State v. Paulich

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
21-FEB-2023
09:17 AM
Dkt. 80 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PAULETTE M. PAULICH, Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(CRIMINAL NO. 3CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, Hiraoka and Wadsworth, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Paulette M. Paulich appeals from
the "Judgment of Conviction and Sentence" entered by the Circuit
Court of the Third Circuit on July 28, 2021.1 For the reasons
explained below, we affirm.
On July 16, 2018, Mark Brown was driving a motorcycle
when he was hit by a car. The driver of the car did not stop at
the scene of the collision. Brown died at the scene.
On May 14, 2019, a grand jury indicted Paulich for
Negligent Homicide in the First Degree in violation of Hawaii
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-702.5(1) and Accidents Involving
Death or Serious Bodily Injury in violation of HRS § 291C-12.
The State filed a motion to determine voluntariness of various
statements made by Paulich after the accident. Paulich filed
1
The Honorable Robert D.S. Kim presided.
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three motions to suppress evidence. The motions were heard on
August 2, 2019. However, the charges against Paulich were
dismissed without prejudice because of a violation of Hawai#i
Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 48.
Charges against Paulich were refiled on July 1, 2020.2
The State refiled its motion to determine voluntariness, and
Paulich refiled her motions to suppress. The motions were heard
on October 27, 2020. Paulich and the State stipulated to
admission of the transcript of the August 2, 2019 hearing from
the previous case (which had been conducted by the same judge),
and the exhibits from that hearing.
The circuit court granted the State's motion to
determine voluntariness and denied Paulich's motions to suppress.
On December 2, 2020, the circuit court entered findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and two orders. Paulich does not challenge
the circuit court's findings of fact.3 Those findings are
binding on appeal. Okada Trucking Co. v. Bd. of Water Supply, 97
Hawai#i 450, 458, 40 P.3d 73, 81 (2002).
The circuit court found that Hawai#i County Police
Department (HCPD) police officer Kimo Keliipaakaua was assigned
to investigate the July 16, 2018 accident. The accident scene
was Highway 11, near the 83-mile marker. HCPD officers Bruce
Parayano and Jason Foxworthy were present when Officer
Keliipaakaua arrived at the scene. A motorcycle was lying in the
gravel shoulder on the northbound side of Highway 11. Brown was
also lying on the gravel shoulder, dead.
A black Cadillac sedan was found on Highway 11 about a
half mile north of the motorcycle and Brown. There was evidence
on the roadway, including a black tire mark and debris trail,
2
Amended charges were later filed to correct a typographical error.
3
The statement of the points of error in Paulich's opening brief
does not comply with Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b)(4)(C).
We cannot discern, from Paulich's arguments, that she challenges any of the
findings of fact contained in either of the circuit court's orders.
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leading to the Cadillac from where the motorcycle and Brown were
found.
The Cadillac was parked at an angle on a grass
embankment, perpendicular to the roadway. The back end was
partially blocking the north-bound lane. The motor was running,
the lights were on, all four doors were closed, and three of the
doors were locked. There was substantial damage to the front
bumper and passenger area. No one was present in the area.
Officer Keliipaakaua looked inside the Cadillac. There
was no one inside, but Officer Keliipaakaua saw a purse, clothes,
and empty beverage containers. He ran the license plate number
and learned that Paulich was a registered co-owner of the
Cadillac.
Officer Keliipaakaua entered the Cadillac because it
was blocking the roadway and was a traffic hazard, and also to
identify who the driver could have been. Inside the purse was a
zippered wallet. Officer Keliipaakaua opened the wallet and
found a Hawai#i identification card bearing Paulich's name. The
contents of the wallet and purse were returned to the Cadillac
and the vehicle was secured as evidence, which was standard HCPD
practice for motor vehicle collisions involving death. Officer
Keliipaakaua later obtained warrants to search the Cadillac and
the wallet.
After a jury trial, Paulich was found guilty of an
included offense, Negligent Homicide in the Second Degree, and of
the charged offense Accidents Involving Death or Serious Bodily
Injury. The Judgment was entered on July 28, 2021. This appeal
followed.
