State v. Cochran

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
10-FEB-2023
07:50 AM
Dkt. 66 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CASIE K. COCHRAN, Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
HONOLULU DIVISION
(CASE NO. 1DCC-XX-XXXXXXX)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Hiraoka and Nakasone, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Casie Cochran (Cochran) appeals
from the "Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order" (Judgment)
entered by the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu
Division (District Court), on March 18, 2021.1
The State of Hawai#i (State) charged Cochran by
complaint with Cruelty to Animals in the Second Degree in
violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 711-1109(1)(f)
(2014). Cochran pleaded not guilty and waived her right to a
jury trial. A bench trial was held on March 18, 2021.
State Deputy Sheriff Bryson Nakamoto (Deputy Nakamoto)
testified that he was on duty patrolling "the airport section" on
January 5, 2020. At about 3:20 p.m. he drove past the Enterprise
lot and saw a dog that "appeared to be caged and locked" in a
kennel. The dog was "panting heavily," its "tongue was out, and
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The Honorable Karin L. Holma presided.
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it was inhaling and exhaling at a -- a great interval. And its
movements was [sic] also slow." The dog was in direct sunlight,
adjacent to a tent but not under it. The kennel contained a bowl
of food and a second bowl that was overturned and empty. Deputy
Nakamoto searched the parking lot but found no one there. Deputy
Nakamoto testified Cochran approached him at about 4:00 p.m.
According to Deputy Nakamoto, Cochran identified herself as the
dog's owner and stated she was the lot attendant. She also
stated that she had last checked on the dog at 2:00 p.m. and the
dog was okay at that time. Deputy Nakamoto issued a citation to
Cochran and left the lot without removing the dog from Cochran's
care.
Cochran testified that she set up the dog's food and
water bowls in the kennel at the beginning of her shift. She was
called away from the lot at about 2:00 p.m., so she left the dog
under the shade of the tent. Cochran testified she "rolled by a
couple times" in a van to check on the dog, but did not say when
that occurred. She stated she saw the dog laying in the kennel,
not panting, with water in her bowl, and there was cloud
coverage. Cochran also testified the dog liked to flip the water
bowl over with her nose and roll in the water. Cochran testified
that around 3:00 p.m. she received a call from her manager that
she needed to get to the lot because "[t]here are cops there."
The District Court found Cochran guilty as charged:
THE COURT: . . . . So the Court finds you guilty,
Ms. Cochran. Under Hawaii Revised Statutes 711-1109, a
person commits the offense of Cruelty to Animals in the
Second Degree if the person intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly confines or causes to be confined in a kennel or
cage any pet animal in a cruel or inhumane manner.
The Court is particularly persuaded by the picture of
Exhibit 1, which shows the dog Puya in a — in a cage in the
sun. It is in this Court's opinion cruel and inhumane to
have a dog in the cage in the sun on asphalt without water.
And I understand you testified that your boyfriend may have
come along and given it water. But that just by definition
is cruel and inhumane. They can be without food. They
cannot be without water. And I don't — I don't know when he
last had his water.
So the Court — Court understands that you did not
perhaps intentionally cause this situation. And — but the
Court finds that it was reckless. And understand that you
were called away from your job or — but we can't have that
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kind of treatment of animals. And again, I understand you
love this dog and you think you are doing the very best for
this dog. But Exhibit 1 shows that — that just can't
happen.
(Emphases added.) The Judgment was entered.2 This appeal
followed.
Cochran raises three points of error: (1) "The trial
court erred when it concluded that under HRS § 711-1109(1)(f), as
a matter of law, it is cruel and inhumane to confine an animal in
a cage, in the sun, on asphalt, and without water"; (2) "The
trial court erred when it concluded that because it could not
determine how long [Cochran's dog] Puya was confined without any
water before Cochran's boyfriend gave her some water, it had to
find and conclude that the confinement was cruel and inhumane";
and (3) "The trial court erred when it found and concluded that
the evidence was sufficient to prove that Cochran was guilty of
Cruelty to Animals in violation of HRS § 711-1109(1)(f)."
For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
I. Statutory Interpretation and Overlapping Statutes
This court ordered supplemental briefing on the
following issue:
whether it was error for the district court to convict
Cochran of violating HRS § 711-1109(1)(f) when, at the time
subsection (f) was enacted, it was already a violation of
HRS § 711-1109(1)(b) for a pet owner to deprive a pet of
water and protection from sun, and Cochran was not charged
with violating HRS § 711-1109(1)(b).
