State v. Sanney.

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-15-0000548
20-SEP-2017
09:55 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
---oOo---
________________________________________________________________
STATE OF HAWAII,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
YOSHIRO SANNEY,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
SCWC-15-0000548
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-15-0000548; CR. NO. 10-1-1570)
SEPTEMBER 20, 2017
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.
I. Introduction
Yoshiro Sanney (“Sanney”) challenges the Intermediate Court
of Appeals’ (“ICA”) affirmance of the Circuit Court of the First
Circuit’s (“circuit court”) denial of his Motion to Reconsider
Sentence (“motion to reconsider”). Sanney argues the circuit
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court1 abused its discretion by refusing to vacate his sentence
of ten years in prison and $25,000 in fines and resentence him
pursuant to the court’s original sentencing inclination of
probation with up to eighteen months of imprisonment as a
condition of probation.
This appeal raises issues regarding appropriate procedures
for cases in which a trial court provides a “sentencing
inclination.” We hold that here, the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Sanney’s motion to reconsider,
because Sanney voluntarily and knowingly entered his plea after
acknowledging the non-binding nature of the circuit court’s
sentencing inclination, and the circuit court provided
sufficient reasons for its deviation from the original
sentencing inclination. Therefore, we affirm the ICA’s judgment
on appeal affirming the circuit court’s decision to deny
Sanney’s motion to reconsider.
To provide guidance in future cases, however, we discuss
procedures trial judges should follow before providing
sentencing inclinations. Furthermore, we prospectively hold
that if a defendant pleads guilty or no contest in response to a
court’s sentencing inclination, but the court later decides not
to follow the inclination, then the court must so advise the
1
The Honorable Karen S.S. Ahn presided.
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defendant and provide the defendant with the opportunity to
affirm or withdraw the plea of guilty or no contest.
II. Background
A. From offense to sentencing
On September 22, 2010, Sanney was indicted on one count of
sexual assault in the second degree in violation of Hawaii
Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 707-731(1)(b)(Supp. 2009)2 and one
count of attempted sexual assault in the second degree in
violation of HRS § 707-731(1)(b) and HRS § 705-5003 (1993).
The indictment arose out of an incident that occurred in
broad daylight on September 15, 2010 in Kapiolani Park. In
front of numerous eyewitnesses, Sanney allegedly cut out the
shorts of an unconscious homeless woman and performed
cunnilingus, then attempted vaginal intercourse with her.
Shortly after, police officers arrived and awoke the unconscious
2
HRS § 707-731(1)(b) provides in relevant part, “(1) A person commits
the offense of sexual assault in the second degree if: . . . (b) The person
knowingly subjects to sexual penetration another person who is mentally
incapacitated or physically helpless. . . .”
3
HRS § 705-500, titled “Criminal attempt,” provides in relevant part:
(1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if
the person:
(a) Intentionally engages in conduct which would
constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as
the person believes them to be; or
(b) Intentionally engages in conduct which, under the
circumstances as the person believes them to be,
constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct
intended to culminate in the person’s commission of the
crime. . . .
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female, who indicated she did not know Sanney. Sanney was
arrested and taken to the Oahu Community Correctional Center.
At the time of his arrest, Sanney was forty-four years old,
unemployed, and homeless. Sanney is a veteran with a history of
alcohol and substance abuse issues, and had participated in a
U.S. Veterans substance abuse program starting in September
2009; he was discharged in April 2010 for using marijuana.
Since 1996, Sanney has had one conviction for criminal trespass
in the second degree, four convictions for driving under the
influence, one conviction for theft in the fourth degree, and
was given a deferred acceptance of guilty plea for disorderly
conduct. Sanney also had an immigration detainer on file, and
an Immigration Enforcement Agent informed state officials that
Sanney would be picked up for deportation if released from state
custody.
A jury trial was scheduled for Sanney, but was postponed
several times. The trial week was eventually rescheduled and
Sanney, unable to post bail after his arrest, remained in
custody at the Oahu Community Correctional Center.
The above information regarding the nature of the charged
offenses and Sanney’s background was contained in Sanney’s file
and available to the circuit court before his change of plea.
