Eckard Brandes, Inc. v. Department of Labor and Industrial Relations.

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
20-APR-2020
08:03 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---oOo---
________________________________________________________________
ECKARD BRANDES, INC.,
Respondent/Appellant-Appellee,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
Respondent/Appellee-Appellee,
and
SCOTT FOYT,
Petitioner/Intervenor-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CIVIL NO. 18-1-0011)
APRIL 20, 2020
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.
I. Introduction
The Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) dismissed this
appeal on the grounds that appellate jurisdiction was lacking.
The ICA ruled that the Circuit Court of the First Circuit
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(“circuit court”)1 abused its discretion in finding the existence
of “excusable neglect” under Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate Procedure
(“HRAP”) Rule 4(a)(4)(B) (2016) to allow an extension of time to
file a notice of appeal.
We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
in determining that “excusable neglect” existed to grant
Petitioner Scott Foyt’s (“Foyt”) motion for extension of time to
file a notice of appeal, and we therefore vacate the ICA’s May
21, 2019 “Order Dismissing Appellate Court Case Number CAAP-19-
0000095 for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction” and remand this case
to the ICA to address the merits of the appeal. Further, in
Enos v. Pac. Transfer & Warehouse, 80 Hawaiʻi 345, 910 P.2d 116(1996), this court adopted definitions of “good cause” as
factors beyond the movant’s control and “excusable neglect” as
factors within the movant’s control for purposes of former HRAP
Rule 4(a)(5). Former HRAP Rule 4(a)(5), however, allowed for
extensions based on either standard, whether filed within the
first thirty or next thirty days. The division of HRAP Rule
4(a)(5) into two subsections reflected in the current HRAP Rule
4(a)(4)(A) and (B), which now allow for extensions within the
first thirty days only if “good cause” exists or within the next
1 The Honorable James K. Kawashima presided.
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thirty days only if “excusable neglect” exists, has resulted in
dismissals of appeals in contravention of “the policy of
law . . . favor[ing] dispositions of litigation on the merits.”
Shasteen, Inc. v. Hilton Hawaiian Village Joint Venture, 79
Hawaiʻi 103, 107, 899 P.2d 386, 390 (1995). We therefore clarify
the terms.
II. Background
A. Factual Summary
Eckard Brandes, Inc. (“Eckard Brandes”) is a contractor
that performs sewer pipe cleaning, inspection, and repair work,
including on governmental public works projects. Eckard Brandes
employees are paid at different rates for work performed based
on differing job classifications. Foyt was employed by Eckard
Brandes from May 2000 to July 2013. During his employment, Foyt
operated different kinds of trucks on various jobs, including
projects for the State of Hawaiʻi (“State”) and the City and
County of Honolulu (“City”). Chapter 104 of the Hawaiʻi Revised
Statutes (“HRS”) includes provisions governing wage requirements
for certain kinds of work performed for the State and City.
B. Procedural Background
1. Notice of Violation
In 2013, Foyt filed a complaint disputing his wages on
various State and/or City jobs. After an investigation
conducted by the Wage Standards Division of the Department of
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Labor and Industrial Relations (“DLIR”), a May 4, 2017 Notice of
Violation was sent to Eckard Brandes. The notice alleged
violations of HRS Chapter 104,2 stating in relevant part as
follows:
Prevailing Wages
Section 104-2(b), HRS, requires that every laborer or mechanic
performing work on the job site for the construction of any
public work project shall be paid no less than prevailing wages.
WSD [Wage Standard Division]’s investigation found that an
employee was classified as a Laborer I for some hours and Laborer
II for other hours, but the employee should have been classified
as a Truck Driver Tandem Dump Truck, over 8 cu. yds.; Water Truck
(over 2,000 gallons) for all hours.
Overtime
Section 104-2(c), HRS, requires the payment of overtime on
Saturday, Sunday, a legal State holiday, or for time worked
in excess of eight hours on any other day. WSD found that
an employee was paid the straight-time rate for hours
exceeding eight hours per day.
Certified Payrolls and Recordkeeping
Section 104-3(a), HRS, requires a certified copy of all
payrolls to be submitted weekly to the contracting agency.
The certification shall affirm that the payrolls are
2 HRS § 104-23 (2012 & Supp. 2016) provides:
§ 104-23 Notification of violation. (a) When the
department, either as a result of a report by a contracting
agency or as a result of the department’s own
investigation, finds that a violation of this chapter or of
the terms of the contract subject to this chapter has been
committed, the department shall issue a notification of
violation to the contractor or subcontractor involved.
(b) A notification of violation shall be final and
conclusive unless within twenty days after a copy has been
sent to the contractor, the contractor files a written
notice of appeal with the director.
(c) A hearing on the written notice of appeal shall
be held by a hearings officer appointed by the director in
conformance with chapter 91.
