State v. Rodrigues.

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
13-DEC-2019
09:13 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAII,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RODNEY ROBERT RODRIGUES, JR.,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; 3CPC171000034)
DECEMBER 13, 2019
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY POLLACK, J.
Our caselaw has established that a search warrant for
a multiple-occupancy building must describe with particularity
each unit to be searched so as to preclude the indiscriminate
search of one or more subunits. The defendant in this case
moved to suppress evidence gathered from a search of his
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residence asserting that the search warrant did not state with
specificity the subunit he resided in.
The circuit court determined that the searched
building was a multiple-occupancy building and that the affiant
officer knew or should have known that the defendant’s subunit
was a separate unit. The search warrant did not describe the
defendant’s subunit with particularity, the court concluded, and
thus the search violated the defendant’s constitutional rights.
The court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress in an order
that included detailed findings of facts and conclusions of law.
The State appealed the order. The Intermediate Court
of Appeals (ICA) disagreed with the circuit court’s finding that
the building was a multiple-occupancy building and held that the
court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress.
Based upon our precedent as to findings of facts
unchallenged on appeal and our law involving multiple-occupancy
buildings, we conclude that the ICA erred and accordingly vacate
the ICA’s Judgment on Appeal and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Rodney R. Rodrigues, Jr., was arrested as a result of
a May 18, 2017 search of his residence on the island of Hawaii
that uncovered various drugs and drug paraphernalia. Rodrigues
was subsequently charged by complaint in the Circuit Court of
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the Third Circuit (circuit court) with two counts of Promoting a
Dangerous Drug in the First Degree in violation of Hawaii
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1241(1)(a),1 three counts of
Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree in violation of
HRS § 712-1243(1),2 two counts of Promoting a Harmful Drug in the
Fourth Degree in violation of HRS § 712-1246.5(1),3 one count of
Promoting a Detrimental Drug in the Second Degree in violation
of HRS § 712-1248(1),4 and one count of Prohibited Acts Relating
1
HRS § 712-1241(1)(a) (2014 & Supp. 2016) provides as follows:
(1) A person commits the offense of promoting a dangerous
drug in the first degree if the person knowingly:
(a) Possesses one or more preparations, compounds,
mixtures, or substances of an aggregate weight of:
(i) One ounce or more, containing
methamphetamine, heroin, morphine, or cocaine
or any of their respective salts, isomers, and
salts of isomers; or
(ii) One and one-half ounce or more, containing
one or more of any of the other dangerous
drugs[.]
2
HRS § 712-1243(1) (2014) provides that, “A person commits the
offense of promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree if the person
knowingly possesses any dangerous drug in any amount.”
3
HRS § 712-1246.5(1) (2014) provides that, “A person commits the
offense of promoting a harmful drug in the fourth degree if the person
knowingly possesses any harmful drug in any amount.”
4
HRS § 712-1248 (2014) provides the following in relevant part:
(1) A person commits the offense of promoting a detrimental
drug in the second degree if the person knowingly:
(a) Possesses fifty or more capsules or tablets
containing one or more of the Schedule V substances;
(continued . . .)
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to Drug Paraphernalia in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a).5
A. The Investigation and Warrant
On May 11, 2017, Officer Marco Segobia of the Hawaii
Police Department submitted an Affidavit for Search Warrant
(Affidavit) to the District Court of the Third Circuit (district
court). The Affidavit included the following statements.
Officer Segobia received information from a confidential
informant (CI) who claimed to have observed Rodrigues sell
methamphetamine multiple times in exchange for U.S. currency.
At the direction of Officer Segobia, the CI conducted a
controlled purchase of methamphetamine from Rodrigues’ residence
(. . . continued)
(b) Possesses one or more preparations, compounds,
mixtures, or substances, of an aggregate weight of
one-eighth ounce or more, containing one or more of
the Schedule V substances;
(c) Possesses one or more preparations, compounds,
mixtures, or substances, of an aggregate weight of
one ounce or more, containing any marijuana; or
(d) Distributes any marijuana or any Schedule V
substance in any amount.
5
HRS § 329-43.5(a) (2010 & Supp. 2016) provides the following:
Except as provided in subsection (e), it is unlawful for
any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow,
harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain,
conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce
into the human body a controlled substance in violation of
this chapter. A violation of this subsection shall
constitute a violation subject to a fine of no more than
$500.