The State filed a supplemental brief, but Cochran did not. In
its supplemental brief, the State gave an equivocal response,
stating:
After consideration of this Court's order and a review of
the record, the State acknowledges that the district court
may have erred when in convicted Defendant of violating HRS
§ 711-1109(1)(f) especially in light of the district court's
emphasis and stated reasoning. Based on the evidence and
testimony the district court focused on and given the
court's oral ruling, its determination more appropriately
supports subsection (1)(b) as opposed to subsection (1)(f).
While a prosecutor is free to choose between subsections
which may overlap, it would appear here that the Legislature
intended subsection (1)(b), as opposed to (1)(f), to cover
the conduct relied upon by the district court in this case.
2
In sentencing Cochran, the District Court imposed no fine, no
probation, and no imprisonment.
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The testimony adduced at trial and the district court's
factual findings and stated reasoning in support of its
verdict may be deemed as more correctly a violation of
subsection (1)(b) as opposed to subsection (1)(f) where
(1)(b) addresses the specific conduct as opposed to the more
general conduct of "cruel and inhumane" in subsection (1)(f)
which was likely intended to cover other
treatment/conditions of animals. To the extent the district
court's findings in support of its ruling were focused on
the specific conduct as covered by subsection (1)(b), then
the district court may have erred in finding Cochran guilty
of violating subsection (1)(f).
(Emphases added.) Notably, the State does not cite any authority
for its confession of possible error.
Although great weight is granted when the prosecution
confesses error, Territory v. Kogami, 37 Haw. 174, 175 (Haw.
Terr. 1945), "appellate courts have an independent duty 'first to
ascertain that the confession of error is supported by the record
and well-founded in law and second to determine that such error
is properly preserved and prejudicial.'" State v. Veikoso, 102
Hawai#i 219, 221-22, 74 P.3d 575, 577-78 (2003) (citation
omitted). "In other words, 'a confession of error by the
prosecution is not binding upon an appellate court[.]'" Id. at
222, 74 P.3d at 578 (citation omitted).
There is no authority or analysis in the State's
supplemental brief as to the proper statutory construction of HRS
§ 711-1109(1)(f). In our interpretation of statutes, we follow
these guidelines:
Our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to
the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained
primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.
And we must read statutory language in the context of the
entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with
its purpose.
When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or
indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a
statute, an ambiguity exists.
In construing an ambiguous statute, the meaning of the
ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with
which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be
compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning.
Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in
determining legislative intent. One avenue is the use of
legislative history as an interpretive tool.
Castro v. Melchor, 142 Hawai#i 1, 11, 414 P.3d 53, 63 (2018)
(citation omitted).
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HRS § 711-1109(1) (2014) provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits the offense of cruelty to animals in the
second degree if the person intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly:
. . . .
(b) Deprives a pet animal of necessary sustenance or
causes such deprivation;
. . . .
(f) Confines or causes to be confined, in a kennel
or cage, any pet animal in a cruel or inhumane
manner[.]
HRS § 711-1100 (Supp. 2015) defines "Necessary sustenance" as
"care sufficient to preserve the health and well-being of a pet
animal" and includes "[o]pen or adequate access to water in
sufficient quantity and quality to satisfy the animal's needs"
and access to protection from the sun.3
3
"Necessary sustenance" is defined in HRS § 711-1100 and provides:
"Necessary sustenance" means care sufficient to preserve the
health and well-being of a pet animal, except for emergencies or
circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the owner or
caretaker of the pet animal, and includes but is not limited to
the following requirements:
(1) Food of sufficient quantity and quality to allow for
normal growth or maintenance of body weight;
(2) Open or adequate access to water in sufficient
quantity and quality to satisfy the animal's needs;
(3) Access to protection from wind, rain, or sun;
(4) An area of confinement that has adequate space
necessary for the health of the animal and is kept
reasonably clean and free from excess waste or other
contaminants that could affect the animal's health;
provided that the area of confinement in a primary pet
enclosure shall:
(a) Provide access to shelter;
(b) Be constructed of safe materials to protect the
pet animal from injury;
(c) Enable the pet to be clean, dry, and free from
excess waste or other contaminants that could
affect the pet animal's health;
(d) Provide the pet animal with a solid surface or
resting platform that is large enough for the
pet animal to lie upon in a normal manner . . .;
(e) Provide sufficient space to allow the pet
animal, at minimum, to do the following:
(i) Easily stand, sit, lie, turn around, and
make all other normal body movements in a
comfortable manner for the pet animal,
without making physical contact with any
other animal in the enclosure; and
(ii) Interact safely with other animals within
the enclosure; and
(continued...)
