State v. Monteil.

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-12-0000052
23-DEC-2014
09:56 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
Respondent/Plantiff-Appellee,
vs.
JACQUES RAYMOND MONTEIL,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-12-0000052
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-12-0000052, 3P711-1171)
December 23, 2014
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY POLLACK, J.
I. Introduction
Defendant was convicted by the District Court for the
Third Circuit (district court) of committing the offense of
prostitution in violation of Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) §
712-1200(1) (1993, Supp. 2013). Defendant appealed the
conviction to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing
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there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The
ICA affirmed the conviction. Defendant filed an application for
writ of certiorari in which he argued the ICA erred by finding
sufficient evidence to prove the commission of a prostitution
offense. We affirm the judgment on appeal of the ICA, and
clarify the prior-to-trial advisement required by State v.
Lewis, 94 Hawaiʻi 292, 297, 12 P.3d 1233, 1238 (2000).
II. Background
On August 3, 2011, James Raymond Monteil was charged
by complaint in the district court with the offense of
prostitution, in violation of HRS Section 712-1200(1).1 Monteil
pleaded not guilty to the charge, and trial was scheduled before
the district court on January 10, 2012.
A. Prior-to-Trial Tachibana Advisory
At the commencement of Monteil’s bench trial,2 the
judge conducted the following colloquy to inform Monteil of his
right to testify and the right not to testify:
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Monteil, let me inform you:
You have the right to remain silent and the right against
1
HRS § 712-1200(1) states,
A person commits the offense of prostitution if the person:
(a) Engages in, or agrees or offers to engage in, sexual
conduct with another person for a fee; or
(b) Pays, agrees to pay, or offers to pay a fee to
another to engage in sexual conduct.
2
The Honorable Joseph P. Florendo, Jr. presided.
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self-incrimination. No one can force you to testify in
this matter. Do you understand?
MR. MONTEIL: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: You don’t have to present any evidence
whatsoever. It’s up to the State to prove this case beyond
a reasonable doubt. Do you understand?
MR. MONTEIL: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand that if you wish to testify,
the Court will allow you to do so; and if you do wish to
testify, your testimony will be taken under oath and
subject to penalties of perjury, the prosecutor can cross-
examine you, and the Court can consider your testimony in
deciding if you are guilty or not guilty?
MR. MONTEIL: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: You can wait until after the State has
completed its evidence in order to decide if you wish to
testify, and you can talk to your attorney before you
decide. All right?
MR. MONTEIL: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Call your first witness.
Notably, the court did not inform Monteil that if he did not
testify, his silence could not be used against him in deciding
the case.
B. Trial
At the conclusion of the court’s colloquy, the State
called its first witness, Honolulu Police Department (HPD)
Sergeant Chad Taniyama (Sgt. Taniyama). Sgt. Taniyama testified
that his duties as a detective included organizing prostitution
sting operations and that he had conducted approximately ten
such operations with the HPD. Some operations involved setting
up email accounts and placing advertisements in the escort
section of web sites such as “Backpage” or “Craigslist.”
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Sgt. Taniyama testified he was the lead investigator
in such an operation on July 18, 2011. He placed an
advertisement in the escort section of “backpage.com” on July
16, 2011, entitled, “ExOtIC BeAuTy AwAiTs You ToDaY.” The
advertisement read as follows:
Hey fellas my name is SiN.
I am here for a short visit, take advantage while you can.
I’m proof that amazing beauty comes in small packages. I’m
5’ with race car curves and eager to make your dreams come
true. Your imagination is our only limit. 100% REAL!! I
guarantee you won’t want to say goodbye.
420 Friendly.
Send me a message at sinsplayground@gmail.com to set up an
appointment.
Sgt. Taniyama testified he received email messages
from several individuals in response to the advertisement,
including messages from Monteil on July 16 and July 18, 2011.3
Monteil’s email conversation with Sgt. Taniyama on July 16,
2011, reads, in relevant part, as follows:
MONTEIL: r u on big island?
SGT. TANIYAMA (posing as “SiN”): Hey babe, i am not on the
Big Island right now. i will b in kona on Monday. i would
love to meet. lmk if we can hook up.
MONTEIL: grat, what time u be i kona? lmk will like to
meet u
SiN: ill b in kona in the afternoon. i shold b ready 2 go
by 5 or so. if you would like to book now i can pencil u
in. my book fills up pretty quickly. lmk if we can meet
and what kind of party u want.
3
The transcript of the email messages between Monteil and Sgt.
Taniyama was admitted into evidence at trial without objection.
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MONTEIL: so then i be #1 in kona. . . where you staying?
catch a drink first is better if u ok with that
SiN: like I said hun my book fills up fast. my first
party is taken. book now or miss the greatest ride on
earth. can have a drink at my place if u like. ill be
staying in kona town. what kind of party ru lookin for
tiger?
MONTEIL: drink at ur place is k. just good fun – do i
really need to say on e-mail . . . . n yes what time do u
have open?
SiN: that my screening hun, making sure ur not popo.
xoxoxo.
Convince me ur not popo and u can have me 6. xoxoxo.