Paulich contends that the circuit court erred by
failing to suppress evidence obtained during the warrantless
search of her car and wallet, failing to suppress the statements
she made to HCPD officers at her residence on the night of the
collision, and failing to suppress statements she made at the
HCPD Kona station on March 14, 2019, after she was arrested. She
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also contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury's verdict.
1. The circuit court denied Paulich's motion to
suppress evidence obtained during the warrantless searches of her
car and wallet. Paulich does not specify what evidence recovered
from her car or wallet was improperly admitted at trial. Her
brief mentions "empty containers for alcoholic beverages"4 and
her state identification card,5 but provides no citations to the
record as required by Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP)
Rule 28(b)(4)(A) and (C). However, we discern from her brief
that she appears to challenge the circuit court's conclusions of
law (COL) nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. See Marvin v. Pflueger, 127
Hawai#i 490, 496, 280 P.3d 88, 94 (2012) (stating that
"noncompliance with Rule 28 does not always result in dismissal
of the claims, and this court has consistently adhered to the
policy of affording litigants the opportunity to have their cases
heard on the merits, where possible. This is particularly so
where the remaining sections of the brief provide the necessary
information to identify the party's argument.") (cleaned up).
The circuit court's conclusions of law in a pretrial
ruling in a criminal case are reviewed under the "right/wrong"
standard. State v. Alvarez, 138 Hawai#i 173, 181, 378 P.3d 889,
897 (2016).
The circuit court concluded:
2. Hawaii has adopted the two-part test that Justice
Harlan articulated in his concurring opinion in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 5764
The record does not indicate that empty containers of alcoholic
beverages were offered or admitted into evidence. We note that the containers
were in plain view — Officer Keliipaakaua testified that he saw the containers
when he looked into the Cadillac before entering the vehicle.
5
The record does not indicate that Paulich's ID card was offered or
admitted into evidence. We note that Officer Keliipaakaua obtained Paulich's
name by checking her car's license plate, which was in plain view, and that
Officer Parayano knew where Paulich lived. Accordingly, the information
obtained by the police officers at Paulich's residence later that evening
(including observations of her injuries and signs of intoxication) was not the
fruit of the warrantless search of Paulich's car or her wallet.
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(1967), to determine whether an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. [State v. ]Bonnell, 75 Haw. 124,
139, 856 P.2d 1265, 1273-74. Under this test: "First, one
must exhibit an actual, subjective expectation of privacy.
Second, that expectation must be one that society would
recognize as objectively reasonable." Id., [75 Haw. at
139,] 856 P.2d at 1274 (quoting State v. Biggar, 68 Haw.
404, 407, 716 P.2d 493, 495 (1986)).
COL no. 2 was right.
The circuit court concluded:
3. [Paulich]'s actions demonstrated that she did not have
the subjective intent to avoid in [sic] public gaze, in that
she left her vehicle running, partially blocking the
highway, with one of the doors unlocked after it had been
involved in a traffic collision involving a fatality. State
v. Quiday, 141 Hawai#i 116, 122, 405 P.3d 552, 558, 2017 WL
5591790 (2017).
COL no. 3 was actually a mixed finding of fact and
conclusion of law.6 A mixed finding of fact and conclusion of
law is reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard because
the determination is dependent on the facts and circumstances of
each individual case. Est. of Klink ex rel. Klink v. State, 113
Hawai#i 332, 351, 152 P.3d 504, 523 (2007). A conclusion of law
that is supported by the trial court's findings of fact and
reflects an application of the correct rule of law will not be
overturned. Id.In State v. Quiday, 141 Hawai#i 116, 405 P.3d 552(2017), the supreme court held that the defendant's placement of
marijuana plants in his fenced backyard, the activities in which
were not capable of observation by members of the public at
ground-level, was "indicative of his subjective intent to avoid
the public gaze[.]" Id. at 122, 405 P.3d at 558 (original
brackets omitted). Cf. State v. Mahone, 67 Haw. 644, 648, 701
6
The label of a finding of fact or a conclusion of law does not
determine the standard of review. City & Cnty. of Honolulu v. Honolulu Police
Comm'n, 151 Hawai#i 56, 62, 508 P.3d 851, 857 (App. 2022) (citing Crosby v.