Hearings on appeal shall be held within sixty days of
the notice of appeal and a decision shall be rendered by
the hearings officer within sixty days after the conclusion
of the hearing, stating the findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The hearings officer may extend the
due date for decision for good cause; provided that all
parties agree.
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correct and complete, that the wage rates are not less than
the applicable rates contained in the Wage Rate Schedule,
and that the classifications conform with the work the
laborer or mechanic performed. WSD found the following:
The employee who was classified as a Laborer I for
some hours and Laborer II for other hours, should
have been classified as a Truck Driver Tandem Dump
Truck, over 8 cu.yds.; Water Truck (over 2,000
gallons).
The employer classified employees as “Laborer”,
rather than “Laborer I” or “Laborer II”.
Pursuant to Section 104-23(b), HRS, this Notification
of Violation may be appealed by filing a written notice of
appeal with the Director within twenty (20) days after the
date of this notification.
The balance due on the Wage and Penalty Assessment form
should be paid by May 24, 2017, to avoid further legal
action, including immediate suspension from performing work
on any State or county public works project. . . .
Eckard Brandes was assessed back wages due and a 10% penalty,
for a total assessment of $60,131.12.
2. Request for Hearing
On May 16, 2017, Eckard Brandes filed an appeal of the
Notice of Violation with the Director of the DLIR pursuant to
HRS § 104-23(b) and requested a hearing pursuant to HRS § 104-
23(c).3 The Notice of Hearing listed Eckard Brandes as the
appellant and the DLIR as the appellee. Foyt was a witness at
the hearing, but he was not named as a party. The hearing was
held on August 11 and 14, 2017. On December 6, 2017, a hearing
officer issued a detailed Decision and Order affirming the
Notice of Violation.
3 See supra, note 2.
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3. Appeal to the Circuit Court
On January 4, 2018, Eckard Brandes filed a Notice of Agency
Appeal. Again, the only parties were Eckard Brandes as
appellant and DLIR as appellee. Foyt was not listed on the
certificate of service of the notice of agency appeal.
Following briefing, another circuit court judge4 held oral
argument, and on December 19, 2018, issued an order reversing
the Decision and Order, concluding that a July 2005 letter from
a former DLIR Director3 established that sewer line cleaning work
was not subject to HRS chapter 104.
4 The Honorable Keith K. Hiraoka presided over the actual agency appeal.
3 The July 26, 2005 letter stated:
This letter is to inform you that you will not
receive a survey this year because the classification
of Sewer Line Tele-Repairer will be discontinued as
of the next Wage Rate Schedule, Bulletin Number 461,
which will be issued on September 2005.
Input from the industry brought to our attention the
distinction between inspection and cleaning versus
repair. The inspection and cleaning function is not
considered construction work as covered under Chapter
104, HRS, therefore it will not be included in the
prevailing wage rate schedule. The repair work is
same work that would be classified as Laborer I, a
classification that already exists.
Additionally, under Section 104-2(b), HRS, the law
states that “prevailing wages shall not be less than
the wages payable under federal law to corresponding
classes.” The U.S. Department of Labor does not
include a separate classification for sewer line
telerepairer work for construction projects covered
by the federal Davis-Bacon Act. Work of that nature
is classified as Laborer I. Thus, maintaining the
rate classification of Sewer Line Tele-Repairer
creates a prevailing wage that is less than the wages
payable under federal law to corresponding classes,
and is contrary to the law.
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The circuit court’s order stated:
The Court finds that Appellee was bound by the July 2005
letter, from then Director Nelson Befitel, that the work of
sewer line cleaning was not subject to Chapter 104 HRS and
therefore, the work performed by the Claimant at the time,
was not subject to Chapter 104 HRS.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Decision and Order of the Department of Labor and
Industrial Relations, Wage Standards Division, Hearings
Branch, dated December 6, 2017, is reversed.
Pursuant to Rule 72(k) of the Hawaii Rules of Civil
Procedure, the clerk of the Court shall notify the
governmental official or body concerned of the disposition
of this appeal. The Court further orders that the agency
take action consistent with the Court’s ruling.
(Emphasis in the original.) Final judgment was entered the same
day.
4. Foyt’s Motion to Intervene
More than one month after the December 19, 2018 final
judgment, on January 25, 2019, Foyt, through counsel, filed two
motions in the circuit court case. The first was a motion for
leave to intervene for the sole purpose of appealing the
December 19, 2018 final judgment. The second was a motion to
extend the time to file a notice of appeal from the December 19,
2018 final judgment. At the time these motions were filed, the
thirty-day period under HRAP Rule 4(a) to file an appeal from
the December 19, 2018 judgment had already expired.4
4 HRAP Rule 4(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Appeals in civil cases.
(1) Time and place of filing. When a civil appeal is
permitted by law, the notice of appeal shall be filed
(continued. . .)