During his rescheduled trial week, Sanney agreed to change
his plea after his attorney said the judge was inclined to
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sentence him to probation with up to eighteen months in jail (of
which he had already served about ten months). There was no
plea agreement with the State. The circuit court then conducted
a change of plea hearing. Before the change of plea colloquy
began, Sanney’s defense attorney stated:
Your Honor, I guess after several status conferences
with the Court and, you know, talking back and forth with
Mr. Sanney, this case being set for trial tomorrow morning,
it’s Mr. Sanney’s decision to enter a guilty plea as
charged, and I did relay to him that the Court has given us
an inclination for probation in this case with up to 18
months in jail, and, you know, based on
that inclination he’s intending to change his plea.
And I also did inform the Court that there is a
federal hold that’s been placed, currently he’s facing
deportation, and he understands that even if given
probation, a conviction in this case will lead to automatic
deportation.
At the beginning of the change of plea colloquy, the
circuit court informed Sanney:
Now, Mr. Sanney, an inclination is not a promise . .
. [T]here’s going to be a presentence report that’s going
to be generated if you decide to plead guilty today . . . I
know what relatively little the lawyers have told me about
the case and about your background, but it’s that
[presentence report] that’s very important, because that’s
going to be a more in-depth explanation of who you are, and
your history, and your characteristics and the offense.
In addition, the Court would always consider what
happens at the sentencing hearing -- you know the
arguments; what, if anything, you have to say, and so on.
So based on all of that, that’s how the Court is going to
make its decision on what an appropriate sentence would be.
So I can tell you that’s the inclination based on the
representations I have. But as you can imagine, an
inclination is only as good as the representations it is
based on, so you need to understand that.
Sanney responded, “I do.” After an extensive change of plea
colloquy, the circuit court found that Sanney voluntarily,
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knowingly, and intelligently entered no contest pleas to the
charges and adjudged Sanney guilty of the charged offenses.
After the presentence investigation and report (“PSI”)4 was
prepared, a sentencing hearing was held. At the hearing, the
circuit court expressed concern “about some of the
representations in the PSI which, to [the circuit court], [were]
different from the representations that were made at the time of
the change of plea and based upon which the court did give its
inclination of probation with an uncertain jail term.” The
circuit court continued the hearing so the probation officer
could be present.
4
“PSI” is the common acronym for the confidential presentence diagnosis
and report prepared by judiciary probation officers pursuant to HRS § 706-
602(1) (1993 & Supp. 2012), which provides in part:
(1) The pre-sentence diagnosis and report shall be made by
personnel assigned to the court or other agency designated by
the court and shall include:
(a) An analysis of the circumstances attending the
commission of the crime;
(b) The defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality,
physical and mental condition, family situation and
background, economic status and capacity to make
restitution or to make reparation to the victim or victims
of the defendant’s crimes for loss or damage caused
thereby, education, occupation, and personal habits;
. . . .
(e) Any other matters that the reporting person or agency
deems relevant or the court directs to be included.
. . . .
“In enacting the Code, the legislature changed the Proposed Draft
by substituting the phrase ‘pre-sentence diagnosis’ for the phrase
‘pre-sentence investigation[.]’” HRS § 706-602 supp. Cmt. (2014).
This appears to explain why the acronym is “PSI” instead of “PSD.
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At the continued sentencing hearing, the circuit court’s
concerns focused on the following statements apparently made by
Sanney to the probation officer:
The defendant declined to provide a written statement but
verbally reported that he pled no contest because he had a
federal hold on him and his plea may change his deportation
hold status. He said he was drunk and “high” from
marijuana on the day of the offense and he is “only guilty
of having sex in public.” The defendant reported he and
the victim drank alcohol together with other people that
morning and he consumed 12 shots of vodka and two marijuana
joints and wanted to sleep. He stated he and the victim
walked to another area of the park to lay [sic] down and
the victim eventually passed out. The defendant reported
he used his scissors to cut the crotch area of her shorts
so he could put his mouth on her vagina and then “humped”
the victim with his clothes on. The defendant said he was
“turned on” due to the fact that he was having sex in
public, in daylight, and other people saw what he was doing
to the victim.
. . . .
The defendant reported that he attended the Veterans In
Progress Program, US Vets in Kapolei, Hawaii [sic], from
September, 2009 [to] April, 2010. He said that he was
living on the street and felt tricked into going to live at
the shelter because he only wanted somewhere to live but
was not willing to participate in the substance abuse
program. He stated that he was rebellious and he just
“went through the motions” of the substance program and
smoked marijuana immediately after his graduation ceremony.