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There is nothing in the plain language of either HRS
§ 711-1109(1)(b) or (1)(f), or in the definition of "necessary
sustenance" under HRS § 711-1100, that indicates the language
"cruel or inhumane" in subsection (1)(f) must mean something
other than what is covered by (1)(b). Further, the legislative
history does not indicate such an intent by the legislature.
Subsection (1)(f) was adopted in 2009 through Act 160, which was
initially introduced as S.B. No. 1222. See 2009 Haw. Sess. Laws
Act 160, § 1 at 488-49. S.B. No. 1222 initially proposed to,
inter alia, create a new section addressing confinement of a pet
on public property but was amended several times during the
course of the legislative session. See Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 85,
in 2009 House Journal, at 1612-13, 2009 Senate Journal, at
852-53; H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1566, in 2009 House Journal, at
1483; S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 590, in 2009 Senate Journal, at
1168-70. The primary focus of the legislature in adopting
subsection (1)(f) appears to be the manner in which pet animals
are confined. Again, however, nothing in the legislative history
of Act 160 suggests that the legislature intended that "cruel or
inhumane" in subsection (1)(f) must mean something other than
what was covered by subsection (1)(b).
HRS § 711-1109 as a whole addresses "[c]ruelty to
animals" and "we must read statutory language in the context of
the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with
its purpose." Castro, 142 Hawai#i at 11, 414 P.3d at 63.
Although there is no statutory definition for "cruel or inhumane"
related to subsection (1)(f), subsection (1)(f) should be read in
pari materia with the entire statute and the definition of
"necessary sustenance" in HRS § 711-1100, to assist in
interpreting "cruel or inhumane". See HRS § 1-16 ("Laws in pari
materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with
(...continued)
(5) Veterinary care when needed to prevent suffering.
(Emphases added.)
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reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be
called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.").
As the Hawai#i Supreme Court has recognized,
[s]tatutes may on occasion overlap, depending on the facts
of a particular case, but it is generally no defense to an
indictment under one statute that the accused might have
been charged under another. Under those circumstances, the
matter is necessarily and traditionally subject to the
prosecuting attorney's discretion.
State v. Modica, 58 Haw. 249, 251, 567 P.2d 420, 422 (1977)
(emphases added) (citations omitted); see also State v. Sasai,
143 Hawai#i 285, 295, 429 P.3d 1214, 1224 (2018). Thus, it was
not improper to convict Cochran under HRS § 711-1109(1)(f) even
though she arguably could have also been charged under subsection
(1)(b).
The State's supplemental brief further asserts that,
"[t]o the extent the district court's findings in support of its
ruling were focused on the specific conduct as covered by
subsection (1)(b), then the district court may have erred in
finding Cochran guilty of violating subsection (1)(f)." However,
the District Court's findings did not focus only on conduct
covered by subsection (1)(b). The District Court noted its
reliance on Exhibit 1 and stated that "[i]t is in this Court's
opinion cruel and inhumane to have a dog in the cage in the sun
on asphalt without water." (Emphasis added.) The District
Court's reasoning that the dog was in a cage and on asphalt does
not focus on conduct covered by subsection (1)(b), as those
factors are not required for a subsection (1)(b) violation. Only
the District Court's reasoning that the dog was in the sun and
without water are factors expressly pertinent to a subsection
(1)(b) violation, given the definition of "necessary sustenance."
In short, the District Court stated a combination of factors that
it found constituted "cruel or inhumane" conduct, only two of
which are expressly pertinent to a subsection (1)(b) violation.
Therefore, after full consideration of the issue and in
light of our interpretation of subsection (1)(f), we conclude the
State's equivocal confession of error is not well-founded in law
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or supported by the record. Veikoso, 102 Hawai#i at 221-22, 74
P.3d at 577-78.
II. Points Raised By Cochran
With regard to Cochran's first point of error, we
conclude the District Court did not rule "as a matter of law."
Rather, the District Court noted it's reliance on Exhibit 1, a
picture of the dog when it was found in the cage by Deputy
Nakamoto, and then the District Court stated "[i]t is in this
Court's opinion cruel and inhumane to have a dog in the cage in
the sun on asphalt without water." Considering the record in
full and in context, the District Court did not make a ruling as
a matter of law.
