State v. Bright.

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
03-JUN-2020
07:46 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
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STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JUSTIN K. BRIGHT,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; FC-CR. NO. 16-1-0079)
JUNE 3, 2020
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.
Justin K. Bright was convicted of violation of a
protective order for coming within 100 feet of the complainant
(“the protected party”) while at his place of work. The order
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for protection prohibited Bright from, inter alia, coming within
100 feet of the protected party at a “neutral location.” This
case requires us to determine whether Bright’s place of work was
a “neutral location” under the terms of the order for
protection. We hold that it was not.
The rule of lenity requires any ambiguous terms to be
construed in favor of the defendant. Because “neutral location”
is not defined by the order for protection and reasonable minds
could disagree about its definition, it is ambiguous and
therefore must be interpreted narrowly. We hold that in the
context of this order for protection, “neutral location” means a
place that is unaffiliated with either party. As Bright’s place
of employment was not a neutral location, he did not violate the
order for protection and his conviction must be reversed.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 10, 2015, Bright consented to the entry of
an order for protection that restrained him from having any
contact with the protected party. The relevant terms of the
protective order provided:
B. CONTACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
[1] Respondent is prohibited from contacting the
Petitioner.
[2] Respondent is prohibited from telephoning,
writing or otherwise electronically communicating
(by recorded message, pager, etc.), including
through [a] third party, with the Petitioner and any
children residing with the Petitioner.
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[3] Respondent is prohibited from coming or
passing within 100 yards of any place of employment
or where the Petitioner lives and within 100 feet of
each other at neutral locations. In the event the
parties happen to come upon each other at a neutral
location, the subsequent arriving party shall leave
immediately or stay at least 100 feet from the
other. When the parties happen to come upon each
other at the same time at a neutral location, the
Respondent shall leave immediately or stay at least
100 feet from the Petitioner.
Do not violate this order even if the Petitioner
invites you to be at the place of employment or
where the other lives.
. . . .
[4] Other: Both parties are permitted to use
Kuamoo Road to access their respective residences.
The order does not define the term “neutral location.”
On April 15, 2016, the State of Hawaiʻi (State) charged
Bright with violating an order for protection, pursuant to
Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 586-5.5 1 and 586-11(a) 2 (2018).
1 HRS § 586-5.5 provides in relevant part:
(a) If, after hearing all relevant evidence,
the court finds that the respondent has failed to
show cause why the [temporary restraining order]
should not be continued and that a protective order
is necessary to prevent domestic abuse or a
recurrence of abuse, the court may order that a
protective order be issued for a further fixed
reasonable period as the court deems appropriate.
The protective order may include all orders
stated in the temporary restraining order and may
provide for further relief as the court deems
necessary to prevent domestic abuse or a recurrence
of abuse, including orders establishing temporary
visitation and custody with regard to minor children
of the parties and orders to either or both parties
to participate in domestic violence intervention
services.
2 HRS § 586-11(a) provides: “Whenever an order for protection is
granted pursuant to this chapter, a respondent or person to be restrained who
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The State alleged that on January 26, 2016, Bright encountered
the protected party on the steps of the Fifth Circuit
courthouse, in violation of the order for protection. On
September 12, 2016, the family court held a bench trial. The
following testimony was adduced at trial.
In mid-January 2016, Bright began working as a
documents clerk at the Fifth Circuit courthouse. The protected
party, who was a forensic social worker, had to go to the
courthouse three to four times a week as part of her job. The
Deputy Chief Court Administrator, Alton Amimoto, testified that
Bright’s job required him to start work promptly at 7:45 a.m.,
and that while new employees may have been allowed to park in
the back of the courthouse and enter through the back door to
avoid the public entrance at the front of the building,
“[g]enerally, . . . all new employees park in the front and
enter through the front entrance.”
On the morning of January 26, 2016 – about a week
after Bright started work – at approximately 7:40 a.m., the
protected party and her father were “walking towards the court
building to get in, and as [they] approached before the stairs,
[she] noticed Justin [Bright] walking from the parking lot[.]”
knowingly or intentionally violates the order for protection is guilty of a
misdemeanor.”