Defense counsel argued at length that the PSI did not
contain anything the court did not know prior to accepting the
change of plea, but did not request that Sanney be given an
opportunity to withdraw his plea if the court did not follow its
sentencing inclination. At the end of the sentencing hearing,
the circuit court stated:
And this is the thing about I felt tricked [sic]. You
weren’t willing to do the substance abuse but went through
the motions and smoked marijuana immediately after
graduation. That’s what this says. Then I look at the
four DUIs, which your attorney is right, we knew about the
four DUIs. But, I mean, they do count as opportunities to
do something about the problem, and, apparently, you know,
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that wasn’t enough. So the Court looks at that. And, you
know, it’s a little bit alarming to see a statement that
the only -- apparently there’s a suggestion -- you said the
only thing you did wrong was having sex in public and that
it was a turn-on, which, I don’t know, it conflicts with
what you’re saying today. But you know, these are -- I
disagree with [defense counsel].
Instead of sentencing Sanney pursuant to the stated inclination
of probation with eighteen months of imprisonment, the circuit
court sentenced Sanney to ten years of imprisonment on both
counts, with the terms to run concurrently.
B. Motion to reconsider sentence and the first appeal
Following the continued sentencing hearing, Sanney filed a
motion to reconsider sentence. The only relief requested was
for the circuit court to sentence Sanney to probation with
eighteen months of imprisonment pursuant to its original
inclination; there was no request to withdraw the plea. A
hearing was scheduled, but it was continued after Sanney’s
attorney withdrew and substitute counsel was appointed. Four
days before the continued hearing date, however, the circuit
court summarily denied Sanney’s motion without a hearing on the
grounds that Sanney had not presented new evidence.
Sanney’s current counsel filed the first appeal in this
case, challenging the circuit court’s summary denial of his
motion to reconsider. After the ICA affirmed in a summary
disposition order, State v. Sanney, CAAP-12-0000654, 2013 WL
3776162 (App. July 8, 2013) (SDO), we accepted certiorari. In a
memorandum opinion, we held that under the facts of this case,
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the circuit court abused its discretion in summarily denying the
motion for reconsideration without a hearing, and remanded the
case for a hearing on Sanney’s motion. State v. Sanney, SCWC-
XX-XXXXXXX, 2014 WL 3928249 (Haw. Aug. 12, 2014)(mem.).
C. Hearing on remand regarding Sanney’s motion to
reconsider sentence
On remand, the circuit court held a hearing on Sanney’s
motion to reconsider sentence. Sanney’s attorney argued his
client had changed his plea based on the court’s stated
inclination. He insisted there was nothing significantly
different between the information available at the change of
plea hearing and the sentencing hearing. Sanney himself stated
that his former attorney had told him the circuit court
insinuated that if he pled out, the court would “parole[] [him]
to the Feds and [he] was reluctant to do that even then.” There
was no request to withdraw the plea.
The circuit court discussed information it did not have at
the time of the original sentencing, including defendant’s
statements to the probation officer summarized above. The
circuit court also provided Sanney with the opportunity to
explain the statements that caused it concern. Sanney’s
responses, however, did not assuage the circuit court’s
concerns. The circuit court then ruled that “the sentence was a
justifiable one based on the PSI and everything else that was
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before [the court],” and denied Sanney’s motion to reconsider
sentence.
D. The current appeal and the ICA’s decision
Following the hearing, Sanney filed the current appeal.
Before the ICA, Sanney argued the case should be remanded for
resentencing in accordance with the circuit court’s original
inclination. In the alternative, Sanney requested the
opportunity to withdraw his no contest plea, a request that had
not been made before the circuit court.
In a summary disposition order, the ICA affirmed the
circuit court’s denial of Sanney’s motion to reconsider,
reasoning that Sanney stated at the change of plea hearing that
he understood that the court’s inclination was not a promise.
State v. Sanney, CAAP-15-0000548, 2016 WL 3548352 (App. June 28,
2016) (SDO) at *2. The ICA concluded, after consideration of
the reasons iterated by the circuit court at sentencing, that
the circuit court did not commit a plain and manifest abuse of
discretion in denying Sanney’s motion. The ICA did not address
whether Sanney should have had the opportunity to withdraw his
plea after the court declined to follow the sentencing
inclination.
E. Application for writ of certiorari and oral argument
In his application for certiorari, Sanney argues the
circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
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reconsider sentence, and that this court should either order the
circuit court to impose the sentence it had been inclined to
impose before the change of plea, or allow him to withdraw his
plea. At oral argument, however, Sanney clarified that the only
relief he seeks is for this court to order resentencing pursuant
to the circuit court’s original sentencing inclination, as
requested in the motion to reconsider filed in the circuit
court. State v. Sanney, SCWC-15-0000548, Oral Argument,
available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us./oral-argument-
before-the-hawaii-supreme-court-scwc-15-548, at 1:05:35.