4
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located at the North West corner of the intersection of Konalani
Street and Puuhalo Street. The residence was a two story light
colored wood siding structure with a white colored rooftop.
Officer Segobia maintained constant surveillance as the CI
walked to, entered, and exited the residence. The CI turned
over a zip packet, containing an unspecified amount of clear
crystal substance that obtained a presumptive positive result
for methamphetamine after Officer Segobia tested it.
The Affidavit requested to search the following
location:
A residence located within the County and State of Hawaii
and within the District of Kona. Your affiant describes
the residence as a three bedroom, 2 bathroom residence that
[is] light colored, [and] has a white colored rooftop. The
residence is located at [] Puuhalo Street in Kailua-Kona,
Hawaii. Your affiant checked the Hawaii County Property
Tax website and located the residence, which is owned by
Yolanda M. RODRIGUES of address [] Puuhalo Street, Kailua-
Kona, Hawaii 96740. . . . To include but not limited to
all rooms, and other parts therein, the patio or lanai of
such unit, and any attached garages and carport, attached
storage rooms, garbage cans and containers located
within[.]
The district court issued a search warrant authorizing
the search of the residence and property as described in the
Affidavit. The warrant authorized the search for
methamphetamine, drug related paraphernalia, articles tending to
show the sale, proceeds of sale, or transport of
methamphetamine, articles tending to establish who controlled
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the premise, and U.S. currency with or near a controlled
substance.6
B. Circuit Court Proceedings
Rodrigues filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence and for
Return of Property (Motion) in which he requested the
suppression of “all evidence obtained as a result of the search
of the ohana studio dwelling unit, in violation of [his]
constitutional rights under Article I” of the Hawaii
Constitution.
In his Motion, Rodrigues argued that the warrant
defined the main residence with particularity, but failed to
mention the separate and distinct ohana unit that the police
actually searched.7 Thus, there was no probable cause to search
his ohana dwelling unit, Rodrigues contended, because a search
warrant for a “multiple-occupancy building” must describe with
particularity the specific subunit to be searched to be valid.
Alternatively, Rodrigues maintained that if the warrant did
authorize a search of his subunit, it was overbroad. Rodrigues
6
The inventory filed with the district court after the search
indicated that the officers seized, inter alia, 131.4 grams of crystal
methamphetamine, 93.4 grams of cocaine, 33.4 grams of marijuana, various
pills and drug paraphernalia, three vehicles, and $993 in cash.
7
“‘Ohana dwelling’ means a second dwelling unit permitted to be
built as a separate or an attached unit on a building site, but does not
include a guest house or a farm dwelling.” Hawaii County Code 1983, ch. 25,
§ 25-1-5(b) (republished 2005).
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also sought the return of his seized vehicles and cash under
Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 41(e).8
In opposition, the State argued that the warrant
satisfied the particularity requirement and that the search did
not exceed the scope of the warrant. The State acknowledged the
general rule that a warrant for a multiple-occupancy building
will usually be held invalid if it fails to describe the
particular subunit. However, the State maintained that there is
an exception when (1) the building appears to be a single-
occupancy building and (2) the affiant, investigating officers,
and executing officers neither knew nor had reason to know that
it was a multiple-occupancy building until the execution of the
warrant was ongoing. Based on the information available to
Officer Segobia at the time that the warrant was issued, the
scope of the search warrant did not preclude him from searching
Rodrigues’ residence, the State argued, because it appeared that
all occupants had access to the entirety of the building, making
it a single-occupancy residence.
8
HRPP Rule 41 (2013) provides in pertinent part:
(e) Motion to return property. A person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure of property or by the
deprivation of property may move the court having
jurisdiction to try the offense for the return of the
property. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of
fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion
is granted, the property shall be returned unless otherwise
subject to lawful detention, but the judge may impose
reasonable conditions to protect access to the property and
its use in later proceedings.
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Next, the State argued that the execution of the
search warrant was valid and did not exceed the scope of the
warrant. The State asserted it was reasonable to search the
entire dwelling described in the warrant because the search was
conducted prior to discovery of the fact that Rodrigues’ unit
was a separate unit. Thus, according to the State, the search
was valid as there was not objectively verifiable evidence from
which the police officers should have unequivocally recognized
that Rodrigues’ unit required a separate warrant.