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When she reached the top of the stairs, Bright was about 20 feet
away from her. She testified that when Bright was 12–15 feet
away from her, approaching the stairs, “he looked right at me.
He looked at my dad also. We were the only two people up
there.” The protected party and her father entered the
courthouse and went through security. Bright did not speak to
her during the encounter, and he did not follow her into the
courthouse. Instead, he stopped outside the courthouse and
stood at the top of the stairs about 10-12 feet away from the
courthouse doors.
The protected party’s father similarly testified that
Bright came “between 12 and 15 feet” of the protected party. He
agreed that Bright stopped at the top of the steps and did not
enter the courthouse, and explained that instead of following
them, Bright walked over to a short wall or bench and sat down.
Amimoto testified that at around 7:45 a.m., he saw
Bright sitting in the front of the courthouse on a bench about
100 feet from the courthouse doors. When Amimoto approached,
Bright told him that “he [Bright] had a problem.” Bright
“looked sad or unsure,” and explained about the order for
protection, telling Amimoto that “he saw [the protected party]
going into the building so he wasn’t sure what he should do.”
Amimoto then took Bright into the courthouse through the back
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entrance.
Bright testified on his own behalf. He explained that
he didn’t see the protected party until he was 10–12 feet away
from her because he had been on his phone while walking through
the parking lot. He told the court, “I didn’t know she was
there until I – until I saw her and then I kind of panicked
because it was already too late.” When asked why he did not
immediately leave, he testified:
Well, I panicked at that time and I then I kind of
like wasn’t sure what to do because I still had to go
to work and they were there, so I ended up kind of
panicking for a little while and then walking away
and I just stayed outside and was kind of unsure what
to do.
. . . .
I mean, like I still had to go to work. I mean,
being late – because I started working there, you
know, being late on the first couple days isn’t a
good – good thing to do.
Bright did not know that the protected party would be
at the courthouse that day: “I knew that she would eventually
come here, yes. I assumed that I would be here before her
because I’m a Judiciary – I was a Judiciary employee with
different hours.”
At the conclusion of trial, the family court found
Bright guilty of violating the order for protection and
sentenced him to two years of probation. The court discredited
Bright’s testimony that he did not see the protected party until
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he was too close to her because the protected party and her
father were the only other people walking into the courthouse at
the time. Although Bright had argued that the courthouse was
not a “neutral location” because it was Bright’s place of work,
the family court never made an explicit finding whether the
courthouse constituted a “neutral location” under the terms of
the order for protection. However, the parties agree on appeal
that the family court implicitly determined Bright’s place of
employment was a “neutral location” because the family court
held that Bright had two options: “One is he could have remained
at a distance, the hundred feet is what the protective order
said, or he could have left because they were there first.”
Bright appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals
(ICA), arguing that the courthouse was not a “neutral place”
because it was Bright’s place of employment. 3 The State conceded
that “there is more than one reasonable way to interpret” the
term “neutral location,” but argued that if the court found that
“neutral location” did not include Bright’s workplace, only his
office – not the entire building – would have been exempted from
the terms of the protective order.
The ICA affirmed Bright’s conviction in a summary
3 Bright raised several additional points of error to the ICA, but
he raised only the “neutral location” issue in his application for writ of
certiorari.
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disposition order. While the ICA agreed with Bright that “[t]he
outside parameters of the prohibitions contained in the Order
for Protection are less than perfectly clear,” the ICA concluded
that “there was substantial evidence that Bright came within
both 100 feet of the complaining witness at a ‘neutral
location,’ and 100 yards at ‘any place of employment.’ In
either case then, Bright’s stated surprise at encountering the
complaining witness notwithstanding, his action was in violation
of the Order for Protection.”
Bright timely filed an application for writ of
certiorari.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The interpretation or construction of a judgment,
decree, or order ‘presents a question of law for the courts.’”