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In filings regarding these motions, counsel for Foyt
represented Foyt had not received a copy of the final judgment
until after Christmas of 2018, had then spent several weeks
searching for an attorney, and that counsel had been officially
retained on January 17, 2019. He represented that the day
before he had been retained, he had spoken with counsel for
DLIR, who informed him that DLIR would not be appealing the
circuit court’s final judgment and that DLIR would not be
willing to file a motion to extend time to file a notice of
appeal, but would stipulate to an extension of time for Foyt to
appeal. Counsel for Foyt also declared he had not heard back
from Eckard Brandes’ counsel as to whether the company would
also be willing to so stipulate. Counsel also pointed out that
Foyt was directly affected by the final judgment disallowing the
additional wages that DLIR had ordered Eckard Brandes to pay to
him.
By orders entered on February 13, 2019, the circuit court
granted both motions. The order granting Foyt’s motion to
extend the time to file a notice of appeal from the December 19,
2018 judgment for an additional thirty days stated that the
within 30 days after entry of the judgment or appealable
order.
. . . .
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circuit court’s decision was based on counsel’s arguments and
“excusable neglect.”
5. Appeal to the ICA
Two days later, on February 15, 2019, Foyt filed a notice
of appeal from the circuit court’s December 19, 2018 final
judgment to the ICA. After the record on appeal was filed and
before briefing, Foyt’s counsel filed a Jurisdictional Statement
on April 22, 2019, asserting appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
HRAP Rule 4. On April 25, 2019, Eckard Brandes filed a
Statement Contesting Jurisdiction, asserting that Foyt failed to
establish excusable neglect.
On May 21, 2019, the ICA filed an order dismissing the
appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, holding the appeal
untimely under HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) because the record did not
establish excusable neglect to extend the time to file the
notice of appeal. The ICA noted that the initial thirty-day
time period under HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) for filing a notice of
appeal from the December 19, 2018 final judgment was Friday,
January 18, 2019. According to the ICA, because counsel for
Foyt had admitted to speaking with counsel for DLIR on January
16, 2019, two days before the deadline, and because “Foyt had an
opportunity to intervene and pursue an appeal before January 18,
2019[,]” the record did not support a finding of “excusable
neglect.”
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6. Certiorari Application
On July 19, 2019, Foyt timely4 filed an application for writ
of certiorari to review the ICA’s May 21, 2019 dismissal order.
Foyt contends that the ICA erred in concluding that excusable
neglect had not been shown and by not reaching the merits of the
appeal. In opposition, Eckard Brandes argues that Foyt does not
discuss the “excusable neglect standard or this court’s decision
in Enos, in which this court stated “the character of the
neglect, rather than the consequences, should be determinative
of whether it is ‘excusable.’” 80 Hawaiʻi at 355, 910 P.2d at
126. Eckard Brandes further quotes this portion of that
opinion:
Thus, when considering a motion brought pursuant to HRAP
Rule 4(a)(5), the trial court must first determine the
cause of the delay in filing the notice of appeal. If that
cause is beyond the movant’s control, the motion may be
granted upon a showing of “good cause.” If the cause of
the delay is some mistake or inadvertence within the
control of the movant, the motion may be granted only upon
a showing of “excusable neglect.”
Enos, 80 Hawaiʻi at 352, 910 P.2d at 123.
III. Standards of Review
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
“The existence of [appellate] jurisdiction is a question of
law that we review de novo under the right/wrong standard.
Construction of rules promulgated by this court is also reviewed
4 On June 6, 2019, Foyt timely requested and received an additional
thirty days to file the application for writ of certiorari. See HRAP Rule
40.1(a)(1) and (a)(3) (2017).
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de novo.” State v. Nilsawit, 139 Hawaiʻi 86, 90, 384 P.3d 862,
866 (2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
B. Finding of Excusable Neglect
A trial court’s order granting a motion to extend time for
filing a notice of appeal on the grounds of excusable neglect is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hall v. Hall, 95 Hawaiʻi
318, 319, 22 P.3d 965, 965-66 (2001) (overruling in part Hall v.
Hall, 96 Hawaiʻi 105, 111, 26 P.3d 594, 600 (App. 2001).
IV. Analysis
A. Appellate jurisdiction exists because the circuit court did
not err in determining that “excusable neglect” existed to
grant the extension
The ICA dismissed Foyt’s appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction on the grounds that there was no “excusable
neglect” under HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(B) to authorize the circuit
court to grant Foyt’s requested thirty-day extension to file his
notice of appeal because Foyt had an opportunity to intervene
and pursue an appeal before January 18, 2019.
Generally, “[w]hen a civil appeal is permitted by law, the
notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of
the judgment or appealable order.” HRAP Rule 4(a)(1). A party,
however, may obtain an extension of time, after the initial
thirty-day appeal deadline to file a notice of appeal has
expired, upon the showing of “excusable neglect.” HRAP Rule
4(a)(4)(B). HRAP Rule 4(a)(4) (2016) provides as follows:
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(4) Extensions of time to file the notice of appeal.