At the hearing on the Motion, Rodrigues called two
witnesses.9 Rodrigues first called Officer Segobia who testified
that his Affidavit was based on information that he obtained
from the CI and from observing the controlled purchase. The
main entrance of the residence was through the carport at the
top portion of the residence, Officer Segobia testified, but he
saw the CI walk downstairs and go to the downstairs unit, not
the main entrance he described in the search warrant. The
officer explained that Rodrigues was living in a downstairs unit
of the residence located on the south portion of the lot.
The “upstairs unit is completely separate from the
downstairs unit” such that a person cannot access the downstairs
unit from the upstairs portion of the residence, the officer
9
The Honorable Henry Nakamoto presided.
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explained. Although Officer Segobia stated that the CI “wasn’t
100 percent if there would be a stairwell within [Rodrigues’]
unit or not” after conducting the controlled purchase, Officer
Segobia acknowledged that, when he executed the warrant, there
was no stairway connecting the downstairs unit to the upstairs
portion of the residence. Officer Segobia further acknowledged
that the unit he described in his Affidavit was “not the unit
[he] searched.”
Officer Segobia stated that he described the property
as one residence in his Affidavit because the Hawaii real
property tax map described the residence as being a three
bedroom owned by Yolanda Rodrigues (Ms. Rodrigues), who is
Rodrigues’ mother. Based on this information, the officer said,
he concluded that the downstairs unit was not an ohana unit but
rather a bedroom that is located downstairs of the residence
that “almost looks like [] an extension” of the residence.
Officer Segobia also testified that his “personal
friend” and Rodrigues’ brother-in-law, Nick Ah Nee, was the
resident of the downstairs unit prior to Rodrigues, and that he
spoke with Ah Nee about the unit before the warrant was
executed. Ah Nee said that he lived in the downstairs unit with
his wife prior to Rodrigues, Officer Segobia explained. The
officer testified that Ah Nee also said that Rodrigues lived
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upstairs in an office unit until Ah Nee moved out, at which
point Rodrigues moved into the downstairs unit and the upstairs
portion became Ms. Rodrigues’ “portion of the residence.”
Officer Segobia stated that he had previously visited Ah Nee at
the residence while Ah Nee was living there.
As to his Affidavit, Officer Segobia testified that he
described the entire residence and the front of the residence
because “the information [from the CI] was very vague” as to
whether the upstairs was accessible from Rodrigues’ unit. He
also described the residence as a whole, he explained, because
it is owned by the same person. Officer Segobia elaborated that
the CI could not give him information as to the inside of the
downstairs unit layout. The officer added that he “didn’t want
to get too specific in [his] affidavit since the CI could not
confirm the information.” While acknowledging that the
description of the area that he wanted to search was nowhere in
his Affidavit, the officer nonetheless testified that the search
warrant was intended to cover the upstairs portion of the house
and the downstairs portion of the house. Officer Segobia stated
that he described the residence in his Affidavit as “wood siding
with a white color roof,” but when questioned, he acknowledged
that the downstairs unit was “painted sort of a greenish color”
and did not have wood siding on it.
10
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As to the execution of the warrant, Officer Segobia
testified that he approached the downstairs door located on the
south side of the residence because that door is where he saw
the CI do a transaction with Rodrigues. But the officer stated
he believed, based on the information he obtained from Ah Nee
that Rodrigues also lived in the residence while Ah Nee lived
there, that “everybody would have access to everything” inside
the residence. When he discovered the upstairs portion of the
residence was not accessible from the downstairs unit, Officer
Segobia testified, he called the search off in the top portion
of the residence. Officer Segobia further acknowledged that the
unit he described in his Affidavit was not the unit he searched.
After Officer Segobia’s testimony concluded, Rodrigues
called Ms. Rodrigues to testify. Ms. Rodrigues stated that she
owned a home located at “[] Puuhalo Street,” which had three
bedrooms upstairs and “a separate unit” downstairs. Rodrigues
began living in the downstairs unit, and paying rent, about two
years prior to May 2017, Ms. Rodrigues testified. She explained
that the downstairs unit had a kitchen, bathroom, and its own
lock.10
10
Ms. Rodrigues testified that she possessed the keys to both the
downstairs unit and the upstairs portion of the residence at the time of the
search.