State v. Guyton, 135 Hawaiʻi 372, 377, 351 P.3d 1138, 1143 (2015)
(quoting Cain v. Cain, 59 Haw. 32, 39, 575 P.2d 468, 474
(1978)). “Questions of law are reviewed under the right/wrong
standard of review.” Id. (citing State v. Higa, 79 Hawaiʻi 1, 3,
897 P.2d 928, 930 (1995)).
III. DISCUSSION
An order for protection must be “clear and
unambiguous” because “fairness and due process dictate that a
court order must be sufficiently particular and definite so as
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to clearly identify the conduct that it prohibits.” Id. at 377–
78, 351 P.3d at 1143–44 (quoting LeMay v. Leander, 92 Hawaiʻi
614, 625, 994 P.2d 546, 557 (2000)). If an order for protection
is ambiguous, under the rule of lenity, it must be “construed in
favor of the defendant.” Id. at 381, 351 P.3d at 1147.
The stay-away provision of the order for protection
against Bright states:
Respondent is prohibited from coming or passing
within 100 yards of any place of employment or
where the Petitioner lives and within 100 feet
of each other at neutral locations. In the
event the parties happen to come upon each
other at a neutral location, the subsequent
arriving party shall leave immediately or stay
at least 100 feet from the other. When the
parties happen to come upon each other at the
same time at a neutral location, the Respondent
shall leave immediately or stay at least 100
feet from the Petitioner.
The order also provides an exception: “Both parties
are permitted to use Kuamoo Road to access their respective
residences.” Thus, the order for protection identifies three
categories of locations: (1) a residence, which includes
Bright’s home as well as the protected party’s, (2) “any place
of employment,” and (3) “neutral locations.” It restrains
Bright from coming within 100 yards of the protected party’s
residence and her place of employment (the 100-yard
prohibition). It also requires him to stay 100 feet away from
her at “neutral locations” (the 100-feet prohibition) – but the
order does not define what constitutes a “neutral location.”
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A. The ICA Erred in Concluding that Regardless of How the
Court Interprets the Phrase “Neutral Location,” Bright
Violated the Order for Protection.
The ICA concluded that even if the 100-feet
prohibition did not apply to Bright’s place of employment, he
still violated the order for protection because he came within
100 yards of the protected party at a place of employment.
According to the ICA, the 100-yard prohibition restrained Bright
from coming within 100 yards of the protected party if the
parties were at any place of employment – including his own.
This misreads the protective order.
The 100-yard prohibition restrains Bright from coming
within 100 yards of two locations – “[1] any place of employment
or [2] where the Petitioner lives” – not within 100 yards of the
protected party at those locations. In other words, Bright
could not go to the protected party’s place of employment, even
if she was not there, because he could not go within 100 yards
of the place. The phrase “any place of employment or where
Petitioner lives,” when read in context, must refer to the
protected party’s place of employment – not Bright’s. If the
term referred to Bright’s place of employment it would create an
absurd result: He would be restrained from coming within 100
yards of his own place of work.
Moreover, Bright could not have been convicted of
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violating the 100-yard prohibition because the State did not
allege he violated that provision of the order for protection
when it filed a Bill of Particulars prior to trial. In the Bill
of Particulars, the State only alleged that Bright came within
100 feet of the protected party, and so that was the only
conduct for which Bright could have been convicted of violating
the order for protection. See State v. Erickson, 60 Haw. 8, 9,
586 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1978) (“After a bill of particulars is
ordered furnished and is filed by the State and until it is
properly amended, the State is limited to proving the
particulars specified in the bill.”).
Thus, the ICA erred in concluding that regardless of
how the language in the order for protection is interpreted,
Bright violated the order. Bright was convicted of being within
100 feet of the protected party. Such conduct would only be a
violation of the order for protection if Bright’s place of
employment – the Fifth Circuit courthouse – is deemed a “neutral
location.”
B. Because the Order for Protection is Ambiguous, It Must be
Construed in Favor of Bright.