(A) Requests for extensions of time before expiration
of the prescribed time. The court or agency appealed from,
upon a showing of good cause, may extend the time for
filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed within the time
prescribed by subsections (a)(1) through (a)(3) of this
Rule. However, no such extension shall exceed 30 days past
such prescribed time. An extension motion that is filed
before the expiration of the prescribed time may be ex
parte unless the court or agency otherwise requires.
(B) Requests for extensions of time after expiration
of the prescribed time. The court or agency appealed from,
upon a showing of excusable neglect, may extend the time
for filing the notice of appeal upon motion filed not later
than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by
subsections (a)(1) through (a)(3) of this Rule. However,
no such extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed
time. Notice of an extension motion filed after the
expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the
other parties in accordance with the rules of the court or
agency appealed from.
Thus, based on our current rule, requests for extensions of time
to file a notice of appeal before expiration of the initial
thirty days are governed by the “good cause” standard of HRAP
Rule 4(a)(4)(A), while requests made after the expiration of the
initial thirty days are generally governed by the “excusable
neglect” standard of HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(B).
The circuit court and the ICA analyzed the timeliness of
Foyt’s appeal in this case based on the “excusable neglect”
standard of HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(B), as more than thirty days had
elapsed after the entry of the circuit court’s final judgment.
The ICA and Eckard Brandes cite to this court’s opinion in
Enos, 80 Hawaiʻi 345, 910 P.2d 116, for the definition of
“excusable neglect” as a cause beyond the movant’s control.
Enos governed extensions of time to file notices of appeal under
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a different version of HRAP Rule 4(a), which was former HRAP
Rule 4(a)(5):
The court or agency appealed from, upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for
filing a notice of appeal upon motion actually filed not
later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by subsections (a)(1) through (a)(4) of
this Rule 4. Any such motion which is filed before
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless
the court otherwise requires. Notice of any such motion
which is filed after expiration of the prescribed time
shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the
rules of the court or agency appealed from. No such
extension shall exceed 30 days past such prescribed time or
10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the
motion, whichever occurs later.
Enos noted that HRAP Rule 4(a)(5) was “patterned after
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) Rule 4(a)(5),
which, until its amendment in 1979, allowed extension of time
only upon a showing of [the stricter] excusable neglect.” Enos,
80 Hawaiʻi at 350, 10 P.2d at 121. Although a majority of
federal Circuit Courts of Appeal had held the “good cause”
standard applicable only when a motion to extend was filed
during the initial thirty-day period, we adopted the approach of
the First Circuit Court of Appeals consistent with the plain
language of the rule, and we allowed the “good cause” standard
to apply to requests for extensions whether they were filed
within the initial thirty days or within the next thirty days.
Enos, 80 Hawaiʻi at 350, 351, 910 P.2d at 121, 122.
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After holding both standards applicable whether a motion
was filed during the initial thirty days or the next thirty
days, we then also held:
when considering a motion brought pursuant to HRAP Rule
4(a)(5), the trial court must first determine the cause of
the delay in filing the notice of appeal. If that cause is
beyond the movant’s control, the motion may be granted upon
a showing of “good cause.” If the cause of the delay is
some mistake or inadvertence within the control of the
movant, the motion may be granted only upon a showing of
“excusable neglect.”
Enos, 80 Hawaiʻi at 352, 910 P.2d at 123. Thus, we also held in
Enos that if the cause of the delay was within the control of
the movant, a motion to extend could only be granted upon a
showing of “excusable neglect.”
Thus, pursuant to Enos, a motion for extension filed in the
second thirty days could only be granted if there was “neglect”
that was “excusable.” In other words, Enos used a two-part
test: (1) Was there neglect? And if so, (2) Was the neglect
excusable? Enos appears to have used “within the movant’s
control” as shorthand for whether or not there was neglect, not
for whether or not existing neglect was excusable. With respect
to determining whether existing “neglect” could be deemed
“excusable,” Enos expressly adopted the equitable standard set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Pioneer, and stated,
“reasons for failure to comply with a court-ordered deadline
range from acts of God to a party’s choice to flout the deadline
and that ‘excusable neglect’ is not restricted to those
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circumstances beyond a party’s control.” 80 Hawaiʻi at 352, 910
P.2d at 123 (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc.
Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). In other words, Enos
clearly indicated that “neglect” could be “excusable” even if
within a party’s control.