11
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The circuit court issued Findings of Fact (FOF) and
Conclusions of Law (COL); Order. The court determined that
Officer Segobia’s Affidavit did not mention the separate
downstairs residential unit nor did it mention an entrance on
the lower story and Konalani Street side of the residence.
Additionally, in FOF 9, the court found that:
9. Officer Segobia testified the downstairs unit is
separate from the upstairs unit with its own bedroom,
bathroom and kitchen.
The court explained that Officer Segobia “admitted he
did not describe the downstairs unit and side doorway in his
application for [the] search warrant” but nonetheless “searched
the downstairs unit which is completely separate from the
upstairs unit described in the search warrant.” The court also
found that the officer testified that he did not search the
three bedroom, two bathroom residence with light colored siding
and white rooftop. Finally, the court determined that Officer
Segobia testified that he had been aware at one time that the
house had been inhabited by multiple individuals and that he was
personally acquainted with the previous resident and had visited
the house.
The circuit court concluded that the search warrant in
this case described with particularity the upstairs residence as
it identified how one must travel to the upstairs residence,
what the upstairs residence looks like from the outside, as well
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as the number of bedrooms and bathrooms in the upstairs unit.
But the warrant did not describe at all the separate studio unit
located downstairs, the court explained. Accordingly, the court
stated that “[n]othing in the Affidavit describes the studio
unit on the bottom floor despite Officer Segobia having ample
facts about this downstairs unit, its separate entrance and
identifying characteristics.” Thus, the court concluded that
the Affidavit and the search warrant did not describe and
therefore did not authorize the search of the separate
downstairs studio unit.
The court also determined that the Affidavit set forth
facts sufficient to issue a warrant for the upstairs unit and to
justify a search of that unit, only. However, in COL 11 the
court concluded that:
11. The Affidavit and the search warrant simply do not
describe and therefore do not authorize the search of the
separate downstairs studio unit.
The court emphasized that the Affidavit did not set
forth any facts sufficient to justify a warrant for a search of
the separate studio unit. The court additionally found that
“Officer Segobia knew or should have known that the residence
was a multi-unit dwelling with more than one occupant” because
he “knew the previous resident, and had been to the residence.”
Further, the “outward appearance of the residence” itself
suggested that “the downstairs [was] a separate unit” because it
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had a separate entrance, the court determined. The warrant was
therefore invalid, the court ruled, because it failed to
describe with particularity the place to be searched.
As to the search itself, the circuit court concluded
that the warrant did not authorize the search of the separate
downstairs studio unit, and therefore the search exceeded the
scope of the warrant. And the search of the property outside
the scope of the warrant was invalid in its own right because
there was no probable cause to justify a search of the
downstairs studio unit and Rodrigues had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the downstairs studio unit, the court
ruled. As a result, the court granted Rodrigues’ Motion and
ordered the return of his three vehicles and cash. The State
filed a timely appeal.
II. ICA PROCEEDINGS
In a Memorandum Opinion, the ICA stated that the
State’s appeal turned on the application of rules governing
“multiple occupancy” search warrants because the circuit court
based its decision, in major part, on its implicit factual
determination that the residence subject to the search at issue
was a multiple-occupancy dwelling.11
11
The ICA’s memorandum opinion can be found at State v. Rodrigues,
No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2019 WL 1123752 (App. Mar. 12, 2019).
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The ICA found that the residence in this case was not
a multiple-occupancy building because (1) the evidence did not
demonstrate that Rodrigues maintained exclusive access to the
lower unit, and (2) the structure had the outward appearance of
community occupation. On the second point, the ICA elaborated
that the residence had one address, one mailbox, and no
additional doorbell for the lower unit.12 The ICA also explained
that the property tax records did not indicate there was an
additional kitchen, bath or bedroom in the lower unit, nor did
the records indicate that this was a separate dwelling unit.
Thus, the ICA concluded that the circuit court’s “implicit
finding” that the structure was a multiple-occupancy building
was clearly erroneous based on the information Officer Segobia
had at the time that he applied for a search warrant.
The ICA also found that the failure of Officer Segobia
to more specifically describe the internal structure of the
residence did not render the warrant invalid. The ICA
acknowledged that the officer had been inside the lower unit at
one time, but stated that his knowledge of its particulars was
not extensive and he thought, although he was not sure, that
there was an internal staircase. Additionally, the ICA
12
It is unclear what evidence the ICA relied on to determine
whether a doorbell existed as there was no mention of the word “doorbell” at
the hearing, and there is nothing in the record discussing one.