State Dep't of Budget & Fin., 76 Hawai#i 332, 340, 876 P.2d 1300, 1308
(1994)). The question whether a circuit court's determination is a finding of
fact or a conclusion of law is a question of law, freely reviewable by an
appellate court. See Kilauea Neighborhood Ass'n v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 Haw.
App. 227, 229, 751 P.2d 1031, 1034 (1988) (citation omitted).
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P.2d 171, 174-75 (1985) ("The right to claim the protection of
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article
I, Section 7 of the [Hawai#i] Constitution depends upon whether
the area searched was one in which there was a reasonable
expectation of freedom from government intrusion. One has no
standing to complain of a search of property he has voluntarily
abandoned.") (citations omitted). COL no. 3 is supported by
substantial evidence in the record and reflects an application of
the correct rule of law; it was not clearly erroneous.
The circuit court concluded:
4. Even if [Paulich] had a subjective expectation of
privacy, it is not an expectation that society would
recognize as reasonable as [Paulich]'s property was left
unattended on the side of the road and was clearly
associated with a vehicle that had been involved in a fatal
car crash and was partially blocking lanes of travel. State
v. Kolia, 116 Hawai#i 29, 34, 169 P.3d 981, 986 (Ct. App.
2007).
In State v. Kolia, 116 Hawai#i 29, 169 P.3d 981 (App.
2007), we held that the defendant "relinquished any expectation
of privacy that he had in the fanny pack when he voluntarily
discarded it while fleeing from the police." Id. at 31, 169 P.3d
at 983; see also Mahone, 67 Haw. at 648, 701 P.2d at 174-75. COL
no. 4, a mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law, is
supported by substantial evidence in the record and reflects an
application of the correct rule of law; it was not clearly
erroneous.
The circuit court concluded:
5. Further, even if the two part test in Katz is
satisfied, the police officers on scene were investigating a
fatal vehicle crash in which the operator of the vehicle had
fled the scene, to the extent a search was conducted the
investigating officers were faced with exigent circumstances
that required immediate police action to try and forestall
the likely escape of a suspect who had already distanced
themselves from the scene of the crime. State v. Dorson, 62
Haw. 377, 384-85, 615 P.2d 740, 746 (1980).
In State v. Dorson, 62 Haw. 377, 615 P.2d 740 (1980),
the supreme court held:
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An exigency, for the purposes of a warrantless search
or seizure, exists when immediate police action is required
to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to
property, or to forestall the likely escape of a suspect or
the threatened removal or destruction of evidence. To
justify a warrantless search or seizure, the government must
be able to show that it was impracticable for the police to
obtain a warrant, or that the delay attendant upon the
application for, and the issuance of, the warrant would have
likely resulted in the removal or destruction of evidence.
Id. at 384–85, 615 P.2d at 746 (citations omitted).
In this case there was no exigency because the Cadillac
was disabled7 and abandoned, had been impounded, and the driver
had already fled the scene. COL no. 5, a mixed finding of fact
and conclusion of law, was clearly erroneous. The error does
not, however, require that the Judgment be vacated, for the other
reasons explained in this summary disposition order.
The circuit court concluded:
6. Finally, even if the two part test in Katz is
satisfied and there was not exigent circumstances justifying
the warrantless search, the discovery was inevitable as the
investigating officers seized all of the evidence at the
scene and later applied for search warrants to search and
inventory the contents of the sedan which was the subject of
the complained of warrantless search. Clear and convincing
evidence was put forth that in fatal collisions the vehicles
are seized by police as evidence for later investigation,
which occurred in this case. State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889(Haw. 1995).
In State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai#i 433, 896 P.2d 889 (1995),
the supreme court adopted the federal concept of inevitable
discovery, stating that "the inevitable discovery exception to
the exclusionary rule is a sound principle, which prevents the
setting aside of convictions that would have been obtained in the
absence of police misconduct." Id. at 451, 896 P.2d at 907. The
State must, however, "present clear and convincing evidence that
any evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 7 [of
7
Officer Keliipaakaua testified that the front passenger side of
the Cadillac, including the wheel rim and tire, was heavily damaged. The tire
was flat with the metal part of the rim protruding from the tire, touching the
ground. Officer Keliipaakaua also testified that he saw white markings on the
asphalt roadway, which appeared to have been caused by something grinding on
the asphalt.