Further addressing what would constitute “excusable
neglect” “within the control of the movant,” we also held that
“only plausible misconstruction, but not mere ignorance, of the
law or rules rises to the level of excusable neglect.” Enos, 80
Hawaiʻi at 353, 910 P.2d at 124. In other words, Enos stated
that the “neglectful” missing of an appeal deadline based on
“plausible misconstruction” of law or rules could be
“excusable.” Under the specific circumstances of that case,
however, we held that “excusable neglect” was not demonstrated
by counsel’s failure to read and comply with the plain language
of the applicable procedural rules, and that the trial court
therefore abused its discretion in granting a motion to extend
time to file a notice of appeal. Enos, 80 Hawaiʻi at 355, 910
P.2d at 126. Then in Hall, also cited to by the ICA, we ruled
that an attorney’s confusion or misunderstanding regarding the
rule governing extension of time to file a notice of appeal did
not constitute “excusable neglect.” 95 Hawaiʻi at 319, 22 P.3d
at 966.
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Foyt’s appeal was analyzed by the ICA for the existence of
“excusable neglect.” Although the circuit court found
“excusable neglect” to exist, applying Enos and Hall, the ICA
ruled that because counsel for Foyt had spoken to counsel for
Eckard Brandes two days before the January 18, 2019 initial
thirty-day deadline, and because Foyt presumably also could have
moved to intervene earlier in the proceedings, the circuit court
abused its discretion in granting an extension. The Enos and
Hall cases, however, are distinguishable from the situation at
hand, and the ICA misconstrued our holding in Enos.
Fundamentally, “the determination [of whether a party has shown
‘excusable neglect’] is at bottom an equitable one, taking
account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s
omission.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. Foyt was not a “party”
until his motion to intervene was granted after it was filed by
his newly retained attorney.5 In addition, according to Foyt’s
submissions to the circuit court, he did not receive a copy of
the December 19, 2018 circuit court final judgment until after
Christmas of 2018, then spent several weeks searching for an
attorney. This was during the holiday period. Although his
prospective counsel spoke to counsel for Eckard Brandes two days
before the deadline, Foyt was not able to officially retain
5 It appears that under HRS Chapter 91 and HRCP Rule 72, Foyt could have
been included as a party. Because this issue has not been briefed, we do not
address it further at this time.
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counsel until January 17, 2019, one day before the initial
thirty-day appeal filing deadline. Counsel then filed motions
to intervene and extend eight days later, and they were decided
and granted by February 13, 2019. Foyt’s notice of appeal to
the ICA was filed two days later, before the additional thirty-
day extended deadline had expired.
Thus, in this case, Foyt was not even a “party” when he
received the circuit court’s final judgment. His motion to
intervene had to first be granted by the circuit court before he
could file a notice of appeal. Also, there was no ignorance,
misreading, confusion, or misunderstanding of the law. After
being retained the day before the initial thirty-day deadline
expired, counsel for Foyt prepared a motion to intervene as well
as a motion for extension under HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(B). To the
extent these circumstances were within Foyt’s control,
“excusable neglect” existed, and the circuit court did not abuse
its discretion in granting the motion for extension of time
based on HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(B). The ICA therefore erred in
dismissing Foyt’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
B. Changed circumstances require us to clarify “good cause”
and “excusable neglect”
Our examination of this certiorari proceeding and HRAP Rule
4(a)(4) causes us to clarify the Enos interpretations of “good
cause” and “excusable neglect.” When Enos was decided, all
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motions to extend time for filing a notice of appeal were
governed by one subsection of HRAP Rule 4(a), the HRAP Rule
4(a)(5) quoted above. At that time, the language of HRAP Rule
4(a)(5) allowed for extensions of time to file notices of appeal
based on “good cause” or “excusable neglect,” whether or not a
motion was filed within the first thirty days or within the next
thirty days.
In Enos, we held that pursuant to the language of the then-
existing HRAP Rule 4(a)(5), the “good cause” standard applied
even if a motion to extend was not filed within the second
thirty days. 80 Hawaiʻi at 350, 351, 910 P.2d at 121, 122. We
also held in Enos, however, that the “good cause” standard only
applied if the reason for the extension was beyond the movant’s
control. 80 Hawaiʻi at 352, 910 P.2d at 123.6 We conversely
held that if a reason for requesting an extension was within the
movant’s control, the motion could only be granted upon a
showing of “excusable neglect.” Id. In doing so, however, Enos
expressly adopted the equitable standard set forth by the Court
in Pioneer, indicating that the “neglectful” missing of an
appeal deadline based on “plausible misconstruction” of law or
6 If HRAP Rule 4(a)(5) still controlled, Foyt’s motion could therefore
have been evaluated under the “good cause” standard for factors not within
Foyt’s control, obviating the need to analyze this case under the “excusable
neglect” standard for factors within Foyt’s control, which the ICA ruled did
not exist.
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rules could be “excusable.” We ruled that the facts of that
case did not support a finding of “excusable neglect.”