MONTEIL: not a cop if that is what u r asking – the ride
of my life that is . . . r u in any law enforcement group
since we are been honest?
convinced enough?
SiN: me?? popo . . . hehehe. i have played a naughty cop
many times. jus lmk what kind of party u want babe.
xoxoxoxo.
MONTEIL: gfe experience for an hour or two
u r so freaking cute too . . .
SiN: gfe sounds like fun!! my part for a hour will be
$300. I cant wait to get my hands on you. i will let u
know where to cum on monday. or send me a message.
xoxoxo.
ooooooo!!!!! flattery will get u everywhere. o and i
taste as good as i look. xoxoxo
MONTEIL: k . . . perfect then, I will e-mail u Monday
around noon – hope u can get out of the 5 n i make ur while
. . . .
i specialize in tasting competitions – until theres no more
to taste. U r gorgeous – assume photos in ur ad recent?
SiN: o really?? i would love to put that to the test. my
pics r recently done. xoxoxoxo
MONTEIL: u will experience it i gtd it – but better then
if i meet u first at 4pm than 5 – who knows what u be doing
in that hour – but then an hour might not be enough . . . I
am a great massage therapist so imagine that first and then
a full tasting[.]
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Two days later, on July 18, 2011, Monteil and Sgt.
Taniyama continued the email conversation in which they agreed
to meet later that day:
MONTEIL: Hi there – still on at 6? looking forward to
meeting u. where u stayin at?
SiN: yes we r sweets. i cant wait to get my hands on u.
cu at 6. xoxoxo
. . . .
ok babe im in and ready!! u can cum early if u like. lmk,
so I can give u the hotel.
MONTEIL: K, just like u I have to be safe so need u to
answer a simple question. Are u associated with any law
enforcement? Yes or no?
SiN: No hun. I’m not popo. But I know how u feel. need
to b careful. xoxoxo. Love Sin.
MONTEIL: K, where r u at?
SiN: I’m at the kona reef, u know it? . . . Love Sin
MONTEIL: Alii drive right?
SiN: Yes hun. Love Sin
MONTEIL: Room number
SiN: F13 . . . Love Sin
Sgt. Taniyama testified that Monteil arrived at Kona
Reef Condominiums (Kona Reef) room F-13 at 6:00 p.m. on July 18,
2011. When Monteil arrived at the room, he knocked on the door,
and Officer Sharon Yoon (Officer Yoon), who was assigned by Sgt.
Taniyama to dress “as a prostitute,” answered, “Who is it?” A
voice replied, “It’s me.” Officer Yoon opened the door and let
Monteil into the unit. Officer Yoon informed Monteil that she
was “gonna get ready” and left the room. At that juncture, “the
vice officers came into the room from a separate room in the
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unit and placed [Monteil] under arrest.” Sgt. Taniyama
testified he conducted a search incident to the arrest and
recovered $300.00 in cash from Monteil’s person.
Sgt. Taniyama testified Monteil had agreed to receive
“GFE” in exchange for $300. The Officer defined the term “GFE”
as “girlfriend experience” and explained that “GFE” meant
unprotected sex.
THE STATE: And what is a “GFE”?
SGT. TANIYAMA: That’s an internet escort term for a
“girlfriend experience.”
THE STATE: And what does “girlfriend experience” mean?
SGT. TANIYAMA: As it relates to escorts, “girlfriend
experience” would mean that the john would like to be
treated as if he was dealing with his girlfriend with the
escort. As it relates to sexual intercourse, it would mean
sexual intercourse without any contraceptives.
THE STATE: And is that what the defendant requested?
SGT. TANIYAMA: Yes, a GFE.
. . . .
THE STATE: And just to clarify: Going back to the term
“GFE,” that means “girlfriend experience.” With regard
specifically to sexual conduct –- I’m sorry, what –- how
would you describe what a “girlfriend experience” is?
. . . .
SGT. TANIYAMA: Vaginal intercourse or anal intercourse or
any intercourse without contraceptives.
THE STATE: So without the use of a condom, for example?
SGT. TANIYAMA: Correct.
THE STATE: Okay. No further questions, your Honor.
On cross-examination, Sgt. Taniyama acknowledged the
email exchange did not expressly mention sexual conduct. Sgt.
Taniyama also acknowledged that from the time Monteil arrived at
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the Kona Reef until the time he was arrested, Monteil did not
make any indication that he came to the room to have sex.
At the conclusion of the State’s case, the judge
inquired if there were any witnesses for the defense. The
defense counsel responded, “Yes, your Honor. We’re gonna have
Mr. Monteil take the stand. . . . So if you’d like to question
him.” The judge replied, “I think I already did that.”