Bright argues that the plain meaning of “neutral”
should govern, and “the plain common sense reading of the Order
for Protection is that either party’s place of employment or
place of residence is not a neutral location.” While he
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contends that the order for protection is not ambiguous, he
asserts that even if this court deems the term “neutral
location” to be ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires the term
be strictly construed in favor of Bright.
The State also contends that the order for protection
is not ambiguous, but reaches a different conclusion as to the
meaning of “neutral location”: “Because [Bright’s] place of
employment is not specifically addressed in the Protective
Order, the only reasonable interpretation of the Protective
Order it [sic] that it is a neutral location to which the
default rule applied[.]” 4
If language is “subject to two possible meanings,”
both of which are reasonable, it is ambiguous. State v.
Fukusaku, 85 Hawaiʻi 462, 491, 946 P.2d 32, 61 (1997); see also
State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawaiʻi 8, 19, 904 P.2d 893, 904
(1995)(“When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or
indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a
statute, an ambiguity exists.” (quoting Mehau v. Reed, 76 Hawaiʻi
101, 109, 869 P.2d 1320, 1328 (1994)) (alteration omitted)).
Here, the 100-feet provision of the order for
protection is ambiguous. Specifically, it is unclear whether a
4 However, as noted above, in its Answering Brief to the ICA, the
State conceded that “there is more than one reasonable way to interpret
‘neutral location[.]’”
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“neutral location” refers to: (1) all locations that are not the
protected party’s residence or place of employment, as the State
now argues, or (2) locations that are unaffiliated with either
party, as Bright argues. 5 Contrary to both parties’ assertions,
either interpretation could be reasonable. In the face of an
ambiguity, we turn to traditional canons of construction to
guide our interpretation.
In State v. Guyton, we explained that if an order for
protection is ambiguous, in accordance with the rule of lenity
“its language should be construed in favor of the defendant.”
135 Hawaiʻi at 381, 351 P.3d at 1147. In Guyton, the defendant
was convicted of violating a protective order that restrained
him from entering the protected party’s “residence, including
yard” which the State had interpreted as including the protected
party’s 1,000-acre macadamia nut farm and conservation land.
This court held that the protective order needed to be “clear
and unambiguous,” and that “residence, including yard” should be
5 Other form orders for protection have approached general stay-
away provisions differently, suggesting that the language used here may be
the exception, not the rule. See, e.g., State v. Valenzona, 92 Hawaiʻi 449,
450, 992 P.2d 718, 719 (App. 1999) (prohibiting “visiting and/or
remaining . . . within 100 feet of the Plaintiff at all other (neutral)
locations”). For example, the Hawaiʻi Family Court of the First Circuit
Temporary Restraining Order form specifies, “Do not approach or come within
100 feet of the Subject(s).” Temporary Restraining Order, Family Court Form
1F-P-756, https://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/1FP/1FP756.pdf (last visited
March 2, 2020) (bold in original); see also Temporary Restraining Order,
Family Court Form 3F-P-303, https://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/form/hawaii/
3FP303.pdf (last visited March 2, 2020).
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given its ordinary meaning, which did not encompass the
protected party’s entire 1,000-acre property. Guyton, 135
Hawaiʻi at 377-78, 351 P.3d at 1143-44. We noted that even if
the terms were ambiguous, under the rule of lenity, the “plain
and popularly understood meaning” had to control. Id. at 381,
351 P.3d at 1147. Here, we apply the rule in Guyton to hold
that “neutral location” should be given its ordinary meaning.
The State argues that Guyton is inapplicable because
the defendant in that case did “not violate the spirit of a
protective order, which typically prohibits in-person contact
within 100 yards or 100 feet.” Since Bright came within 100
feet of the protected party, the State contends that his actions
“violate[d] both the terms and the spirit of the Protective
Order.”
We disagree with the State’s interpretation of Guyton.