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explained that the CI could not give more specifics regarding
the internal structure nor could he confirm whether an internal
staircase existed at the time. The warrant authorized the
search of the entire structure, the ICA determined, because
Officer Segobia had information that all of the family members
had access to the entire house.13 The ICA therefore concluded
that the circuit court erred in concluding that the warrant was
not sufficiently specific, and it vacated the circuit court’s
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Judge Leonard dissented from the ICA’s decision,
noting that the State only challenged COL 9 and 11 and did not
contest any of the other findings of facts, conclusions of law,
or mixed findings and conclusions.14 These unchallenged mixed
findings were well-grounded in the testimony and evidence in the
record and reasonable inferences therefrom, the dissent stated.
13
Although Officer Segobia stated that “it appeared that everybody
would have access to other people’s areas” in the residence, he did not
testify that Ah Nee told him this information. Rather, despite his knowledge
that Ah Nee previously occupied the downstairs unit, the officer’s
supposition was based on the fact that “this [was] a family house.”
Additionally, Officer Segobia’s Affidavit did not indicate his belief that
“everybody would have access to other people’s areas.”
14
As stated, the challenged conclusions of law were as follows:
9. Officer Segobia testified the downstairs unit is
separate from the upstairs unit with its own bedroom,
bathroom and kitchen.
11. The Affidavit and the search warrant simply do not
describe and therefore do not authorize the search of the
separate downstairs studio unit.
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The unchallenged findings of fact demonstrated that the
downstairs unit was separate and distinct from the upstairs
unit, and that Officer Segobia knew this from personal
experience and observations, the dissent noted. The dissent
explained that the unchallenged conclusions and findings also
found that Officer Segobia failed to describe the bottom unit in
his Affidavit and thus failed to justify a warrant or search of
that unit. Thus, the State’s contention that COL 9 was clearly
erroneous was without merit and the State’s challenge to COL 11
was inconsistent with the Circuit Court’s unchallenged findings
and the record on appeal, the dissent concluded.
The case was remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings. Rodrigues timely filed an application for writ of
certiorari, which this court accepted.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review a circuit court’s findings of fact under a
“clearly erroneous standard,” and we review its conclusions of
law de novo. Mikelson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 107 Hawaii
192, 197, 111 P.3d 601, 606 (2005) (quoting RGIS Inventory
Specialist v. Hawaii Civil Rights Comm’n, 104 Hawaii 158, 160,
86 P.3d 449, 451 (2004)). Additionally, a conclusion of law
“that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under
the clearly erroneous standard because the conclusion is
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dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular
case.” Booth v. Booth, 90 Hawaii 413, 416, 978 P.2d 851, 854
(1999) (quoting Poe v. Hawaii Labor Relations Bd., 87 Hawaii
191, 195, 953 P.2d 569, 573 (1998)). But while “[c]onclusions
of law are not binding upon an appellate court and are freely
reviewable for their correctness,” LC v. MG & Child Support
Enforcement Agency, 143 Hawaii 302, 310, 430 P.3d 400, 408
(2018) (internal quotation marks omitted), unchallenged findings
of fact are “binding upon this court.” Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside
Partners, 111 Hawaii 205, 227, 140 P.3d 985, 1007 (2006).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Warrant Was Invalid Because It Did Not Particularly
Describe Rodrigues’ Unit
The Hawaii Constitution provides that “[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches, seizures and invasions of
privacy shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place
to be searched[.]”15 Haw. Const. art. I, § 7. The particularity
requirement ensures that a search pursuant to a warrant
“limit[s] the police as to where they can search, for otherwise
the constitutional protection against warrantless searches is
15
This language is identical to the language of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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meaningless.” State v. Anderson, 84 Hawaii 462, 467, 935 P.2d
1007, 1012 (1997) (quoting State v. Woolsey, 71 Haw. 638, 640,
802 P.2d 478, 479 (1990)). A determination regarding whether a
warrant satisfies the particularity requirement must be made “on
a case-by-case basis, taking into account all of the surrounding
facts and circumstances.” Id. at 468, 935 P.2d at 1013 (quoting
State v. Kealoha, 62 Haw. 166, 170-71, 613 P.2d 645, 648
(1980)). While “[t]he cornerstone of such a determination is
the language of the warrant itself,” the “executing officer’s
prior knowledge as to the place intended to be searched, and the
description of the place to be searched appearing in the
probable cause affidavit in support of the search warrant” is
also relevant. Id. (quoting State v. Matsunaga, 82 Hawaii 162,
167, 920 P.2d 376, 381 (App. 1996)).