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the Hawai#i Constitution], would inevitably have been discovered
by lawful means before such evidence may be admitted under the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule." Id.(footnote omitted). The circuit court found that warrants to
enter and recover evidence from the Cadillac and Paulich's wallet
were subsequently issued. The warrants were admitted into
evidence. Paulich does not challenge those findings, or the
issuance of the search warrants.
COL no. 6, a mixed finding of fact and conclusion of
law, is supported by substantial evidence in the record and
reflects an application of the correct rule of law; it was not
clearly erroneous.
The circuit court concluded:
7. To the extent any complained of search violated
[Paulich]'s rights to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure, the search did not result in any 'fruit' which
would require suppression as [Paulich]'s identity as a
possible operator was already known from the investigating
officers conducting a registered owner check of the vehicle
which was accomplished without entering the vehicle.
COL no. 7, a mixed finding of fact and conclusion of
law, is supported by substantial evidence in the record and
reflects an application of the correct rule of law; it was not
clearly erroneous.
We conclude that the circuit court did not err by
denying Paulich's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the
warrantless searches of her car and wallet. In addition, Paulich
has not shown that any evidence obtained as a result of the
warrantless searches of her car and wallet was admitted at trial.
2. The circuit court denied Paulich's motion to
suppress the statements she made to HCPD officers at her
residence on the night of the collision. She argues that Officer
Keliipaakaua obtained her residence address from her state
identification card, which he found after a warrantless search of
her purse. However, the circuit court found, and Paulich does
not challenge, that after the license plate check identified
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Paulich as a registered owner of the Cadillac, Officer Parayano
told Officer Keliipaakaua he knew where Paulich lived from
previous contacts with her. Officer Keliipaakaua and Officers
Parayano and Foxworthy went to Paulich's residence at about
11:50 p.m., three to four hours after the initial report of the
collision.
The police officers knocked on Paulich's door. Paulich
appeared. Officer Keliipaakaua identified himself and the other
officers, and asked Paulich to come outside so they could speak
with her. Paulich said she did not want to go outside, but
invited the officers to enter her residence. All three officers
entered Paulich's residence. Paulich testified that she did not
believe she was going to be arrested on July 16, 2018, she did
not feel threatened, she spoke to the police officers freely, and
she just wanted to know why the officers were there and to answer
their questions. She never asked the officers to leave her
residence.
At trial, Officer Keliipaakaua testified:
Q. (By [the State]) And did you have a conversation
with [Paulich] that night?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ask her what kind of vehicle she owns?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did she say?
A. She said that she -- she owns a Cadillac sedan.
. . . .
Q. Did you ask her where her vehicle was?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did she say?
A. She said that it was in the garage of her, uh,
garage of her residence.
Q. And when you walked up to the residence could you
see the garage?
A. Yes. It was a open carport.
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Q. Okay. And you could see directly into that?
A. Yes.
Q. And was there a vehicle in the carport?
A. No, it was empty.
Q. While you were talking with [Paulich] did you ask
her if she had gone anywhere that day?
A. Yes.
Q. What did she say?
A. She said she had gone to the store earlier.
Q. Did she refer to what store she went to or what,
um, the area the store was located?
A. Yes.
Q. Where -- what -- what was the general area that she
said she went to?
A. Uh, general area of Ocean View.
Q. Okay. And did she indicate whether or not anyone
else drives her vehicle?
A. She said she was the only driver.
Paulich argues that Officer Keliipaakaua's testimony
about what Paulich said to him the night of July 16, 2018, should
have been suppressed because she was not advised of her Miranda
rights. The circuit court concluded:
2. [Paulich] was not in custody on July 16, 2018 at the
time the statements were made to Officers present at her
residence, she invited officers into her home and was not
placed under arrest as police did not have probable cause to
arrest her at the time as they did not feel they had enough
information relating to the identity of the driver of the
sedan, her freedom had not been deprived, and therefore the
requirements of Miranda do not apply to the statements made
by [Paulich]; these statements may be used by the State upon
establishing proper foundation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed.2d 694(1966)[.]