III. Standard of Review
Sentencing decisions are reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard. A sentencing judge generally has broad
discretion in imposing a sentence. Generally, to constitute an
abuse of discretion, it must appear that the court clearly
exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rule of principles
of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party
litigant. State v. Hussein, 122 Hawaii 495, 503, 229 P.3d 313,
321 (2010).
IV. Discussion
A. Sentencing Inclinations
California refers to sentencing inclinations as “indicated
sentences.” In People v. Clancey, 56 Cal. 4th 562, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 485, 299 P.3d 131 (2013), the California Supreme Court
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explained the differences between a plea bargain and a
sentencing inclination:
The process of plea bargaining which has received
statutory and judicial authorization as an appropriate
method of disposing of criminal prosecutions contemplates
an agreement negotiated by the [State] and the defendant
and approved by the court. Pursuant to this procedure the
defendant agrees to plead guilty in order to obtain a
reciprocal benefit, generally consisting of a less severe
punishment than that which could result if he were
convicted of all offenses charged. Judicial approval is an
essential condition precedent to the effectiveness of the
bargain worked out by the defense and the prosecution.
Because the charging function is entrusted to the
executive, the court has no authority to substitute itself
as the representative of the [State] in the negotiation
process and under the guise of plea bargaining to agree to
a disposition of the case over prosecutorial objection.
On the other hand, where the defendant pleads guilty
to all charges so all that remains is the pronouncement of
judgment and sentencing, there is no requirement that the
[State] consent to a guilty plea. In that circumstance,
the court may indicate what sentence it will impose if a
given set of facts is confirmed, irrespective of whether
guilt is adjudicated at trial or admitted by plea.
56 Cal. 4th at 569-70, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 490, 299 P.3d at 135
(internal punctuation and citations removed).
Thus, a plea bargain is an agreement between the executive
branch5 and the defendant, which can include the reduction or
dismissal of charges and/or agreements regarding sentencing.
See Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (“HRPP”) Rule 11(f)(1)
(2014). Pursuant to this rule, a judge is able to participate
5
In Hawai‘i, the executive branch is represented by the Attorney General
or county Prosecuting Attorney offices.
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in negotiations leading to a plea agreement, and may agree to be
bound.6 Id.
In Clancey, the California Supreme Court explained the role
of the executive versus the court in sentencing proceedings:
The charging function is the sole province of the
executive. The executive also decides whether to engage in
negotiations with the defense by which a more lenient disposition
of the charges can be secured without trial-- a bargain that must
ultimately be approved by a court.
. . . .
The imposition of sentence within the legislatively
determined limits, on the other hand, is exclusively a judicial
function. The refusal of prosecutors to consider plea bargaining
as a viable alternative to a lengthy trial may militate against
the efficient administration of justice, impose unnecessary costs
upon taxpayers, and subject defendants to the harassment and
trauma of avoidable trials. A court may alleviate this burden
upon our criminal justice system if this can be accomplished by
means of a permissible exercise of judicial sentencing discretion
in an appropriate case.
Clancey, 56 Cal. 4th at 574, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 493, 299 P.3d
at 138 (internal citations and quotation marks removed).
The Clancey court also laid out appropriate procedures for
trial judges regarding sentencing inclinations or “indicated
sentences”:
First, in order to preserve the executive’s
prerogative to conduct plea negotiations, a trial court
6
HRPP Rule 11(f)(1) provides:
IN GENERAL. The prosecutor and counsel for the defendant, or
the defendant when acting pro se, may enter into plea
agreements that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or
no contest to a charged offense or to an included or
related offense, the prosecutor will take certain actions
or adopt certain positions, including the dismissal of
other charges and the recommending or not opposing of
specific sentences or dispositions on the charge to which a
plea was entered. The court may participate in discussions
leading to such plea agreements and may agree to be bound
thereby.
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generally should refrain from announcing an indicated
sentence while the parties are still negotiating a
potential plea bargain. . . .
Second, a trial court should consider whether the
existing record concerning the defendant and the
defendant’s offense or offenses is adequate to make a
reasoned and informed judgment as to the appropriate
penalty. The utility of an indicated sentence necessarily
depends on the quality of the information available to the
court at an early stage concerning the offense and the
defendant’s criminal history.