A search warrant that authorizes the search of a
“multiple-occupancy [dwelling] . . . will usually be held
invalid if it fails to describe the particular subunit to be
searched with sufficient definiteness to preclude a search of
one or more subunits indiscriminately.” Id. (quoting 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(b), at 526–29 (3d ed. 1996)).
That is, the particularity requirement “is not met when only a
general description of a multiple-occupancy building is
provided[.]” 68 Am. Jur. 2d Searches & Seizures § 224, 407
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(2010). This is because the “basic requirement” of the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 7 “is that the officers who are
commanded to search be able from the ‘particular’ description of
the search warrant to identify the specific place for which
there is probable cause to believe that a crime is being
committed.” 2 Wayne R. Lafave et al., Criminal Procedure
§ 3.4(e), at 186 (4th ed. 2015). A search warrant, however, is
not defective for failing to specify a subunit within the
designated building if the building “from its outward appearance
would be taken to be a single-occupancy structure and neither
the affiant nor other investigating officers nor the executing
officers knew or had reason to know of the structure’s actual
multiple-occupancy character until execution of the warrant was
under way.” Anderson, 84 Hawaii at 468, 935 P.2d at 1013
(quoting 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.5(b), at 526–29).
Thus, whether the warrant in this case satisfied the
particularity requirement entails a determination of (1) whether
the structure would be viewed as a multiple-occupancy structure
from its outward appearance, and (2) whether the affiant or
other investigating or executing officers knew or had reason to
know of the structure’s actual multiple-occupancy character
prior to the commencement of execution of the warrant. See id.
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If either of these questions yields an affirmative answer, then
the search warrant is invalid.
Here, the downstairs unit had a different appearance
than the remainder of the residence. The downstairs unit was
painted green whereas the rest of the residence was light
colored, and unlike the upstairs portion of the residence, the
downstairs unit did not have wood siding. Additionally, the
downstairs unit’s roof was not connected to the roof covering
the rest of the residence. The downstairs unit also had an
entrance that was separate from the upstairs portion and
accessible from a separate street. A worn path led from the
entrance of the upstairs residence to the entrance of the
downstairs unit. Indeed, the CI that conducted the controlled
purchase walked along the path and entered the downstairs unit
through this separate entrance. And Officer Segobia testified
that the downstairs unit’s entrance was not the same as the main
door that he had described in the search warrant.16 These facts
signaled that the downstairs unit was not internally connected
to the rest of the residence.
16
One factor relevant to whether a unit appears to be a residence
is whether the unit has “its own access to the outside.” Anderson, 84 Hawaii
at 471, 935 P.2d at 1016; see also United States v. Kyles, 40 F.3d 519, 524
(2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that a “[f]actor[] that indicate[s] a separate
residence include[s] separate access from the outside” (citing United States
v. Ayers, 924 F.2d 1468, 1480 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hinds, 856
F.2d 438, 441-42 (1st Cir. 1988))).
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The circuit court specifically determined that the
residence’s outward appearance indicated the downstairs was a
separate unit. The court’s related findings of fact are in
accord with this determination. It found that the downstairs
unit has its own door to the outside and the door has a lock.
The court also found that the downstairs unit had a different
appearance than the upstairs portion of the house as the outside
of the house was green on the bottom and brown on the top and
the top portion has new lumber and has a different color from
the downstairs. Thus, the court determined that Officer Segobia
had ample facts about the downstairs unit, its separate entrance
and identifying characteristics. None of these findings of fact
were challenged by the State on appeal.17 These findings, and
the underlying evidence, support the circuit court’s
unchallenged determination that the outward appearance of the
residence suggests that the downstairs is a separate unit.