After Enos, effective January 1, 2000, HRAP Rule 4(a) was
amended, and the former HRAP Rule 4(a)(5) was split into the
structure in which it now appears, with Rule 4(a)(4)(A)
governing extensions of time within the first thirty days,
requiring “good cause,” and Rule 4(a)(4)(B) governing extensions
of time within the next thirty days, requiring “excusable
neglect.” Hall, 95 Hawaiʻi at 319 n.1, 22 P.3d 965 at n.1.7
Thus, from that time, according to the plain language of HRAP
Rule 4(a)(4), extension requests made within the first thirty
days are governed by the “good cause” standard of subsection (A)
7 HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)&(5) (eff. 2000), provided the following:
(4) Extensions of Time to File the Notice of Appeal.
(A) Requests for Extensions of Time Before Expiration of
the Prescribed Time. The court or agency appealed from,
upon a showing of good cause, may extend the time for
filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed within the time
prescribed by subsections (a)(1) through (a)(3) of this
rule. However, no such extension shall exceed 30 days past
such prescribed time. An extension motion that is filed
before the expiration of the prescribed time may be ex
parte unless the court or agency otherwise requires.
(B) Requests for Extensions of Time After Expiration of
the Prescribed Time. The court or agency appeal[ed] from,
upon a showing of excusable neglect, may extend the time
for filing the notice of appeal upon motion filed not later
than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by
subsections (a)(1) through (a)(3) of this rule. However,
no such extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed
time. Notice of an extension motion filed after the
expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the
other parties in accordance with the rules of the court or
agency appealed from.
(Emphases added.)
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while requests made within the next thirty days are governed by
the “excusable neglect” standard of subsection (B).
Yet, as noted, before the split of HRAP Rule 4(a)(5) into
Rule 4(a)(A) and (B), Enos had expanded the more lenient “good
cause” standard to extension requests made in the second thirty
days. Since the split into two subsections, however, a motion
to extend filed after expiration of the first thirty days and
within thirty days thereafter can only be granted based on
“excusable neglect,” which, by definition, must be a reason
within the movant’s control. Therefore, if the reason for
seeking an extension is not within the movant’s control, based
on our interpretation of “excusable neglect” in Enos, an
extension is not available. For example, if a self-represented
litigant is hospitalized or is otherwise incapacitated on the
thirtieth day, just before a notice of appeal can be filed that
day as planned, and the litigant is not able to file a motion to
extend until after the thirtieth day, because the reason for
seeking the extension was not within the litigant’s control,
“excusable neglect” would not exist. And the “good cause”
standard of HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(A), for reasons not within the
litigant’s control, although clearly met, would not apply
because the motion was filed after expiration of the first
thirty days.
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Conversely, Enos held that the “good cause” standard, now
applicable to motions filed within the first thirty days,
applies only if the reason for requesting an extension is beyond
the movant’s control. Thus, if the reason for seeking an
extension is within the movant’s control, an extension is not
available if sought within the first thirty days. For example,
if the professional or personal schedule of a party or a party’s
attorney makes it difficult to decide whether to file a notice
of appeal by the end of the initial thirty days, an extension
would not be available, as making such a decision is within the
party’s control. The same would hold true if a party or party’s
attorney had a family trip, an elective surgery, or other
professional or family circumstance that made the decision on
whether to file an appeal difficult to make within the first
thirty days.8
The definitions of “good cause” and “excusable neglect” we
adopted in Enos for purposes of the then-existing HRAP Rule
4(a)(5), which construed a rule that allowed application of
either standard whether an extension was sought within the first
thirty days or the next thirty days, could therefore be
8 The party or party’s attorney could file a motion under HRAP Rule
4(a)(4)(B) asserting “excusable neglect” for a reason within the party’s
control after expiration of the first thirty days, but would be taking the
risk it would be denied. Yet, they would not meet the Enos definition of
“good cause” if they requested an extension within the first thirty days.
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misapplied to prevent those with good reasons to qualify for
extensions. In addition, as in this case, and especially after
the 2000 division of HRAP 4(a)(5) into two subsections, much
litigation has ensued regarding whether “good cause” or
“excusable neglect” exists.9
Therefore, the splitting of the former HRAP Rule 4(a)(5)
into subsections allowing extensions based only on “good cause”
within the first thirty days and “excusable neglect” within the
next thirty days10 has created possible unintended consequences.
9 See, e.g., Cabral v. State, 127 Hawaiʻi 175, 277 P.3d 269 (2012); Doe
v. Doe, 98 Hawaiʻi 144, 44 P.3d 1085 (2002); In re Doe, No 26805 (Haw. Dec.
9, 2004) (order); Jones v. Owners and Occupants of Adjoining Lands, No.
25872, (Haw. Apr. 23, 2004) (order); Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. 1974 Ltd.
P’ship, No. 26500 (Haw. Aug. 12, 2004); GE Capital Hawaiʻi, Inc. v.
Balicanta, No. 23624 (Haw. May 28, 2004) (SDO); Pitre v. Admin. Dir. of
Court, No. 26316 (Haw. Apr. 7, 2004) (order); Ox Koko Marina, Inc. v. Pac.