Monteil then took the stand and testified that in the
email communications prior to his arrest, all he asked was if he
could “meet somebody and have dinner or a drink,” and he
maintained that “GFE” had no sexual connotations that he knew
of. Monteil stated as a realtor, he “use[d] ‘GFE’ as ‘good
faith estimate’ all the time” and that he did not “know what the
intent of ‘GFE’ [was] in [the] prostitute world.” Monteil
acknowledged his email interaction with “SiN” was not a “real
estate transaction,” but he asserted that when he used the term
“GFE” he meant “good fun everywhere experience,” “which [was] a
very common term in any hotel industry.” He added that “having
good fun everywhere [could mean] go and have dinner and have []
drinks,” and he maintained that his purpose for going to the
Kona Reef was to take someone to dinner. However, on cross-
examination, Monteil acknowledged he did not mention going to
dinner with SiN in his emails, but rather requested a “GFE
experience for an hour or two.”
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With respect to his email communication with “SiN”
about police, Monteil stated he thought it was “very strange
that [he] was being asked if [he] was popo,” and he maintained
he “didn’t know what ‘popo’ was.” When asked about his comment
in the email correspondence about “tastings,” Monteil testified
he was “a food and beverage director” and the “conversation
ha[d] nothing to lead to any sex or anything.” Monteil
additionally testified he had $400 on his person at the time of
his arrest rather than the $300 the police testified to
recovering from him. At the conclusion of Monteil’s testimony,
the defense rested.
The State’s closing relied on the testimony of Sgt.
Taniyama, Officer Yoon, and the cross-examination of Monteil.
The defense maintained in its closing that under the
prostitution statute the defendant’s state of mind is at issue,
not the police officer’s beliefs. For that reason, the defense
argued Sgt. Taniyama’s testimony as to the meaning of the term
“GFE” was not relevant in determining whether Monteil had the
intent to engage in sexual conduct with “SiN.” The defense
concluded that the evidence presented failed to demonstrate
Monteil had the intent to engage in sexual conduct and thus the
court should find Monteil not guilty.
The district court indicated “the critical issue” was
the definition of the term “GFE” or “GFE experience.” The court
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found “[t]aken into effect the entirety of [the email exchanges
between Monteil and “SiN”], together with the actions of
[Monteil], [Monteil] did agree to engage in a girlfriend
experience, which, as testified by Sgt. Taniyama, would be
treated as if [Monteil], or the customer, were the boyfriend of
the female and had sex without contraceptives.” Thus, the State
“proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [Monteil] intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly paid or agreed to pay or offered to pay
a fee to another to engage in sexual conduct.”
When asked if he wished to make any further
statements, Monteil stated, “Your Honor, . . . I am a law-
abiding officer -- law-abiding citizen . . . . There was no
intent whatsoever to do that.”
In response to Monteil’s statement, the court
explained to Monteil that his testimony was an additional factor
it considered in finding him guilty of prostitution:
Part of your testimony led me to believe that you did have
[] intent. You initially said you didn’t have any idea
what “GFE” means and you referred to your real estate
experience, but the communication in this e-mail shows that
you were the one who suggested the “GFE experience,”
. . . . but when you came onto the witness stand, you said
you didn’t know what “GFE” means. . . . [t]hat’s one factor
that I used to decide this case.
The court imposed a $500 fine and a $30 criminal
injury fee.
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III. Appellate Proceedings
On appeal to the ICA, Monteil argued the district
court erred by concluding there was sufficient evidence to
support a conviction of prostitution based on the term “GFE.”
Monteil maintained that in order to establish that “[he] paid,
agreed to pay, or offered to pay a fee to another to engage in
sexual conduct, the district court would have to find the
following, beyond a reasonable doubt”: (1) “‘GFE’ means ‘Girl
Friend Experience[,]’” and (2) “the term ‘Girl Friend
Experience’ is defined or means sexual conduct.” Monteil argued
there was “contradictory testimony on the definition of the term
“Girl Friend Experience” and whether the term in fact means
sexual conduct.
Monteil contended Hawaiʻi cases dealing with
prostitution have held that “when a term is not statutorily
defined, [courts] may resort to legal or other well accepted
dictionaries as one way to determine its ordinary meaning.”
Monteil pointed out neither Black’s Law Dictionary nor any other
“generally regarded dictionaries” reference the term “GFE” or
“Girl Friend Experience,” and therefore, the “term ‘GFE’ [wa]s
not commonly understood, or widely accepted to possess a generic
meaning.” Monteil further argued, “Hawaiʻi appellate courts have
never recognized GFE to mean ‘Girl Friend Experience’” and no
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Hawaiʻi case law “defines a ‘Girl Friend Experience’ to mean []
sexual conduct, sexual contact or sex without contraceptives.”4
Monteil contended Hawaiʻi case law requires the trial
court to find a “meeting of the minds” for an “agreement to pay
a fee to another to engage in sexual conduct” when slang terms
or phrases of uncertain meaning are used. Monteil maintained
the “GFE” acronym was “not known or used by the general public
to the extent that it ha[d] a general recognized meaning in the
public,” and therefore, the “acronym, standing by itself[,]
[was] insufficient to establish the element and finding of the
district court, that [he] paid, agreed to pay, or offered to pay
a fee to another to engage in sexual conduct.” Accordingly,
Monteil requested the ICA reverse his conviction.
