State v. Beck

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
31-OCT-2022
08:02 AM
Dkt. 54 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I
STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
QUINCY K. BECK, Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
HANA DIVISION
(CASE NO. 2DCW-XX-XXXXXXX)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Quincy K. Beck (Beck) appeals from
the District Court of the Second Circuit's 1 July 2, 2021
Judgment; Notice of Entry (Judgment) convicting Beck of Criminal
Trespass in the Second Degree, in violation of Hawaii Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 708-814(1)(b) (Supp. 2019). On appeal, Beck
raises two points of error, challenging the sufficiency of the
charge and sufficiency of the evidence.
1 The Honorable Douglas J. Sameshima presided.
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Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the issues raised and the arguments advanced, we resolve the
points of error as discussed below.
(1) In the first point of error, Beck contends that
the State "failed to provide [him] with adequate notice of the
elements and essential facts of the offense of Criminal Trespass
[i]n [t]he Second Degree because the Complaint and oral charge
failed to provide the meaning of 'reasonable warning or request'
as that phrase is expressly defined by HRS § 708-814(1)(b)."
Beck argues that the charge "did not specify that Beck must be
served, within the past year, with a written warning or request
to leave."
The State acknowledges that "[t]he lack of [a
statutory] definition rendered the charge fatally defective[.]"
See Territory v. Kogami, 37 Haw. 174, 175 (Haw. Terr. 1945)
(holding that, while a prosecutor's concession of error is
"entitled to great weight," before a conviction is reversed, "it
is incumbent upon the appellate court to ascertain first that
the confession of error is supported by the record and well-
founded in law and to determine that such error is properly
preserved and prejudicial").
"[A]n oral charge or complaint must sufficiently
allege all of the essential elements of the offense." State v.
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Sprattling, 99 Hawai‘i 312, 318, 55 P.3d 276, 282 (2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Jendrusch, 58 Haw.
279, 281, 567 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1977). In addition, "[a]
complaint . . . cannot reasonably be construed to charge an
offense if it omits an element of the offense or when the common
definition of an element of an offense set forth in the charge
does not comport with its statutory definition." State v.
Baker, 146 Hawai‘i 299, 308, 463 P.3d 956, 965 (2020) (citations
omitted). We review the sufficiency of a charge de novo. State
v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai‘i 383, 390, 219 P.3d 1170, 1177 (2009)
(citation omitted).
HRS § 708-814(1)(b) defines "reasonable warning or
request" as a "warning or request communicated in writing at any
time within a one-year period." This definition does not
comport with its common meaning because a reasonable person
would not assume that the warning requires a writing within a
one-year period. See State v. King, 139 Hawai‘i 249, 254, 386
P.3d 886, 891 (2016) (explaining that "[a] 'reasonable warning
or request' is then given a specialized meaning that applies
only '[f]or the purposes of this paragraph'" (some brackets in
original)).
Thus, the failure to provide the statutory definition
of reasonable warning or request in the complaint and oral
charge "amounted to an omission of an entire element of the
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offense." See State v. Kauhane, 145 Hawai‘i 362, 373, 452 P.3d
359, 370 (2019) (holding that the State's failure to include the
statutory definition of "obstructs" in its charge, as defined by
HRS § 711-1100 (2014), rendered the charge insufficient because
the statutory definition does not comport with its common
definition); State v. Cavness, 80 Hawai‘i 460, 464, 911 P.2d 95,
99 (App. 1996) (explaining that "reasonable warning or request"
is an element of Criminal Trespass in the Second Degree).
(2) In his second point of error, Beck contends
"[t]he district court reversibly erred by finding that the State
presented sufficient evidence to prove Beck trespassed on
'commercial premises.'" Beck argues that "[t]here is no
evidence, let alone substantial evidence, the Church received
money from the food truck operators or their customers."
[E]vidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in
the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate
court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to
support a conviction . . . . The test on appeal is not
whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but
whether there was substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the trier of fact.
State v. Kalaola, 124 Hawai‘i 43, 49, 237 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2010)
(citations omitted and emphasis added). In Cavness, the court
defined "'commercial property' as '[i]ncome producing property
(e.g., office buildings, apartments, etc.) as opposed to
'residential property.'" 80 Hawai‘i at 466, 911 P.2d at 101
(citation omitted).
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Here, the State's witness testified that the food
trucks that reside on church property actively collect money and
pay rent, providing supplemental income for the church. Viewing
this testimony in the light most favorable to the State,
substantial evidence existed to support the conclusion that the
food truck lot was an income producing property and, thus, a
"commercial premises." See Kalaola, 124 Hawai‘i at 49, 237 P.3d
at 1115. Therefore, sufficient evidence existed as to the
commercial premises element.
For the above reasons, we vacate the district court's
July 2, 2021 Judgment, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this summary disposition order.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, October 31, 2022
On the briefs: /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
Chief Judge
Henry P. Ting,
Deputy Public Defender, /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
for Defendant-Appellant. Associate Judge
Gerald K. Enriques, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge
County of Maui,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
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