Thomas Corp., No. 25447 (Haw. Apr. 4, 2003) (order); Chon v. Ass’n of
Apartment Owners of Lele Pono, Inc., No. 25185 (Haw. Sept. 30, 2002) (order);
McCormick v. Keohokalole, No. 23387 (Haw. Aug. 22, 2002) (mem.); King v.
Elkayam, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX (App. July 13, 2016) (order); Ke Kailani Dev., LLC
v. Ke Kailani Partners LLC, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX (App. Mar. 30, 2016) (order);
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salvacion, No. 30594 (App. Apr. 26, 2011) (mem.);
Bolomet v. RLI Ins. Co., No. 29798 (App. Mar. 15, 2010) (order); Whittaker v.
Fransen, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX & XX-XXXXXXX (App. Sept. 25, 2008) (SDO); Porter v.
Porter, No. 28066 (App. Oct. 13, 2006) (order).
10 This split has not happened in the federal rule. As noted, in Enos,
this court cited to federal cases construing “good cause” and “excusable
neglect” for purposes of FRAP Rule 4(a)(5) in fashioning definitions of these
terms. FRAP Rule 4(a)(5) now provides as quoted below, and as can be seen,
it allows for extensions based on “good cause” or “excusable neglect,”
whether filed within the first thirty or the second thirty days; as did the
HRAP Rule 4(a)(5) construed in Enos, it also continues the option of
obtaining an extension within the first thirty days based on an ex parte
motion:
(5) Motion for Extension of Time.
(A) The district court may extend the time to file a notice
of appeal if:
(i) a party so moves no later than 30 days after the time
prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires; and
(continued. . .)
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The split of HRAP Rule 4(a)(5) into two subsections after Enos
has led to dismissals of appeals, as in this case, in derogation
of “the policy of law . . . favor[ing] dispositions of
litigation on the merits.” Shasteen, 79 Hawaiʻi at 107, 899 P.2d
at 390. The changed circumstances therefore compel us to
clarify the Enos definitions of “good cause” and “excusable
neglect” for purposes of HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(A) and (B).
Recently, in Chen v. Mah, 146 Hawaiʻi 157, 457 P.3d 796(2020), we addressed the “good cause” standard for purposes of a
HRCP Rule 55(c) motion to set aside entry of default. We noted
that in the context of a Hawaiʻi Family Court Rules (“HFCR”) Rule
59(a) motion for a new trial, Doe v. Doe stated:
“Good cause” . . . “depends upon the circumstances of the
individual case, and a finding of its existence lies
largely in the discretion of the officer or court to which
[the] decision is committed.”
(ii) regardless of whether its motion is filed before or
during the 30 days after the time prescribed by this Rule
4(a) expires, that party shows excusable neglect or good
cause.
(B) A motion filed before the expiration of the time
prescribed in Rule 4(a)(1) or (3) may be ex parte unless
the court requires otherwise. If the motion is filed after
the expiration of the prescribed time, notice must be given
to the other parties in accordance with local rules.
(C) No extension under this Rule 4(a)(5) may exceed 30 days
after the prescribed time or 14 days after the date when
the order granting the motion is entered, whichever is
later.
Interestingly, it appears FRAP Rule 4(a)(C) allows the deadline to be
extended beyond the second thirty days for up to an additional fourteen days,
if a motion to extend is granted within the last fourteen days of the second
thirty days.
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Chen, 146 Hawaiʻi at 178, 457 P.3d at 817 (citing Doe v. Doe, 98
Hawaiʻi 144, 154, 44 P.3d 1085, 1095 (2002) (citation omitted,
brackets in original)). We also noted that Doe also referred to
a Black’s Law Dictionary entry, stating that “[t]he term
‘good cause’ has been defined to mean ‘a substantial reason
amounting in law to a legal excuse for failing to perform an act
required by law[.]’” Doe, 98 Hawaiʻi at 154, 44 P.3d at 1095(quoting Good Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)).
Chen, 146 Hawaiʻi at 178, n.22, 457 P.3d at 817, n.22. We
further pointed out that Black’s Law Dictionary now defines
“good cause” as “[a] legally sufficient reason.” Good cause is
often the burden placed on a litigant (usu. by court rule or
order) to show why a request should be granted or an action
excused.” Id. (quoting Good Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019)).
Accordingly, we clarify that “good cause” is “a sufficient
reason, depending upon the circumstances of the individual case,
and that a finding of its existence lies largely in the
discretion of the court.”11
11 In Chen, we ruled that for purposes of HRCP Rule 55(c)), if: (1) the
defendant did not deliberately fail to plead or otherwise defend or engage in
contumacious conduct; or (b) if the defendant did deliberately fail to plead
or otherwise defend or engage in contumacious conduct, there is no actual
prejudice to the plaintiff that cannot be addressed through lesser sanctions,
then “good cause” should exist to set aside an entry of default. Chen, 146
Hawaiʻi at 180, 457 P.3d at 819. We also construed our cases interpreting
HRCP Rule 41(b)(2), which requires “good cause” to set aside a dismissal, as
(continued. . .)