In its Answering Brief, the State asserted it was
“well within the [district] court’s discretion [to] . . . make
credibility determinations and draw reasonable inferences from
[the] evidence presented.” The State maintained that the
evidence supported the court’s finding that “GFE” meant
“girlfriend experience,” which constituted sexual conduct, and
that Monteil solicited a “GFE” experience from “SiN.”
Therefore, the State contended that the trial court’s finding
Monteil guilty of prostitution was not clearly erroneous.
4
Monteil instead argued the term “GFE” has been uniformly
recognized as “Good Faith Estimate” by federal courts located in Hawaiʻi.
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Alternatively, the State argued that even if the
district court clearly erred by finding “GFE” meant “girlfriend
experience,” there was “still substantial evidence Monteil
agreed to pay a fee to engage in sexual conduct” as evidenced by
the nature of the online advertisement and the “sexually
saturated remarks” in Monteil’s email exchange with Sgt.
Taniyama. The State maintained “these exchanges—and the
reasonable inferences that follow given the context—[were]
sufficiently credible and probative that the agreement for a GFE
concerned ‘sexual conduct’ as that term is defined under the
Hawaiʻi Penal Code.”
The State asserted the district court “reasoned that
the exhibits, [Sgt.] Taniyama’s testimony, and Monteil’s
behavior on the stand—considered in its entirety—showed that
Monteil agreed to pay a fee in return for sexual conduct.” The
State concluded that the evidence presented was of “sufficient
quality and probative value to sustain Monteil’s conviction even
if [Sgt.] Taniyama’s testimony [was] disregarded.”
A. ICA Summary Disposition Order
In its Summary Disposition Order (SDO), the ICA
concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the district
court’s finding that Monteil’s use of the term “GFE” conveyed
his intent to engage in sex for a fee. The ICA noted that it
was Monteil who first used the term “GFE” to describe the “kind
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of party” he wanted in response to Sgt. Taniyama’s email and who
subsequently agreed to pay “for this experience.” The ICA
additionally noted that Sgt. Taniyama testified the term “GFE”
had “a literal meaning of girlfriend experience” but “within the
context of the escort industry was the equivalent of having sex
as boyfriend and girlfriend without contraceptives.”
The ICA noted that “even assuming that there are other
meanings” for the acronym “GFE” and “the meaning testified to by
Officer Taniyama has not been recognized by the courts of Hawaiʻi
as Monteil argues, Officer Taniyama testified GFE is understood
as referring to unprotected sex in the escort context, and when
Monteil used the term in that context, it was to convey that
meaning.” The ICA further noted that the “District Court
credited Officer Taniyama’s testimony.”
The ICA found the context of the email exchange
supported Sgt. Taniyama’s testimony. The ICA held “[i]t [was]
well-settled that an appellate court will not pass upon issues
dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of
the evidence” within “the province of the trier of fact.” The
ICA concluded that in considering the evidence in the strongest
light for the prosecution, there was substantial evidence as to
every material element of the offense charged. Thus, the ICA
affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction.
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B. Application for Writ of Certiorari
In his Application for Writ of Certiorari
(Application) to this court, Monteil raises the following point
of error:
The ICA committed grave error when it found the State
introduced sufficient evidence to find Monteil guilty under
the new prostitution statute, because he never agreed or
offered to pay another for sexual conduct.
Monteil reiterates his argument that there was
insufficient evidence demonstrating he offered to pay another
for sexual conduct and that the trial court’s determination of
the meaning of “GFE” was improper.
Additionally, Monteil argues that, assuming he meant
“girlfriend experience” in his email, Sgt. Taniyama’s definition
“as it relates to escorts” was “consistent with an offer to pay
for . . . lawful services provided by escorts, including dates,
dancing, dinner, drinks, . . . or flirting in an email exchange,
all of which fall outside the definition of sexual conduct.”
Monteil argues that the ICA’s conclusion that there was
sufficient evidence to convict him of prostitution was “clearly
wrong” and that “girlfriend experience,” as it relates to
services performed by an escort, does not involve sexual contact
or sexual intercourse.
Monteil asks this court to reverse the ICA’s SDO and
the district court’s judgment of conviction and remand this case
for entry of an acquittal.
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In its Response to Monteil’s Application (Response),
the State contends Monteil made “many sexually saturated
remarks” throughout his email exchange with “SiN,” which
evidences that “he wanted to engage in sexual conduct.” The
State concludes that these remarks, “and the reasonable
inferences that follow, given Monteil’s subsequent actions, are
sufficiently credible and probative that the $300 agreement for
a ‘gfe experience’ was vernacular for sexual conduct.”
In Monteil’s Reply, he argues that “75% of the
‘sexually saturated remarks’ in the email exchange were made by
Sgt. Taniyama, and exchanges about ‘popo’ and ‘tasting’ were
initiated by SiN, not Monteil.” Monteil argues the “prohibited
conduct must be shown by the defendant’s words, not police
suggestions,” and he contends that he did not “email SiN [in
response to the ad] requesting sexual favors.”
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, the test for sufficiency of the evidence is
“not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but
whether there is ‘substantial evidence’ to support the
conclusion of the trier of fact.” State v. Matavale, 115 Hawaiʻi
149, 157-58, 166 P.3d 322, 330-31 (2007) (quoting State v.
Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 248-49, 831 P.2d 924, 931 (1992)).
“Substantial evidence” is “credible evidence which is of
sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of
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reasonable caution to support a conclusion.” Id. at 158, 166
P.3d at 331 (quoting Batson, 73 Haw. at 248-49, 831 P.2d at
931). When considering the legal sufficiency of evidence to
support a conviction, such “evidence adduced in the trial court
must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution.”
Matavale, 115 Hawaiʻi at 157, 166 P.3d at 330.
In a bench trial, “the trial judge is free to make all
reasonable and rational inferences under the facts in evidence,
including circumstantial evidence.” Batson, 73 Haw. at 249, 831
P.2d at 931. Further, “[i]t is for the trial judge as fact-
finder to assess the credibility of witnesses and to resolve all
questions of facts; the judge may accept or reject any witness’s
testimony in whole or in part.” State v. Eastman, 81 Hawaiʻi
131, 139, 913 P.2d 57, 65 (1996). It is not the role of the
appellate court to weigh credibility or resolve conflicting
evidence. Id.; State v. Wallace, 80 Hawaiʻi 382, 418, 910 P.2d
695, 731 (1996).
V. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A person commits the offense of prostitution if he or
she “[p]ays, agrees to pay, or offers to pay a fee to another to
engage in sexual conduct.” HRS § 712-1200(1)(b). In this case,
the State adduced evidence that Monteil responded to Sgt.
Taniyama’s online advertisement in which the officer portrayed
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an escort named “SiN.” The email conversations between Monteil
and “SiN” were replete with sexual innuendo,5 and at several
times during the conversation, Monteil expressed concern about
whether “SiN” was involved in law enforcement.6 Ultimately,
Monteil asked “SiN” for a “GFE experience for an hour or two”
and offered to pay $300.00 for such experience. After reaching
an agreement with “SiN” to pay $300.00 for “GFE,” Monteil
arranged a date, time and location to meet “SiN,” and he
followed through with those plans.
Sgt. Taniyama and Monteil both testified as to the
meaning of “GFE.” Sgt. Taniyama explained the term “GFE” was
vernacular in the internet escort community for “girlfriend
experience,” which in turn meant to have sex with another
without the use of contraceptives. Monteil testified he did not
know what “GFE” meant in the context of prostitution; he
asserted that “GFE” means “good faith estimate” in the real
5
For example, “SiN” made several sexually suggestive comments to
Monteil: 1) he needs to “book [her] now or miss the greatest ride on earth,”
2) she “played a naughty cop many times,” 3) she “can’t wait to get [her]
hands on [him],” and 4) she “will let [Monteil] know where to cum.”
Additionally, in response to “SiN’s” comment that she “taste[d] as good as
she look[ed]” in her ad, Monteil told “SiN” that 1) he specialized in
“tasting competitions,” 2) he would taste her “until there’s no more to
taste,” and 3) he guaranteed that she would “experience” the “tasting.”
6
When “SiN” initially asked what “kind of party” he wanted,
Monteil was resistant to answering on email, “Do i really need to say on e-
mail . . . .” Monteil then asked whether or not “SiN” was in any “law
enforcement group.” On the day that Monteil was scheduled to meet with
“SiN,” Monteil again asked “SiN” if she was “associated with any law
enforcement.”
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estate context and that “GFEE” means “good fun everywhere
experience” in the hotel industry.
In its oral ruling, the district court expressly
relied on Sgt. Taniyama’s testimony in finding “GFE” constituted
sexual conduct; by contrast, the judge noted Monteil’s testimony
regarding the term “GFE” was inconsistent and contradictory.
The sexual nature of the email conversation between Monteil and
“SiN” further supports Sgt. Taniyama’s contention that “GFE”
constitutes sexual conduct.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
the totality of the evidence—including the email conversation,
Sgt. Taniyama’s testimony,7 and Monteil’s subsequent actions—
constitutes substantial evidence that Monteil contacted “SiN” to
solicit sexual conduct. Thus, the ICA did not err in concluding
the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain
Monteil’s conviction for prostitution.
7
The ICA has previously relied on police testimony to discern the
meaning of colloquial words, phrases, or other types of street vernacular.
State v. Connally, 79 Hawai#i 123, 127, 899 P.2d 406, 410 (App. 1995)
(affirming the defendant’s conviction for prostitution based, in part, on the
officer’s testimony that the defendant’s question in Japanese to the Japanese
male tourists, “Would you like to play?” was the street vernacular equivalent
to “Would you like to have sex?”).
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B. Prior-to-Trial Advisement
1.
Hawaiʻi law has long recognized that a defendant
accused of a criminal offense is accorded specific fundamental
rights, including the right to be represented by counsel, the
right to have guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and, as
relevant to this case, the right to testify and the right not to
testify. See Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawai#i 226, 900 P.2d 1293
(1995); see also Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 295, 12 P.3d at 1236.