COL no. 2, a mixed finding of fact and conclusion of
law, is supported by substantial evidence in the record and
reflects an application of the correct rule of law; it was not
clearly erroneous.
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3. The circuit court denied Paulich's motion to
suppress the statements she made to HCPD officers at the Kona
station on March 14, 2019. Paulich does not contest that she
understood and initialed an advice-of-rights form, admitted into
evidence as State's exhibit 1. However, she argues that her
consent was coerced by a deliberate extrinsic falsehood: because
the police officers did not tell her "that a main factor is
whether the accident occurred due to intoxication,[8] [she] was
deprived of making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver
of her rights under [Miranda]." She does not cite to evidence in
the record to support her argument,9 as required by HRAP
Rule 28(b)(7). Although we are not obliged to "sift through the
voluminous record to verify an appellant's inadequately
documented contentions[,]" Lanai Co. v. Land Use Comm'n, 105
Hawai#i 296, 309 n.31, 97 P.3d 372, 385 n.31 (2004), we address
her argument because the circuit court found, and the State does
not dispute:
61. Officers did not inform [Paulich] that being under the
influence of drugs or alcohol was an element of the offences
[sic] she was being investigated for.
In State v. Matsumoto, 145 Hawai#i 313, 452 P.3d 310(2019), the supreme court noted that "a deliberate falsehood will
be regarded as coercive per se if the falsehood is extrinsic to
the facts of the alleged offense and is of a type reasonably
likely to procure an untrue statement or to influence an accused
to make a confession regardless of guilt." Id. at 325, 452 P.3d
8HRS § 707-702.5 (2014) provides, in relevant part:
(1) A person commits the offense of negligent homicide in
the first degree if that person causes the death of:
(a) Another person by the operation of a vehicle in
a negligent manner while under the influence of drugs
or alcohol[.]
9
Paulich cites only to her proposed findings of fact, which contain
no citations to the trial court record and are not themselves evidence.
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at 322 (citing State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 511, 849 P.2d 58,
73 (1993)).
In Kelekolio, the supreme court adopted the rule that
"deliberate falsehoods extrinsic to the facts of the alleged
offense, which are of a type reasonably likely to procure an
untrue statement or to influence an accused to make a confession
regardless of guilt, will be regarded as coercive per se[.]" Id.
at 511, 849 P.2d at 73. The court explained:
Some examples of extrinsic falsehoods — of a type reasonably
likely to procure an untrue statement or to influence an
accused to make a confession regardless of guilt — would
include (1) assurances of divine salvation upon confession,
(2) promises of mental health treatment in exchange for a
confession, (3) assurances of treatment in a "nice hospital"
(in which the defendant could have his personal belongings
and be visited by his girlfriend) in lieu of incarceration,
in exchange for a confession, (4) promises of more favorable
treatment in the event of a confession,
(5) misrepresentations of legal principles, such as
(a) suggesting that the defendant would have the burden of
convincing a judge and jury at trial that he was "perfectly
innocent" and had nothing to do with the offense,
(b) misrepresenting the consequences of a "habitual
offender" conviction, and (c) holding out that the
defendant's confession cannot be used against him at trial,
and (6) misrepresentations by an interrogating police
officer, who is a close friend of the defendant, that the
defendant's failure to confess will get the officer into
trouble with his superiors and jeopardize the well-being of
the officer's pregnant wife and children[.]
Id. at 512–13, 849 P.2d at 73–74 (citations omitted).
An investigating law enforcement officer's failure to
tell a suspect the elements of any criminal offense of which the
suspect may be charged is "extrinsic to facts of the alleged
offense in question[.]" Kelekolio, 74 Haw. at 511, 849 P.2d at
73. Paulich fails to explain how the police officers' failure to
tell her that intoxication is an element of negligent homicide in
the first degree was "reasonably likely to induce an untrue
statement or to influence [her] to make a confession regardless
of guilt." Matsumoto, 145 Hawai#i at 326, 452 P.3d at 323.
