery’s claim for declaratory judgment is not a direct
challenge to the election results, and instead takes issue with
the timing of the inauguration of the certain elected officials.
See Dkt. 1. The particular relief requested by Cordery is akin
to the relief available under Chapter 632, titled “Declaratory
Judgments.” Specifically, HRS § 632-1 (2016) provides that
declaratory relief, including on the interpretation of a
statute, may be granted in the specific circumstances enumerated
therein. HRS § 632-1(a), (b).
Outside of a challenge to a constitutional amendment, this
court is without original jurisdiction to consider a claim for
declaratory judgment. See HRS § 602-5; see also Blaisdell v.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 30342, 2010 WL 708623, at *1 (Haw.
Feb. 25, 2010) (dismissing a petition for writ of mandamus on
the basis “that issuance of a declaratory judgment . . . is not
within the original jurisdiction of the supreme court.” (citing
HRS §§ 602–5 and 632–1); Blaisdell v. Trader, No. 29895, 2009 WL
1944467, at *1 (Haw. July 7, 2009) (same); Blaisdell v. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety, No. 29920, 2009 WL 2387371, at *1 (Haw. Aug. 3,
2009) (same). The only narrow exception to this jurisdictional
18
bar, is that this court has original jurisdiction to consider a
claim for declaratory relief on the validity of a constitutional
amendment. See Taomae v. Lingle, 108 Hawaiʻi 245, 250, 118 P.3d
1188, 1193 (2005) (granting in an original proceeding before the
court the plaintiffs’ requested relief for declaratory judgment
that the bill proposing a constitutional amendment “was not
validly passed”); see also Watland, 104 Hawaiʻi at 134–35, 85
P.3d at 1085–86 (considering in an original proceeding before
the court the plaintiffs’ requested relief to invalidate the
ratification of a constitutional amendment); Kahalekai v. Doi,
60 Haw. 324, 331, 590 P.2d 543, 549 (1979) (similar).
Here, the narrow exception clearly does not apply because
Cordery’s claim for declaratory judgment is not related to the
passage of a constitutional amendment. See Dkt. 1. Rather, the
jurisdiction to consider the merits of a claim for declaratory
relief is with the circuit court. See HRS § 632-1(b) (providing
relief by declaratory judgment “may be granted in civil cases”);
HRS § 603-21.5(a)(3) (2016 & Supp. 2021) (establishing the
circuit court with jurisdiction of civil actions). See e.g.,
Tax Found. of Hawaii v. State, 144 Hawaiʻi 175, 189, 439 P.3d
127, 141 (2019) (discussing the nature of standing requirements
in declaratory judgment actions under HRS § 632-1).
Accordingly, the court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
19
D. Pending Motions
Cordery’s complaint requests the court take judicial notice
of the Hawaiʻi laws cited therein. Dkt. 1:3. Defendants did not
file any opposition to Cordery’s request. Pursuant to Hawaiʻi
Rules of Evidence Rule 202(b) (2016), the request for judicial
notice of the Hawaiʻi laws cited in the complaint is granted.
Cordery’s motions are all denied as moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ordered that the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss is granted. The complaint is dismissed as to all claims
and parties.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, February 22, 2023.
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
/s/ Todd W. Eddins
/s/ Wendy M. DeWeese
20