Third, a court may not offer any inducement in return
for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. It may not treat
a defendant more leniently because he foregoes his right to
trial or more harshly because he exercises that right.
Because an indicated sentence is merely an instance of
sentencing discretion wisely and properly exercised, the
indicated sentence must be the same punishment the court
would be prepared to impose if the defendant were convicted
at trial. An indicated sentence, properly understood, is
not an attempt to induce a plea by offering the defendant a
more lenient sentence than what could be obtained through
plea negotiations with the prosecuting authority. When a
trial court properly indicates a sentence, it has made no
promise that the sentence will be imposed. Rather, the
court has merely disclosed to the parties at an early stage
-- and to the extent possible -- what the court views, on
the record then available, as the appropriate sentence so
that each party may make an informed decision. . . .
Fourth, a trial court may not bargain with a
defendant over the sentence to be imposed.
56 Cal. 4th at 574-75, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 494, 299 P.3d at
138-39 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis
in original).
We agree with the California Supreme Court’s well-reasoned
approach to sentencing inclinations. First, absent unusual
circumstances, a trial court should not provide a sentencing
inclination unless plea negotiations have concluded or did not
occur. Second, before giving a sentencing inclination, a trial
court should consider whether the existing record concerning the
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defendant and the defendant’s offense(s) is adequate to make a
reasoned and informed judgment as to the appropriate penalty.
Third, a trial court must follow the established “principle
forbidding a trial court from improperly considering the
defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right to a . . .
trial as an influential factor in determining the appropriate
sentence.” State v. Kamanao, 103 Hawaii 315, 321 n.8, 82 P.3d
401, 407 n.8 (2003) (citations omitted). In other words, the
sentencing inclination must be the same punishment the court
would be prepared to impose if the defendant were convicted
after trial. Finally, a trial court may not bargain with the
defendant over the sentence to be imposed, as a trial court’s
sentencing inclination must be the same punishment the court
would impose if the defendant were convicted following a trial.
Bargaining over the sentence would contravene this requirement.
B. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Sanney’s motion to reconsider pursuant to the original
sentencing inclination, because a sentencing inclination is
not binding, and certain facts became available after the
court issued its sentencing inclination.
The guidance discussed above was not part of our law at the
time of Sanney’s change of plea, sentencing, or reconsideration
of sentence, so we analyze this appeal based on governing law at
the times of the trial court’s decisions. Sanney argues he
should have been resentenced pursuant to the circuit court’s
original inclination of probation with eighteen months of
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imprisonment instead of the ten years of imprisonment actually
imposed, because the court’s stated sentencing inclination
influenced his decision to change his plea to no contest. As
noted, this was Sanney’s only request to the circuit court -- he
did not request the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
Therefore, the only issue before us is whether the circuit court
abused its discretion when it denied Sanney’s motion to
reconsider sentence and refused to resentence him pursuant to
its original sentencing inclination.
To constitute an abuse of discretion, “it must appear that
the court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded
rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial
detriment of a party litigant.” Hussein, 122 Hawaii at 503, 229
P.3d at 321. A sentencing inclination is not binding; it is
merely a trial court’s statement of the sentence it would be
inclined to impose for the offense(s) charged, should the
defendant be convicted after trial. Sanney argues that the
information available at the pre-sentencing hearing and the
sentencing hearing was virtually identical. As discussed above,
however, the record clearly reflects that the circuit court
changed its sentencing inclination based on Sanney’s statements
to the probation officer who was preparing the PSI. These
statements occurred after the change of plea, and comprise
information not available to the circuit court at the time it
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gave its sentencing inclination. The circuit court’s
postponement of the sentencing hearing so the probation officer
could be present to clarify the PSI evidences the importance of
these statements to the circuit court’s sentencing decision.
At the hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence, the
circuit court provided Sanney with the opportunity to explain
his statements. Sanney’s responses, however, did not assuage
the circuit court’s concerns. The circuit explained how
information not available at the time it gave its original
inclination caused it to change its sentencing inclination and
to deny the motion to reconsider sentence.
At the change of plea hearing, Sanney unequivocally stated
that he understood the circuit court’s sentencing inclination
was not binding. The circuit court conducted a thorough change
of plea colloquy before finding that Sanney had voluntarily and
knowingly entered into the change of plea. At the hearing on
the motion to reconsider sentence, the circuit court explained
that it had changed its sentencing inclination based on
information in the PSI that was not available at the time of its
original sentencing inclination. Therefore, the circuit court
did not abuse its discretion by refusing to resentence Sanney
pursuant to its original sentencing inclination, and the ICA did
not err in affirming the circuit court.