At no point did we consider whether the defendant in Guyton
violated the “spirit” of the protective order – the only
question was whether he violated the terms of the order, as
interpreted by their plain meaning and in accordance with the
rule of lenity. Id. at 381, 351 P.3d at 1147. Even if we were
to assume that the facts of this case demonstrate Bright
violated the spirit of the order for protection, the spirit of
the order cannot override its terms. And, for the reasons
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explained below, Bright did not violate the terms of the order
for protection.
C. In Accordance with the Rule of Lenity, a “Neutral Location”
is a Place that is Unaffiliated with Either Party.
The rule of lenity requires us to construe an
ambiguous court order in favor of the defendant and “adopt a
less expansive meaning.” State v. Woodfall, 120 Hawaiʻi 387,
396, 206 P.3d 841, 850 (2009). Here, the narrowest
interpretation of “neutral location” is also the term’s plain
and popularly understood meaning. See Guyton, 135 Hawaiʻi at
381, 351 P.3d at 1147.
To ascertain a word’s plain meaning, we “may resort to
legal or other well accepted dictionaries[.]” State v. Pali,
129 Hawaiʻi 363, 370, 300 P.3d 1022, 1029 (2013) (quoting State
v. Kikuta, 125 Hawaiʻi 78, 96, 253 P.3d 639, 658 (2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Guyton, 135 Hawaiʻi
at 378, 351 P.3d at 1144 (using Oxford Dictionaries and the
Merriam-Webster Dictionary to ascertain the plain meaning of
“residence”). Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines neutral as
“not engaged on either side.” Neutral (adj.), Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines “neutral” as
“[n]ot belonging to, associated with, or favoring any party or
side,” and “[b]elonging to, or falling under, neither of two
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specified, implied, or usual categories; occupying a middle
position with regard to two extremes.” 6 Neutral (adj.), Oxford
English Dictionary Third Ed. (Sept. 2003) (emphasis added). The
common thread between these definitions is that something is
neutral if it is unaffiliated with either side of a dispute.
Thus, the “plain and popularly understood meaning” of “neutral
location” in this context means a place that is unaffiliated
with either of the parties. Therefore, locations affiliated
with Bright – such as his place of employment – are not neutral
locations.
Our interpretation is consistent with the other
provisions of the order for protection. Locations affiliated
with the protected party – her residence and place of employment
– are clearly not considered neutral locations, as the order
applies a separate prohibition to both those locations: Bright
may not go within 100 yards of those places. Similarly, the
order implicitly refers to Bright’s residence - “[b]oth parties
are permitted to use Kuamoo Road to access their respective
residences” - suggesting that it, too, is not a “neutral
location.” If the protected party’s residence and place of
employment are not neutral locations, and Bright’s residence is
6 Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines “neutral” as “[n]ot
supporting any of the people or groups involved in an argument or
disagreement[.]” NEUTRAL (adj.), Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)
(emphasis added).
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not a neutral location, it follows that Bright’s place of
employment is not a neutral location either. Accordingly,
Bright did not violate the order for protection by being within
100 feet of the protected party at his place of employment, and
his conviction must be reversed. 7
IV. CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that the term “neutral location”
in the order for protection at issue was ambiguous, under the
rule of lenity it must be construed in Bright’s favor and in
accordance with its ordinary meaning. Thus, “neutral location,”
as used in the order for protection at issue, means a location
that is unaffiliated with either party. Because Bright’s
workplace was not a neutral location, Bright did not violate the
order for protection. Accordingly, we vacate the ICA’s judgment
7 Even if the 100-feet prohibition did not apply at Bright’s
workplace, the rest of the order remained enforceable and provided protection
to the protected party at the Fifth Circuit courthouse. Thus, regardless of
the parties’ location, Bright could not have “any contact” with the protected
party, could not “threaten[] or physically abus[e],” the protected party, or
“maliciously damage any property of the [protected party] or property of the
[protected party’s] household.” But here, there was no allegation that Bright
contacted the protected party, only that he came within 100 feet of her.
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on appeal filed August 1, 2019, and remand to the family court
for entry of a judgment of acquittal.
Emmanuel G. Guerrero /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Tracy Murakami
for respondent /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
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