A defendant’s “right to testify is guaranteed by the
United States’ Sixth Amendment guarantee of compulsory process,
and Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process; the Hawai#i
Constitution’s parallel guarantees under Article I, sections 14,
and 5, respectively; and HRS § 801-2 (1993)’s statutory
protection of the right to testify, which states, ‘In the trial
of any person on the charge of any offense, he shall have a
right . . . to be heard in his defense.’” State v. Pomroy, 132
Hawai#i 85, 91, 319 P.3d 1093, 1099 (2014) (citing Tachibana, 79
Hawai#i at 231-32, 900 P.2d at 1298-99); accord State v. Han, 130
Hawai#i 83, 87, 306 P.3d 128, 132 (2013).
A defendant’s right not to testify is guaranteed by
the United States’ Fifth Amendment guarantee against compelled
testimony and the Hawaiʻi Constitution’s parallel guarantee under
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Article I, section 10. See State v. Silva, 78 Hawaiʻi 115, 124,
890 P.2d 702, 711 (App. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by
Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi 226, 900 P.2d 1293; see also Lewis, 94
Hawai#i at 293, 12 P.3d at 1234. As early as 1887, this court
held that a defendant should not be prejudiced for exercising
the right not to testify and for remaining silent at trial. See
The King v. McGiffin, 7 Haw. 104, 114 (Haw. Kingdom 1887)
(holding a comment by the prosecution in its summation as to the
defendant’s failure to testify was “highly improper, and
contrary to the statute” although not prejudicial in the
particular case as the court intervened and directed the jury
not to take notice). The Hawaiʻi Legislature later adopted and
codified this common law rule when it enacted HRS § 621-15 that
provided, in part, “[N]o inference shall be drawn prejudicial to
the accused by reason of such neglect or refusal [to testify],
nor shall any argument be permitted tending to injure the
defense of the accused person on account of such failure to
offer himself as a witness.” HRS § 621-15 (1976) (repealed
1980). This provision has evolved over the years and is found
today in Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 513, which
prohibits the court or counsel to comment on, or draw any
inference from, a defendant’s exercise of the right not to
testify. HRE Rule 513(a) (codified at HRS § 626-1).
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Thus, Hawai#i has historically protected both the right
to testify and the right not to testify. To ensure that a
decision to waive the fundamental right to testify is an
intelligent and voluntary act, this court adopted the colloquy
approach in which “the trial judge, as a matter of routine,
conducts an [on-the-record] inquiry . . . with the defendant.”
Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi at 233, 900 P.2d at 1300.
In Tachibana, this court reviewed a defendant’s claim
that his attorney had prevented him from testifying at trial,
and thus violated his right to testify. 79 Hawaiʻi at 230, 900
P.2d at 1297. To protect the right to testify and to limit
similar post-conviction challenges, Tachibana required that the
trial court conduct an “ultimate colloquy” in cases in which a
defendant has not testified prior to the close of the case. 79
Hawaiʻi at 236, 900 P.2d at 1303. The court is required to
advise defendants of their right to testify and must obtain an
on-the-record waiver of that right in every case in which the
defendant does not testify. Id.
“In conducting the colloquy, the trial court must be
careful not to influence the defendant’s decision whether or not
to testify.” Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi at 236 n.7, 900 P.2d at 1303
n.7. Accordingly, the court’s advisory to the defendant must
maintain an “even balance” between a defendant’s right to
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testify and the right not to testify. Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 295,
12 P.3d at 1236. Particular caution must be afforded to avoid
infringing upon the right not to testify, which has been
recognized as a “more fragile right”8 than the right to testify.
See id. at 295, 12 P.3d at 1236.
Expressly recognizing the importance of a balanced
advisement, Tachibana provides the trial courts with specific
guidance for the “ultimate” colloquy to ensure defendants are
informed of their right to testify and not to testify, without
influencing this decision. As stated by Tachibana, the court
should inform the defendant of the following:
[H]e or she has a right to testify, that if he or she wants
to testify that no one can prevent him or her from doing
so, and that if he or she testifies the prosecution will be
allowed to cross-examine him or her. In connection with
the privilege against self-incrimination, the defendant
should also be advised that he or she has a right not to
testify and that if he or she does not testify then the
jury can be instructed about that right.
Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi at 236 n.7, 900 P.2d at 1303 n.7
8
“Fragile” in the context of the right not to testify derives
from Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1987).
To require the trial court to follow a special procedure,
explicitly telling defendant about, and securing an
explicit waiver of, a privilege to testify (whether
administered within or outside the jury’s hearing), could
inappropriately influence the defendant to waive his
constitutional right not to testify, thus threatening the
exercise of this other, converse, constitutionally
explicit, and more fragile right.
Id. at 30. The court in Siciliano suggests that advising the defendant of
the right to testify may inappropriately influence the defendant to
relinquish the more fragile constitutional right not to testify.
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(emphasis added).
In addition to requiring an “ultimate colloquy,”
Tachibana strongly recommended trial courts conduct a prior-to-
trial advisement to inform defendants of their right to testify
and the right not to testify. Id. at 237 n.9, 900 P.2d at 1304
n.9 (noting that “although the ultimate colloquy should be
conducted after all evidence other than the defendant’s
testimony has been received, it would behoove the trial court,
prior to the start of trial” to inform the defendant of his or
her right to testify or not to testify). However, not all trial
courts took heed of Tachibana’s recommendation.