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C. Prospectively, a trial court must advise the defendant of a
change in its sentencing inclination before imposing a
sentence and provide the defendant with the choice of
affirming or withdrawing the guilty or no contest plea.
Although we find no error in this case, we take this
opportunity to further address the sentencing inclination
process to provide a new rule for application to future cases.
The American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Section
historically provides guidance in the form of Standards Relating
to Pleas of Guilty (“ABA Standards”). ABA Standard 14-2.1
relates to “Plea withdrawal and specific performance,” and
provides, in relevant part:
(a) After entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
and before sentence, the court should allow the defendant
to withdraw the plea for any fair and just reason. In
determining whether a fair and just reason exists, the
court should also weigh any prejudice to the prosecution
caused by reliance on the defendant’s plea.
(b) After a defendant has been sentenced pursuant to a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court should allow
the defendant to withdraw the plea whenever the defendant,
upon a timely motion for withdrawal, proves that withdrawal
is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. A timely
motion for withdrawal is one made with due diligence,
considering the nature of the allegations therein.
(i) Withdrawal may be necessary to correct a manifest
injustice when the defendant proves, for example, that:
. . . .
(E) the defendant did not receive the charge or sentence
concessions contemplated by the plea agreement, which was
either tentatively or fully concurred in by the court, and
the defendant did not affirm the plea after being advised
that the court no longer concurred and after being called
upon to either affirm or withdraw the plea[.]
(Emphases added.) On its face, ABA Standard 14-2.1(b)(i)(E)
applies to plea bargain agreements and not to judge-only
sentencing inclinations. The ABA Standard applies, however,
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even when a court has not agreed to be bound, but has merely
indicated a tentative inclination to follow a plea agreement,
including sentencing recommendations. Stating a tentative
inclination to follow the sentencing recommendations of a plea
agreement is analogous to giving a sentencing inclination
without a plea agreement. Thus, the ABA Standard can be
analogized to situations where a court changes its sentencing
inclination.
Various states, including Hawaii, have adopted procedures
identical to, or consistent with, the ABA Standard. Relevant
cases involve circumstances where a judge is no longer inclined
to follow its original sentencing inclination, a defendant
cannot as a matter of law be sentenced pursuant to a trial
court’s originally stated sentencing inclination, or the law has
changed to allow for a more lenient sentence. In 1967,
Wisconsin adopted the ABA Standard while it was still in the
tentative draft stage. See State v. Washington, 176 Wis. 2d
205, 214, 500 N.W.2d 331, 335 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court “accepted the 1967 tentative draft
of what is now the plea withdrawal standard, sec. 14-2.1 of the
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Standards for Criminal Justice
(2d Ed. Supp. 1986)”). In 1930, the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that where defendants changed their plea based on a judge’s
stated inclination offering a more lenient sentence than that
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required by law, they should have been granted leave to withdraw
their pleas. People v. Moore, 342 Ill. 316, 320, 174 N.E. 386,
387 (1930). In Ex parte Otinger, 493 So. 2d 1362 (Ala. 1986),
the Supreme Court of Alabama held that where a trial judge
cannot follow its initial indicated sentence, the defendant
should be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his pleas. 493
So. 2d at 1364. In Cripps v. State, 122 Nev. 764, 137 P.3d 1187
(2006), the Nevada Supreme Court held that “when a judge does
express an inclination to follow the parties’ sentencing
recommendation, the defendant must be given an opportunity to
withdraw the plea if the judge later reconsiders and concludes
that a harsher sentence is warranted.” 122 Nev. at 771, 137
P.3d at 1191-92. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second
Department of New York held that “[w]here the court determines
that it cannot sentence the defendant as indicated prior to
acceptance of the plea, the proper procedure is to allow
defendant the choice of either withdrawing his guilty plea or
accepting a proper sentence[.]” People v. Grant, 471 N.Y.S.2d
325, 327 (1984) (internal citation omitted). Finally, where a
trial court granted defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas to greater charges due to there being an inadequate
factual basis for the pleas but denied the motion as to a lesser
charge, a New Jersey appellate court held that a plea withdrawal
is mandated “whenever the defendant’s exposure to prison time is
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dramatically reduced from what it was when a defendant entered
the plea.” State v. Ashley, 443 N.J. Super. 10, 23, 126 A.3d
1234, 1243 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015), certif. denied, 224
N.J. 526 (2016).