With regard to Cochran's second point of error, Cochran
is wrong in asserting that the District Court "concluded that
because it could not determine how long [the dog] Puya was
confined without any water before Cochran's boyfriend gave her
some water, it had to find and conclude that the confinement was
cruel and inhumane."4 The District Court did not make the
conclusion asserted by Cochran and thus this point lacks merit.
With regard to Cochran's third point of error, that
there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction under
HRS § 711-1109(1)(f), it is well-established that:
Evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the
strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court
passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a
conviction; the same standard applies whether the case was before
a judge or jury. The test on appeal is not whether guilt is
established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was
substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of
fact.
State v. Richie, 88 Hawai#i 19, 33, 960 P.2d 1227, 1241 (1998),
as amended (Aug. 3, 1998) (quoting State v. Quitog, 85 Hawai#i
128, 145, 938 P.2d 559, 576 (1997)) (brackets omitted). Further,
"it is well-settled that an appellate court may affirm a judgment
of the lower court on any ground in the record that supports
4
Cochran testified that, a few minutes before she got to the lot
(apparently after she was called to go back), her boyfriend had arrived there,
let the dog out, and gave it water.
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affirmance." State v. Enos, 147 Hawai#i 150, 164, 465 P.3d 597,
611 (2020) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Here, the record establishes substantial evidence to
support the District Court's conclusion that Cochran is guilty
under HRS § 711-1109(1)(f). There is no dispute that Cochran
confined her pet dog in a kennel or cage; the dispute is whether
Cochran recklessly did so in a "cruel or inhumane manner."
As noted before, there is no statutory definition for
"cruel or inhumane" applicable to subsection (1)(f). Thus, we
consider the plain meaning of the terms. "Cruel" is defined as
"disposed to inflict pain or suffering : devoid of humane
feelings" or "causing or conducive to injury, grief, or pain."5
The term "inhumane" is defined as "cruel and causing suffering to
people or animals[.]"6 Further, reading subsection (1)(f) in
pari materia with the statute as a whole and the definition of
"necessary sustenance," we conclude it is relevant in this case
to consider whether the dog was confined in a manner that it did
not have "necessary sustenance" as part of determining whether
Cochran's conduct was "cruel or inhumane." Thus, here, it was
relevant whether the dog had "access to water in sufficient
quantity . . . to satisfy [its] needs" and whether the dog had
"access to protection from . . . [the] sun[.]" HRS § 711-1100
(definition of "necessary sustenance").
The District Court found that Cochran's conduct was not
intentional or knowing, but instead was reckless. We agree with
this determination.
With respect to what constituted the cruel or inhumane
conduct, the District Court expressly noted its reliance on
Exhibit 1, a picture showing the dog in the kennel completely in
the sun with no shade, on asphalt, and a water bowl turned over.
In addition to these factors, viewing the evidence under the
5
See cruel, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cruel (last visited Feb. 7, 2023).
6
See inhumane, Cambridge Dictionary,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/inhumane (last visited
Feb. 7, 2023).
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applicable standard of review, the kennel was about 50 inches by
30-40 inches, and Cochran left the dog in the kennel from between
2:00 p.m. and 3:20 p.m. in the afternoon. The dog was discovered
by Deputy Nakamoto, who testified, inter alia, the dog did not
have any water, was panting heavily (inhaling and exhaling at a
great interval) throughout his observation of the dog, and the
dog was moving slowly. Deputy Nakamoto also testified that the
kennel was dry, that "it felt hot that day," and he believed the
dog was in immediate danger of overheating and was concerned for
the dog's safety.
With regard to when the dog last had water, Cochran
testified that her dog liked to turn its water bowl over. She
also testified that she "rolled by" sometime after 2:00 p.m. to
check on her dog, but Deputy Nakamoto testified that Cochran told
him the last time she had checked on the dog was at 2:00 p.m.
Under the applicable standard of review, we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
Given the above, we conclude there is sufficient
evidence in this case to support the District Court's
determination that Cochran violated HRS § 711-1109(1)(f).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the "Notice of Entry of
Judgment and/or Order" entered by the District Court of the First
Circuit, Honolulu Division, on March 18, 2021, is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, February 10, 2023.
On the briefs: /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
Chief Judge
William H. Jameson, Jr.,
Deputy Public Defender, /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
For Defendant-Appellant Associate Judge
Loren J. Thomas, /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellee
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