Thus, the evidence supports the circuit court’s finding that the
outward appearance of the residence indicated that the structure
17
Despite the unchallenged findings of the circuit court, the ICA
found the residence had the appearance of “community occupation” because
there was only one address and one mailbox and because the property tax
records did not show a separate dwelling unit. While a single address and
mailbox can be considered in determining the “outward appearance” of a
structure, see Anderson, 84 Hawaii at 471, 935 P.2d at 1016, tax records do
not aid in determining the “outward appearance” of a structure. The more
weighty countervailing circumstances that the circuit court considered
included the different physical appearance and construction materials of the
two residential units, the units’ different roofs, and the separate entrances
of the units that were on different streets.
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described in the search warrant would not be taken as a single-
occupancy structure, and on this basis alone, the warrant was
not valid.
Turning to the second question, the search warrant
authorized a search of “a three bedroom, 2 bathroom
residence . . . located at [] Puuhalo Street[.]” The evidence
shows that Officer Segobia had significant knowledge of the
details of the downstairs prior to the execution of the search
warrant. In addition to the outward appearance of the
structure, the officer’s knowledge that Ah Nee and his wife
previously lived in the unit apart from Rodrigues indicated that
multiple families had been separately living in the building.
Officer Segobia acknowledged being told by Ah Nee that during
the time he lived in the unit with his wife, Rodrigues lived
“upstairs in an office unit.” The officer also knew that when
Ah Nee moved out, Rodrigues moved into the downstairs unit and
the upstairs portion became his mother’s portion of the
residence. And, Officer Segobia had been inside the downstairs
unit while Ah Nee lived there. Further, Officer Segobia had
personal knowledge of the appearance of the building because he
was both the investigating officer who drafted the Affidavit and
the officer that executed the search warrant.
The circuit court’s findings of fact support its
conclusion that Officer Segobia “knew or should have known” that
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the residence he described in his Affidavit, and that was
described in the search warrant, “was a multi-unit dwelling with
more than one occupant.” The court found that Officer Segobia
testified that Rodrigues was living in a downstairs unit of the
residence located on the south portion of the residence.
Additionally, the court found that the officer had been aware at
one time that the house had been inhabited by multiple
individuals and that Officer Segobia was personally acquainted
with the previous resident and had visited the house. The
officer also testified, the court found, that the downstairs
unit is completely separate from the upstairs unit described in
the search warrant. None of these findings were challenged by
the State. Based on these findings, the court determined that
Officer Segobia knew or should have known that the residence was
a multi-unit dwelling with more than one occupant. Thus, the
evidence in the record supports this finding of fact and
therefore it was not clearly erroneous.18
18
The ICA found that Officer Segobia’s knowledge of the downstairs
unit’s particulars was not extensive, as he thought, although he was not
sure, that there was an internal staircase. Although Officer Segobia
testified that the CI “wasn’t 100 percent [sure] if there would be a
stairwell within [Rodrigues’] unit” and also testified that, “I almost want
to say there used to be a stairwell and it got blocked off from the bathroom
area, if I remember correctly,” the circuit court implicitly rejected this
testimony based on the complete lack of evidentiary support for the prior
existence of a stairwell or a “blocked” staircase. This rejection was based
upon the actual knowledge and descriptions of the officer regarding the
Rodrigues’ unit, particularly his earlier presence in the unit, as the
circuit court determined that the Officer knew or should have known that the
residence was a multi-unit dwelling with more than one occupant.
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The court’s findings demonstrate that the residence
would not “be taken to be a single-occupancy structure” from its
outward appearance and that Officer Segobia “knew or had reason
to know of the structure’s actual multiple-occupancy character”
prior to the execution of the warrant. Anderson, 84 Hawaii at
468, 935 P.2d at 1013 (quoting 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.5(b), at
526–29). Either determination rendered the search warrant
invalid, and the circuit court thus correctly concluded that the
search warrant in this case failed to describe with
particularity the place to be searched, despite the officer
having sufficient information to do so.19 Accordingly, the
State’s challenge to the circuit court’s COL 9 that the warrant
did not describe at all the separate studio unit located
downstairs and its challenge to COL 11 that the search warrant
did not describe and therefore did not authorize the search of
the separate downstairs unit lack merit.
19
The ICA found, however, that the residence was not a multiple-
occupancy dwelling because the evidence did not demonstrate that Rodrigues
maintained exclusive access to the lower unit as Officer Segobia had
information that all of the family members had access to the entire house.