In Lewis, the court reviewed a post-conviction
challenge from a defendant who testified at his trial and was
subsequently found guilty. Lewis, 94 Hawaiʻi 292, 12 P.3d 1233.
The defendant did not receive either the “ultimate” Tachibana
colloquy or Tachibana’s recommended prior-to-trial advisement.
Id. On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred by
failing to obtain an on-the-record waiver of his right not to
testify. Id.
In finding the trial court did not err, the Lewis
court observed Tachibana’s “ultimate” colloquy was primarily
intended to protect the right to testify and thus was “only
required in cases in which the defendant does not testify.” Id.
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at 295, 12 P.3d at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Lewis further noted the prior-to-trial advisement discussed in
Tachibana was a recommendation, not a requirement for trial
courts. Id. at 296-97, 12 P.3d at 1237-38. As such, Lewis held
the trial court in that case was not required to advise the
defendant of his right not to testify. Id.
Although holding the trial court did not err,9 Lewis
found that there was a “salutary effect” gained from “a trial
court addressing a defendant” prior to trial regarding the right
to testify or not testify. Id. Specifically, the court noted a
prior-to-trial advisement would “have the beneficial impact of
limiting any post-conviction claim that a defendant testified in
ignorance of his or her right not to testify.” Id. The
pretrial advisement also lessened the risk that the “ultimate
colloquy” would affect the defendant’s right not to testify.
Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi at 236 at 236 n.9, 900 P.2d at 1303 n.9
(“Such an early warning would reduce the possibility that the
trial court’s colloquy could have any inadvertent effect on []
the defendant’s right not to testify . . . .”). Lewis thus
recognized the fundamental importance of a trial court informing
9
The Lewis court concluded that although the trial court did not
advise the defendant of his right not to testify, there was “nothing to
indicate [] [the defendant’s] decision to testify was anything other than
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made,” and the court affirmed the
conviction. Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 296-97, 12 P.3d at 1237-38.
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a defendant of the constitutional right not to testify prior to
the commencement of trial.
Accordingly, Lewis set forth a prospective requirement
that, prior to the start of trial, trial courts must “(1) inform
the defendant of his or her personal right to testify or not to
testify and (2) alert the defendant that if he or she has not
testified by the end of the trial, the court will briefly
question the defendant to ensure that the decision not to
testify is the defendant’s own decision.” 94 Hawaiʻi at 297, 12
P.3d at 1238 (quoting Tachibana, 79 Haw. at 237 n.9, 900 P.2d at
1304 n.9). In contrast to Tachibana’s delineated advisory for
the “ultimate” colloquy, Lewis did not specify the content of
the prior-to-trial advisement.
2.
In this case, at the commencement of trial, the court
conducted a prior-to-trial advisement to inform Monteil of his
right to testify and right not to testify. As to Monteil’s
right not to testify, the court advised him that he had the
“right to remain silent and the right against self-
incrimination” and that no one could “force [him] to testify.”
The court also informed Monteil that he did not “have to present
any evidence whatsoever” and that it was “up to the State to
prove [the] case beyond a reasonable doubt.” However, the
court’s prior-to-trial advisement did not inform Monteil that if
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he exercised his right not to testify, his silence could not be
used against him in deciding the case. Monteil later testified
without a further advisory from the court.
3.
A defendant’s understanding of the right to testify or
not to testify is fundamental to a fair trial. A court has a
“serious and weighty responsibility to determine whether” a
waiver of the right to testify is a knowing and intelligent
decision. Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi at 233, 900 P.2d at 1300.
Similarly, a decision by a defendant not to testify should be
based upon a defendant’s awareness of the “relevant
circumstances and likely consequences” of such a decision. See
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Waivers of
constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”).
Foremost among the “relevant circumstances” pertaining
to the constitutional right not to testify is the guarantee that
a defendant cannot be penalized for exercising the right not to
testify. That is, “no inference may be drawn therefrom,” by the
fact finder. HRE Rule 513(a). If an inference of guilt could
be drawn from not testifying, such penalty would erode the
constitutional guarantee against compelled testimony as it would
tend to coerce a defendant to testify.
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In this case, the court did not advise Monteil of the
very significant “relevant circumstance” of his right not to
testify—i.e., that no inference of guilt may be drawn for
exercising this right. Because Monteil testified, implicitly
waiving his right not to testify prior to the close of his
defense’s case, he did not receive the “ultimate” Tachibana
colloquy. However, had Monteil waited until he received the
“ultimate” colloquy before deciding whether to testify, he would
have been informed by the court that a decision not to testify
could not be used against him in deciding the case.10
This imbalance in information between the prior-to-
trial advisement and the “ultimate” colloquy potentially
threatens the “more fragile right” not to testify, as testifying
defendants, such as Monteil, are not assured to receive adequate
advisement of the “relevant circumstance” of exercising the
10
The Tachibana ultimate colloquy provides as follows in
relevant part:
In connection with the privilege against self-
incrimination, the defendant should also be advised that he
or she has a right not to testify and that if he or she
does not testify then the jury can be instructed about that
right.
Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi at 236 at 236 n.7, 900 P.2d at 1303 n.7. Hawai#i
Criminal Jury Instruction No. 3.14, entitled “Defendant Not Required to
Testify” provides as follows:
The defendant has no duty or obligation to testify, and you must
not draw any inference unfavorable to the defendant because
he/she did not testify in this case, or consider this in any way
in your deliberations.
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right not to testify. Consequently, a prior-to-trial advisement
that fails to advise the defendant that a decision not to
testify may not be used as evidence of guilt, may jeopardize an
informed decision by the defendant regarding whether to testify.
The prior-to-trial advisement as given in this case
additionally may not achieve its intended objective of limiting
post-conviction challenges from defendants claiming to have
testified without adequate awareness of the right not to
testify. Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 297, 12 P.3d at 1238 (pretrial
advisement “will have the beneficial effect of limiting any
post-conviction claim that a defendant testified in ignorance of
his or her right not to testify”).11 If a court omits a
significant “relevant circumstance” of the right not to testify
from its prior-to-trial advisement, as occurred in this case,
the advisement’s effect on limiting post-conviction challenges
is diminished. See Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 297, 12 P.3d at 1238.
Further, a pretrial advisement that fails to
adequately inform a defendant of a “relevant circumstance” poses
a possibility that the court may inadvertently influence a
defendant’s decision of whether or not to testify. See Lewis,
11
See also Tachibana, 79 Hawai#i at 235, 900 P.2d at 1302 (“[B]y
engaging in the colloquy, a trial judge would establish a record that would
effectively settle the right-to-testify issues in the case, and thereby
relieve the trial judge of extended post-conviction proceedings.” (quoting
Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670, 679-80 (D.C. App. 1991)).
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94 Hawai#i at 295, 12 P.3d at 1236; Tachibana, 79 Hawai#i at 236
n.7, 900 P.2d at 1303 n.7. In expressly recognizing the risk of
undue influence, Tachibana provided trial courts with express
guidance to ensure the “ultimate” colloquy would “maintain the
even balance of the trial court’s statement to the defendant”
while at the same time providing sufficient information for a
defendant to be adequately informed of his or her right to
testify or not to testify. Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 295, 12 P.3d at
1236 (balanced statement was intended to avoid risk that “by
advising the defendant of his or her right to testify, the court
could influence the defendant to waive his or her right not to
testify”).
In this case Monteil was informed of the right to
remain silent, the right against self-incrimination, and that no
one could force him to testify, however not conveyed was the
critical information that the exercise of the right not to
testify does not permit a fact finder to draw an inference of
guilt from not testifying. Consequently, such an advisory may
have a potential to influence the decision to testify or not
testify.
To address the future risk of a court inadvertently
influencing a defendant’s decision, the court’s pretrial
advisement should provide the “even balanced” statement that is
required in the ultimate colloquy—that a decision not to testify
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may not be used against the defendant in deciding the case.
This will ensure that the testifying defendant is provided with
the same information that is given to the non-testifying
defendant regarding the “circumstance” of not testifying, and
thus, the court will avoid emphasizing one right over the other.
It will also help accomplish one of the primary objectives of
the pretrial advisory, which is to reduce the number of post-
conviction challenges from defendants claiming to have testified
in ignorance of their right not to testify. Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at
297, 12 P.3d at 1238.
Therefore, we hold that in order to more fully protect
the right not to testify under the Hawai#i Constitution, the
trial courts when informing the defendant of the right not to
testify during the pretrial advisement must also advise the
defendant that the exercise of this right may not be used by the
fact finder to decide the case. This requirement will be
effective in trials beginning after the date of this opinion.
The inclusion of this information in the pretrial advisement
will enhance the even balance of the trial court’s statement to
defendants regarding the right to testify or the right not to
testify. See Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 295, 12 P.3d at 1236.
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4.
Although the court’s advisement did not inform Monteil
that his silence could not be used against him if he did not
testify, “there is nothing to indicate his decision to testify
was anything other than voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently made.” Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 296-97, 12 P.3d at
1237-38. “Thus, there can be no [finding of] error premised on
[the] lack of judicial advice” in this case.12 Id. at 296, 12
P.3d at 1237.
VI. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the March 3, 2014 Judgment on
Appeal of the ICA, but for the reasons set forth in this
opinion.
Peter Van Name Esser and /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
Robert D.S. Kim
for petitioner /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Mitchell D. Roth and /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
Jason R. Kwiat
for respondent /s/ Richard W. Pollack
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
12
As stated in Lewis, “Because we view this prior-to-trial
advisement as incidental to the ‘ultimate colloquy,’ any claim of prejudice
resulting from the failure of the trial court to give it must meet the same
‘actual[ ] prejudice[]’ standard applied to violations of the colloquy
requirement.” 94 Hawaiʻi at 297, 12 P.3d at 1238 (alterations in original)
(quoting Tachibana, 79 Hawai#i at 237, 900 P.2d at 1304).
32