This court has held that a motion to withdraw plea should
be granted where a defendant entered a plea based on a
sentencing inclination that is legally impossible. See State v.
Fogel, 95 Hawai‘i 398, 405, 23 P.3d 733, 740 (2001). (“[W]e hold
that to correct manifest injustice, a defendant must be
permitted . . . to withdraw a plea entered in reliance on a
court’s representation or promise, which is statutorily
incapable of being effectuated.”).
States have also applied the concept of plea withdrawal in
situations where a court has changed its mind after a defendant
enters a plea in reliance on a court’s stated sentencing
inclination. For example, in People v. Cobbs, 443 Mich. 276,
505 N.W.2d 208 (1993), the Supreme Court of Michigan allowed
the defendant the right to withdraw his plea after the court
determined a harsher sentence was appropriate:
The judge’s preliminary evaluation of the case does not
bind the judge’s sentencing discretion, since additional facts
may emerge during later proceedings, in the presentence report,
through the allocution afforded to the prosecutor and the victim,
or from other sources. However, a defendant who pleads guilty or
nolo contendere in reliance upon a judge’s preliminary evaluation
with regard to an appropriate sentence has an absolute right to
withdraw the plea if the judge later determines that the sentence
must exceed the preliminary evaluation.
443 Mich. at 283, 505 N.W.2d at 212 (emphasis added).
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The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District,
iterated a similar standard:
Where[,] as here[,] a nolo contendere or guilty plea is
tendered in reliance on the court’s expression of
sentencing intentions, and the plea is accepted, the
sentencing judge must grant the defendant a clear
opportunity to withdraw the plea if the judge cannot in
conscience impose the sentence indicated; but that is the
limit of the trial court’s obligation.
State ex rel. Wilhoit v. Wells, 356 So. 2d 817, 824 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted;
brackets added). The court reached this conclusion in part by
considering the 1968 version of the ABA Standard, Pleas of
Guilty. Id.
New Jersey has, by rule, adopted a similar plea withdrawal
standard. New Jersey Rules of Court Rule 3:9-3 titled “Plea
Discussions; Agreements; Withdrawals” provides in part:
The court may then indicate . . . the maximum sentence it
would impose in the event the defendant enters a plea of
guilty, assuming, however, . . . that the information in
the presentence report at the time of sentence is as has
been represented to the court at the time of the disclosure
and supports its determination that the interests of
justice would be served thereby . . . If at the time of
sentencing the court determines that the interests of
justice would not be served . . . by imposing sentence in
accordance with the court’s previous indications of
sentence, the court may vacate the plea or the defendant
shall be permitted to withdraw the plea.
N.J. Ct. R. 3:9-3 (emphasis added).
Finally, in Clancey, the Supreme Court of California
contemplated defendant’s request to adopt a rule “that when a
trial court offers an indicated sentence, it must advise the
defendant of the opportunity to withdraw the plea if the court
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later decides not to impose the indicated sentence.” Clancey,
56 Cal. 4th at 583-84, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 501, 299 P.3d at
144-45. The court ultimately declined “to resolve here which
standard should govern the withdrawal of a plea after a trial
court declines to impose the indicated sentence” because the
trial court did not decline to follow its original inclination
and the defendant did not seek to withdraw his plea. 56 Cal.
4th at 584, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 501-02, 299 P.3d at 145. The
State of California acknowledged, however, the existence of
California law permitting a guilty plea to be withdrawn for
“good cause shown” would be given “a liberal construction . . .
in the interest of promoting justice.” Id.
Hawaii law regarding plea withdrawals is governed by HRPP
Rule 32(d) (2012) and case law construing the rule. The
language in HRPP Rule 32(d) is similar to that in ABA Standard
14-2.1 and provides:
(d) Withdrawal of Plea. A motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty or of nolo contendere may be made before sentence is
imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; provided
that, to correct manifest injustice the court, upon a
party’s motion submitted no later than ten (10) days after
imposition of sentence, shall set aside the judgment of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea.
At any later time, a defendant seeking to withdraw a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere may do so only by petition
pursuant to Rule 40 of these rules and the court shall not
set aside such a plea unless doing so is necessary to
correct manifest injustice.