Paulich did not confess to driving while intoxicated, nor was
evidence of any such confession introduced at trial. Paulich was
ultimately found guilty of Negligent Homicide in the Second
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Degree, an offense of which intoxication is not an element. See
discussion below in section 4.
In Matsumoto the defendant "confessed to a crime after
an interrogating officer informed him, untruthfully, that he did
not pass a polygraph test." Id. at 316, 452 P.3d at 313. After
a comprehensive analysis of the extensive literature and research
establishing "the coercive nature of falsified polygraph test
results[,]" the supreme court held that "inculpatory statements
elicited during a custodial interrogation from a suspect whom has
previously been given falsified polygraph results in the
interrogation process are coercive per se and are inadmissible at
trial." Id. at 326-27, 452 P.3d at 323-24 (citing Kelekolio, 74
Haw. at 511, 849 P.2d at 73). Paulich cites no legal or other
authority for the proposition that a law enforcement officer is
required to recite all of the elements of an offense to a
suspect, or that the officer's failure to do so is coercive per
se. We conclude that the officers' omission under the
circumstances of this case was not coercive per se.
Paulich also argues that "[p]olice further
misrepresented the law by mischaracterizing the length of an
arrest before the probable cause determination created by the
Riverside case." She cited County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991), a class action challenging the manner in
which a California county provided "probable cause determinations
to persons arrested without a warrant." Id. at 47 (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court stated: "a jurisdiction that provides
judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of
arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness
requirement of Gerstein[ v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) and] . . .
be immune from systemic challenges." Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
The Court then stated that "in a particular case[,]" a probable
cause determination could be challenged "if the arrested
individual can prove that his or her probable cause determination
was delayed unreasonably." Id.
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Riverside is inapposite. Here, the determination that
there was probable cause to arrest Paulich was made before she
was arrested. The circuit court found, and Paulich does not
dispute:
57. Before [Paulich]'s arrest [the] officer made telephone
calls attempting to locate Paulich.
58. As a result of the telephone calls made, [o]n March
13, 2019, Paulich learned there was a warrant out for her
arrest.
59. Paulich testified that she was unable to sleep after
learning there was a warrant out for her arrest.
Paulich was arrested pursuant to a warrant. Riverside does not
apply.
4. Paulich contends there was insufficient evidence
to support the jury's verdict. When reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence on appeal, we apply the following deferential standard
of review:
[E]vidence adduced in the trial court must be
considered in the strongest light for the prosecution
when the appellate court passes on the legal
sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction;
the same standard applies whether the case was before
a judge or jury. The test on appeal is not whether
guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but
whether there was substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the trier of fact.
State v. Kalaola, 124 Hawai#i 43, 49, 237 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2010)
(citation omitted). "'Substantial evidence' as to every material
element of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of
sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of
reasonable caution to support a conclusion." Id.Paulich was found guilty of the included offense of
Negligent Homicide in the Second Degree. HRS § 707-703 (2014)
provides, in relevant part:
(1) A person commits the offense of negligent homicide in
the second degree if that person causes the death of:
(a) Another person by the operation of a vehicle in
a negligent manner[.]
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The evidence presented at trial, including testimony
from eyewitness Charles Brown, Officer Keliipaakaua, and Paulich
herself, considered in the light most favorable to the State,
supported the jury's verdict.
Paulich was also found guilty of Accidents Involving
Death or Serious Bodily Injury. HRS § 291C-12 (1993) provides,
in relevant part:
(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in serious bodily injury to or death of any person
shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the
accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then
forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the
scene of the accident until the driver has fulfilled the
requirements of section 291C–14. Every such stop shall be
made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.
The evidence presented at trial, considered in the
light most favorable to the State, supported the jury's verdict.
For the foregoing reasons, the "Judgment of Conviction
and Sentence" entered by the circuit court on July 28, 2021, is
affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, February 21, 2023.
On the briefs:
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Eli N. Bowman, Presiding Judge
for Defendant-Appellant.
/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Stephen L. Frye, Associate Judge
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
County of Hawai#i, /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
for Plaintiff-Appellee. Associate Judge
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