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Likewise, the plain language of the HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(B)
allows for an extension based on “excusable neglect.” As noted
earlier, Enos used a two-part test: (1) Was there neglect? And
if so, (2) Was the neglect excusable? Enos also appears to have
used “within the movant’s control” as shorthand for whether or
not there was neglect, not for whether or not existing neglect
was excusable. Because HRAP Rule 4 has been amended and missing
a deadline now automatically triggers the “excusable neglect”
standard, there is no need for courts to examine whether or not
the reason for missing the deadline was within the movant’s
control.
Accordingly, as indicated by the United States Supreme
Court in Pioneer, 507 U.S. 380, which was cited favorably in
Enos,12 whether “excusable neglect” exists is “at bottom an
equitable” decision; it is necessary to first determine whether
there is “neglect,” and, if so, whether the “neglect” is
holding by implication that “good cause” exists to set aside a dismissal
under HRCP Rule 41(b)(2) if there is no (1) deliberate delay and/or
contumacious conduct; or (2) if deliberate delay or contumacious conduct
exist, there is no actual prejudice that cannot be addressed through lesser
sanctions. Id.12 As further discussed in note 13, infra, Pioneer construed “excusable
neglect” for purposes of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1), which empowered a
bankruptcy court to permit a late filing if the movant’s failure to comply
with an earlier deadline was the result of excusable neglect; the rule did
not contain “good cause” language. Enos, 80 Hawaiʻi at 352 & n.2, 910 P.2d at116 & n.2. Interestingly, we noted that the Court interpreted “excusable
neglect” to include both intervening circumstances beyond a party’s control
and neglect on the part of a party, Enos, 80 Hawaiʻi at 352, 910 P.2d at 116,
but we still adopted definitions differentiating “good cause” and “excusable
neglect” on these bases.
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“excusable.” 507 U.S. at 393-94.13 As also noted, with respect
to determining whether existing “neglect” could be deemed
“excusable,” Enos expressly adopted the equitable standard set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Pioneer, and stated,
“reasons for failure to comply with a court-ordered deadline
range from acts of God to a party’s choice to flout the deadline
and . . . ‘excusable neglect’ is not restricted to those
circumstances beyond a party’s control.” We therefore clarify
that, as indicated in Enos, “excusable neglect” is to be
construed pursuant to its plain language: “neglect” that is
13 As discussed in David N. May, Pioneer’s Paradox: Appellate Rule
4(a)(5) and the Rule Against Excusing Ignorance of Law, 48 Drake L. Rev 677
(2000) (“May”), although Pioneer interpreted “excusable neglect” in the
context of Bankruptcy Rule 9006, the opinion ended up impacting the
definition of “excusable neglect” for purposes of FRAP Rule 4(a)(5). May, at
680-81. The Court’s definition of “excusable neglect” “advanced a new,
‘flexible understanding’ of excusable neglect[,]” and posited that
“[d]eterminations of whether neglect is excusable should involve a broad,
equitable, inquiry.” May, at 1 (citing Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 389). Yet, as
further discussed in the article:
During the same years in which the circuits anointed
Pioneer as their guiding star, a second trend was also
developing. Strangely, this second trend can be viewed as
contrary to Pioneer. Specifically, in the years since
Pioneer, seven different circuits have held that a mistake
or ignorance of plain law cannot be excusable neglect under
Rule 4(a)(5). Notwithstanding judicial acceptance of
Pioneer’s broad equitable inquiry, the circuit courts have
continued to apply the ancient maxim that ignorance or
mistakes of plain law cannot excuse. [sic] The circuit
courts have accepted Pioneer’s prescription that “all
relevant circumstances” must be taken into account; yet,
the same courts continue to hold that “‘[t]he excusable
neglect standard can never be met by a showing of inability
or refusal to read and comprehend the plain language of the
federal rules.”’
May, at 681 (internal footnotes omitted). Despite Enos citing favorably to
Pioneer, that opinion, as well as Hall, favored the stricter interpretation
of “excusable neglect” noted in the quotation above.
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“excusable,” which, “involve[s] a broad, equitable, inquiry”
“taking into account all relevant circumstances surrounding the
party’s omission.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 389, 393-94. As with
“good cause,” the determination of whether “excusable neglect”
exists should lie largely in the discretion of the court.
Our clarifications of “good cause” and “excusable neglect”
should reduce litigation over whether “good cause” or “excusable
neglect” exists for purposes of HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(A) and (B) and
advance “the policy of law [that] favors dispositions of
litigation on the merits.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we vacate the ICA’s May 21,
2019 “Order Dismissing Appellate Court Case Number CAAP-19-
000095 for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction” and remand this case
to the ICA to address the merits of the appeal.
Shawn A. Luiz /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Richard M. Rand
for respondent /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
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