State v. Jim, 58 Haw. 574, 574 P.2d 521 (1978), outlines
the standards that govern based on whether a motion to withdraw
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plea is made before or after sentencing. These standards are
similar to those reflected in the ABA Standard:
A defendant does not have an absolute right to
withdraw his guilty plea, and a motion for withdrawal of a
guilty plea under [HRCP Rule 32(d)] . . . must therefore be
determined under either of two established principles.
Where the request is made after sentence has been imposed,
the “manifest injustice” standard is to be applied.
H.R.Cr.P. Rule 32(d) (now H.R.P.P. Rule 32(d)). . . But
where the motion is presented to the trial court before the
imposition of sentence, a more liberal approach is to be
taken, and the motion should be granted if the defendant
has presented a fair and just reason for his request and
the State has not relied upon the guilty plea to its
substantial prejudice. What the manifest injustice rule
seeks to avoid is an opportunity for the defendant to test
the severity of sentence before finally committing himself
to a guilty plea. But the risk of prejudice to the State
and to the efficient administration of criminal justice is
much less apparent where the withdrawal is requested before
final judicial action is taken on the defendant’s plea.
Jim, 58 Haw. at 575-76, 574 P.2d at 522-23 (internal citations,
quotation marks, and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Regarding post-sentencing plea withdrawal, when the higher
“manifest injustice” standard governs, this court has held that
a motion to withdraw plea should be granted when a court’s
stated intention to allow a deferral for which he was not
eligible induced the defendant to change his plea. Fogel, 95
Hawai‘i at 405, 23 P.3d at 740. As iterated in Jim, a more
liberal standard applies to pre-sentencing plea withdrawal.
Jim, 58 Haw. at 575-76, 574 P.2d at 522-23.
Based on the principles contained within ABA Standard 14-
2.1, persuasive law from other jurisdictions that have addressed
the issue, HRPP Rule 32(d), and our case law, we now adopt a new
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rule in the sentencing inclination context, which will have
prospective effect only. See State v. Cabagbag, 127 Hawaii 302,
315, 277 P.3d 1027, 1040 (2012) (holding that a new rule
requiring eyewitness identification in certain circumstances
would have a prospective effect only).
The new rule is as follows: if a defendant pleads guilty
or no contest in response to a court’s sentencing inclination,
but the court later decides not to follow the inclination, then
the court must so advise the defendant and provide the defendant
with the opportunity to affirm or withdraw the plea of guilty or
no contest.7
Applying the first Jim requirement for pre-sentence plea
withdrawal motions, “fair and just reasons” clearly exist when a
defendant makes a pre-sentence request to withdraw plea, as the
defendant’s change of plea was made in reliance on the court’s
stated sentencing inclination. Applying the second Jim
requirement that “the State has not relied upon the guilty plea
to its substantial prejudice,” a defendant’s guilty plea made in
response to a court’s stated sentencing inclination would
usually not affect the State. In any event, the new rule will
7
A defendant should be allowed to affirm and persist in the plea despite
knowing the court will no longer impose the sentencing inclination upon which
the defendant relied. If the defendant chooses this alternative, however,
the court should conduct a colloquy on the record establishing the
defendant’s knowing and voluntary decision to affirm his or her guilty or no-
contest plea despite the change in the court’s sentencing inclination.
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encourage trial judges to consider whether the existing record
concerning the defendant and the defendant’s offense(s) is
adequate to make a reasoned and informed judgment as to the
appropriate penalty. It will also curtail hearings on motions
and appeals to address whether a trial court abused its
discretion by not following its originally stated sentencing
inclination. This includes hearings regarding whether adequate
reasons existed for the change in a trial court’s sentencing
inclination.8 The new rule will also eliminate hearings and
questions regarding whether a defendant truly understood the
non-binding nature of a court’s sentencing inclination.
Finally, the new rule will foster public confidence in the
judicial system, as defendants will no longer question whether
they were somehow misled into entering into a change of plea
based on a judge’s stated sentencing inclination.
V. Conclusion
The above-described procedures and new rule will provide
guidance for future cases involving changes of plea based on a
judge’s stated sentencing inclination. In this case, however,
8
Many discussions regarding the offenses charged and the defendant’s
history occur off the record, in a judge’s chambers. This makes it difficult
to ascertain the information on which a court relied when determining a
sentencing inclination. This problem is compounded if the sentencing judge
is not the same judge who gave the sentencing inclination and the information
on which the inclination is based is not included in the record.
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we affirm the ICA’s judgment on appeal affirming the decision of
the circuit court denying Sanney’s motion to reconsider.
Shawn A. Luiz /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Brian R. Vincent
for respondent /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
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