The cases relied upon by the ICA addressing a person’s “exclusive access” to
a residential unit involved a residence in which multiple people shared a
common area but had separate bedrooms, not an entirely separate living unit
as in this case. Additionally, there was no evidence that anyone besides
Rodrigues had access to the downstairs unit other than Ms. Rodrigues, who
rented the unit to Rodrigues and thus had keys to it. And Officer Segobia’s
speculation that “it appeared that everybody would have access to other
people’s areas” in the residence was not based on information provided by Ah
Nee and, in fact, was contrary to his knowledge that Ah Nee and his wife
lived in the downstairs unit separate from Rodrigues and Ms. Rodrigues.
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Because the search warrant in this case failed to
satisfy the particularity requirement of article I, section 7 of
the Hawaii Constitution, it was invalid. See Anderson, 84
Hawaii at 468, 935 P.2d at 1013 (“A search warrant for a[] . . .
multiple-occupancy building will [] be held invalid if it fails
to describe the particular subunit to be searched[.]”).
The ICA nevertheless concluded that it was error for
the circuit court to conclude that the warrant was deficient for
the failure to specifically describe the lower unit. As
explained, the circuit court determined that the outward
appearance of the residence suggests that the downstairs is a
separate unit. Additionally, based on the building’s
appearance, the information that the officer received from Ah
Nee, and the officer’s prior visit to the residence, the court
determined that Officer Segobia knew or should have known that
the residence was a multi-unit dwelling with more than one
occupant. Neither finding was challenged by the State before
the ICA. Whether the downstairs unit appeared to be separate
based on the “outward appearance of the residence” was plainly a
factual finding, determined by the circuit court based upon the
testimony and photographs of the exterior of the structure
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introduced into evidence at the hearing.20 It is well-
established that appellate courts must review challenged
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and that
unchallenged findings of fact are binding upon appellate courts.
Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 111 Hawaii 205, 227, 140 P.3d
985, 1007 (2006); Okada Trucking Co. v. Bd. of Water Supply, 97
Hawaii 450, 458, 40 P.3d 73, 81 (2002). The ICA nonetheless
found that the residence had the “outward appearance of
community occupation.” Because the circuit court’s unchallenged
finding was binding on the ICA, it was error for the ICA to make
a factual finding as to the appearance of the structure that was
contrary to the circuit court’s finding. See Kelly, 111 Hawaii
at 227, 140 P.3d at 1007.
Similarly, the circuit court’s determination that
Officer Segobia knew or should have known that the residence was
a multi-unit dwelling with more than one occupant was a factual
determination; it involved the court examining the evidence
regarding the appearance of the residence, the information that
the officer received from Ah Nee, and the officer’s prior visit
to the residence. But the ICA determined that Officer Segobia
20
Some of the circuit court’s findings of fact in this case were
labeled as conclusions of law. We have recognized, however, that “a finding
of fact is not freely reviewable by reason of its label as a conclusion of
law.” Molokoa Vill. Dev. Co. v. Kauai Elec. Co., 60 Haw. 582, 596, 593 P.2d
375, 384 (1979).
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did not have sufficient knowledge that the residence was a
multi-unit dwelling. It was error for the ICA to make a
determination regarding Officer Segobia’s knowledge of the
character of the residence that was contrary to an unchallenged
finding made by the circuit court to which the ICA was bound.
Id. Thus, the ICA erred in not accepting the circuit court’s
findings of fact and in concluding the particularity requirement
was satisfied. See Anderson, 84 Hawaii at 468, 935 P.2d at
1013.
B. The Search Violated Rodrigues’ Constitutional Rights
It is well-established that any warrantless search of
a constitutionally protected area is “presumptively unreasonable
unless there is both probable cause and a legally recognized
exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Phillips, 138
Hawaii 321, 336, 382 P.3d 133, 148 (2016); State v. Wallace, 80
Hawaii 382, 393, 910 P.2d 695, 706 (1996); State v. Bonnell, 75
Haw. 124, 137, 856 P.2d 1265, 1273 (1993). There has been no
assertion at any point in the course of this litigation that an
exception to the warrant requirement applied. Thus, the search
of Rodrigues’ residence violated his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches under article I, section 7 of the
Hawaii Constitution. The circuit court properly granted
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Rodrigues’ motion to suppress, and the ICA erred in vacating the
circuit court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the ICA’s April 10, 2019 Judgment on
Appeal is vacated, and the case is remanded to the circuit court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Taryn R. Tomasa /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Kauanoe A. Jackson /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
for respondent
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
29